

**LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT
LEGAL AFFAIRS DIVISION – DISCOVERY SECTION**

INVOICE FOR

**PUBLIC
RECORDS**

**BOR ADMINISTRATIVE
RECORD**

Requested By: Glenn Katon **Date:** January 17, 2014

Officer/Serial No.: Not Applicable **Box File No.:** Not Applicable

CPRA Reference No.: C13-1200040 **Analyst:** Caydene Monk

Documents to be Provided		
Description of Documents	Pages/CD	Fee
Statement of Michael Downing Commanding Officer	8	.80
Letter from the ACLU to Commander Downing	2	.20
Muslim Community Engagement Initiative November 2007	4	.40
ACLU's article titled: Racial Profiling (2007)	5	.50
Documents from LAPD's Planning, Research and Development	7	.70
Documents from LAPD's Training Division	21	\$2.10
Documents from 2007 to 2010	13	\$1.30
Documents from 2011	98	\$9.80
Documents form 2012	118	\$11.80
Documents from 2013	88	\$8.80
Total cost of reproducing documents		\$36.40

Note: Please include reference number C13-1200040 on your check/money order.

The documents will be mailed to you once the payment is received. Make your check/money order payable to the LAPD.

Mailing Address: LAPD – Discovery Section, 201 N. Los Angeles St., Space 301, Los Angeles, CA 90012

If you have any questions, please contact Management Analyst Caydene Monk at (213) 978-2136.

**LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT
LEGAL AFFAIRS DIVISION – DISCOVERY SECTION**

INVOICE FOR

PUBLIC RECORDS

BOR ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD

Requested By: Christopher Craig, Esq. **Date:** July 1, 2014

Officer/Serial No.: Not applicable **Box File No.:** Not applicable

CPRA Reference No.: C14-0400026 **Analyst:** Caydene Monk

Documents Provided	Pages	Fee*
CD containing: Personnel assigned to Metropolitan Division, Major Crimes Division and Deputy Chief Michael Downing's office within CTSOB, from the period beginning 2001 to present.		\$5.00
Copies of Documents related to the search for records @ 10 cents a page		\$4.10
TOTAL		\$9.10

* Govt Code Section 6253(b)
Govt Code Section 6253.9(b)
Admin Code, Div 12, Chapter 2, Art 4
Admin Code, Div 22, Chapter 11, Art 8

Make your check/money order payable to the LAPD. If you wish, you may obtain the documents at our public counter. Please ask to speak with the assigned analyst. Please note that only checks or money orders are accepted at the counter.

Pick-up Hours: 8:00 a.m. – 4:30 p.m.
Monday – Friday
excluding holidays

Location: LAPD – Discovery Section
201 N. Los Angeles St., Space 301
Los Angeles, CA 90012

Note: Please include “CPRA-DL” and the CPRA reference number on your check/money order. If you have any questions, please contact Management Analyst Caydene Monk at (213) 978-2155.

CHAND SYED - Fwd: A request from a Counter/HVE specialist from NCTC

From: JAMES BUCK
To: SYED, CHAND; [REDACTED]
Date: 8/9/2012 2:30 PM
Subject: Fwd: A request from a Counter/HVE specialist from NCTC
CC: Eleina Thomas; SEGUIN, MICHAEL

Chand, take a look at the below e-mail and see if any of it is relevant for your Minnesota trip.

Jim

>>> "Anderson, Ashley" <Ashley.Anderson@HQ.DHS.GOV> 8/9/2012 10:36 AM >>>
Jim -

It was good catching up with you and your colleagues at the JCTAWS event. See below as I have some further information for you regarding the NCTC Initiative on Countering Violent Extremism that I briefly mentioned. Can you please socialize this with your unit and leadership and send me a POC that I can provide to my HQs and to Dr. Carrilio for planning purposes? And if you are aware of other grassroots LE efforts along these lines (LA City, LASD, etc), that would be good for Dr. Carrilio to learn about, can you send me those POCs as well?

Some of the key takeaways on the project are highlighted below, but pls let me know if you have any add'l questions.

Thank you,
Ashley

Ashley Anderson
Intelligence Officer - Los Angeles
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
At the Joint Regional Intelligence Center
[REDACTED]

STE (562) 807-2190

ashley.anderson@hq.dhs.gov

HSDN: ashley.a.anderson@dhs.sgov.gov

FBInet: aanderson@fbi.sgov.gov

This communication is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed and may contain information which is privileged, confidential, proprietary, or exempt from disclosure under applicable law. If you are not the intended recipient or the person responsible for delivering the message to the intended recipient, you are strictly prohibited from disclosing, distributing, copying, or in any way using this message. If you have received this communication in error, please notify the sender and destroy and delete any copies you may have received.

From: Nill, Robert
Sent: Thursday, August 09, 2012 7:17 AM
To: Keller, Fernando H; Anderson, Ashley; Skonovd, Matthew; SLPO Review

Subject: Fernando and Ashley: A request from a Counter/HVE specialist from NCTC

Matt, Ashley and Fernando: See below and please email me with any questions related to this NCTC HVE initiative.

NCTC is working on a CVE toolkit for state and local communities and Los Angeles and San Diego have been identified as areas of interest within this arena. On behalf of DHS, I have been meeting with Dr. Carrilio and providing a State/local perspective and guidance on the toolkit project mentioned below. This is a good opportunity for San Diego and Los Angeles to contribute to this CVE project that will showcase several of the State and local best practice, highlighting their knowledge and their experience in this area, and help other communities counter violent extremism. See below for a summary section of the particulars of the program. Regarding exchanges and possible meeting dates, Terry is expecting to be in San Diego for two days in late September: 27th/28th, then in Los Angeles Monday Oct 1st, and is interested in arranging to meet any State/local community or law enforcement officers that you believe will be valuable for her to speak with.

[REDACTED]

This project is a way for local departments and communities to draw attention to the hard work and commitment that have gone into developing these community outreach and inclusion programs. I'm hoping you can give me a few names and contacts for Dr. Carrilio so that she can begin working with you on a visit to your community.

Thanks in Advance,
Robert Nill

GREG TOYAMA - Re: Email search capabilities

From: LESHON FRIERSON
To: TOYAMA, GREG
Date: 4/17/2015 1:10 PM
Subject: Re: Email search capabilities

What is your call back number?

Leshon Frierson, SSA 1
Information Technology Division, LAPD
(213) 486-0330
frierson@lapd.lacity.org

>>> GREG TOYAMA 4/16/2015 3:56 PM >>>

Leshon - Discovery is working with CA Julie Raffish to draft a response addressing the Dept's email search capabilities and we need to have a clear understanding of the time parameters so we can accurately reflect it in our letter. We received a request on December 12, 2013, so how far back could a search have gone if one had been conducted at that time? Similarly, if a request was received today, how far back could a search go? We will be finalizing our reply tomorrow so if you can let me know as soon as possible it would be greatly appreciated. If this question should be answered by someone else please forward it to them and let me know who it is.

Thanks

Greg

GREG TOYAMA - Re: Email search capabilities

From: LESHON FRIERSON
To: TOYAMA, GREG
Date: 4/17/2015 1:44 PM
Subject: Re: Email search capabilities

Greg,

The Department instituted an email archiving system in March of 2013. We are capable of retrieving mail from that time forward without issue.

To retrieve email from prior to March, 2013, the process involves restoring data from tape backups of servers that were originally intended only for disaster recovery purposes. The backup tapes contain the mailboxes at the date and time of the back up and are not complete records of all email sent or received. Once the data is restored it must be decrypted in order for the mail to be readable. This is a manual process that is extremely time consuming and there is no guarantee that a tape, which has been sitting for years, is still readable. We make every attempt to fully comply with all requests. However, the further back we go the less likely we will be able to extract the data. Anything older than 2008 is very doubtful due to changes in backup hardware and software over that time.

Leshon

Leshon Frierson, SSA 1
Information Technology Division, LAPD
[\(213\) 486-0330](tel:(213)486-0330)
frierson@lapd.lacity.org

>>> GREG TOYAMA 4/16/2015 3:56 PM >>>

Leshon - Discovery is working with CA Julie Raffish to draft a response addressing the Dept's email search capabilities and we need to have a clear understanding of the time parameters so we can accurately reflect it in our letter. We received a request on December 12, 2013, so how far back could a search have gone if one had been conducted at that time? Similarly, if a request was received today, how far back could a search go? We will be finalizing our reply tomorrow so if you can let me know as soon as possible it would be greatly appreciated. If this question should be answered by someone else please forward it to them and let me know who it is.

Thanks

Greg

Subject: Countering Violent Extremism
From: MICHAEL DOWNING
Date: Fri, 25 Mar 2011 12:01:00
To: "" <bill.bratton@allegriyrisk.com>

Hello Chief

Per our conversation I have attached several document which may be of help on your panel. The testimony I gave before Congress in 2007 is pretty much on target (just leave out the MAPPING section :)

If you have any questions or need clarification I'm always on the cell phone.
Best to you and Rikki

Mike

Attachment: TEXT86.htm
Attachment: Michael DowningTestimonyfortheU.S.Senate-Final.doc
Attachment: COMMUNITY POLICING SUPPORT TO COUNTER TERRORISM.docx
Attachment: CVE Curriculum-CommunityPolicingTopicAreas-10December2010.pdf
Attachment: LAPD Counter Radicalization Strategy Paper.pdf
Attachment: Master Executive Summaries Document 3.31.10
Attachment: NCTC Community Oriented Policingoffers a Grassroots Framework for Counte

Subject: Re: NYU School of Law report on homegrown terrorist threat and law enforcement
From: MICHAEL DOWNING
Date: Thu, 19 May 2011 16:41:00
To: "" <usutliff@lafayettegroup.com>

Their loss:).

Michael P. Downing, Deputy Chief, Commanding Officer, Counter-Terrorism and
Special Operations Bureau, Los Angeles Police Department, (O) 213 486-8780.

(Fax) 213 486- Email

Michael.Downing@lapd.lacity.org

>>> Usha Sutliff <usutliff@lafayettegroup.com> 5/19/2011 4:27:59 PM >>>Mike:

I just want to make sure you caught the LAPD reference in the footnotes.

The Guidelines and DIOGs work together to authorize extensive surveillance,
information-gathering, and "geo-mapping" of Muslim communities, creating a
troubling law enforcement approach of targeting entire communities, rather than
policing individuals on the basis of particularized suspicion of criminal
activity.⁶⁸

⁶⁸ The Los Angeles Police Department's experiment with geo-mapping of Muslim
communities is most well-known. Richard Winton, Jean-Paul Renaud, and Paul
Pringle, LAPD To Build Data on Muslim Areas, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2007, at A1;
Richard Winton and Teresa Watanabe, LAPD's Muslim Mapping Plan Killed, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 15, 2007, at A1; see also Letter to Commander Michael P. Downing,
Counter-Terrorism/Criminal Intelligence Bureau, Los Angeles Police Department
from Ranjana Natarajan & Peter Bibring, Staff Attorneys, ACLU of Southern
California, Farhana Y. Khera, Muslim Advocates, Shakeel Syed, Islamic Shura
Council, and Hussam Ayloush, Council on American Islamic Relations (Nov. 8,
2007), available at http://www.aclu-sc.org/attach/m/muslim_mapping_letter.pdf
expressing "grave concerns" about the LAPD's community-mapping plans).

All the best,

Usha Sutliff
[REDACTED]

On May 19, 2011, at 12:12 PM, MICHAEL DOWNING wrote:

Thanks Usha. I read it. There is some truth to taking them places they never
dreamed of going however it could just as easily come from the other side -
hadi

Michael P. Downing, Deputy Chief, Commanding Officer, Counter-Terrorism and

Special Operations Bureau, Los Angeles Police Department, (O) 213 486-8780.

[REDACTED] (Fax) 213 486- Email Michael.Downing@lapd.lacity.org

>

> >>> Usha Sutliff <usutliff@lafayettegroup.com> 5/19/2011 12:04:35 PM >>>

> Mike and John:

>

> This report was mentioned in today's Los Angeles Times. With a title like "Targeted and Trapped," I think it's fair to say it has a certain slant. That said, I wanted to make you aware of its existence. Thanks.

>

> Excerpt from the L.A. Times story:

>

> <http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-muslim-report-20110519,0,6896387.story>

>

> U.S. government tactics in pursuing domestic terrorism cases target and entrap Muslim community members and fail to enhance public safety, according to a report released Wednesday by a human rights center at New York University's law school.

>

> The government's use of surveillance, paid informants and invented terrorism plots prompts human rights concerns, according to the report by NYU's Center for Human Rights and Global Justice. The authors examined three high-profile cases in New York and New Jersey that they said raised questions about the role of the FBI and New York Police Department in creating the perception of a homegrown terrorism threat.

>

>

> All the best,

>

> Usha Sutliff

> [REDACTED]

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Attachment: Text87.htm

Subject: Re: NYPD's covert "human mapping program" in Muslim neighborhoods
From: MICHAEL DOWNING
Date: Wed, 24 Aug 2011 13:00:00
To: "" <ushasutliff@advancedpolicing.com>

Rog I read it this morning. I knew it would happen one day. Dangerous
Michael P. Downing, Deputy Chief, Commanding Officer, Counter-Terrorism and
Special Operations Bureau, Los Angeles Police Department, (O) 213 486-8780.
[REDACTED] (Fax) 213 486- [REDACTED] Email
Michael.Downing@lapd.lacity.org

>>> Usha Sutliff <ushasutliff@advancedpolicing.com> 8/24/2011 12:58:50 PM
>>> Incredible.

http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5iiwl_LiP3l8NwLPoSruULZWhDPTg?docId=68e74ec21cb6481ebff3a063dc4ca2ba

"The department has dispatched teams of undercover officers, known as "rakers," into minority neighborhoods as part of a human mapping program, according to officials directly involved in the program. They've monitored daily life in bookstores, bars, cafes and nightclubs. Police have also used informants, known as "mosque crawlers," to monitor sermons, even when there's no evidence of wrongdoing. NYPD officials have scrutinized imams and gathered intelligence on cab drivers and food cart vendors, jobs often done by Muslims."

All the best,

Usha Sutliff
[REDACTED]

Attachment: Text105.htm

We can certainly talk about why LAPD decided to use it and the reasons why it was stopped (after uproar from communities?). And we want to know if this is legal.

I would love to hear from you. Please reply to this email or call me.

Thanks much.

Wilma B. Consul
NPR's Talk of the Nation
202.513.2315 w (if I don't pick up, please call my cell)

02.07.08.5.0

Attachment: Text146.htm

Subject: Re: Fw: NPR interview
From: MICHAEL DOWNING
Date: Wed, 07 Mar 2012 10:32:00
To: "ANDREW SMITH" <andrewj.smith@lapd.lacity.org>

Thanks Andy I declined
Michael P. Downing, Deputy Chief, Commanding Officer, Counter-Terrorism and
Special Operations Bureau, Los Angeles Police Department, (O) 213 486-8780.
[REDACTED] (Fax) 213 486- [REDACTED] Email
Michael.Downing@lapd.lacity.org

>>> ANDREW SMITH 3/7/2012 9:16:51 AM >>>Chiefs,

[REDACTED]

>>> MICHAEL DOWNING 3/7/2012 8:49 AM >>>

Mikw and Andy any thoughts ?
Michael P. Downing, Deputy Chief, Commanding Officer, Counter-Terrorism and
Special Operations Bureau, Los Angeles Police Department, (O) 213 486-8780.
[REDACTED] (Fax) 213 486- Email Michael.Downing@lapd.lacity.org

>>> Wilma Consul <WConsul@npr.org> 3/7/2012 8:44:10 AM >>>

Mr. Downing,

NPR's Talk of the Nation, a live national call-in news show based in
Washington, DC, is doing a show on the use of mapping within law enforcement.
It's for tomorrow, Thu, March 8th, 2:00 - 2:38 pm EST (11:00 - 11:38 am
Pacific).

We're looking for someone to just explain what is mapping, why and how it's
used - effective or not.

I wonder if you would be able to be a guest on our show. We know that the LAPD
tried this tool a few years ago, and now NYPD is using the tool, and there've
been lots of issues thrown about on this.

We can certainly talk about why LAPD decided to use it and the reasons why it
was stopped (after uproar from communities?). And we want to know if this is
legal.

"I would love to hear from you. Please reply to this email or call me.

Thanks much.

Wilma B. Consul
NPR's Talk of the Nation
202.513.2315 w (if I don't pick up, please call my cell)
202.607.8485 c

Attachment: Text148.htm

Subject: Re: NPR interview
From: MICHAEL DOWNING
Date: Wed, 07 Mar 2012 09:48:00
To: "" <WConsul@npr.org>

Wilma very sorry I am going to have to decline per the advice of our PIO. Mike Michael P. Downing, Deputy Chief, Commanding Officer, Counter-Terrorism and Special Operations Bureau, Los Angeles Police Department, (O) 213 486-8780.
[REDACTED] (Fax) 213 486- [REDACTED] Email
Michael.Downing@lapd.lacity.org

>>> Wilma Consul <WConsul@npr.org> 3/7/2012 9:15:02 AM >>> Phone would be okay.

But just need to ask a few...is this mapping really effective in fighting or preventing crime - in general? Are you still for it or now against it? Is it still being used in your department for other things? I know Oakland does mapping for crimes, too, but not "ethnic" mapping.

wilma

From: MICHAEL DOWNING [mailto:downingm@lapd.lacity.org]
Sent: Wednesday, March 07, 2012 11:59 AM
To: Wilma Consul
Subject: Re: NPR interview

Wilma I am in a three day training program however as long as I can do this by phone I am happy to accomodate. Mike Michael P. Downing, Deputy Chief, Commanding Officer, Counter-Terrorism and Special Operations Bureau, Los Angeles Police Department, (O) 213 486-8780.
[REDACTED] (Fax) 213 486- [REDACTED] Email Michael.Downing@lapd.lacity.org

>>> Wilma Consul <WConsul@npr.org> 3/7/2012 8:44:10 AM >>>
Mr. Downing,

NPR's Talk of the Nation, a live national call-in news show based in Washington, DC, is doing a show on the use of mapping within law enforcement. It's for tomorrow, Thu, March 8th, 2:00 - 2:38 pm EST (11:00 - 11:38 am Pacific).

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We can certainly talk about why LAPD decided to use it and the reasons why it was stopped (after uproar from communities?). And we want to know if this is legal.

I would love to hear from you. Please reply to this email or call me.

Thanks much.

Wilma B. Consul
NPR's Talk of the Nation
202.513.2315 w (if I don't pick up, please call my cell)
202.607.8485 c

Attachment: Text146.htm

Subject: Re: NPR interview
From: MICHEL MOORE
Date: Wed, 07 Mar 2012 08:56:00
To: "MICHAEL DOWNING" <michael.downing@lapd.lacity.org>

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Michael P. Downing, Deputy Chief, Commanding Officer, Counter-Terrorism and
Special Operations Bureau, Los Angeles Police Department, (O) 213 486-8780.
(Fax) 213 486- Email
Michael.Downing@lapd.lacity.org

>>> MICHEL MOORE 3/7/2012 8:52:18 AM >>>Michael

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Mike

>>> MICHAEL DOWNING 3/7/2012 8:49:18 AM >>>Mike and Andy any thoughts ?
Michael P. Downing, Deputy Chief, Commanding Officer, Counter-Terrorism and
Special Operations Bureau, Los Angeles Police Department, (O) 213 486-8780.
(Fax) 213 486- Email
Michael.Downing@lapd.lacity.org

>>> Wilma Consul <WConsul@npr.org> 3/7/2012 8:44:10 AM >>>Mr. Downing,

NPR's Talk of the Nation, a live national call-in news show based in
Washington, DC, is doing a show on the use of mapping within law enforcement.
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I would love to hear from you. Please reply to this email or call me.

Thanks much.

Wilma B. Consul
NPR's Talk of the Nation
202.513.2315 w (if I don't pick up, please call my cell)
202.607.8485 c

Attachment: Text436.htm

Subject: Re: important question
From: MICHAEL DOWNING <23692@lapd.lacity.org>
Date: Thu, 05 Mar 2015 14:37:00
To: "" <sgf1@columbia.edu>

Yes

Sent from my iPhone

> On Mar 5, 2015, at 2:29 PM, Samuel G. Freedman <sgf1@columbia.edu> wrote:

>

> Got it, thanks. So it was primarily your autonomy.

>

>> On Thursday, March 5, 2015, MICHAEL DOWNING <michael.downing@lapd.lacity.org> wrote:

>> The mapping outreach idea was mine. When we shelved that we went to grass roots outreach. I kept Bratton informed

>>

>> Sent from my iPhone

>>

>>> On Mar 5, 2015, at 2:20 PM, Samuel G. Freedman <sgf1@columbia.edu> wrote:

>>>

>>> Dear Chief Downing,

>>>

>>> My editor has a question he wanted me to run by you. To what extent was your Muslim outreach your own initiative and to what extent was it mandated or encouraged by Chief Bratton?

>>>

>>> If you can email me back later today or early tomorrow, that would be great.

>>>

>>> Thanks,

>>> Sam Freedman

>>>

>>>

>>> --

>>> Prof. Samuel G. Freedman

>>> Columbia Journalism School

>>> 2950 Broadway

>>> New York, NY 10027

>>> sgf1@columbia.edu

>>> 212-854-1829

>

>

> --

> Prof. Samuel G. Freedman

> Columbia Journalism School
> 2950 Broadway
> New York, NY 10027
> sgfl@columbia.edu
> 212-854-1829
>

Attachment: TEXT39.htm

Subject: Re: important question
From: "Samuel G. Freedman" <sgf1@columbia.edu>
Date: Thu, 05 Mar 2015 14:29:00
To: "MICHAEL DOWNING" <michael.downing@lapd.lacity.org>

Got it, thanks. So it was primarily your autonomy.

On Thursday, March 5, 2015, MICHAEL DOWNING <michael.downing@lapd.lacity.org> wrote:

> The mapping outreach idea was mine. When we shelved that we went to grass
> roots outreach. I kept Bratton informed

> Sent from my iPhone

> On Mar 5, 2015, at 2:20 PM, Samuel G. Freedman <sgf1@columbia.edu>
> <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','sgf1@columbia.edu');>> wrote:

> Dear Chief Downing,

> My editor has a question he wanted me to run by you. To what extent was
> your Muslim outreach your own initiative and to what extent was it mandated
> or encouraged by Chief Bratton?

> If you can email me back later today or early tomorrow, that would be
> great.

> Thanks,
> Sam Freedman

> Prof. Samuel G. Freedman
> Columbia Journalism School
> 2950 Broadway
> New York, NY 10027
> sgf1@columbia.edu <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','sgf1@columbia.edu');>
> 212-854-1829

Prof. Samuel G. Freedman
Columbia Journalism School
2950 Broadway
New York, NY 10027

sgf1@columbia.edu
212-854-1829

Attachment: TEXT30.htm
Attachment: Mime20.822

Subject: Fw: NPR interview
From: MICHAEL DOWNING
Date: Wed, 07 Mar 2012 08:49:00
To: "MICHEL MOORE" <michel.moore@lapd.lacity.org>
To: "ANDREW SMITH" <andrewj.smith@lapd.lacity.org>

Mike and Andy any thoughts on this? Mike
Michael P. Downing, Deputy Chief, Commanding Officer, Counter-Terrorism and
Special Operations Bureau, Los Angeles Police Department, (O) 213 486-8780.
(Fax) 213 486- Email
Michael.Downing@lapd.lacity.org

>>> Wilma Consul <WConsul@npr.org> 3/7/2012 8:44:10 AM >>>Mr. Downing,

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We can certainly talk about why LAPD decided to use it and the reasons why it
was stopped (after uproar from communities?). And we want to know if this is
legal.

I would love to hear from you. Please reply to this email or call me.

Thanks much.

Wilma B. Consul
NPR's Talk of the Nation
202.513.2315 w (if I don't pick up, please call my cell)
202.607.8485 c

Attachment: Text142.htm

Subject: Fwd: Re: Muslim Brotherhood
From: MICHAEL DOWNING
Date: Mon, 20 Jun 2011 16:43:00
To: "" <steven.gomez@ic.fbi.gov>

Steve

This is an fyi only. I sent it out as she is a member of a community police advisory board for LAPD.

Mike

Michael P. Downing, Deputy Chief
Commanding Officer
Counter-Terrorism and Special Operations Bureau
Los Angeles Police Department
Office (213) 486-8780
Cell [REDACTED]
Fax (213) 486-8775
Email michael.downing@lapd.lacity.org

Forwarded:

From: MICHAEL DOWNING
Subject: Re: Muslim Brotherhood
Date: Mon, 20 Jun 2011 15:42:00
cc: MARK STAINBROOK
cc:
To: Concerned
cc:
cc:

Attachment: TEXT95.htm
Attachment: TEXT96.htm
Attachment: Chief 6-15-11 Downing's Testimony Before US House of Rep Comm on HS2.pdf
Attachment: 10-30-07 Chief Downing's Testimony be US Senate Comm on HS & Governmer

COMMUNITY POLICING, COUNTERINSURGENCY, AND CONVERGING THREATS



Sign in Gretna, Louisiana showing support for the controversial actions of the police to block the bridge over the Mississippi River from being crossed by people from New Orleans trying to escape the flooding. Photo by Infrogation

"Where the law is subject to some other authority and has none of its own, the collapse of the state, in my view, is not far off; but if law is the master of the government and the government is its slave, then the situation is full of promise and men enjoy all the blessings that the Gods shower on a state."¹

— Plato

**By Anthony Abati, Michael P. Downing,
and John Zambri**

The twenty-first century presents law enforcement with a monumental challenge: to prevent increasingly violent, well-financed, and equipped criminal groups from perpetrating acts that threaten the functionality and security of democratic society. These globally connected, functionally interactive groups—hereafter referred to as convergent threats—include transnational terrorists, street gangs, drug cartels, ethnically aligned organized crime, and a host of domestic and foreign extremists.² The resulting criminal network conducts interactively complex, technologically adept activities that are influenced by dynamic socioeconomic and political factors around the world.

An examination of convergent threat methods and effects provides insight to improving the effectiveness of current community policing enterprises. Although different in organizational composition and motive, the individual threats employ

similar methods (e.g., drug trafficking, document fraud, surreptitious weapons trading, kidnapping, extortion, etcetera) to achieve their respective objectives.³ Furthermore, each threat's criminal activities reduce the security, stability, and resulting prosperity of associated societies, deliberately undermining the effectiveness, viability, and resulting legitimacy of governments. In total, such methods and effects are consistent with those of traditional insurgencies,⁴ leading us to posit that effective counterinsurgency (COIN) principles may prove useful in ongoing community policing efforts to disrupt, degrade, and ultimately defeat convergent threats.

COMMUNITY POLICING

Community policing concepts emerged in the 1820s with Sir Robert Peel's formulation of nine general principles defining basic ethical requirements for British police officers to follow while

In such communities, citizens view themselves and their contributing peers as essential catalysts to resolving public security challenges, improving their respective lives, and marginalizing miscreants, confident in the knowledge that "no person or institution is above the law—including government officials and local elites."

engaging with the populace, building shared trust and respect, and enforcing community laws. In conjunction with the Metropolitan Police Bill of 1829—legislation Home Secretary Peel composed in an effort to reform British criminal law—these principles guided the establishment and subsequent operations of the London Metropolitan Police Service (MPS).⁵ Based at London's Scotland Yard, the 1,000 MPS constables or "bobbies" were unpopular at first; however, they soon proved very successful in cutting

crime in London, prompting other United Kingdom cities to form similar police organizations.

In accordance with Peel's principles, MPS constables were physically immersed and mentally invested in their respective communities, employing recurrent personal interactions and physical presence to gain and maintain intimate, firsthand knowledge and understanding of the local populace's culture, expectations, priorities, and concerns. In so doing, the constables embodied Peel's fundamental belief that

the "police are the public and the public are the police," creating invaluable, two-way information gateways that formed the basis for identifying and rectifying local security problems, arresting criminals, and reducing the likelihood of future criminality.

Such enterprises require police officers to possess expertise in standard law enforcement functions,⁶ conflict resolution, and negotiation theory, as well as knowledge of neighborhood cultures and dynamics, applicable languages and customs, and other societal characteristics. Recurrent face-to-face interactions and personal relationships are the norm. Day-to-day police operations embrace neighborhood collaboration, emphasizing foot patrols and ride-along programs, organizational manning that attempts to reflect local demographics, and other activities that facilitate the sharing of security/policing responsibilities with individual citizens.

The sharing of security responsibilities is a fundamental aspect of community policing, linking interests and objectives across individuals, law enforcement personnel, and, ultimately, the community at large. In fact, the authority to police comes from the people, with policing success positively correlated to public approval. Underlying personal decisions to trust each other, to share and pool available resources (e.g., time, effort, intellectual energy, and physical assets) reflect mutually beneficial exchange opportunities where participants believe they are better off working together. The end result is a lawful community where the majority of people desire and act in accordance with the rule of law, trusting the police, reporting crimes, serving as witnesses, and relying on socially accepted practices and the justice system to protect individual property rights.

In such communities, citizens view

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themselves and their contributing peers as essential catalysts to resolving public security challenges, improving their respective lives, and marginalizing miscreants, confident in the knowledge that “no person or institution is above the law—including government officials and local elites.”⁷

PEEL'S NINE POLICING PRINCIPLES

- Police exist to prevent crime and disorder
- Ability to perform police duties depends upon public approval of police actions
- Secure the willing co-operation of the public in [observing] the law, [in order] to secure and maintain the respect of the public
- Public cooperation diminishes proportionately to the use of physical force
- [Develop] public favor not by catering to public opinion, but by constantly demonstrating impartial service to the law
- Use physical force to secure [law and order] only when persuasion, advice, and warning [are] insufficient
- Maintain relationships that [demonstrate ...] that the police are the public and the public are the police; the police being members of the public who are paid to [fulfill] duties which are incumbent upon every citizen
- Police should always direct their action strictly towards their functions, and never appear to usurp the powers of the judiciary
- The test of police efficiency is the absence of crime and disorder, not the visible evidence of police action in dealing with it

Like community policing, traditional insurgencies require the active involvement of the local populace to succeed; however, insurgencies strive to overthrow or force the change of governing authorities “through the organized use of subversion and violence.”⁸ Possessing a rich history that includes multiple protagonists, venues, and circumstances, traditional insurgencies have altered the perspectives and actions of governments, civilian populaces, and related entities across the globe since at least 207 BC, when a group of rebel peasants forced the last ruler of China’s Qin Dynasty to abdicate authority and surrender.⁹

Some traditional insurgencies have relied almost exclusively on violence and terrorism to effect change; others have favored sedition and “passive resistance” to build support across key leaders and community groups. Regardless of selected employment methodology, all traditional insurgencies share a common objective: to usurp the authority and resulting viability of the “targeted” government and, in so doing, radically alter sanctioned policies, programs, and organizational structures.

Convergent threats have poignant parallels with traditional insurgency, attempting to undermine the authority, effectiveness, and resulting public perceptions of constitutional functions: namely, law enforcement entities, the criminal justice system, and rule of law. Additionally, they threaten and frequently ignore nonmember property rights—a fundamental characteristic of voluntary trade and commerce. Unfettered illicit activities and resulting rewards entice other community members to practice criminal behaviors and beliefs.¹⁰ Learning a trade and abiding by societal rules are time-consuming, difficult tasks that can appear foolhardy when juxtaposed with the money, lifestyles, and excitement offered by powerful criminal gangs, drug cartels, and ethnic-based criminal groups.

The same dichotomy applies to radical extremism and accepted societal behaviors because impassioned messages and goals convince ill-informed, disaffected members of the populace to reject democratic principles and transform their volatile emotions into destructive actions.

Whereas most convergent threats do not fully satisfy the definition of traditional insurgencies (i.e., primarily seeking to overthrow an existing government), all of them unquestionably seek to change the actions of government authorities through sedition and various forms of violence. Street gangs in the United States, for example, do not necessarily advocate or strive for the violent overthrow of local, state, or national government organizations. Nonetheless, through brutal criminal acts, dedicated recruiting, and other destabilizing influences, street gangs are de facto assuming leadership roles, supplanting legitimate government functions. Unchecked, this menacing threat will continue to grow, exploiting ready information exchange across geographically disparate gangs, connectivity with other convergent threats, and subsequent learning across criminal networks.

Protecting individual citizens and their way of life from the destabilizing, typically violent effects of traditional insurgencies has been the *raison d'être* for COIN strategies and supporting operations. Based on contemporary news reports and resulting public perceptions, many people mistakenly associate COIN with military-centric applications of national power.¹¹ Some COIN practitioners have employed force-based, military-centric approaches that concentrate on capturing/killing enemy insurgents at the expense of diminished civil liberties and rule of law; however, such approaches neither define nor embody COIN. Instead, COIN is actually a synchronized blending of available civilian and military resources

to defeat insurgent forces, address core grievances, and resolve other causal factors.¹² Furthermore, depending on situation-specific considerations (e.g., civilian populace preferences, insurgent *modus operandi*, constitutional authorities, etcetera), an effective COIN strategy could actually minimize direct military involvement while emphasizing law enforcement and other nonmilitary elements of national power.¹³ This is true in both post-conflict zones and challenged high-crime societies with weak or corrupt governments and ineffective civilian police institutions.

Situational variability is an essential characteristic of successful COIN strategies. Insurgencies and contributing factors vary across cultures, geographic regions, and time; moreover, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that worked during a particular COIN endeavor may not apply in another venture. Prudent counterinsurgents embrace such distinctions, incorporating general principles¹⁴ rather than hard-fast rules or situational-specific TTPs, while assessing insurgencies and developing appropriate remediation strategies. These principles provide time-proven intellectual guides.

The COIN operational environment is not a geographic area or region on a map, although it possesses physical components and includes the targeted nation's land mass and infrastructure. It is also not defined by conflicts between an insurgent group and national government. Rather, the operational environment is a dynamic, interactively and structurally complex system¹⁵ that includes the thoughts and actions of multiple thinking, adaptive entities and a host of other evolving elements. In total, it comprises all the factors, conditions, and characteristics that a beleaguered government must assess and understand to protect its people, maintain sovereignty, and defeat an insurgency.¹⁶

Three interactive components form the operational environment's nucleus: the affected nation's people, government, and insurgency. The resulting trilogy embodies several basic, yet critical COIN considerations. First and foremost is the essential nature of the populace in both governing and undermining a democratic nation. Gaining populace support and resultant participation are fundamental objectives for the

SELECT COIN PRINCIPLES

- Gain, retain, and actively involve the civilian populace—the nation's most important "natural resource"
- Perceived government legitimacy is directly proportional to the government's ability to fulfill societal expectations
- Eliminating enemy forces and infrastructure is often less important than positively influencing the populace
- When possible, execute actions in accordance with societal rule of law and the concurrence of civilian populace leaders
- Complementary interests promote the collective pursuit of mutually beneficial objectives and resource sharing
- Build partnerships on complementary characteristics, while harnessing and integrating differences
- Physical capabilities, strong organizations, and unwavering desire are critical to governments and insurgencies
- Reconciliation and reassimilation are more important than revenge and retribution; former enemies can be strong allies
- The COIN environment necessitates a whole of government approach that employs all elements of national power

The importance of community involvement in government processes—to include local security patrols, intelligence-gathering efforts, and other activities—cannot be understated or undervalued.

government and insurgency because the purpose for democratic government is to serve its citizens and insurgencies cannot thrive without support. Our constitutional government must seek willing participation of its citizens in the governing processes—to include security attainment and rule of law adherence—whereas an insurgency may employ truth, deception, and various coercive measures (e.g., extortion, blackmail, and outright violence) to gain support. Populace members choose between these opposing entities, assessing the legitimacy of competing claims and actions in conjunction with personal preferences, anticipated costs and benefits, and what they personally see and hear.¹⁷

Citizen perception of legitimacy is critical. Individuals assess relative legitimacy based on perceived fulfillment of expected functions and adherence to stated commitments. The government and insurgency influence perceptions through

various means, including physical actions and compelling messages. During the assessment process, social and personal expectations are not static; changing in accordance with evolving knowledge, cultural norms, and other factors. The government, insurgency, populace members, and a variety of external influences can also affect expectations and subsequent legitimacy assessments. In the end, assessments and resulting support depend on the congruence of personal expectations and competitor actions, rather than reliance on platitudes and promises.

In tandem with efforts to positively influence citizen perceptions through recognizable actions and messages, the government and insurgency strive to enhance organic capabilities and diminish those of their opponent. The government seeks improved governance capacity¹⁸ and underlying resolve while conducting and pursuing actions that will degrade the

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insurgency's abilities, determination, and popular appeal. Eliminating insurgent leaders, capturing propaganda material and computer hard drives, and destroying weapon stockpiles are common elements. When executed with excess or inefficiency, outside the rule of law, such force-based offensive activities can unintentionally benefit the enemy by alienating populace segments and inciting individuals to support or join the insurgency. COIN practitioners must consider potential second and third order effects, eschewing actions and policies that would imperil government legitimacy and individual commitment to the governance processes.

Readily observable, force-based actions against the enemy are often of little value. Eradicating insurgent forces and equipment unilaterally, without populace support, can be less beneficial than persuading the citizenry to shun insurgent overtures and voluntarily provide security forces with timely information on insurgent intentions. Recognizing and correctly evaluating such competing actions and results are paramount to successful COIN operations and, as a consequence, the government's continued survival.

While assessing insurgent capacity and resolve, it is natural to focus on elements such as leadership, infrastructure, controlled territory, or techniques. Doing so exclusively can be shortsighted because the insurgency gains "combat power" from at least two cognitive components: the ideology and supporting narrative that describe insurgent grievances, objectives, and methods, and negative public perceptions of government leaders, institutions, and abilities to fulfill expected functions or adhere to the rule of law.

The importance of community involvement in government processes—to include local security patrols, intelligence-gathering efforts, and other activities—cannot be understated or undervalued.



Malaysian UNGERIN anti-terror-police on the Community Policing show on May 23rd, at the Muar in Johore, Malaysia. Photo: Rizuan

The government must create circumstances that promote partnerships between and with seemingly distinct civilian groups by highlighting shared interests and mutual advantages that exist across the groups.¹⁹ Throughout such processes, the watchword is individual participation and commitment, rather than “buy-in” to government-generated concepts.

To successfully counter an insurgency across a nation that encompasses multiple cultures, preferences, and communities, national government organizations cannot dictate the ways, means, and objectives of COIN efforts that are designed to address local circumstances. Instead, leaders must identify strategic-level goals and priorities, provide “commander’s intent,” and empower and assist local COIN programs.²⁰ Concurrently, national and local entities must work in tandem to integrate local actions and desired effects

into national-level aspirations, “blending” national and local efforts into mutually supporting activities. Collaborative thought is, of course, difficult to achieve, necessitating candid dialogue, reciprocal learning, and earned trust between and across national and local government elements.

Insurgencies are internecine conflicts, pitting family members, friends, and others against one another. National prosperity and development are incompatible with such internal distrust and enmity. Reconciling destabilizing internal conflicts are critical COIN objectives. In fact, to achieve sustainable, long-term success, counterinsurgents must convince large segments of insurgent group members and supporters to shun illicit, seditious activities and “join” productive, “legitimate” enterprises and political processes.

COIN is more than killing, arresting, and incapacitating government adversaries and political opponents. It must also provide disaffected protagonists with incentives to pursue attainable goals, offer constructive suggestions, and prompt change “within the system,” while operating in accordance with established laws and social dynamics. Such options present disruptive, lawbreaking individuals and parent groups with viable opportunities to transform themselves and join/rejoin society as respected, accepted members—without fear of incrimination for past misdeeds—as long as they genuinely commit to and actively support constructive, lawful behavior.²¹ Whole-of-government approaches that are tailored to meet specific situational circumstances, yet are flexible enough to adapt to unforeseen and intended changes, are necessary. One component of a nation’s capacity—regardless of size, power, and financial potential—will not suffice. ●

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ENDNOTES

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DRAFT

Counter Radicalization Strategies

Reaching Out: Policing with Muslim Communities in an Age of Terrorism



The Los Angeles Police Department

DRAFT

This discussion paper was prepared by the Los Angeles Police Department and the National Consortium for Advanced Policing. It is intended to support development of DHS efforts to counter violent extremism.

I. Background

At a community meeting between the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) and local Muslim communities, one participant asked an officer, “Why are there so many of your [LAPD] counter-terrorism representatives here?” If the reasons were less than obvious, then it was a challenge to address, as the speaker was indicating that the LAPD believed that Los Angeles Muslim communities were somehow under suspicion. The individual was engaged in discussion and explained that quite to the contrary, if by definition, “counter-terrorism” means “a strategy to prevent terrorism,” then the LAPD recognized that all of our communities are valuable resources to leverage in defeating terrorism (Houghton Mifflin Company, 2003).

Like many American law enforcement agencies, the LAPD recognizes that our Muslim communities are affected by significant internal and external political, cultural, and religious pressures that make positive police-community relations difficult to achieve. Sensitive to these conditions, the LAPD believes that “counter-terrorism” and “community policing” are not mutually exclusive terms. On the contrary, local police in particular should redouble outreach efforts to American-Muslim communities, if they are going to effectively address terrorism and their communities’ role in combating extremist violence.

Since the 7/7 bombing attacks in London in July 2005, there has been a great deal of speculation on the potential risks of “homegrown radicalization” in the United States. In 2007, the New York Police Department released a study documenting this phenomenon in the U.S. (New York City Police Department, 2007). With an estimated population of 2-3 million American-Muslims, there has been concern among US law enforcement officials that disaffected Muslims could be a potential source of violent Islamist extremism. This concern is

not without basis. According to the 2007 PEW report titled “Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream,” eight percent of American-Muslims agreed with the assertion that suicide bombing of civilian targets in defense of Islam can sometimes be justified. Among American-Muslims under the age of 30 that percentage was almost twice as high at fifteen percent (Pew Research Center, 2007). This is the kind of information that keeps counter-terrorism officials up at night.

The case of Najibullah Zazi is a chilling and contemporary example of radicalization in a local community. A nationalized citizen, Zazi was educated and worked in the United States for over a decade prior to planning an attack in New York City. Court records show that Zazi was seemingly integrated into American society before he traveled to a terror camp overseas in 2008. Trained in the same camp as the London bombers, Zazi planned explosions with devices that utilized the same chemical formulation and design.

From the fourth quarter of 2009 through the first quarter of 2010, there has been an exponential increase in number of plots, radicalized individuals, and deaths at the hand of Muslim militants. Examples include David Headley, an American charged with assisting in the Mumbai terrorist attack; Somali recruitment of Americans to fight for Al Shabab; the Virginia 6 traveling to Pakistan and training in terrorist camps; “Jihad Jane” and Sharif Mobley tied to the Yemeni branch of Al Qaeda and the Somali movement Al Shabab; and more recently Jamie Pauline-Ramirez radicalized through the internet while living in Denver. Much of the recent radicalization is attributed to transnational terrorist recruiters such as Anwar al-Awlaki, who lived in the United States from 1990 to 2002. These are the stories of discontented Americans who feel outside the walls and institutions of modern society and become seduced by extremist ideology.

Community Policing and Terrorism

In September 2006, former Los Angeles Police Chief William Bratton and George Kelling wrote an article for the Manhattan Institute describing how local police agencies can have a major impact on counter-terrorism efforts through community policing (Bratton & Kelling, 2006). Building on Bratton and Kelling, this article expands on the need for proactive community policing efforts in Muslim communities and offers specific practical approaches to working in communities that may be affected by violent political extremism.

In the United Kingdom, Dr. Martin Innes of Surrey University, has written a very convincing article championing community policing in the fight against terrorism called “Policing Uncertainty: Countering Terror through Community Intelligence and Democratic Policing.” Innes contends that community-policing is more democratic, and therefore inclusive, so it has less of a chance at eroding our civil rights and is less invasive than covert policing methods. In his article Innes states:

“Al Qaeda attacks are deliberately attempting to create fissures along religious lines. Police have recognized that they need to mitigate any perceptual harm that may result from terrorism exacerbating and inflaming interethnic and interfaith community tensions.” (Innes, 2006)

American-Muslim communities are under extraordinary sets of pressures. These pressures may be attributed to a variety of factors, including extreme media attention, the implementation of the Patriot Act, additional security precautions in the transportation industries, and increased interaction with law enforcement. This paper discusses a series of practical suggestions for local law enforcement agencies now working with Muslim communities in the United States, and how to overlay the community policing enterprise over the diverse Muslim communities and then integrates these communities into the community

based government infrastructure. Achieving this alignment will help mitigate the push and pull factors associated with diaspora communities, or those sitting on the fence being influenced by societal struggles and lack of purpose or meaning. The push: What is causing the discontent – the Muslim identity, racism and discrimination, threats to Islam, local grievances, and a perception of injustice or anger over Western policy. The pull factors: What causes the individuals to cross the line into violence – this could be influenced by the violent ideology, culture or the local community support for such an ideology. It could also be influenced by charismatic figures espousing a powerful narrative appealing to those looking for purpose. Or the influence could come from virtual network identifying an appealing path to follow to justice.

Community Policing and the British Experience

To better understand the issues and pressures facing Muslim communities in “the West,” lessons may be learned from the response to homegrown radicalization in the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom has struggled with domestic terrorism for decades, and shares many police philosophies and practices with the United States. That bond extends to law enforcement, as a long history of collaboration cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdom is reinforced with exchanges of both personnel and information. Many Muslim communities are also multi-national, with extended families and friends, who are living, working, and traveling between the United States and the United Kingdom, and other English speaking countries.

On July 7, 2005, four British citizens detonated explosive devices in London’s Underground rail system and one double-decker bus, thus becoming the first case of “homegrown” suicide bombers in that country. These four young men, three British-Pakistani Muslims and one British-Muslim convert of Afro-Caribbean descent, killed 52 of their countrymen and injured over 700 additional people.

The attack publicly raised issues of racial discrimination, community cohesion, and

community-government relations in the United Kingdom at a time when police forces across the nation were in the midst of reorganization with a focus on community policing. Due to negative feedback from several government commissions in the 1990s and the early part of the New Millennium, police forces around the country made serious efforts to improve community engagement across the board (British Home Office, 1999 & 2002; Bradford Vision, 2001). In November 2003, the Home Office issued a paper called “Policing: Building Safer Communities Together,” which also called for the police to improve community engagement. At the direction of the Home Office, police forces across the UK were required to staff robust Neighborhood Police Teams (NPTs) throughout the communities they served by April 2008.

The Home Office Report (2002) and Bradford Vision (2001), known respectively as the Cattle Report and the Ousley Report, specifically dealt with racial issues and community tensions in northern Muslim communities. During the summer of 2001 there were serious riots in the northern UK cities of Oldham, Burnley, and Bradford that were characterized as “race riots” and primarily involved young, Pakistani-Muslim males. Shortly after the 2001 riots, the September 11th attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon put even more scrutiny on Muslim communities, and tension was exacerbated by intense media speculation. The tension in UK, including West Yorkshire, remained high in the four years between the Bradford Riots and the 7/7 London attacks. A few British-Muslims were unabashedly aggressive as the quote from one young man made over a year *prior* to the 7/7 London attacks suggested:

“As far as I'm concerned, when they bomb London, the bigger the better,” says Abdul Haq, a social worker. “I know it's going to happen because Sheikh bin Laden said so. Like Bali, like Turkey, like Madrid - I pray for it, I look forward to the day.” (Cohen, 2004).

Accordingly, the West Yorkshire Police Force was taking proactive steps to counter terrorist attacks, but they were also looking to engage more fully with an increasingly complex, diverse British-Muslim community that was going through many growing pains. The fear among many police officers after the Bradford Riots was that a major terrorist attack could set off more rioting, race related attacks, or a cycle of terrorist attacks, which could lead to an upward spiral of violence. Yet that did not happen in West Yorkshire after the 7/7 terrorist attack in London. No major incident occurred, and to the contrary, there were even some displays of solidarity between Muslim communities and other communities during the period immediately after the attacks. It has been suggested that improved community-police relations, due to the implementation of aggressive Neighborhood Policing Teams, helped reduce hate crimes and other potential violent acts (Baines & Read, 2007).

II. Muslims in “the West”

“There is no such thing as THE Muslim community. There is a hugely complex set of people making up different sub-sections of a community who have different divisions, rivalries and factions.” –Unnamed British police officer (Innes, 2006).

Muslim communities come in many different sizes, shapes, and colors and have differing national, ethnic, and cultural roots. They speak different languages, although they often may know Arabic due to their study of the Koran. Too often, they have been lumped together nationally as “THE” Muslim community, which does not recognize that for local police jurisdictions, Muslim communities in Atlanta may be very different than those in Los Angeles, thus requiring different levels and types of services.

Islam has two major divisions, Sunni and Shi’i, but also many other sects, traditions,

movements, and schools of thought.¹ Equally complex is the relationship of the large number of political and private organizations that represent Muslim communities and interests both in the United States and around the world.

Many Muslims refer to a brotherhood/sisterhood with other Muslims all over the world, known as the “worldwide Ummah,” or global Muslim community. Interviews with Muslims regarding global issues bring to light several interesting observations: that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are often mentioned when describing oppression against fellow Muslims. These conflicts are often cited by some Muslims as a systematic persecution of Muslims by “the West.” Because law enforcement is one of the most obvious representatives of government, we may be seen as the face of unpopular government laws or policies.

Particularly when coupled with the fact that many Muslim communities in the West have only recently immigrated to the United States, the impact of globalization and transnationalism on these communities is significant. Due to the availability of cheap, fast, air travel and improved communications technologies such as satellite/cable television, cell phones, and the Internet, these communities are able to maintain physical and ethereal contact with their homeland. Events in foreign countries now have a significant impact on Diaspora communities. For example in December 2007, the assassination of Benazir Bhutto reverberated through American Pakistani communities, causing them concern for the future of their native land (Jones, 2007). The impact of globalization on law enforcement is undeniable, thus it is important for police to monitor how global events impact their local communities.

¹ For example Sunni Islam is divided into four schools of thought: Hanafi, Hanbali, Maliki and Shafii. Shi’ii divisions include the Zaydis (Fivers), the Ismailis (Sevensers), and the Ithna Ashari (Twelvers) (Esposito, 2002).

Due to enhanced communications technologies, what Western Muslim immigrant communities in the West observed in the 1980s and 1990s on their televisions, and then later over the Internet, was perceived global Muslim persecution in Afghanistan, Palestine, Bosnia, Kosovo and Chechnya. Extremist terrorist groups used these images to their own political and military advantage. Furthermore, media portrayals of Muslims, both in the news and entertainment format, were perceived by their communities as being negatively biased against Muslims and Islam (Shaheen, 2001).

Government responses to terrorist attacks, such as the Terrorist Act of 2001 (UK) and the Patriot Act (US) are considered by civil rights organizations, such as the ACLU, and many members of Muslim communities to infringe on individual civil liberties (Donahue, 2002). Since 9-11 there have also been concerns of racial profiling in the transportation industries against Muslim travelers (Islam On-line, 2004). Whether institutional discrimination against Muslim communities is real or perceived, because anti-terrorist laws are enforced by police agencies, they make working in Muslim communities that much more difficult, and sometimes uncomfortable for law enforcement personnel (Stainbrook, 2006).

The good news is that, despite these negative pressures on Muslim communities, individual contacts between police officers and Muslims in the United States are generally positive, and both groups are working to improve relations (Henderson, Miller, Ortiz, & Naomi, 2006). This fact reinforces the need for continued positive contacts between law enforcement and Muslim communities.

Understanding Local Muslim Perspectives

“Rumours of the fraud reached the Arab ears, from Turkey. In the East persons were more trusted than institutions. So the Arabs, having tested my friendliness under fire, asked me, as a free agent, to endorse the promises of the British Government.”-TE Lawrence

T. E. Lawrence, a British military officer most commonly referred to as “Lawrence of Arabia,” realized that it was imperative that individuals working in Arab communities understand them, if they were going to positively influence them. To know where a community is going, we must know where they have been. Understanding of local Muslim communities’ issues and concerns, especially as they relate to law enforcement, will take the dedicated efforts of locally community-based police officers.

Local community engagement begins with understanding a community’s history, country of origin, demographics, social structure, religious background, immigration pattern, cultural nuances, and its relationship with other communities. This process has been referred to in academic circles as “community mapping,” and is critical for local law enforcement officers for the purpose of community outreach.

Outreach in Muslim communities is more than just knowing where the mosques are, but also how the community is organized and how it functions in the larger society; a process which will involve some academic study. Local colleges and universities are key resources in truly understanding the history of various communities. Local communities are often the subject of research by professors and students in criminal justice, sociology, history, geography and religion, so academia may be an excellent resource.

II. A Proposed Approach

Cities like Los Angeles have realized compelling results with a community policing approach that focuses on problem-solving and the inclusion of community members in fighting terrorism, similar to the police-community partnerships that have been built to fight gangs.

Media Communications Strategies

Before engaging a Muslim community, one must understand how many Muslims may perceive the media and the world around them. Muslim communities generally do not find themselves reflected in the mainstream media; thus many Muslims may be distrustful and seek their news from non-traditional sources (Clayton, 2007).

This is important for two reasons: First, the way that Muslim communities perceive the world and their role in it will not be the same as other communities. They may feel like they are unfairly treated in the mainstream media and that they are characterized as being the “enemy” in what they perceive as the conflict between “the West and Islam.” This idea of a “clash of civilizations” was originally suggested in the 1990s by Professor Samuel Huntington, and although hotly debated it is a starting point for understanding differing cultures and the stresses of globalization and transnationalism (Huntington, 1996).

Secondly, Muslim communities may not regularly follow the media sources that the police generally use to reassure and calm the community or to spread general information. British police in West Yorkshire were surprised to find during a search of Muslim houses that the television was tuned to Al-Jazeera rather than the BBC or Sky news (Archer, 2007).

On the first point, the police need to monitor the sources that the community monitors to gain an understanding of their local/world view. On the second point, the police need to factor

this knowledge into their strategies to disseminate information to the community. In order to effectively communicate with at-risk communities the police need to make effective use of local media sources and direct engagement. To do this, the police must develop a comprehensive media strategy as part of their larger overt counter-terrorism strategy.

Indirect Community Engagement Strategies

Police engagement with Muslim communities does not always have to follow a direct path. Because some Muslims, like some members of any other community, may never come to completely trust law enforcement organizations, a third party approach can be employed.

Local community engagement is best done on a very personal and individual level. A community may never truly trust the police as an organization, but cultural norms in many Muslim communities may dictate that close personal associations with individuals can move mountains. The key is finding the right community leaders who can be trusted and will assist the police in helping their community. The community also must trust these individuals. Because of unique dynamics in Muslim communities, additional energy and special relationships will need to be formed between police representatives and young Muslim men, and especially Muslim women, who are under unique sets of pressures.

Police officers will often encounter 1st generation Muslims from countries where the police are corrupt and much different than law enforcement in Western democracies. Many immigrant communities carry forward the same fears about police in the United States based on their experiences in their homeland. In the current context, terrorist arrests are widely publicized and the result is fear in the Muslim community that they might be targeted by law enforcement. American Muslims in Maine, for example, reported after 9-11 a fear of being

watched or being under suspicion by the police. If they were interviewed by law enforcement, they feared that their friends, neighbors or co-workers might find out and the result would be embarrassment or worse (Wessler, 2002).

There are several advantages to police-community partnerships. By using faith-based initiatives or communicating with social service organizations (both public and private) the police can find new routes into Muslim communities. As an example, inter-faith forums might be attended by a police representative in order to monitor community tensions or to assist in conflict resolution. Some community members may not report hate crimes to the police, but may feel more comfortable reporting them to social service agencies. Interacting with other governmental agencies and non-governmental agencies (NGOs) can be an avenue into building police relationships with Muslim communities.

Planning a Police Action

When action such as arrests of suspected terrorists or the execution of search warrants -- must be taken within a Muslim community, many of the negative effects can be mitigated by having a community reassurance plan in place. A reassurance plan includes the following: (1) briefing community leaders on the situation prior to briefing the media, thus reducing rumors and speculation; (2) providing extra patrols in the areas affected; (3) arming police officers with information, including leaflets for distribution; (4) conducting a series of open community forums to address fears and concerns; and (5) continuously updating agency websites on the status of the investigation. American police departments may learn lessons learned from the British experience. Both the London Metropolitan Police, through the Muslim Contact Unit (MCU), and the West Yorkshire Police Force, through localized Neighborhood Policing Teams, have used these strategies with great success.

Combined, all of these measures should reduce rumor mongering, distrust, and resentment. On the positive side, these efforts may elicit important information to the investigation from the public and create an opportunity for improved police-community relations. As part of their comprehensive community engagement strategy, law enforcement agencies should include community reassurance plans in their Standard Operating Procedures (SOP).

A reassurance plan should not be an afterthought, but should be as well prepared and detailed as the operations plan. Operational security of the investigation remains a key issue, so coordination and communication between those leading the reassurance measures and the investigations team are vital. Community reassurance and calming should immediately go into effect after the direct action is completed and security concerns for the operation are reduced.

Muslim communities recognize that incidents of hate crime tend to go up after terrorist attacks and arrests, so they will appreciate the extra security, if it is done in a positive and respectful manner. Remember that there may still be concerns in the community regarding continuing investigations and the possibility of more arrests, so there may still be apprehension when speaking to police officers. Officers in the field can make a huge impact by visiting local mosques and letting the congregations know that the extra police officers are in the area for their security. Appropriate protocols, such as removing shoes before entering prayer areas (when not in tactical or emergency situations), should be followed.

Direct Strategies by Local Law Enforcement

Muslim leaders will be suspicious of police motives and must be convinced that the effort is genuine and continuing. This is not a new challenge for local law enforcement agencies. In the

context of contemporary rhetoric, the police can show the Muslim public and their leaders that ***actions speak louder than words.***

To this point, Deputy Chief Michael Downing of the Los Angeles Police Department Counter-Terrorism Bureau, in testimony before the United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs stated:

“We need to show that our democratic principles built on the values, practices, and lives of American citizens are sacred and worthy of embracing. We need to show our belief in human dignity, the family and the value of the individual. We need to show how we honor the meaning of our lives by what we contribute to others' lives. We need to show that behind the badges of American law enforcement are caring Americans “doing” law enforcement. To do this we need to go into the community and get to know peoples' names. We need to walk into homes, neighborhoods, mosques, and businesses. We need to know how Islam expresses itself in Los Angeles if we expect to forge bonds of community support” (Downing, 2007).

The Police or Sheriff's Department must demonstrate a sincere commitment by its actions, not merely its words. Los Angeles and other major cities have done what cops do best. Starting at the neighborhood level, police are working within the community ***as part of the community.*** Specific crime and juvenile delinquency prevention demonstration efforts not related to the terrorist threat will show the Muslim community that their police truly care about their safety – the police are there to protect them and not to investigate them. Organized police participation in neighborhood and cultural events and activities that have *no law enforcement connection* will demonstrate that the police are supportive and sincere, not merely investigating potential terrorists. Here are some common elements of a successful strategy:

Law Enforcement Training and Education

- **Specialized Training for Line Personnel:** Patrol personnel and others assigned to work directly with the Muslim public should receive specialized training to ensure sensitivity and understanding of Muslim culture and values, including the innate distrust of law enforcement.
- **Language Capability:** Through recruitment and training it is imperative that key police personnel speak the languages of the Muslim community. Any qualified personnel in the Department with such skills should be assigned to work directly with the community.

Research and Community Involvement

- **Open Source and Neighborhood Research:** Local police should study niche media and local publications in the Muslim community to keep current and well informed on issues of priority concern to the community.
- **Neighborhood Outreach:** Specialized personnel should meet business owners, religious leaders and engage all -American Muslim groups and organizations to learn about their concerns and priorities, with a message that the police want to protect them, not to investigate them.

Routine Police Services and Activities

- **Patrol Personnel:** Units and personnel assigned to Muslim neighborhoods should approach the public and greet them openly, showing that their role is to protect and serve. Visits to shops, restaurants and community centers should be encouraged as part of community policing enterprise.
- **Youth Activities:** The Police Athletic League and other youth groups should be expanded to include specialized outreach with mosques and Muslim neighborhoods with focus on .American Muslim interests such as Cricket.

- **Community Events:** Police personnel assigned to the neighborhood should be present and active at all community events to demonstrate concern and partnership on topics that are not related to law enforcement.

Department Organization

- **Police Chaplain:** The Chief or Sheriff should appoint one or more chaplains from the Islamic faith who must receive the same designation and status as other faiths in the police agency.
- **Organizational Placement:** Leadership of the outreach effort should be vested in a unit that has the best opportunity to deliver results and gain community trust. This may or may not be the unit responsible for counter terrorism.

Relationship Building

- **Muslim Forum:** Regular public meetings provide an open forum for announcement of positive new programs and initiatives as well as venting and official responses to community concerns, especially regarding cases involving members of the community.
- **Recruitment:** It is essential to aggressively recruit officers from the Muslim community including foreign born to show that police officers and deputy sheriffs truly reflect the community they serve.
- **Cultural Immersion:** Specialized personnel must be assigned to direct and continued involvement in Muslim community life, so that community leaders recognize familiar police personnel whom they can rely upon and trust.
- **Relationship with Mosques:** A formal relationship with religious leaders is an essential component of the outreach effort. Frequent, regular visits to the mosques will demonstrate that the effort is sincere and ongoing.

IV. The Way Forward

These efforts are a contemporary extension of the policing approaches that have served our Nation well. Benefits resulting from this approach have a broad reach across the urban area and may penetrate deep into the community. The police and their public share a strong bond – their common commitment to safe neighborhoods for families and children. Once the police and the public have come together to form this alliance, great strides can be made to counter radicalization and violent extremism. Community policing initiatives in Muslim communities should aim to create a shared sense of threat: society as a whole fears the indiscriminate, mass violence we are seeing around the world.

Goals of prevention and detection are thus joined in a common approach. Community leaders, groups and families work in partnership with law enforcement to prevent radicalization. Should these efforts falter or fail, the same individuals, organizations and parents will play the key role in early detection of violent extremism. Law enforcement needs to identify with its American Muslim community and the Muslim American community needs to identify with its families, neighborhoods, city, state, country, and police.

Police and Sheriffs who undertake a comprehensive strategy should realize these benefits:

- Build a strong base of public support for police and sheriffs among .American Muslims
- Counter the radical messages of extremism with positive dialogue and debate
- Identify community leaders who will step forward and speak out against extremism
- Establish credible channels of communication with the community for use by police
- Deny a welcome environment in the community for terrorist conspiracies, building hostile environments to terrorists and their support networks.
- Enlist individuals who will warn or tip law enforcement about threats and extremists

Ultimately, preventing extremism will be up to neighborhoods and communities, but thread by thread, relationship by relationship, the police can help build a network of services and relationships that will make it very hard for terrorism to take root. American Muslim neighborhoods and communities have a genuine responsibility in preventing any form of extremism and terrorism. If the broader communities are intolerant of such things, these ideologies cannot take root in its midst. And no amount of enforcement or intelligence can ultimately prevent extremism if the communities are not committed to working with law enforcement to prevent. To do this however, communities need the partnership of law enforcement.

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Countering Violent Extremism

Potential Curriculum Components (Working Document)

Submitted to DHS on September 29, 2010

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Summary: The following 12 potential topic areas of a curriculum to counter violent extremism were developed specifically for a target audience of front-line state and local police officers and key law enforcement outreach personnel. These would include officers, detectives, analysts, sergeants and lieutenants. These 12 topic areas would change depending on whether the curriculum was for executive-level law enforcement or the community, including community-based organizations, schools and parent and youth groups. The 12 topic areas are followed by the rationale for their potential inclusion. At this stage, not much detail is given about exactly what would be included as subtopics. This is so that the entities submitting proposals have the ability to apply their own creative approach to the curriculum development process.

*Topic Area One: **Fanaticism through the ages***

Rationale: In order to fully understand violent extremism, it is critical that students gain an understanding of fanaticism, its presence throughout history and its relationship to violent extremism. From the local law enforcement perspective, this information can help to place the overall training into historical context, emphasize that it is an issue that will continue into the future and help officers understand some of the factors that propel some groups and individuals along the continuum from idealism to fanaticism to violence. Most importantly, it can help officers start to make distinctions between behaviors along that continuum – some of which are constitutionally protected expressions of belief; others of which lead to criminal acts.

*Topic Area Two: **Violent Extremism in America***

Rationale: In order to be able to identify and, ultimately, counter a threat, police must have a clear understanding of the socio- and geopolitical factors and ideologies that serve as its fuel. The objective of this portion of the curriculum is to define violent extremism¹ and, through lectures and case studies, enable police to identify and articulate what it is, how this problem pertains to their work, how they can identify it, and, most importantly, what is being done around the country and the world to counter it (case studies). One of the key elements of this portion of the training can be demonstrating that community knowledge and the policing of everyday crimes – in other words, leveraging the things police already know how to do well – are essential ingredients of any plan to counter violent extremism. It is suggested that the case studies highlight violent extremism along a broad spectrum (terrorists, gangs, white supremacists, animal rights activists, etc.) rather than in the context of one particular issue. This will ensure that the curriculum is applicable to jurisdictions and communities across the country and will lay the inclusive philosophical groundwork for the outreach programs to follow. This broad-spectrum approach will also support the reality that

¹ This definition and the accompanying lexicon will come from DHS so that all training is in line with DHS' policy and philosophy in this area.

police officers across the country are experiencing: threats such as gangs and terrorism are increasingly converging and overlapping. To reflect that reality in the training will better equip the officers to face 21st Century policing issues, which are undeniably altered by globalization and other complex, transnational factors.

*Topic Area Three: **Philosophy and Approaches of Community-Oriented Policing***

Rationale: Community Policing is rooted in relationships of trust, honesty and open communication with communities, problem solving, the aligning of resources with the mission and applying tried-and-true methods such as SARA (Scanning, Analysis, Response, Assessment) to address crime, social disorder and fear of crime. This topic area would include case studies and lectures that demonstrate the pros and cons of various outreach models (Faith-Based Initiatives, Values-Based Initiatives, Youth, etc.) and Community Policing approaches, with emphasis placed on those models with the most potential to counter violent extremism.

*Topic Area Four: **Community-Oriented Policing and CVE***

Rationale: Armed with a comprehensive overview of the Community Policing toolbox, this section would focus on exactly how to incorporate and tailor best practices to violent extremism. (Examples: What are the essential components of an outreach plan that lead to relationships of trust? How can problem-solving approaches such as SARA be applied? How do you create a strategic approach in which enforcement and outreach efforts complement each other rather than undermine each other?)

*Topic Area Five: **Developing Socio-Cultural Awareness at the State and Local Levels***

Rationale: This section would provide officers with training on sociological factors such as cultural, religious, socioeconomic or linguistic isolation that can lead to an environment in which violent extremism is likely to flourish. What are the universal risk factors at the community, group and individual levels? Ideally, this portion of the training will also use case studies and lectures to address cultural and religious issues specific to the jurisdiction in which the training is being held.

*Topic Area Six: **Incorporating Socio-Cultural Awareness into a CVE Strategy***

Rationale: Police methods to learn about the communities they serve can be complemented and made stronger through a multi-disciplinary approach that includes academia, the media and community-based organizations. This section will focus on how police can become better “listeners,” embrace a “whole-of-government” approach and clearly identify community needs (part of the problem-solving equation). This section can also focus on how to blend the tactical and strategic and create guidelines for officers. What do they look for when it comes to behaviors and crimes linked to violent extremism? What questions should they ask? With whom should they engage?

What should they do with the information? How can partnerships with communities increase the cultural and linguistic acumen of police, leading to more productive and informed crime prevention strategies? How can police leverage social networks and create more peer-to-peer messaging opportunities (i.e. officer with same cultural/linguistic/religious background to community member; community member to community member)?

*Topic Area Seven: **Protecting Civil Rights and Civil Liberties***

Rationale: This section would put the material developed by DHS' Civil Rights Civil Liberties and other relevant Federal units into context for police officers. This section would also include training on hate crimes. The training would touch on why these issues matter in the context of countering violent extremism and policing and how these issues are operationalized at the state and local levels.

*Topic Area Eight: **Creating Open Dialogue with Communities***

Rationale: This section would address ways to improve police interaction – at the interpersonal and departmental levels – with communities through meetings, Citizens Police Academies, Neighborhood Watch groups, Advisory Boards and the media. Potential topics could include: messaging, strategic communications, the importance of niche media, how to identify community leaders and opinion formers, how to build trust and community confidence, how to incorporate socio-cultural considerations into outreach events, how to create a collaborative problem-solving process with the community, how to successfully navigate complicated group dynamics (conflict resolution) and how to set goals and identify measurements of success. This section could also include examples of how familiarizing populations with police practices and U.S. law can create understanding that leads to more civic involvement and less illegal activity.

*Topic Area Nine: **Blending Tactics and CVE Outreach Strategies***

Rationale: Police tactics and enforcement actions can, in certain circumstances, undermine the accomplishments of a CVE strategy and create conditions in which violence is more likely. Drawing lessons from recent protests, demonstrations and police enforcement actions, this section would examine how police can blend tactics and enforcement actions with outreach strategies to prevent violence. In one example, this section would examine how proactive engagement with the community in advance of a protest or demonstration, coupled with tactics that minimize injury and property damage, can help minimize the chance that constitutionally protected activities will turn violent. This section would be as much about facilitating the non-violent struggle through protecting free speech (demonstrations and protests) as it would be about CVE-related strategies.

Topic Area Ten: Including the Community in CVE

Rationale: Carefully selected community members could be brought in to talk with the students about some essential components of a CVE plan, from their perspective. These community members would be briefed in advance on the issues/challenges facing law enforcement and asked to provide suggestions on approaches and community-based resources. This section would serve the following purposes:

- 1) It would include the community in the development of a CVE plan at the earliest stage thereby ensuring that such a plan was not developed by the government but by the community itself. This creates instant “buy-in” to the solutions, demonstrates respect for the community members’ opinions and helps tailor the CVE strategy.
- 2) This group/panel discussion would start a dialogue with the police where none existed previously or continue one – both essential steps in building trust. Ultimately, the discussion would evolve into how to isolate the violent extremists and how to capitalize on the moderate messaging.

Topic Area Eleven: Resources at the Federal, State and Local Levels

Rationale: This section would provide students with numerous resources, including, but not limited to grant guidance, information sharing platforms, professional reading lists and CVE-related research.

Topic Area Twelve: Creating a CVE Plan (Class Exercise)

Rationale: Asking the students to devise a CVE plan would accomplish several objectives. It would: 1) Assess the level of knowledge attained by the students and provide DHS with a measurement tool; 2) Generate action items that could be used as tools for follow-up; 3) Create a general road map for future interactions with the community; 4) Pull the training elements together in an actionable way; and 5) Allow DHS to identify emerging trends in this area.

In one scenario, students could be asked to develop a plan for an area/community in their respective jurisdictions that they think would be susceptible to violent extremism, based on what they had learned in the course. They would be asked to:

- 1) Articulate exactly what those risk factors were;
- 2) Determine how to leverage existing resources to address the problem;
- 3) Determine whether any of the resources/approaches identified during the course could supplement the usual way of doing business;
- 4) Identify at least one new pathway of communication that could be formed with the community; and
- 5) Identify action items and how to measure success.

**Summaries of Readings for HSAC CVE Workgroup
Spring 2010**

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SUMMARIES OF DHS, STATE AND LOCAL ACTION ON CVE

1) Executive Summary of Counter Radicalization Strategies: Reaching Out: Policing with Muslim Communities in the Age of Terrorism, Los Angeles Police Department and the National Consortium for Advanced Policing

Background

After proposing the idea that Muslim-American communities face “significant internal and external political, cultural, and religious pressures” that can, at times, inhibit constructive relationships with law enforcement, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) produced this document detailing steps to reach out to this community in order to prevent radicalization. According to the LAPD, this mission is made even more urgent by the potential for homegrown terror threats. There are three broad recommendations for action:

- Direct police-community engagement
- Indirect police-community engagement
- Refined media strategies

Recommendations

Direct Police-Community Engagement

- The report contends that personal contacts between law enforcement and the Muslim-American population are generally positive, with both sides eager to strengthen these bonds. Therefore, a community policing strategy that aims to address countering violent extremism with the assistance of community members should be developed. This plan would look much like those in place to combat gangs. Such a strategy would also serve to build trust and preserve civil rights.
- Reaching this goal will require a dedicated effort on the part of law enforcement to understand the history and culture of the Muslim-American community. This education process is referred to as “community mapping” and can only be achieved by personally engaging the community itself. The main objective should be to identify and collaborate with the most esteemed community leaders. Outreach to academics from relevant fields (e.g. sociology, history, theology) should be conducted to supplement this learning process.

Indirect Police-Community Engagement

- The report suggests that due to potential latent mistrust between the police and the Muslim-American community, it will sometimes be necessary to employ a third party to build a relationship between the two sides.
- According to the LAPD, many first-generation Muslim Americans could harbor negative feelings towards the police as a result of negative experiences they may have had with

corrupt or ineffective law enforcement authorities in their homeland. This apprehension could be exacerbated by impressions of being profiled as terrorists by American law enforcement.

- Partnerships with social-service organizations (public, private, religious, secular) could help overcome this barrier in order to build relationships between the police and the community. The report suggests the example of sponsoring inter-faith forums “in order to monitor community tensions or to assist in conflict resolution between communities.”

Refined Media Strategies

- The report cites as crucial to the engagement with the Muslim-American population an understanding of how this community feels about the media and their treatment of the community.
- According to the LAPD, Muslim Americans frequently resent their portrayal in the media as the “enemy” in a struggle between “the West and Islam.” As a result, those who feel alienated by mainstream media could turn instead to news sources with which the police are not familiar.
- The report advises that law enforcement should identify these alternative news sources and monitor them to better learn about the segment of the Muslim-American population that consumes them. Achieving this will help the police communicate information to the community.
- Should the police need to take planned direct actions like targeted arrests or raids within the Muslim-American community, the report advises implementing a comprehensive, five-point “reassurance plan” immediately after the operation to mitigate any resulting ill will or false impressions of the police.
 - Authorities should brief community leaders before informing the media of the operation.
 - Stepped-up patrols should be launched in the affected neighborhood(s).
 - Officers should be equipped with informational materials, such as flyers for distribution.
 - Authorities should arrange open forums for the community to air issues and concerns.
 - Law enforcement agencies should regularly update their Web sites on the state of the investigation.

Conclusions

In order to most effectively prevent violent extremism in the Muslim-American community, law enforcement must succeed in understanding the unique historical, cultural and religious facets of this populace. Since the community is so large and diffuse, local police are the first and best resources in this effort. Sustained outreach and effective community policing must be the foundation of this strategy.

2) An Integrated Community Outreach Strategy Checklist, Governor Martin O'Malley

It is important that law enforcement/government regularly participate in community events before problematic issues arise – do not wait to establish relationships after there has been a negative incident such as Ft. Hood. Establish and maintain relationships now and foster those relationships on a regular basis and around positive events, so that if something adverse does occur, it is not the first time the parties are talking.

These are some examples of initiatives and strategies that may better engage our diverse communities and create more regular two-way paths of communication.

- Identify state and local agencies that can lead/organize and foster relationships with existing communities and organizations.
 - In Maryland, this includes the Governor's Office of Community Initiatives (GOCI) and the Governor's Office of Crime Control and Prevention (GOCCP).
 - Create liaisons to constituency and community groups
 - At the County level, this can be agencies such as the Mayor's Office of Neighborhoods in Baltimore City or the Office of Community Partnerships in Montgomery County.
 - Create liaisons to constituency and community groups
- Identify existing national and statewide organizations and advocacy groups that represent the target community.
 - In Maryland, such organizations include the Maryland Muslim Council, African Alliance Group, and the Coordination Council of Chinese American Associations.
 - Appoint members to boards and commissions
 - One way to identify such organizations may be through reports and databases housed at the White House Office of Faith-based and Neighborhood Partnerships.
- Establish a working relationship with national advocacy groups such as:
 - Council for American Islamic Relations – Nihad Awad, Executive Director
 - Arab American Anti Discriminatory Committee (ADC)
 - Jewish Anti-Defamation League – Abraham Foxman, Director
 - South Asian American Leaders of Tomorrow (SAALT) – Deepa Iyer, Executive Director
 - Asian American Justice Center – Karen Narasaki, Executive Director
- Create cultural and ethnic commissions that are representative of the population.
 - Empower commissions to form a work program to make recommendations and to advise the executive level
 - Interact in cultural celebrations with cultural and ethnic communities (e.g. Iftar, Lunar New Year, Diwali)
- Identify and support community organizations in target communities by regional or county level. These local organizations should have a relationship with the state and local government agencies as well as national and statewide advocacy organizations. Examples of such organizations include:
 - Business associations and trade organizations (e.g. Korean American Grocers Association, Muslim Gas Stations Owners)
 - Chambers of Commerce (e.g. the Maryland Middle Eastern Chamber of Commerce, the Maryland Hispanic Chamber of Commerce)
 - Places of worship (temples, mosques, etc.)
 - Schools that teach heritage language and culture (e.g. Hope Chinese School in Maryland has more than 4,000 students)

- Community Centers
 - Student Associations
- Highlight and support civic engagement activities that many of these organizations participate in, such as health fairs, canned food drives, blood donation campaigns, and cultural festivals.
 - Assist in promotion of these events.
 - Have a presence at the event by manning a table or booth.
 - Engage the surrounding mainstream community to participate.
 - Government agencies should participate.
 - Federal, state and local law enforcement agencies should participate.
- Encourage ethnic and cultural groups to participate in civic engagement during appropriate occasions (such as Martin Luther King, Jr. Day of Service activities, Thanksgiving, etc.) and promote those organizations that engage in these activities.
- Support organizations that participate in civic engagement during their own holidays, such as Ramadan (food collections), Lunar New Year (health fairs and flu vaccine drives), and Three Kings Day (toy drives).
- Foster communications by exchanging information via print, web, email, and other media with individuals and their organizations.

3) Executive Summary of 5th Annual NJ OHSP Counter-Terrorism Conference: Radicalization: Global Trend...Local Concern? October 12, 2007

Overview

On October 3, 2007, the New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness (OHSP), held its 5th Annual Counter-Terrorism Conference entitled *Radicalization: Global Threat...Local Concern?* The objective of the event was to explore the nature and extent of Islamic radicalization in New Jersey and how government, law enforcement, academia and clinicians should address it.

The Conference was split into two panels. The first examined Islamic radicalization in the United States, while the second focused specifically on the situation in New Jersey.

Key Findings of the Participants

At the October 3, 2007 OHSP Conference, the attendees proposed the following:

- Radicalization is a growing problem in both the United States and New Jersey, the full extent of which is not clear. The Internet, corrections system, universities, mosques, bookstores and cafes are prime breeding grounds for radical ideas that could lead to violent extremism.
- A “catastrophic” terror attack is most likely to be launched from overseas. Homegrown radicals, however, will inevitably achieve this level of intent and facility.
- The process of radicalization is multifaceted and therefore subject to disruption at several steps along the way. Combating this issue requires cooperation from a broad-based coalition; law enforcement alone is not enough. An official from the NYPD presented the report, *Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Terror Threat*, that outlines a general progression of radicalization that individuals follow. The militant’s broad goal is to achieve “power and redemption” and he/she finds motivation in personal hatred.
- Radicals use a “distorted” interpretation of Islam in order to attract adherents.
- Using socially-sensitive and non-threatening language is crucial. Care must be taken to separate religion from ideology. Moreover, authorities should refrain from casting their efforts as a “war on terror” to avoid alienating mainstream Muslims and elevating terrorists from the level of criminal to soldier.
- Radicals conform to no profile or single progression. Radicalization is most accurately thought of as a “team sport” that is dependent on community social dynamics. As such, behavioral specialists should be enlisted in the coalition against extremism.
- Universities are common “breeding grounds” of radical activity, which necessitates the assistance of academia.
- Mainstream Muslims must be a part of any successful efforts against radicalization. Authorities should engage this population through the community policing model.
- The United States faces less dangerous homegrown threat than Europe due largely to better socioeconomic integration and governmental protection of minority rights. Terror networks will likely focus their recruiting efforts on the disenfranchised and disaffected among the American Muslim population. Furthermore, it is a mistake to stereotype radicals as ignorant, poor or mentally unstable.
- Preserving civil rights and civil liberties is essential to discrediting the radical narrative.

- Law enforcement’s strategy must be proactive and predicated on intelligence in order to “prevent, not prosecute.”

Recommendations of the Participants

- State and federal officials will collaborate in working groups to examine radicalization in the corrections and university systems. Working groups will also be organized to partner with behavioral health professionals.

4) Executive Summary of Eight Years After 9/11: Confronting the Terrorist Threat to the Homeland; Secretary Napolitano's Testimony to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs; September 30, 2009

Secretary Napolitano remarked that guarding against terrorism is the founding purpose of the Department and that addressing this threat will always remain our highest priority, and as a major part of this mission, we are continually bolstering our efforts against domestic threats..

Key Areas highlighted by the Secretary:

Engaging Communities, Individuals, and Others Outside of Government

- Though the federal government and state, local, and tribal law enforcement continually work to secure the Nation from the threat of terrorism, government can't counter the threat alone—the American public has a key role to play in our security, particularly against the threat of violent extremism.
- While only a tiny fraction of any American community ever embraces violent extremism, preventing and countering violence and other criminal activity is a shared responsibility. With this in mind, DHS is working with communities, individuals, and others outside of government in order to better understand the phenomenon of violent extremism and to develop strategies to counter its causes.
- The Secretary has met personally with several of her counterparts from European Union countries on the topic of violent radicalization, and how the United States can learn from European experiences.
- Our security is a shared responsibility. So DHS and other federal government actions to engage individuals, communities, academia, and international partners—on preparedness, as well as on preventing violent extremism from taking root in America—are critical to this effort.

**5) A Dialogue on Our Nation's Security; Prepared Remarks of John O. Brennan,
Assistant to the President For Homeland Security and Counterterrorism;
Islamic Center of New York University; February 13, 2010 (Full Speech)**

Thank you all very much. Thank you, Dr. Mattson, for your very kind introduction and for your leadership, as an academic, whose research continues the rich tradition of Islamic scholarship, and as president of the Islamic Society of North America, where you have been a voice for the tolerance and diversity that defines Islam.

I know that President Obama was grateful for your words at the national prayer service during the Inauguration. We were proud to welcome you and many others to the White House for the Iftar dinner with the President. And I thank you for bringing us all together today—leaders and believers of many faiths, Muslim, Christian, Jew, Hindu and Sikh, including many groups who work together in community service. Thank you all for coming this morning.

Imam Latif, thank you for hosting us and for your welcome. As President Obama was preparing to take the oath of office last year, you wrote him an open letter. You spoke of your hopes for his presidency. You also wrote that America had rarely noticed that American Muslims such as yourself have always denounced violent extremism, that despite the frequent misrepresentations of your faith, you have never lost faith in America, and that, and I quote, “we, as American Muslims, are eager to serve our country.”

To Imam Latif, for your service to Muslim students and the NYPD, to our hosts the Islamic Center at NYU and the Islamic Law Student's Association, to everyone who joins us today, please consider my presence an acknowledgement of Imam Latif's eloquent appeal.

On behalf of President Obama, who asked that I send you his personal greetings and appreciation, I am here to say that your example and your denunciations of violent extremism are not merely noticed, they are celebrated. Your abiding faith in America strengthens and inspires us all, and there is indeed much we can do together to serve our country, as fellow Americans.

I know that many of you, and the organizations you represent, engage often with the White House and the Obama Administration. Not just on issues of foreign policy, national security and civil liberties that are of unique concern to you, but across the whole range of issues that affect your lives, as they do all Americans, from economic policy and health care to education, the environment and faith-based community service. I thank you for working so closely with us. And I'm pleased that we're joined today by two members of our White House Office of Public Engagement who work with you every day—Paul Monteiro and Kalpen Modi.

I join you today as President Obama's principal advisor on homeland security and counterterrorism. I want to thank you for this opportunity to discuss the President's strategy for confronting violent extremism, around the world and here at home. And I look forward to an honest and candid discussion about what we can do together to keep our country safe.

I also want to thank you on a more personal level for the opportunity to convey my respect for a faith that has helped to shape my own worldview. I grew up in New Jersey, just across the river in North Bergen. In fact, I stayed last night in Hoboken and woke up this morning to the beautiful view of New York City and the Hudson River, a river that has welcomed countless millions of people over hundreds of years to this great country. I am a product of a Jesuit education, or maybe I should say a "survivor" of a Jesuit education. I attended Fordham University – you know, that school in the Bronx that you couldn't get into so you had to go to NYU instead.

But for more than three decades, I have also had the tremendous fortune to travel the world and, as part of that experience, to learn about the goodness and beauty of Islam.

As a college student in the 1970s, I spent a summer traveling through Indonesia, taking in the wonderful landscape, culture and people of Java and Bali. Like the President during his childhood years in Jakarta, I came to see Islam, not how it is often misrepresented, but for what it is and how it is practiced every day by well over a billion Muslims worldwide—a faith of peace and tolerance and great diversity.

I also spent time as an undergraduate at the American University of Cairo in the 1970's, time spent with classmates, from Egypt, Jordan, Palestine, and around the world, who taught me that whatever our differences of nationality or race or religion, there are certain aspirations that we share, to get an education, to provide for our families, to practice our faith freely, to live in peace and security.

During a 25-year career in government, I was privileged to serve in positions across the Middle East.

As a political officer with the State Department and as a CIA station chief in Saudi Arabia. I saw how our Saudi partners fulfilled their duty as Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques at Mecca and Medina. I marveled at the majesty of the Hajj and the devotion of those who fulfilled their duty as Muslims by making that pilgrimage.

And in all my travels, the city I have come to love most is Jerusalem, where three great faiths come together. So much attention is paid to divisions in that wonderful city. But you can't visit those holy places—the Church of the Holy Sepulcher, the Wailing Wall, the dome of the Rock—and not know that these faiths can and will live in peace.

I have also seen, as the President has said, how Islam is part of America's story. American Muslims have enriched every segment of American life, including an area that is often overlooked, our national security.

American Muslims protect our communities as police, firefighters and first responders, and were some of the first to respond to the heinous attack on this city on 9/11.

American Muslims serve with honor in every branch of our armed forces. Many have given their lives. And some now rest in Arlington National Cemetery—the crescent moon and star on their headstones—next to their fellow Americans, rightly honored as heroes in the proud story of America’s fight for freedom.

And American Muslims work to ensure our national security and civil liberties. They are public servants I work with every day. For example, at the Department of Homeland Security, Assistant Secretary Arif Alikhan. At the FBI, Javed Ali. In the counterterrorism community, Shaarik Zafar. And from the civil rights division at the Justice Department, Mazen Basrawi. I’m pleased that some of these patriotic Americans are here with us today, and I’d ask them to stand and be recognized.

These Americans, and many others, help keep us safe every day from threats that are real and serious, among them the threat from violent extremism. And as we all know, violent extremism is neither unique nor inherent to any one faith. Indeed, violence is something that every faith rejects but that every faith has had to confront.

For we have seen extremists, who purport to be Christian, murder the innocent in this country. We have seen extremists, who purport to be Hindu, murder Gandhi and Muslims in India, and an extremist, who purports to be Jewish, murder Yitzhak Rabin.

And we are seeing extremists called al Qaeda, who purport to be Islamic, murder people of all faiths. Those of you here today, you understand this better than most—because Muslims, including American Muslims, have suffered the consequences of this violent extremism in a way the rest of us will never know.

As Americans, you are targeted by al Qaeda and its affiliates just like every other American. Indeed, we should never forget that terrorist attacks on our Nation, including the 9/11 attacks, have also taken the lives of many American Muslims—innocent men, women and children whose lives were lost simply because they too were American citizens. And had that attack succeeded on December 25th, it could have cost the lives of all those on that aircraft as well as lives on the ground in Detroit, which is home to so many Muslim and Arab Americans.

As Muslims, you have seen a small fringe of fanatics—who cloak themselves in religion—try to distort your faith, though they clearly are ignorant of the most fundamental teachings of Islam. Instead of finding the inherent dignity and decency in other human beings, they practice a medieval brand of intolerance. Instead of saving human lives, as the Qur’an instructs, they take innocent life. Instead of creating, they destroy—bombing mosques, hospitals and schools. They are not jihadists—for jihad is a holy struggle, an effort to purify, for a legitimate purpose, and there is nothing holy or pure or legitimate or Islamic about murdering innocent men, women and children.⁴

And so devout Muslims like you, have been forced to defend and define your faith. And this can be especially hard when so many people develop a distorted view of Islam because, too often, the only time they read and hear about your faith is in the context of al Qaeda and terrorism.

As families with relatives and friends around the world, you know that it is actually Muslims who have suffered most at the bloody hands of violent extremism. It is your Muslim brothers and sisters—from Afghanistan and Pakistan, from the Sahel to South Asia—who have paid the highest price. As one study noted, in recent years nearly all of al Qaeda's victims—98 percent—have been innocents from Muslim countries, thousands of men, women and children. And as the Qur'an reveals, "Never should a believer kill a believer," and if he does, "the wrath and the curse of God are upon him."

As parents, it is your sons and daughters—young people the age of students here today—who are being targeted by al Qaeda and its hateful ideology. Until recently, some thought this was a challenge for other countries where Muslims had often not assimilated or been accepted into mainstream society. But as we have seen in recent months, al Qaeda seeks to steal the souls of young people here in America as well.

In this sense, al Qaeda is not unlike drug lords, gang leaders or human traffickers—preying on the confused and the vulnerable who are perhaps struggling with their identity and seeking a sense of belonging, brainwashing them with false promises of paradise and using them as cannon fodder for their own murderous agenda. And so, increasingly, American Muslims, mothers and fathers, face the challenge of protecting their own sons and daughters.

As communities, you have also been targeted from the other side—by inexcusable ignorance and prejudice here in the United States, Europe and elsewhere. Each of you here no doubt has your own stories. We know that it is not only Muslims who have been singled out, but also those perceived to be Muslim—Arab, Sikh and South Asian.

In the wake of the Fort Hood tragedy and the attempted attack over Detroit, we've seen an ugly rise in scape-goating and fear-mongering. Yet the true character of America was on display when Army Chief of Staff General Casey went on national television and said so eloquently that, in our Army and in our America, our diversity is a strength, and our diversity cannot become a casualty of such incidents.

President Obama declared in his address in Cairo that he considers it part of his responsibility as President to fight against negative stereotypes of Islam. This is not only a matter of civil rights. It's a matter of our national security. And it's a matter of our morality as a nation. Hostility and harassment toward American Muslims, and toward members of other faiths and backgrounds, plays right into the hands of violent extremists. It reinforces the misguided notion that American Muslims are somehow separate from, rather than a part of, America. It creates an atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust that discourage dialogue and cooperation with law enforcement. And it increases the chance that a kid growing up in America, who is perhaps struggling with issues of his own, will become captivated by extremist ideologies.⁵

So it is very clear. Ignorance is a threat to our national security. Prejudice is a threat to our national security. Discrimination is a threat to our national security. And those who purport to be religious are frequently the most egregious purveyors of ignorance, prejudice, and discrimination. And it must stop.

In the spirit of candor, we must also acknowledge that, over the years, the actions of our government have at times perpetuated these attitudes. Violations of the PATRIOT Act. Surveillance seen as excessive. Policies perceived as profiling. Over inclusive no-fly lists subjecting law-abiding individuals to unnecessary searches and inconvenience. Creating an unhelpful atmosphere around many Muslim charities that made Muslims hesitant to fulfill their sacred obligation of zakat.

These are the challenges we face together, as Americans. And President Obama and his administration are pursuing a comprehensive approach to address them.

This approach is rooted in the President's vision of America's role in the world. Since taking office, he has made it a priority to uphold our values and highest ideals, not only because they keep us true to who we are as a Nation, but because they make it more likely that other nations will partner with us for our common security. That's why he prohibited torture and mistreatment of individuals in custody and why he remains committed to closing the prison at Guantanamo Bay.

The President has made it clear that we will define our country not simply by what we are against, but by what we are for—the opportunities, liberties and common aspirations we share with people around the world. Rather than simply focusing on ties between governments, he has pursued a broader engagement with people on issues that are most important to them: economic development, education, health, good governance and the dignity of every human being, including women's rights.

We see this in his outreach to Muslim communities around the world. He is the first President to use an inaugural address to speak directly to Muslims. He has spoken to people directly in his interviews on al-Arabiya and Dawn TV in Pakistan, in his message on Nowruz, and, of course, in his speeches in Ankara and Cairo, where he pledged a new beginning with Muslim communities based on mutual interest and mutual respect.

And this weekend, the President is addressing Muslims from around the world, including representatives from some of your organizations, in videotaped remarks to the U.S.-Islamic World Forum in Doha, which Secretary of State Clinton will attend. He's reaffirming the commitments he made in Cairo, including his unyielding pursuit of peace between Israelis and Palestinians. He's highlighting the many new partnerships that he promised in Cairo and that have already begun—initiatives to promote economic development, education, science and technology and public health.

And in a sign of his continued commitment, the President is announcing that a member of his White House legal staff known to many of you, Rashad Hussain, will serve as his Special Envoy to the Organization of the Islamic Conference.

This same spirit of partnership is needed to confront the challenge of violent extremism, and the President's approach has three main components: defeating al Qaeda and its allies, confronting the broader challenge of violent extremism generally, and safeguarding our homeland in a manner that both protects our security and our values.

First, defeating al Qaeda and its allies. The President has been very clear about who we are fighting. We are not waging a "war on terrorism," because terrorism is but a tactic that will never be defeated any more than the tactic of war itself. Rather, such thinking is a recipe for endless conflict. We are not at war against "terror"—because terror is but a state of mind, and, as President Obama has said, as Americans we refuse to live in fear.

Rather, we are focused on defeating and destroying al Qaeda and its violent extremist allies. That is why President Obama is responsibly ending the war in Iraq, which had nothing to do with 9/11, and all U.S. troops will be out of Iraq by the end of next year. At the same time, the President has refocused the military mission in Afghanistan by targeting the Taliban insurgency and protecting the Afghan people, increasing training of Afghan security forces, and beginning the transfer of responsibility to those forces in summer 2011 so that American forces can begin to come home.

Today, the core al Qaeda—led by Osama bin Laden—is seriously damaged, bloodied and hunkered down in the tribal areas along the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan. We've taken out key leaders and made it harder for them to move, raise money, recruit, train and plot attacks. In fact, we've disrupted more plots and saved more lives than the American public and the press will ever know.

Nevertheless, al Qaeda remains adaptive and highly resilient, with a web of affiliates in places like Yemen, where al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula took credit for the failed attack over Detroit, in Somalia and East Africa, the Sahel and North Africa, in South Asia and Southeast Asia.

So in partnership with countries around the world, we're using every tool in our toolbox to protect our country—going after these murderers wherever they plot and train, sharing intelligence and building the capacity of partners like Yemen to defend themselves, disrupting the financing that fuels terrorism, and working with law enforcement.

At the same time, we recognize that there is no military solution to the second and larger challenge we face of violent extremism generally. This includes those upstream factors—the political and economic causes and conditions that help fuel hatred and violence, including loss of faith in political systems to improve daily life and the vulnerability of young minds to predators like gangs and terrorist recruiters. And while poverty and lack of opportunity do not cause terrorism, it is obvious that lack of education, basic human services and hope for the future make vulnerable populations more susceptible to ideologies of violence and death.

Ultimately, these challenges require political and economic solutions. So in Afghanistan, we're investing in leaders who combat corruption, promote good governance and improve basic services, including education and health. Across the border, we're partnering with the Pakistani people, investing \$1.5 billion every year for five years to promote economic development and strengthen democratic institutions.

Finally, we are doing everything in our power to protect our homeland. And just as Muslim Americans serve at every level of government—local, state and federal—to keep our country safe,

let's never forget that Muslim American citizens—you and your organizations—help keep our Nation safe as well. This too is frequently lost in the hysteria and fear-mongering that often surrounds national security discussions.

In the aftermath of the tragic murder of 13 Americans on Army base in Texas, Muslim American organizations roundly condemned such senseless violence and, in fact, reached out to help and support the families of the victims.

We read about arrests, such as the Lackawanna Six in Buffalo, but forget that it was Muslim Americans—community members, religious leaders—who helped bring those plots to the attention of authorities.

We read about the cases—Somali-Americans from Minnesota returning to fight in Somalia and five Virginia men who went to Pakistan seeking militancy—but let's not forget that it was concerned parents and families, worried for their loved ones, who frequently alerted authorities.

In other words, keeping our country safe and protecting our sons and daughters from hateful ideologies demands trust and cooperation. Over the years, organizations represented here today have worked closely with our government in this regard. Going forward, I would suggest that several key principles can guide us as we meet our responsibilities to each other.

First and foremost, government must fulfill its responsibilities, including protecting the rights and civil liberties of all Americans. For the President—who worked as a civil rights lawyer and as a professor of constitutional law—this is not some policy choice to be debated, these are core values and laws that must be upheld. We must remember what we're fighting for.

As the President noted in his State of the Union address, the civil rights division at the Justice Department has returned to its founding mission—protecting civil rights and prosecuting violations. This includes the rights of Muslim, Arab, Sikh and South Asian Americans. For the burning of a mosque in Tennessee, several individuals will spend many years in prison. Across the country, the Justice Department has gone to court to protect the right of girls and women to wear the hijab, at school and work.

And I can assure you today, the Obama administration will vigorously enforce new hate crimes laws. Because in the United States of America, no one should ever have to hide their faith out of fear.

Second, your government must listen to you. Security policies and procedures cannot be formulated in a vacuum. They must reflect the realities of the world in which they will be implemented. Law enforcement cannot lose sight of the people that it is sworn to protect and to serve.

We may not always see eye-to-eye. We may not always agree on every policy. These are very difficult and complex issues. And frankly, we struggle with them on a daily basis. They do not lend themselves to easy answers. And, at times, we are forced to make painful decisions that we would not make under ordinary circumstances.

But on behalf of President Obama, on behalf of this administration, I can promise you this. In every discussion, in every decision, civil rights and civil liberties are always a priority. For example, in the wake of the attempted attack over Detroit, we are strengthened our no-fly list—

focusing on those who might do us harm, not those who don't. From the President on down, we are doing everything in our power to protect both our national security and civil liberties, as we do not believe we need to make a choice between the two. And we will continue to optimize both our security and our civil liberties.

Third, even as we listen and work together, we cannot “securitize” the relationship between the American people and their government. In other words, we cannot let the relationship between millions of Muslim, Arab, Sikh and South Asian Americans and your government be defined by the threat of violent extremism. That is exactly what terrorists want and it would risk reinforcing the dangerous notion that your communities and your government are somehow in conflict, when, in fact, we are fellow citizens facing a common threat.

Fourth, our work together must respect the proper roles of government and community. Government—law enforcement and counterterrorism at the local, state and federal levels—should focus on keeping our country safe by preventing and prosecuting illegal behavior, including terrorist activities. And as experience has shown us, this is most effective when done in partnership with affected communities—because you know your communities best.

The separate task of countering radical ideologies—the beliefs and attitudes that can lead to violence—must be led by families and communities, including your organizations. Government can play a supporting role, as is the Department of Homeland Security in partnership with some of your organizations. But communities must take the lead.

I commend your efforts to reach vulnerable individuals, especially young people, through religious education, social programs and the Internet and social networking sites. Let me say a word about the Internet. Just like gangs and drug dealers have infiltrated our neighborhoods, and our parks, and our playgrounds, so too have violent extremists and terrorists penetrated our cyber domain to ply their evil and sinful trade. Our communities must be vigilant for those cyber activities and defeat the efforts of those who seek to do us harm.

Finally, there is a principle that can guide each and every one of us, regardless of our faith—that we never forget the core values of diversity and tolerance and trust that define us as Americans. Each of us, in our own lives, has many identities. I am at once a son, a husband, a father, a Virginian, a Catholic, a public servant. As students, you are at once a son or daughter, a brother or sister, a Muslim, a student. Each of us, at times, may struggle with our different identities. Others may try to get us to focus narrowly on the identities that seem to separate us. But we can never lose sight of the identities that unite us. We are all Americans. And therefore, we all share a common purpose.

We are a nation of faith, founded by men and women who came here to escape religious persecution, and have since been joined by believers of every faith. We are a nation of liberty, dedicated to the proposition that all men—and women—are created equal. Just as I am the son of an immigrant, we are a nation of immigrants, constantly renewed and strengthened by new arrivals from every country and culture. We are a nation of progress, where rights and justice have been expanded when we come together across color, creed and faith to demand change.

As the President said in Cairo, there are those who say that Muslims and non-Muslims are somehow fated to disagree, that, as individuals, we must somehow choose among our many identities, that different civilizations are doomed to clash. Of course, that myth is belied by more

than two hundred years of American history and American success. And it is belied by those of you in this room, Americans who know that our identities of faith and citizenship are not exclusive of one another. On the contrary, they strengthen and reinforce each other and America itself.

And anyone who doubts this truth need only look to recent events in Haiti. Amidst so much suffering, we saw man's inherent goodness. People came together from many nations and faiths—Christian and Jew, Muslim, Sikh and Hindu—for a single purpose, to help other human beings in crisis. And I couldn't help but think as I watched that footage how much it stood in stark contrast to the blood and suffering and death that have been perpetrated by extremist organizations.

The effort in Haiti included physicians and relief works from the Islamic Medical Association of North America, Islamic Relief, and the Zakat Foundation. As one of those volunteers said, "We are commanded by our creator to help a fellow man in need. It's very clear in the Qur'an that to save one human life is as if you saved all of humanity."

I can't imagine a more inspiring lesson for us all, as we work together, here at home, to keep our country safe, and as we work together, around the world, to build a safer and more secure future for our children.

Thank you all very much.

6) Terminology to Define the Terrorists: Recommendations from American Muslims; DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties; January 2008 (Full Paper)

Words matter. The terminology that senior government officials use must accurately identify the nature of the challenges that face our generation. It is critical that all Americans properly understand the gravity of the threats we face, and prepare themselves to take the steps necessary to build a secure future. We are facing an enemy that holds a totalitarian ideology, and seeks to impose that ideology through force across the globe. We must resist complacency. The language that senior government officials use can help to rally Americans to vigilance.

At the same time, the terminology should also be strategic – it should avoid helping the terrorists by inflating the religious bases and glamorous appeal of their ideology. One of the most common concerns expressed by Muslims in America, and indeed the West, is that senior government officials and commentators in the mass media regularly indict all Muslims for the acts of a few. They argue that terminology can create either a negative climate, in which acts of harassment or discrimination occur, or, by contrast, a positive climate, such as President Bush’s remarks while visiting a mosque in the days after 9/11.

If senior government officials carefully select strategic terminology, the government’s public statements will encourage vigilance without unintentionally undermining security objectives. That is, the terminology we use must be accurate with respect to the very real threat we face. At the same time, our terminology must be properly calibrated to diminish the recruitment efforts of extremists who argue that the West is at war with Islam.

This memorandum outlines recommendations from a wide variety of American Muslim leaders regarding the difficult terrain of terminology. This memorandum does not state official Department of Homeland Security (DHS) policy nor does it address legal definitions. Rather, it outlines recommendations compiled by the DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) from its discussions with a broad range of Muslim American community leaders and scholars.

Background

On May 8, 2007, Secretary Chertoff met with a group of influential Muslim Americans to discuss ways the Department can work with their communities to protect the country, promote civic engagement, and prevent violent radicalization from taking root in the United States. Part of the discussion involved the terminology U.S. Government (USG) officials use to describe terrorists who invoke Islamic theology in planning, carrying out, and justifying their attacks. While there was a broad consensus that the terminology the USG uses impacts both national security and the ability to win hearts and minds, this discussion did not yield any specific recommendations. Secretary Chertoff requested that these leaders continue to reflect on the words and terms that, in their opinion, DHS and the broader USG should use. Based on this request, CRCL has consulted with some of the leading U.S.-based scholars and commentators on Islam to discuss the best terminology to use when describing the terrorist threat.

Assumptions

Starting from the premise that words do indeed matter, three foundational assumptions inform this paper:

- 1) We should not demonize all Muslims or Islam;
- 2) Because the terrorists themselves use theology and religious terms to justify both their means and ends, the terms we use must be accurate and descriptive; and
- 3) Our words should be strategic; we must be conscious of history, culture, and context. In an era where a statement can cross continents in a manner of seconds, it is essential that officials consider how terms translate, and how they will resonate with a variety of audiences.

TERMINOLOGY TO AVOID

Expert Recommendation 1 – Respond to ideologies that exploit Islam without labeling all terrorist groups as a single enemy.

The public statements of the USG must convey the ideological dimensions of the terrorist threat, in addition to conveying its tactical dimensions. Specifically, it is important for the public to understand that many extremists groups seek to impose their totalitarian worldview by seizing political power through force. In labeling specific organizations and movements, however, the experts recommend that the USG should not feed the notion that America is engaged in a broad struggle against the so-called “Muslim World.” Currently, the U.S. and its allies are facing threats from a variety of terrorist organizations operating across the globe. But the threats presented by transnational movements like al-Qaeda are perhaps the most serious.¹ According to these experts, al-Qaeda wants all Muslims to line up under its banner. Collapsing all terrorist organizations into a single enemy feeds the narrative that al-Qaeda represents Muslims worldwide. Al-Qaeda may be spreading its influence, but the USG should not abet its franchising by making links when none exist. For example, the cult members arrested in Miami should not be called members of al-Qaeda; and, while they are both terrorist organizations who threaten global security and stability, Hezbollah and Hamas are distinct in methods, motivations and goals from al-Qaeda. When possible, the experts recommend that USG terminology should make this clear.

Expert Recommendation 2 –Do not give the terrorists the legitimacy that they seek.

What terrorists fear most is irrelevance; what they need most is for large numbers of people to rally to their cause. There was a consensus that the USG should avoid unintentionally portraying terrorists, who lack moral and religious legitimacy, as brave fighters, legitimate soldiers, or spokesmen for ordinary Muslims. Therefore, the experts counseled caution in using terms such as, “jihadist,” “Islamic terrorist,” “Islamist,” and “holy warrior” as grandiose descriptions.

Using the word “Islamic” in a phrase will sometimes be necessary in order to distinguish terrorists who claim the banner of Islam from other extremist groups who do not invoke religion, or who invoke other faiths. Nevertheless, CRCL understands the experts’ caution in this regard to be rooted in the concern that we should not concede the terrorists’ claim that they are legitimate adherents of Islam. Therefore, when using the word, it may be strategic to emphasize that many so-called “Islamic” terrorist groups twist and exploit the tenets of Islam to justify violence and to serve their own selfish political aims.

¹ “National Intelligence Estimate: The Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland.” p. 6 (July 17, 2007) http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20070717_release.pdf (July, 28 2007).

The same is true of the moniker “Islamist” (or the related “Islamism”), which many have used to refer to individuals who view Islam as a political system in addition to a religion. The experts we

consulted did not criticize this usage based on accuracy; indeed, they acknowledged that academics and commentators, including some in the Arab and Muslim Worlds, regularly use “Islamist” to describe people and movements. Nevertheless, they caution that it may not be strategic for USG officials to use the term because the general public, including overseas audiences, may not appreciate the academic distinction between Islamism and Islam. In the experts’ estimation, this may still be true, albeit to a lesser extent, even if government officials add qualifiers, e.g. “violent Islamists” or “radical Islamism.”

Regarding *jihad*, even if it is accurate to reference the term (putting aside polemics on its true nature), it may not be *strategic* because it glamorizes terrorism, imbues terrorists with religious authority they do not have, and damages relations with Muslims around the globe.

Some say that this is a war against “Salafis.” However, Salafism is a belief system that many people follow. This includes al-Qaeda leadership, as well as many individuals who are not violent at all. Again, if we assign this term to al-Qaeda, we will be handing them legitimacy that they do not have, but are desperately seeking.

The consensus is that we must carefully avoid giving bin Laden and other al-Qaeda leaders the legitimacy they crave, but do not possess, by characterizing them as religious figures, or in terms that may make them seem to be noble in the eyes of some.

Expert Recommendation 3 – Proceed carefully before using Arabic and religious terminology.

USG officials may want to avoid using theological terms, particularly those in Arabic, even if such usage is benign or overtly positive. Islamic law and terms come with a particular context, which may not always be apparent. It is one thing for a Muslim leader to use a particular term; an American official may simply not have the religious authority to be taken seriously, even when using terms appropriately.

TERMINOLOGY TO USE

Expert Recommendation 4 – Reference the cult-like aspects of terrorists, while still conveying the magnitude of the threat we face.

In describing al-Qaeda, its supporters, and other violent extremists, some commentators have used the term “death cult.”² While the term may not fully encompass or describe the threat posed by groups like al-Qaeda, it may be both accurate and useful when used as a point of comparison. Cults, while often linked to mainstream religions, have a negative connotation. As a practical matter, terrorist groups use recruitment tactics that are similar to cults: separation from family, indoctrination, and breaking down previously-held beliefs.³

² Thomas L. Friedman, “If It’s a Muslim Problem, It Needs a Muslim Solution,” *The New York Times* (July 8, 2005) <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/08/opinion/08friedman.html?ex=1278475200&en=a1cbffb46f2ac7d0&ei=5088> (July 28, 2007) (“[I]t is essential that the Muslim world wake up to the fact that it has a jihadist death cult in its midst”); *see also* Reza Aslan, “Why Do They Hate Us? Strange Answers Lie in Al-Qaida’s Writings,” *Slate* (August 6, 2007) <http://www.slate.com/id/2171752> (September 6, 2007) (referring to Osama bin-Laden as a “cult leader literally dwelling in a cave”).

³ For a discussion of terrorist indoctrination, *see* Robert Baer, “A Talk With a Suicide Bomber,” *Time Magazine* (July 20, 2007) <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1645461,00.html> (July 28, 2007).

This negative connotation also exists in the Muslim world. Indeed, the experts highlighted previous instances in Islamic history where heretic sectarian groups formed, followed a cultish strategy of

recruitment, and were eventually marginalized. This began with the Kharijites, the first radical dissidents in Islam, who assassinated the fourth Caliph Ali in 661 C.E. There is even a genre of literature, the *Kitab al-Firaq* or *Book of Sects*, which discusses these movements.

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Based on this history and context, senior officials might use terms such as “death cult,” “cult-like,” “sectarian cult,” and “violent cultists” to describe the ideology and methodology of al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups. “Cult” is both normative and accurate in that it suggests a pseudo-religious ideology that is outside the mainstream. Moreover, as there is no overt reference to Islam, these terms are not as likely to cause offense. Referring to bin Laden’s movement as “fringe” or “outside the mainstream” may also be helpful. Of course, the threat posed by terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda is far greater than that posed by most cult groups. Nevertheless, “cult” comparisons may advance strategic USG objectives by marginalizing those who falsely claim to represent ordinary Muslims.

Expert Recommendation 5 – Use “mainstream,” “ordinary,” and “traditional” in favor of “moderate” when describing broader Muslim populations.

In characterizing the broader Muslim American community, the Muslim World, and Islam generally, “mainstream,” “ordinary,” and “traditional” are preferable to “moderate.” One can be deeply religious, strictly adhere to fundamental doctrines, and nevertheless abhor violence. In addition, “mainstream” is a useful foil to the “cult” terminology referenced above. By contrast, the term “moderate” has become offensive to many Muslims, who believe that it refers to individuals who the USG prefers to deal with, and who are only marginally religious. Notably, ⁴“mainstream” is a term that is emerging among Muslim American commentators.

Expert Recommendation 6 – Pay attention to the discourse on takfirism. As discussed, USG officials should use caution before employing religious terminology. But they should not be ignorant of useful phraseology. According to the experts we consulted, one such term is “takfirism,” which refers to the practice of declaring a Muslim a *kafir* or non-believer, and then proclaiming that their lives can be forfeited. Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups employ *takfir* to name as apostates all Muslims who reject their ideology, arguing that this makes their blood violable. This is not a new phenomenon; indeed, takfiri practices arise sporadically in Islamic history. For example, the Kharijites’ practice of *takfir* became the justification for their indiscriminate attacks on civilian Muslims. Modern examples are the Iraqi insurgent groups who justify their actions against Shi’as by labeling them *kafirs*, e.g. the bombers of the Golden Mosque in Samarra. Strictly speaking, takfirism most accurately describes terrorism by Muslims against other Muslims.

⁴ Shahed Amanullah, “Western Muslims need a ‘fourth estate,’” *Altmuslim.com* (April 9, 2007) http://www.altmuslim.com/a/a/a/western_muslims_need_a_fourth_estate/ (September 6, 2007) (“Dynamic, independent, and professional Muslim voices, free of restrictions based on organizational affiliation yet **intimately connected to the mainstream Muslim community**, can make a difference even if their numbers are small.”)(emphasis added).

⁵ James S. Robbins, “Al Qaeda Blows It.” *National Review Online* (February 23, 2006) <http://www.nationalreview.com/robbins/robbins200602230743.asp> (July 28, 2007).

But it may be strategic to employ the term in a wider context given that (1) many of the leaders of al-Qaeda are known to have adopted a takfiri ideology, ⁶ and (2) part of the USG’s anti-terrorism

strategy should be to emphasize that the majority of the victims of modern terrorism are Muslim. There may also be a useful nexus to cult terminology; regarding takfiri indoctrination, French terrorism expert Roland Jacquard states: “Takfir is like a sect: once you’re in, you never get out. The Takfir rely on brainwashing and an extreme regime of discipline to wet the weak links and ensure loyalty and obedience from those taken as members.”⁸ Thus, the phrase “takfiri death cult” may have some relevance.

The experts we consulted acknowledged that USG officials may feel uncomfortable using religious and Arabic terminology. And as discussed above, it may not be strategic for them to do so. Nevertheless, given its relevance to Islamic history and present-day conflicts, the experts believe government officials should pay attention to the discourse on takfirism for three reasons.

First, unlike *jihad*, which arguably has a variety of interpretations, *takfir* has historically had an overwhelmingly negative connotation. Second, and as the articles referenced here demonstrate, commentators do use the term to describe terrorists and their ideology. As such, no one can argue that the USG invented the concept. Last, and perhaps most important, some of the most influential Muslim religious leaders have strongly come out against the takfiri doctrine.

⁶ A *Time Magazine* article published shortly after 9/11 is instructive:

Bin Laden and al-Qaeda may have learned, by violent experience, to pre-empt and harness the new fanaticism. In late 1995, bin Laden's compound in Khartoum was attacked by gunmen believed to be Takfiri. A Sudanese friend of bin Laden's who questioned the surviving attacker said, “He was like a maniac, more or less like the students in the U.S.A. who shoot other students. They don't have very clear objectives.” By the time al-Qaeda had resettled in Afghanistan, ideological training was an integral part of the curriculum, according to a former recruit who went on to bomb the U.S. embassy in Nairobi. Students were asked to learn all about demolition, artillery and light-weapon use, but they were also expected to be familiar with the fatwas of al-Qaeda, including those that called for violence against Muslim rulers who contradicted Islam—a basic Takfiri tenet.

Michael Elliot, “Hate Club: Al-Qaeda’s Web of Terror.” (November 4, 2001).

<http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,182746,00.html> (July 28, 2007).

⁷ David McKeeby, “Terrorism Report Highlights Global Challenge.” *USINFO* (April 30, 2007)

<http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2007&m=April&x=20070425112825idybeekcm0.2628443> (July 28, 2007).

⁸ See supra note 6. ⁹ In *The Amman Message*, the participating scholars issued a unanimous ruling, known as the “Three Points of the *Amman Message*.” In it, they took the following actions: 1. They specifically recognized the validity of all 8 *Mathhabs* (legal schools) of *Sunni*, *Shi'a* and *Ibadhi* Islam; of traditional Islamic Theology (*Ash'arism*); of Islamic Mysticism (Sufism), and of true *Salafi* thought, and came to a precise definition of who is a Muslim. 2. Based upon this definition, they forbade *takfir* (declarations of apostasy) between Muslims. 3. Based upon the *Mathahib*, they set forth the subjective and objective preconditions for the issuing of *fatwas*, thereby exposing ignorant and illegitimate edicts in the name of Islam. Prince Ghazi Bin Muhammad, “Muslims Speak Out,” *On Faith* (July 22, 2007) http://newsweek.washingtonpost.com/onfaith/muslims_speak_out/2007/07/ghazi.html (August 2, 2007).

In July 2005, King Abdullah II of Jordan convened a conference in Amman of 200 of the world's leading Islamic scholars from 50 countries.⁹ The group, which included Sunnis and Shi'as, unanimously issued a ruling, known as *The Amman Message*, specifically forbidding the practice of *takfir*.¹⁰ Since then, over 500 Islamic scholars worldwide have adopted the ruling.¹¹ While it is undoubtedly a welcome development, the experts agreed that *The Amman Message* is just one step, and that its effect on the ideology and operations of al-Qaeda will be negligible.

They pointed out, however, that the audience the USG is attempting to reach includes mainstream Muslims, the majority of whom denounce violence, yet still believe the U.S. is waging a war against their religion.¹² It is this group, the experts reasoned, that may pay attention to *The Amman Message* and its anti-takfiri stance.

The experts did not recommend a wholesale adoption of takfirism or related terms into the USG lexicon. Rather, they advised us to pay attention to how this term is used, and consider future opportunities for utilization. The experts themselves believe in its efficacy and accuracy and have pledged to reference the term in their writings.

Nevertheless, they recognized that takfirism is a religious term and that, at least initially, it may be awkward for USG officials to use it. But this was also true of *jihadi*, which is now used regularly. Moreover, unlike other terms, using takfirism does not create a division between Islam and the West. To the contrary, its usage, the experts maintained, will allow the USG to linguistically sever the violent actors from broader Muslim communities, without sacrificing accuracy, succumbing to political correctness, or alienating mainstream Muslims.

Expert Recommendation 7 – Emphasize the Positive.

USG officials should emphasize the positive – what we are seeking together. In addition to recognizing the dark vision of our terrorist enemies and the need to counter their actions with all elements of national power, the USG should also attempt to convince people that this generation needs to unite to promote a common vision for the future. The experts we consulted suggested defining the challenge of our times as “A Global Struggle for Security and Progress.” It is unlikely that this phrase will replace existing monikers such as “the war on terror” or “the long war,” which are more widely used both within and outside the government. Moreover, as a comprehensive descriptor, the phrase may not sufficiently reflect the need to promote public vigilance and rally support for the USG's anti-terrorism mission. Nevertheless, we understand the experts' recommendation to be grounded in the realization that we must define what we stand *for*, in addition to defining what we stand *against*. More specifically, it may be strategic to emphasize the following:

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² “Muslims Believe US Seeks to Undermine Islam.” *World Public Opinion* (April 24, 2007) http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/home_page/346.php?nid=&id=&pnt=346&lb=hmpg1 (July 29, 2007).

1. The civilized world is facing a “global” challenge, which transcends geography, culture, and religion;
2. This struggle is for “security,” a global aspiration that all people seek. In particular, Islam emphasizes order and structure. The takfiri ideology is the antithesis of this and in many respects resembles anarchism – killing wantonly, destroying great buildings and mosques without reason, and bringing chaos and disorder. Moreover, the concept of “security” is one that resonates with mainstream American audiences, as well as with Muslims around the world.
3. This struggle is for “progress,” over which no nation has a monopoly. The experts we consulted debated the word “liberty,” but rejected it because many around the world would discount the term as a buzzword for American hegemony. But all people want to support “progress,” which emphasizes that there is a path for building strong families and prosperity among the current dislocations of globalization and change. And progress is precisely what the terrorists oppose through their violent tactics and through their efforts to impose a totalitarian worldview.

Expert Recommendation 8: Emphasize the Success of Integration.

Bin Laden and his followers will succeed if they convince large numbers of people that America and the West are at war with Islam, and that a “clash of civilizations” is inherent. Therefore, USG officials should continually emphasize a simple and straightforward truth: Muslims have been, and will continue to be part of the fabric of our country. Senior officials must make clear that there is no “clash of civilizations;” there is no “us versus them.” We must emphasize that Muslims are not “outsiders” looking in, but are an integral part of America and the West. Officials should look to incorporate concepts such as these, and the following, into their remarks:

- Muslims have successfully integrated into American communities for generations. From decades of experience, Muslims know that the environments created by democracies such as ours give them the freedom to choose the best way to raise their families, get an education, relate to their governments, become part of the government, start a business, and become prosperous in their professions.
- Muslim Americans are successful doctors, lawyers, teachers, first responders, Boy Scout leaders, and political leaders.
- We honor and value the contributions that Muslim Americans make to our communities.
- The motto on the seal of the United States is, “E Pluribus unum” – out of many, one. We all need to work together to make this great motto our reality.
- In America, there are no guests and no hosts; all citizens are politically and culturally equal.

The fact is that Islam and secular democracy are fully compatible – in fact, they can make each other stronger. Senior officials should emphasize this positive fact.

Expert Recommendation 9: Emphasize the U.S. Government’s Openness to Religious and Ethnic Communities.

Bin Laden’s narrative presumes a war against Islam and rampant mistreatment of Muslims by the American and other Western governments. Extremist recruiters argue that Muslims should segregate from the larger society; moreover, their recruitment pitch depends on isolation. These appeals are undercut by the fact, true for decades, that the USG works openly with religious and ethnic communities, and takes aggressive steps to protect their rights. Senior USG officials should emphasize themes such as the following:

- The USG is engaged with the American people, including Muslim Americans, looking for ways to make our communities prosperous and just.
- We are listening; we have an open door. There is no reason for Muslim Americans to feel isolated from their governments; we are working together regularly. Muslims Americans are playing a constructive and proactive role in improving the public policy of our country.
- There is no war against Muslims or Islam in America. In fact, the American government is committed to ensuring justice in our country. For example, we have aggressively prosecuted allegations of hate crimes against Muslims; the Department of Justice Civil Rights Division has sued a school district that refused to allow a teenage girl to wear a hijab; and, we actively pursued justice for Muslims victimized during the conflict in the Balkans.
- There is a good level of engagement between the Federal government and Muslim American communities, and it will continue to increase over the upcoming months and years. Indeed, we have the hope of seeing levels of engagement between the USG and Arab and Muslim Americans that have never been reached in the history of this country. For example, leading Arab, Muslim, and South Asian American groups have met multiple times with the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Attorney General, the Director of the FBI, the Secretary of the Treasury, and senior officials at the State Department.

If senior officials will emphasize these themes, it will undercut those who attempt to develop a “grievance” or “victim” mentality in the American Muslim community.

C. CONCLUSION

Words matter. The terminology the USG uses should convey the magnitude of the threat we face, but also avoid inflating the religious bases and glamorous appeal of the extremists’ ideology. Instead, USG terminology should depict the terrorists as the dangerous cult leaders they are. They have no honor, they have no dignity, and they offer no answers. While acknowledging that they have the capacity to destroy, we should constantly emphasize that they cannot build societies, and do not provide solutions to the problems people across the globe face.

Where our reach is limited, we should strongly encourage Muslim writers, commentators and scholars to use terminology that will drive the debate in a positive direction. While the USG may not be able to effectively use terms like *takfirism*, others certainly can.

Finally, we should view our words as bricks used to build a coalition. The USG should draw the conflict lines not between Islam and the West, but between a dangerous, cult-like network of terrorists and everyone who is in support of global security and progress.

SUMMARY OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES STRATEGIES

7) Executive Summary of United Kingdom's Prevent Strategy, June 2008

Overview

The Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU) of the Government of the United Kingdom's document entitled "The Prevent Strategy: A Guide for Local Partners in England" outlines a number of methods through which local communities can better equip themselves for combating violent extremism (CVE).

The Prevent strategy has five key strands:

- Challenging the violent extremist ideology and supporting mainstream voices;
- Disrupting those who promote violent extremism and supporting the institutions where they may be active;
- Supporting those who are being targeted and recruited to the cause of violent extremism;
- Increasing the resilience of communities to violent extremism; and
- Addressing the grievances that ideologues are exploiting.

The information most germane to Secretary Napolitano's charge to HSAC regarding CVE can be found in sum below, with particular focus on the document's recommended community oriented law enforcement approaches.

Community Oriented Law Enforcement Approaches: Mapping and Coordinating Support

"The Prevent Strategy" asserts that local authorities and the police should take the lead and ensure that other partners from the statutory and voluntary sector are involved with community CVE efforts. Because communities do not stop at local boundaries, local partners should work closely with neighboring areas, and with Government Offices, to deliver effective programs of action. In particular, the link between criminality and radicalization means that police and offender management teams should consider whether they are working with those who may become interested in violent extremism and consider what interventions need to be incorporated into processes to rehabilitate offenders or divert people away from criminality. This document also underscores the importance of a strong and trusting relationship between local partners and the media.

A deeper understanding of local communities should be developed to help inform and focus the program of action – this may include mapping denominational backgrounds and demographic and socio-economic factors as well as establishing community infrastructure and ways of accessing and influencing communities. This will help local partners to develop a richer understanding of the factors underpinning the challenge in a locality, and will provide a firmer basis on which to engage local communities.

The threat of individuals and communities in the local area becoming involved in, or supporting, violent extremism should be assessed and regularly reviewed using information from the community, local partners such as the police, and other sources. In understanding the extent and nature of the challenge in an area, local partners should assess:

- where radicalization is occurring;
- which groups of people may be most vulnerable to being drawn into violent extremism and why; and
- which sections of the community are most likely to need support if they are to challenge and resist messaging and overtures from violent extremists.

Local partners, in close collaboration with the police, need to establish a process to:

- identify individuals or groups which promote violent extremism;
- create a referral point and context in which agencies can consider appropriate action; and
- consider action that may be required in advance of or in addition to police action: this might include disrupting or removing funding streams or removing the access of groups or individuals to particular locations.
- Local partners may prioritize institutions or places that are in need of support based on a local risk assessment.
- Local partners can assess levels of risk in different institutions, organizations or places, and keep it up to date as risks change.

Local authorities and police should work with local institutions to:

- raise awareness within institutions or organizations about what makes them vulnerable;
- establish channels of communication, including a single point of contact in the local police;
- assist organizations to design policies and procedures that will strengthen them against activities of radicalizers. For example, institutions and organizations could:
 - ask police to conduct pre-appointment checks on candidates who would be working on projects receiving CVE funding, and to be a source of broader advice for groups working with young people;
 - organize staff training to ensure awareness and understanding of Prevent issues;
 - adopt policies on working with those who may not be reached by mainstream services; and
 - adopt appropriate policies on internet access.

“The Prevent Strategy” also places, in areas of high priority, dedicated “Prevent” resources in basic command units. These resources include regional “Prevent” delivery managers, counter terrorism unit “Prevent” teams and a newly formed national coordination team which will link into the work of central government and provide support and assistance to all forces. “Prevent” counter terrorism intelligence officers will also be deployed into basic command units to enhance the role of acquiring, interpreting, assessing, developing, and disseminating national security intelligence, and will also act as a crucial link or bridge with local community information.

8) House of Commons; Communities and Local Government Committee; Preventing Violent Extremism Summary, March 16, 2010

The Government's *Preventing Violent Extremism* program is a complex and sensitive agenda which has met with widely varying perceptions as to what the program stands for and what it aims to deliver on the ground. Our inquiry has shown that the current overall approach to *Prevent* is contentious and unlikely ever to be fully accepted in its existing form by those it is most important to engage.

The current breadth of focus of *Prevent*—from community work to crime prevention—sits uncomfortably within a counter-terrorism strategy. We support the logic behind the 'Four P's' of the CONTEST strategy—*Pursue, Prevent, Protect and Prepare*—and we do not wish to see this approach deconstructed. We also strongly support the need for a clear national strategy which deals with the specific threat from al-Qaeda-inspired terrorism. However, we question the appropriateness of the Department of Communities and Local Government—a Government department which has responsibility for promoting cohesive communities—taking a leading role in counter-terrorism initiatives. We agree with the majority of our witnesses that *Prevent* risks undermining positive cross-cultural work on cohesion and capacity building to combat exclusion and alienation in many communities.

We see a very important role for CLG in continuing such work and acknowledge its contribution to the aims of *Prevent*. However, we believe that this work can be successful only if untainted by the negative association with a counter-terrorism agenda.

The single focus on Muslims in *Prevent* has been unhelpful. We conclude that any program which focuses solely on one section of a community is stigmatizing, potentially alienating, and fails to address the fact that no section of a population exists in isolation from others. The need to address extremism of all kinds on a cross-community basis, dependent on assessed local risk, is paramount.

We remain concerned by the number of our witnesses who felt that *Prevent* had been used to 'spy' on Muslim communities. Our evidence suggests that differing interpretations of terminology relating to concepts such as 'intelligence gathering', 'spying' and 'surveillance' are posing major challenges to the *Prevent* agenda.

Information collected for the purposes of project monitoring and community mapping—both of which are to be encouraged—are sometimes being confused with the kind of intelligence gathering and surveillance undertaken by the police and security services to combat crime and actively pursue suspects. However, despite rebuttals, the allegations of spying retain widespread credibility within certain sections of the Muslim community. I

If the Government wants to improve confidence in the *Prevent* program, it should commission an independent investigation into the allegations made.

Regarding the Government's analysis of the factors which lead people to become involved in violent extremism, we conclude that there has been a pre-occupation with the theological basis of radicalization, when the evidence seems to indicate that politics, policy and socio-economics may be more important factors in the process.

Consequently, we suggest that attempts to find solutions and engagement with preventative work should primarily address the political challenges. We therefore recommend that opportunities be provided for greater empowerment and civic engagement with democratic institutions, to strengthen the interaction and engagement with society not only of Muslims, but of other excluded groups.

Our witnesses demonstrated widely ranging views as to how Government and local authorities should fund, seek advice from, and engage with organizations in the development and execution of the *Prevent* program. There is a sense that Government has sought to engineer a 'moderate' form of Islam, promoting and funding only those groups which conform to this model. We do not think it is the job of Government to intervene in theological matters, but we are also concerned that local authorities have been left with too much responsibility for deciding how engagement and project funding should be managed. We make a range of recommendations on this topic and conclude that this is an area requiring immediate attention by Government.

9) Executive Summary of Dutch Intelligence Polarisation and Radicalisation Action Plan 2007 – 2011

Background

According to the Dutch intelligence service, AIVD, “Islamic radicalization and right-wing extremist radicalization form the greatest social threat currently facing the Netherlands.” To address this, the government’s strategy has three main points: prevention of future radicalization, creating a system to help signal signs of radicalization in the society, intervention by identifying and neutralizing irreconcilable radicals. To help gauge progress, the government has endeavored to develop metrics based on crime, discrimination, education and labor statistics.

Findings

Who is Vulnerable to Radicalization?

- The report found that those most vulnerable to turn to radicalization are usually men under the age of 30 who are searching for some sort of purpose or identity. Women, however, are a growing percentage of this segment of society. One of the main attractions of radicalization is the feeling of belonging that it can confer to those in need of camaraderie. A final component is a deep feeling of grievance for a perceived injustice committed against themselves or other Muslims around the world. These attributes apply to those born Muslim and those who have converted.

Strategy

- The report concludes that confronting radicalization is a mission best left to local authorities. Teachers, police officers and youth workers are identified as being the most capable of executing the three-point anti-radicalization plan: prevention, signaling and intervention. Both “soft” and “hard” tactics are recommended at the local level. Examples of soft tactics include things like arranging community meetings and debates, promoting both job training and creation, and the monitoring of school dropout statistics. Hard tactics include strict enforcement of school attendance rules, stepped-up police street patrols, creation of neighborhood boarding schools, and a zero-tolerance stance on discrimination.
- It is also recommended that a national plan should be developed in order to support these local actors. National policies should be focused on goals that are not necessarily aimed only at radicalization, but are helpful in eliminating the breeding grounds of terrorism. Specific national policy goals should be:
 - Increasing the integration into mainstream society those who are most vulnerable to radicalization. This can include actions like educating youths and recent immigrants on Dutch culture while also educating native Dutch on Islamic culture, cultivating ties with leading figures in the Muslim community, and reinforcing social-bonding elements like education and employment.
 - Increasing the abilities of local government officials who work with at-risk youth and youth groups. Examples of this include developing communications tools to counter the radical narrative, deploying teams of experts to localities dealing with

radicalization issues, and organizing regional information-sharing forums and training programs.

- Early containment and confrontation of signs of radicalization. This can be accomplished through means like the interdiction of radical propaganda, the targeting of extremist financial networks, and “de-radicalization processes, e.g. by means of specific interventions in prisons and rehabilitation projects.”
- Further, the authors advise that international partnerships should be cultivated to address radicalization on a global scale.
 - Currently, the Netherlands collaborates with the United States, the United Kingdom, Denmark, France and Canada regarding general information sharing and best practices.
 - Outside of the Netherlands, anti-radicalization initiatives are focused on the prevention and intervention avenues. The Netherlands, however, chooses to put more resources into counteracting polarization.

10) Executive Summary of Counter-Terrorism White Paper, Australian Government; 2010

Executive Summary (Taken from Document)

The first responsibility of government is the protection of Australia, Australians and Australian interests. So a key government priority is to protect Australia from terrorism.

The threat of terrorism to Australia is real and enduring. It has become a persistent and permanent feature of Australia's security environment.

The main source of international terrorism and the primary terrorist threat to Australia and Australian interests is from a global violent jihadist movement – extremists who follow a distorted and militant interpretation of Islam that espouses violence as the answer to perceived grievances.

This extremist movement comprises al-Qa'ida, groups allied or associated with it, and others inspired by a similar worldview.

While the threat is persistent, the challenge has evolved since the last counter-terrorism White Paper in 2004 in two respects.

First, while there have been counter-terrorism successes (most notably pressure on al-Qa'ida's core leadership in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and action against terrorists in South-East Asia), these successes have been offset by the rise of groups affiliated with, or inspired by, al-Qa'ida's message and methods, with new areas such as Somalia and Yemen joining existing areas of concern in South Asia, South-East Asia, the Middle East and the Gulf.

A second shift apparent since 2004 has been the increase in the terrorist threat from people born or raised in Australia, who have become influenced by the violent jihadist message. The bombings in London on 7 July 2005, which were carried out by British nationals, brought into stark relief the real threat of globally-inspired but locally generated attacks in Western democracies, including Australia.

A number of Australians are known to subscribe to this message, some of whom might be prepared to engage in violence. Many of these individuals were born in Australia and they come from a wide range of ethnic backgrounds. The pool of those committed to violent extremism in Australia is not static – over time some move away from extremism while others become extreme.

We have seen terrorist planning within Australia. Since 2001, numerous terrorist attacks have been thwarted in Australia. Thirty-eight people have been prosecuted or are being prosecuted as a result of counter-terrorism operations and 20 people have been convicted of terrorism offences under the Criminal Code. Over 40 Australians have had their passports revoked or applications denied for reasons related to terrorism.

The Government's counter-terrorism strategy is informed by a number of core judgments. We must take a comprehensive and layered approach. Our counter-terrorism measures must be informed by strategic judgments about the nature of the threat and Australia's vulnerability to it. And we must conduct our activities in a manner which harnesses our capabilities, upholds our principles and mitigates the risk of attack or failure in our response.

The strategy has four key elements:

- 1) Analysis: an intelligence-led response to terrorism driven by a properly connected and properly informed national security community.
- 2) Protection: taking all necessary and practical action to protect Australia and Australians from terrorism at home and abroad.
- 3) Response: providing an immediate and targeted response to specific terrorist threats and terrorist attacks should they occur.
- 4) Resilience: building a strong and resilient Australian community to resist the development of any form of violent extremism and terrorism on the home front.

Analysis

Australia's counter-terrorism efforts are intelligence-led and focused on prevention. This approach hinges on strong partnerships and cooperation at the national level, effective engagement at the international level, and effective information sharing. Over recent years, there has been significant growth in Australia's security, intelligence and law enforcement agencies and the Government has taken steps to improve their capabilities and enhance information sharing. The establishment of the National Intelligence Coordination Committee has ensured that Australia's intelligence effort, both domestically and internationally, is better integrated into the new national security arrangements. The creation of a new Counter-Terrorism Control Centre will also ensure that we better integrate our overall counter-terrorism intelligence capabilities.

Protection

The Government is committed to taking strong action to protect Australians and reduce the risk of attack.

This approach involves efforts at a number of complementary levels, including:

- Strong border management arrangements to prevent the movement of individuals who try to enter or transit Australia to conduct terrorism-related activities by introducing a new biometric-based visa system for certain non-citizens – making it harder for terrorists to evade detection;
- Preventing Australians suspected of involvement in terrorism from travelling overseas by revoking or denying passports;
- Improving the security of our airports to enhance protection of the travelling public;
- Continued cooperation and collaboration with the states and territories through comprehensive national counter-terrorism arrangements;
- Working in partnership with the business community to protect our critical infrastructure, including information and communications technology; and
- Strengthened collaboration with international partners, both bilaterally and multilaterally, to contribute to international counter-terrorism efforts and create an international environment that is hostile to terrorism.

Response

The Government's ability to prevent and disrupt terrorist attacks within Australia relies on coordinated and cooperative relationships between our intelligence, security and law enforcement agencies nationally.

This collaborative approach ensures that we have a robust and effective national capacity to respond to terrorist threats. Australia's comprehensive national response uses the full array of Commonwealth, state and territory counter-terrorism capabilities. It is underpinned by a legal regime that provides effective powers for our agencies and the ability to prosecute people who seek to conduct terrorist acts. The Government will keep these powers under review against any further need to expand them or tailor them to deal with any changes in the nature of the threat in the future.

Resilience

Australia's counter-terrorism efforts are supported by our open democratic society. There are inherent strengths in our society that make Australia resilient to the divisive worldview of al-Qa'ida and like-minded groups. However, we know from experience that the terrorist narrative may resonate with a small number of Australians.

It is incumbent upon all Australians to work together to reject ideologies that promote violence, no matter from where they arise or to what purpose they aspire. We must all support and protect the values and freedoms from which all Australians benefit. By reducing disadvantage, addressing real or perceived grievances and encouraging full participation in Australia's social and economic life, government policies can help to mitigate any marginalization and radicalization that may otherwise occur within the Australian community.

Terrorism will continue to pose challenges to Australia's national security for the foreseeable future. The Government is committed to the continuous improvement of Australia's counter-terrorism efforts, and will pursue a range of measures to protect Australia, its people and interests from terrorism.

Our coordinated, multilayered approach is aimed at ensuring that counter-terrorism efforts are effective and conducted in a manner that enhances our wider national security.

The Government remains committed to taking all necessary and practical action to keep Australia safe.

SUMMARIES OF REPORTS, WORKSHOPS, CONFERENCES AND TASK FORCES ON CVE

11) Executive Summary of Community Policing Within a Counter-Terrorism Context: the Role of Trust; Dr. Basia Spalek; University of Birmingham (UK)

Background

The focus of this article was on the issue of trust between police and community members within community-based models of policing in relation to counterterrorism. The article cited a research study which examined the community policing model in the United Kingdom. The article focused in particular upon the importance of trust within a counter-terrorism context and looked at the importance of cultural intelligence for policing within a counter-terror context, a context marked by suspicion, distrust and secrecy.

The article “argued that trust-building within a counter-terrorism context requires police officers to have a sophisticated level of cultural intelligence as it is important for officers to understand the complexities of the communities that they are working with, including understanding the local, national and international political dynamics that are at play. This article argues that it may be that police officers working within specialist units like the Muslim Contact Unit (MCU) are best placed for developing a sophisticated understanding of Muslim communities in order to be able to build trust with communities so as to work with community members to prevent terror crime.”

The article also noted the emphasis on community-based policing principles in counterterrorism efforts under UK’s Prevent strategy. The author also cited Canada as another example where there has been a movement towards the adoption of community policing within the context of national security policing.

Community-Oriented Policing

Spalek and Lambert (2008) noted, “Communities are also seen as being key to countering terrorism, and in the case of al-Qaeda inspired or related terrorism, Muslims’ responsibilities as active citizens are being increasingly framed by anti-terror measures so that Muslim citizens are expected to work with the authorities to help reduce the risk of terrorism.”

Importance of Two-Way Communication

The article cited the necessity of organizational decentralization in order to facilitate two-way communication between the police and the community. Skogan and Hartnett (1997) also noted that community policing “requires that police be responsive to citizens’ demands when they decide what local problems are and set their priorities.” Skogan and Harnett (1997) also argued that “it also implies a commitment to helping neighbourhoods solve crime problems on their own, through community organizations and crime prevention programs.”

Spalek noted, “The work of the MCU illustrated the importance of reciprocity – that for communities to work effectively with police, it is important for officers to reciprocate efforts by helping communities tackle their issues of concern.” Spalek also noted that empathy-building is a

two-way process and so initiatives that enable communities to understand and learn about police perspectives and experiences are also important.

Importance of Trust

Innes et al. (2007) argued that insufficient trust in the police can inhibit the willingness of individuals to pass community intelligence about a range of problems and issues, and a report by Demos (2007) highlights the importance of high trust relationships between communities and the police for effective national security in the age of 'home-grown terrorism'. According to Hillyard (1993; 2005), "A breakdown of police-community relations can have serious consequences for policing, and in the context of counter-terrorism can halt the flow of vital information from communities."

According to Thacher (2005), who drew upon a case study of the US city of Dearborn, "Surveillance and information-gathering can detrimentally affect a city's social life through undermining trust and cooperation with police. At the same time, through targeting a particular social group for intrusive policing, rather than targeting a general and abstract class of suspected criminals, police officers can stigmatize an entire social grouping, thereby potentially damaging individuals' honor."

2009 Research Study of Muslim Contact Unit in UK

The article cited a 2009 research study by X in the UK which looked at their Muslim Contact Unit (MCU). Spalek (2009) noted, "Establishing trust between police and community members for the purposes of gathering community intelligence in a counter-terrorism context involves a sophisticated level of policing which draws upon the cultural intelligence of police officers. The skills that police officers require within this context are perhaps more easily acquired through specialist counter-terrorism units based upon the model of the MCU."

Spalek argued, "This study found that an important way for police officers to build trust with communities is through empowering them by helping individuals and groups to access funding for projects as well as helping communities to implement changes that they wish to implement in order to prevent terror crime. Thus, the MCU has helped to facilitate a change of leadership within mosques under the influence of extremists."

Conclusion

The article argued, "How, in a post 9/11 and 7/7 context, 'hard' policing strategies may have served to undermine trust between Muslim communities and police and so community-based models of policing are being implemented in order to help build trust between communities and police officers." The article pushed for an increase in trust-building, including empathy building and community empowerment.

Finally, the article noted the importance "that sophisticated cultural skills are required in police officers working within a counter-terrorism context due to the complex global, national and local terrain. Specialist knowledge of Muslim communities is vital given the highly politicized and globalised counter-terrorism context that requires a detailed and sophisticated understanding of individual and community dynamics and how these relate to the wider social context. It would appear that police officers within specialist units are perhaps best-placed to develop such an in-depth understanding of Muslim communities within the locale within which they operate, taking into consideration local, national and international dynamics." Spalek noted that the case study of

the MCU showed “that specialist counterterrorism units, perhaps more traditionally associated with ‘hard’ intelligence-led models of policing, can effectively develop ‘softer’ community-based approaches to counterterrorism if appropriately guided towards building trust between police and communities.”

12) Executive Summary of Muslim Communities in Homeland Security Workshop; Center for Homeland Defense and Security, Naval Postgraduate School; August 3 - 5, 2009

Purpose of Workshop

The workshop had a general and a specific purpose. Its general purpose was to support the activities of Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS) by developing materials for use in its courses.

Its specific purpose was to do that by examining Muslim communities in the context of homeland security. Often, such examinations focus on radicalization or on charges of government interference with religious practices or harassment. The purpose of the workshop was to put these issues into a broader context that includes politics and religion, history, immigration, integration of religious minorities, religion and culture, and other issues.

These contexts explain both America's aspiration to religious freedom and mutual respect among religions and its difficulties in attaining this objective. For example, we can think of a religious minority that practices a religion hardly known to the majority yet despised by segments of it; in an odd language; a religion some of whose women veil and seclude themselves; a religion that often seeks to establish its own schools; some of whose leaders encourage its members to remain separate from the larger society; whose members maintain suspicious links with various foreign lands and organizations; whose clerical function is often carried out by foreigners, often ignorant of American customs and habits; a minority that has been subject to harassment, violence and discrimination; and, finally, a religious minority some of whose members have engaged in acts of terrorism on American soil and supported terrorism in other parts of the world.

This religious minority, of course, was American Catholics in the nineteenth-century, particularly the Irish version thereof and, in that case, not just in the nineteenth-century. Like all analogies, the Catholic-Muslim one is not perfect. It does suggest, however, that we might learn by a comparative approach. This was the approach of the workshop. Its intent was to compare Muslim communities with the general populations they are part of and with other religious communities in the United States and Muslim communities in the United States with communities in Europe and elsewhere.

Structure

The purpose of the workshop and its comparative intent dictated its structure. There were four teams, as well as a control team that sought to keep track of what occurred in the workshop.

The teams represented Muslims in the United States, Muslims in the UK and Europe and Muslims around the world, as well as a homeland security team. Except for the homeland security team, which represented local and state governments in the United States and the U.S. Federal government, all teams represented communities and not governments.

Each team had a facilitator and an idea capturer. Their jobs were to help the team accomplish its tasks, to help it keep in mind that it represented an array of self-defined opinions and attitudes, and to capture as best they could what developed through team discussions.

The teams consisted of a mixture of academics, individuals involved in Muslim community activities, homeland security practitioners (largely state, local and federal law enforcement), and

students in the CHDS master's program. Non-student participants came from the United States and Europe.

Mechanics

Each team had a set of questions to answer. Facilitators guided discussion of these. In addition, materials were prepared to prompt discussion (e.g., scripted news items, role playing). These proved unnecessary. Teams were able to communicate either by sending delegates to another team or by all meeting together. In addition, plenary sessions occurred periodically during the workshop so that all the participants could exchange ideas and discuss issues that arose in or among separate teams.

Results

The discussions were varied, complex and often contentious. Disagreements remained at the end of the conference. The following lists some of the key ideas that arose:

- The Muslim population of the United States is the most diverse in the world. It is not useful to speak of "Muslims" as a whole. Policy has to be made at the local/city level because each Muslim community will be different.
- Ethnicity can and does trump religion.
- U.S. foreign policy affects the home countries of various diaspora communities in the United States, which in turn affects those communities in the United States. All state and local officials must be aware of this.
- Civic integration has taken place after mobilization of a community over homeland causes, which ultimately makes the immigrants more American. The Irish are an example of this. But these are not necessarily benign processes. They frequently lead to conflict. One difference between the Irish case and the current issue is that the U.S. government did not have as much at stake with regard to Ireland as we do today with regard to the Middle East.
- The concept of assimilation, blending into the dominant society, generates negative feelings in Muslims. Integration, remaining Muslim but participating fully in American life, is a better objective.
- The relationship between assimilation/integration and violence is important but not well understood.
- Radicalization happens to an individual. Islam does not have explicit things in it that force radicalization. Some Christians bomb clinics. So, do not look to Islamic texts to understand violent acts, look at the context.
- Domestically, immigration policies have a significant impact. When thousands of people have to register, it affects trust and perceptions of the government and those affected do not differentiate between the levels of government in that perception.
- Trust between Muslim communities and local authorities needs time to develop. To counter this lack of trust, it is necessary to get stakeholders involved ahead of time. Don't act and then try to come back to build trust.
- One possibility is to establish a national community policing office, responsible for encouraging trust-building between law enforcement and local communities. DHS should build outreach strategies based on existing practices in communities where outreach has been successful and tie use of these strategies to grant funding.

13) Executive Summary of Anti-Terror Lessons of Muslim-Americans, David Schanzer, Charles Kurzman, Ebrahim Moosa, National Institute of Justice, January 2010

Background

The purpose of the report is to investigate the reasons why America has experience a relatively low level of homegrown terror threats since the 9/11 attacks. The report, derived from interviews with over 120 Muslim-Americans from communities around the country, examines what Muslim-American communities on their own, without government help, are doing to minimize the radicalization process that leads to violent extremism. The answers to this are meant to help inform future collaboration between the government and Muslim-American populations to counter radicalization. The report highlights five strategies that Muslim-American communities are using in this effort and seven recommendations to be undertaken in partnership with government agencies.

Five Anti-Radicalization Techniques in Muslim-American Communities

Public and Private Condemnation of Extremist Violence

- Unnoticed by much of the mainstream press, Muslim-American leaders have used condemnations against extremist violence as the most effect tool to fight radicalization. The report cites numerous examples of Muslim-American advocacy groups publicly expressing outrage at the 9/11 attacks and support for the American government.
- There is similarly strong opposition to violent extremism among individual citizens of both religiously liberal and conservative viewpoints.
- Though the report's researchers found overwhelming sentiment among Muslim-Americans against terror attacks in the United States, there was less unanimity of opinion regarding acts of violence against targets outside of the U.S. that were considered to be part an authentic armed conflict.

Self-policing

- The researchers found that Muslim-Americans back up their denunciations of terrorism by taking proactive measures to monitor and minimize radicalization in their own communities. This self-policing is credited by the report as being a significant factor contributing to the low level of extremism in the Muslim-American community. The report found that "although a variety of radical Islamic movements sought to raise funds in the United State, for their revolutionary campaigns abroad, there has been little recruitment of Muslim-Americans for domestic terrorism in the United States."
- The researchers further found an overwhelming consensus in their interview subjects in favor of contacting law enforcement authorities in the event that they detect suspicious conduct: "Of the more than 120 interviews conducted for this project, only one respondent expressed hesitancy about reporting a potential act of terrorism to the authorities."
- The report cites examples of Muslim-American organizations being proactive and not reactive about radicalization in their communities. For example, some Muslim-American organizations have coordinated events with teenagers and young adults to discuss controversial topics in order to ferret out any possible threats. A Houston group organizes

“venting sessions” aimed at encouraging youths to “express feelings of anger, prejudice, and hostility about difficult issues in order to counteract them.”

- Another common self-policing tactic is the screening of both prayer leaders and the content of their lectures for signs of extremism
- Interviewees cited

Community Building

- In studying examples of terrorist violence committed by Muslim-Americans since 9/11, the researchers found no single profile regarding the level of social integration among the perpetrators.
- The report notes that it is crucial for Muslim-American communities to integrate into the social network those most inclined towards radicalization: teenagers, young adults, recent immigrants and loners.
- Mosques, book stores, Islamic centers, ethnic institutions and civil rights groups are specified as places that can help in this assimilation process. Commonly held events that are sponsored by such institutions include: sports leagues, religious/ethnic festivals, dances and charity events.
- According to the report, “The direct goal of these activities is not to prevent radicalization, though that appears to have been an unintended outcome. Instead, these activities are intended to strengthen Muslim-American communities and serve community goals, which include protecting Muslim-Americans’ rights, deepening community members’ faith, and spreading the message of Islam to non-Muslims.”
- Another target audience for these programs is ex-convicts who have converted to Islam while incarcerated. The report states that many of these individuals leave prison with both an accurate image of the moderate nature of Islam and an ingrained hostility towards mainstream America.
- While these efforts do have the effect of reducing feelings of alienation in the community, they are also conducted with an emphasis on maintaining an Islamic identity that may be weakening due to immersion in American culture.
- The report also makes note that some Muslim-American communities, rather than embracing all of its members, instead expel problematic ones. This practice serves to undermine the benefits that come with integration.

Political Engagement

- Since 9/11, the researchers report, Muslim-Americans have strengthened their involvement with democratic politics.
- Again, the main goal is not to avert radicalism, but to defend the civil rights of Muslim-Americans. This initiative does have the side effect of anti-radicalization, however, in that political participation allows grievances to be expressed through democratic engagement.
- One example that Muslim-American communities try to emulate is that of civil rights activism and organizations like the NAACP.
- Complementing work done on national level is the growing collection of local, grass-roots Muslim-American political organizations. These groups have had notable successes in

lobbying local government, conducting voter drives and helping to elect Muslim-American candidates for office.

Identity Politics

- The report states that expressions of Muslim-American identity have grown more prominent since 9/11. Examples given include women wearing of head scarves, men growing beards and parents sending children to Islamic schools.
- The researchers conclude, however, that “Muslim-Americans are becoming more American, not less American, as they engage in identity politics.”
- According to the report, there is a growing overlap between American and Muslim-American cultures that counteracts terrorism by “emphasizing the compatibility of Muslim-ness and American-ness.

Recommendations

Encourage Political Mobilization

- The researchers conclude that Muslim-American political engagement is the most positive integrating trend since it allows grievances to be expressed, debated and resolved through the democratic process.
- As such, the report advises that political parties should increase efforts to court the Muslim-American vote. Furthermore, public officials should bolster their outreach efforts by attending events at mosques and encouraging Muslim-Americans to participate in community meetings and events.

Promote Public Denunciations of Violence

- The report advises that Muslim-American groups should continue their public condemnation of extremist violence in order to better educate the significant minority of Americans who are still deeply suspicious of Muslim-Americans.
- This message should be echoed by more local groups and mosques, public officials and members of the media.

Reinforce Self-Policing Efforts by Improving the Relationship Between Law Enforcement and Muslim-American Communities

- Law enforcement and Muslim-American communities should collaborate more fully in order to help break down mutual suspicion since both sides have the same goals.
- Specifically, Muslim-American leaders should promote a culture that treats cooperation with law enforcement as a moral and civic obligation.
- Concurrently, law enforcement must address radicalization in a prudent and restrained manner. More energy should be directed towards intervention and prevention and away from arrests and prosecutions. Techniques for such tactics should be flesh out with local Muslim-American communities.
- The report recommends that law enforcement and Muslim-American communities should undertake frank discussions regarding the police tactics, particularly the use of informants,

and the level of radicalization in the communities. Law enforcement should create more measured policies for the use of informants and share these policies with the community leaders. For their part, Muslim-American leaders should maintain their self-policing efforts, while also being candid with authorities about the small but present element of extremism in their communities.

- Furthermore, law enforcement agencies at all levels should increase their outreach to Muslim-American populations by aiming to hire more Muslim officers. These agencies should also augment their community engagement efforts by reaching out to not only mosques, but neighborhood associations, ethnic groups and youth groups, among others. The report cites the FBI's Bridges Program and Citizens' Academy as productive initiatives that should be expanded nationally.
- Finally, law enforcement agencies should work to educate themselves about the ever-increasing diversity of the Muslim-American population in order to ensure that engagement with these communities is not predicated on a single standard to thinking.

Assist Community-Building Efforts

- The report advises that all levels of government should work to assist Muslim-American populations build community institutions should they require outside assistance. This can take the form of recreation and day care centers along with ESL courses. The report identifies "isolated immigrant communities" as likely being in need of such aide.
- The researchers conclude that there should greater training in spotting signs of mental illness since several homegrown extremists were mentally ill and there is a lack of understanding about the condition in many Muslim-American communities.

Promote Outreach by Social Service Agencies

- More government agencies besides those from law enforcement should work to provide more services to improve public health, education, and transportation in Muslim-American communities. The researchers contend that "general engagement in these areas will contribute to counter-radicalization efforts by improving community integration and reducing the isolation of vulnerable populations."

14) Radicalization: Made in the USA? Matthew Levitt; Homeland Security Policy Institute; June 2, 2009 (Full Report)

When officials announced the successful prevention of a plot in New York to bomb synagogues and down airplanes with rocket-propelled grenades, many reacted with shock at the prospect of locally radicalized violent extremists plotting attacks here at home. Indeed, policymakers, long focused on the radicalization problem facing our European allies, were slow to realize that domestic radicalization and terrorist recruitment is a problem here in the United States as well. While short of the acute radicalization and recruitment crisis facing many European countries, recent events from Minneapolis to Atlanta suggest the United States is not immune from similar phenomena on our side of the Atlantic.

Overall, Muslim-American communities have had a relatively positive integration experience—particularly in comparison to Europe. This is often attributed to the United States’ inclusive, immigrant-friendly environment, stringent and well-enforced anti-discrimination policies, and—most of all—the strong belief in an equal opportunity to climb the socio-economic ladder and achieve financial prosperity. In the United States communities are integrated into society without having to sacrifice their distinct cultural identities.

But recent months have seen troubling developments on this front. In October 2008, a Somali youth apparently radicalized and recruited in the Minneapolis area, participated in what the FBI believes is the first instance of an American suicide bomber anywhere. In Minneapolis, the FBI reports, “there has been an active and deliberate attempt to recruit individuals—all of who are young men, some only in their late teens—to travel to Somalia to fight or train on behalf of al-Shabaab.” None of these recruits are believed to have been tasked to return home and conduct attacks in the U.S., but the FBI remains concerned about such a possibility. Lashkar-e-Taibah, the group behind the Mumbai attacks, maintains “facilitation, procurement, fundraising, and recruitment activities worldwide, including in the United States.”

The U.S. has uncovered terrorist cells living and operating in the U.S. apparently planning to conduct attacks here. Just last month the leader of one such cell, dubbed the Jam’iyyat Ul-Islam Is-Saheeh, was sentenced to 16 years in federal prison for plotting to attack Jewish and Israeli synagogues in California in 2005. The cell, comprised of Muslim converts who met in prison, highlighted the problem of radicalization in U.S. prisons. In 2007, a potential plot was disrupted in which Atlanta college students had surveilled possible targets in Washington, DC. According to the FBI, these students were connected virtually to a global network run by British webmaster Younis Tsouli, who facilitated Internet communication with prospective cells in Sweden, Bosnia, and Canada, among other locations. Indeed, one reason the U.S. is not immune to extremist radicalization is the transnational reach of extremist media outlets, violent propaganda on Internet, and virtual connectivity to extremists overseas.

Clearly, while the scope of the radicalization challenge in the U.S. is significantly smaller than that facing many European countries, the U.S. cannot afford to ignore the radicalization of American youth on the home front. Taking steps now to ensure that the broadly positive situation here does not deteriorate further is critical.

First, the U.S. should not reinvent the wheel. America should pay close attention to existing counterradicalization programs in Europe, the Middle East and Southeast Asia. In particular, U.S. officials should take a page from their British colleagues, and ensure that all relevant government

agencies are engaged on these issues and fully understand the U.S. strategy. At the very least, the U.S. should focus on ensuring that its agencies avoid mistakes that will poison community relations and possibly heighten the radicalization threat. Most importantly, U.S. government outreach should be as broad as possible—not allowing one group or organization to monopolize representation of these tremendously diverse communities.

The U.S. should work with local communities to develop means of engagement at the local level beyond just those provided to date by law enforcement to deal with radicalization in these communities. The City of Amsterdam’s “Information House” is a good model. In the U.S., law enforcement agencies have long reached out to Muslim and Arab communities. But these communities must see the government for more than its law enforcement arms. It is therefore critical that that engagement is broadened to include service providing entities, such as the Department of Health and Human Services.

The vast majority of the Muslim American population is well integrated and rejects violent ideologies. Unfortunately, the U.S. government has not always effectively empowered these communities to provide an alternative to the extremist narrative. It should empower and leverage mainstream Muslim voices in this effort, making perfectly clear that it does not consider Islam itself a danger, but only the distorted version of Islam perpetrated by radical extremists. And it should proactively focus on ensuring that the radical extremists’ global narrative does not resonate with individuals’ day-to-day lives by addressing local grievances, not only global ones. We dare not wait to confront this radical ideology until the FBI informs that a second American has carried out a suicide bombing, possibly here at home.

15) Executive Summary of HSAC Future of Terrorism Task Force Report; Homeland Security Advisory Council, January 2007

Key Findings and Recommendations of the Report Include:

Key Findings:

- Terrorism is a tactic that can be employed by any adversary. We must be prepared to respond to potential threats from unexpected as well as familiar directions.
- The future of terrorism will depend, in large part, on the use and accessibility of technology.
- The most significant terrorist threat to the homeland today stems from a global movement, underpinned by a jihadist/Salafist ideology.
- The Internet has become a major facilitator of terrorist activities, especially the spread of jihadist ideology.
- The alienation of Muslim populations in the Western world is a major component of the spread of jihadist ideology.

Key Recommendations:

- Countering “home-grown” radicalization must be one of the Department’s top priorities by using the Department’s Radicalization and Engagement Working Group (REWG) to better understand the process – from sympathizer to activist to terrorist.
- The Department must place a renewed emphasis on recruiting professionals of all types with diverse perspectives, worldviews, skills, languages, and cultural backgrounds and expertise.
- The Department should work with subject matter experts to ensure that the lexicon used within public statements is clear, precise and does not play into the hands of the extremists.
- Broader avenues of dialogue with the Muslim community should be identified and pursued by the Department to foster mutual respect and understanding, and ultimately trust.
- Local communities should take the lead on developing and implementing Muslim outreach programs. DHS should encourage and support with appropriate resources outreach efforts and facilitate the sharing of best practices.
- The Secretary should work directly with state, local, private sector and community leaders to educate them on the threat of radicalization, the necessity of taking preventative action at the local level, and to facilitate the sharing of other nations’ and communities’ best practices.
- The Department should develop and immediately implement, in concert with the Department of Justice and state and local corrections officials, a program to address prisoner radicalization and post-sentence reintegration.
- Consider naming the Secretary of Homeland Security to the National Security Council in order to fully integrate national security with homeland security.

16) **Executive Summary of Community-Level Indicators of Radicalism: A Data and Methods Task Force; START; February 16, 2010**

Background

The purpose of this research is to explore alternative perspectives that could be used to understand the radicalization process before the threat of attack. In specific, the report focuses on the potential link between community characteristics and susceptibility to radicalization. Such communities include those that are marginalized (e.g., Diaspora groups), destitute, or have experienced some type of social disruption. Experts on topics like radicalization, political science, psychology, criminology, and sociology contributed to the findings.

Findings

Related Research

- Research suggests that, contrary to popular opinion, it is a mistake to believe that extremists can be categorized as “abnormal” socially. Instead, most research argues for the “normality” of these individuals.
- The report argues that there is no single cause or trigger for radicalization like poverty, education, or religious ideology. Factors like these can contribute to radicalism, but are not solely responsible. Therefore, researchers consider radicalization as a dynamic process, rather than the result of a discrete event.

Understanding Criminal Activity through a Community Lens

- The report argues that authorities should study the relationships between individuals and their social, economic and political environments rather than at any sort of deviance in each person. The emphasis should be on the opportunities for a terrorist operation, rather than the individual actors. This model calls for local entities, like banks and retailers, to serve as data collectors for things like targeting vulnerability and weapons accessibility.
- Popular theory on street-gang dynamics can be applied to terror groups. Concepts about gang characteristics like the appeal of protection provided by membership, social networking patterns, and broad-based non-hierarchical structures could all be usefully applied to research terror groups.
- The report suggests that there are some illuminating similarities between hate crimes and terrorism: venting a grievance, choosing symbolic targets, responding to an event, and intent to intimidate. In contrast to hate crimes, however, terrorism is usually committed by a minority group that plans its actions over a period of time.
- The report proposes that radicalization could be monitored by studying one community over time to keep track of the fluctuations in radicalization based on certain political triggers

Marginalized and Traumatized Groups

- Feelings of marginalization, humiliation, or victimization can be required, but are not alone sufficient for radicalization. The report argues that the levels of participation in

local government among minority groups can be a useful measure of group marginalization.

- According to the report, the link between a single traumatic event and radicalization may be overstated. Additional contributing factors to be examined are economic conditions, age, and family structure/stability. Obtaining good data should allow for generalizations among communities.
- The report states that prisons are a likely incubator of radicalization since inmates are frequently from disadvantaged backgrounds and often have histories of using violence to solve problems. Budget cutbacks, however, may undo much of the progress that prison officials have made in limiting radicalization.

Radicalization and Support for Violence Internationally

- According to the report, the mixture of grievance, capability, and opportunity can be used to gauge the probability of a community's radicalization. Open democracies make it less likely that a person would become radicalized, but they also make it easier for the already-radicalized to commit violence.
- The report cites certain environmental factors that appear to support radicalization: urban settings, female social equality, and poor economic development.
- The evidence indicates that American extremists are likely to travel abroad for training and indoctrination purposes. Destinations like Somalia and Yemen are becoming increasingly popular. American radicals are more likely to plan attacks on targets either outside of the United States or on American military installations. Individuals from war-torn populations, like Somalis, appear to be particularly vulnerable to radicalization.

Observations on Radicalization at the Community Level

- The report recommends that authorities should pay more attention to how events around the world involving violence against Muslims in any fashion facilitate radicalization, particularly events in a migrant community's homeland. As an example, the conflict in Somalia appears to be a strong motivating factor in the radicalization that has occurred in the Somali Diaspora community.
- Another factor in radicalization, according to the report, may be relative deprivation that immigrant communities may feel compared to the general population or within their communities themselves. While experts argue that economic conditions are never the sole motivating factor, deprivation frequently leads to feelings of helplessness and frustration that are common in radicals.

17) **Executive Summary of What Terrorists Want; Max Abrahms; International Security**

Background

The purpose of this paper is to study the commonly-held notion that terrorists are rational actors whose actions are designed to achieve the greatest level of political utility. Three essential facets of this theory are that terrorists: have logical political motives, critically evaluate their options for action, and resort to violence when the political return outweighs alternatives. Should this strategic model hold, government authorities can eliminate the incentive to commit terrorist acts by “rendering it an ineffective or unnecessary instrument of coercion.” Conversely, this strategy would be fruitless if the model is baseless.

Findings

According to the author, terrorists do not conform to the rational actor model. Thus, substantial reconsideration of popular terrorist theory is in order. To refute conventional wisdom, the author offers seven irrationalities commonly observed in terrorist acts.

Coercive Ineffectiveness

- The report notes that despite the destructive power of terror attacks, terrorist practically never achieve their political goals. According to the author: “Research fails to identify a single terrorist organization that has achieved its political platform by attacking civilians.”
- Further, the report cites earlier work that indicates that the political ramifications of terrorist attacks are “nearly always negative” with respect to the original goals. Examples of plummeting public opinion of terrorists’ goals in Britain, Egypt, Indonesia, Israel, Jordan, the Philippines, and Russia after attacks in those nations are presented as evidence of this. In addition, terror attacks serve to harden government positions against negotiations with terrorists, eliminating hope for political accommodation.

Terrorism as the First Resort

- Contrary to the precepts of the strategic model, the author contends that terrorists fail to explore nonviolent alternatives to attacks. Instead of being a last resort, violence instead appears to be the only strategy considered by these organizations. These groups, therefore, rarely choose to renounce violence in order to become mainstream political movements.
- The report notes that the number of terrorist organizations in a country has a direct, positive correlation with that country’s level of social and political freedom. Thus these groups do not suffer from a lack of nonviolent options. Under the theory of “the paradox of terrorism,” the author proposes that “terrorist groups tend to target societies with the greatest number of political alternatives, not the fewest.”
- As an explanation for this seemingly irrational behavior, the report notes that experts agree that terrorists display “an innate compulsion to engage in terrorism and an unswerving belief in its desirability over nonviolence, contradicting the strategic model’s assumption that groups employ terrorism only as a last resort upon evaluating their political options.”

Reflexively Uncompromising Terrorists

- The report contends that terrorist groups do not compromise with the target government. As a result of their intractable demands, they are more apt to thwart negotiations by augmenting their attacks. According to the author: “No peace process has transformed a major terrorist organization into a completely nonviolent political party.”
- Contrary to conventional opinion, terrorists’ political goals are frequently not as radical as assumed. The report posits the example of the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, a group that aims to achieve a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, a goal that is not at odds with the preferences of much of the international community. Yet, these groups rarely negotiate, even when it would serve to secure their political goals.

Protean Political Platforms

- Yet another flaw in the strategic model is that terror groups routinely do not issue policy demands or even claim credit after attacks. According to the report, since 1968, “64 percent of worldwide terrorist attacks have been carried out by unknown perpetrators. Anonymous terrorism has been rising, with three out of four attacks going unclaimed since September 11, 2001.” Terrorists, therefore, rarely communicate their political demands through their violence, eliminating any chance of nonviolent coercion.

Terrorist Fratricide

- The report notes that terror groups, even those with identical political platforms, routinely clash with each other. These battles can sometimes occur more frequently than attacks on the targeted government. Examples of this phenomenon appearing in places like the Gaza Strip, Iraq and Sri Lanka are cited.

Never-Ending Terrorism

- The author points out that terrorist organizations commonly endure for decades after it has become clear that their political goals will likely never be realized. When these groups understand that their political justification dissolves or otherwise loses credibility, they frequently invent new ones to sustain themselves.

Having argued against the strategic model of terrorism, the author posits a new explanation for the violence. Instead of rational political goals, the author proposes that terrorists are actually motivated by the desire to experience social bonding with other members of the group.

Terrorists as Social Solidarity Seekers

- The report contends that tight-knit terrorist organizations have particular appeal to the socially alienated. The majority of these individuals are young, unmarried men or widowed women who have no substantial employment history prior to joining a terror group. They are furthermore very likely to be recent immigrants feeling isolated from both their homelands and their new countries.

- Another motivating factor in joining a terrorist organization, the author reports, is knowing someone involved in the group already. A study of 1,100 Turkish extremists found that the subjects were “ten times more likely to say that they joined the terrorist organization because their friends were members, than because of the ideology of the group.” A similar study done on Guantanamo detainees produced corroborating results.
- Consequently, terror groups target their recruitment efforts on the socially isolated rather than those with an ideological fervor. Indeed, the report offers, terrorists frequently have a false notion of their groups’ ideologies in the first place.
- Furthermore, terror groups commonly disintegrate when they fail to maintain their value as social support systems. Once groups grow old and fail to attract younger members, they die out regardless of the currency of their political grievance.

If terrorists are acting more out of a desire for social communion than political success, counterterrorism strategies should be readjusted.

Counterterrorism Implications

- In most common counterterrorism policies, governments seek to deprive terrorism of its political usefulness by refusing to engage in political negotiations. On the other hand, many believe that concessions are the only way to convince terrorists to halt further attacks. A third counterterrorism method is the promotion of democracy under the assumption that political freedom will defuse terrorist aggression.
- Each of these policies is meant to eliminate the political utility of terrorism. Given the arguments presented earlier, each is also ultimately useless.
- The author argues that there is no single profile for a terrorist. Authorities can, however, effectively combat terrorism by understanding the social pools from which new recruits emerge. These groups include “diaspora communities in Western countries that host large, unassimilated, dislocated populations such as the Maghrebis in France; single, unemployed, Islamist men residing in comparatively secular Muslim countries such as in Pakistan; restive, youthful populations that feel estranged from the state such as in Saudi Arabia; and prison populations, which, by definition, are home to the socially isolated and dislocated.”
- While these are certainly vast populations, the report suggests that law enforcement authorities can increase their effectiveness by taking advantage of the tendency of terrorist groups to be frequently made up of networks of friends and family.
- Governments should significantly augment funding for research into social networking analysis (SNA), a mathematical technique for mapping and studying interpersonal relationships. By ferreting out the social links from known terrorists to separate clusters of people, law enforcement can predict the possibility of anyone from these clusters joining a terrorist organization.
- On the demand side, the author argues that authorities should work to eliminate the social attraction of terrorism. One way to do this would be to “drive a wedge between organization members.” This means that there should be greater effort to identify and cultivate possible double-agents within terrorist groups, even if this means negotiating leniency with these people. Second, governments must work to reduce pervasive social alienation in their countries by vigorously addressing bigotry and fostering moderate places of worship.

18) **Executive Summary of Assessing the Effectiveness of Current De-Radicalization Initiatives and Identifying Implications for the Development of U.S.-Based Initiatives in Multiple Settings, START; September 2009**

Background

This report looks at case studies of de-radicalization programs from Northern Ireland, Colombia, Indonesia, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia in order to assess their effectiveness and generalizability. It seeks to isolate best practices from these examples so that they can be applied to other environments.

Case Studies

Northern Ireland

- The report examines the “Early Release Scheme” provision of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement that stipulated the release of up to 500 imprisoned militants. This element is cited as a crucial factor in maintaining the peace in Northern Ireland.
- The program called for the British and Northern Irish governments to ensure the peaceful reintegration of these individuals into mainstream society. The accord required these governments to provide training, education, and jobs to assist this transition.
- The report claims that the reintegration piece of the program generally proved to be disappointing due largely to a lack of resourcing from the government.
- Another issue, notes the report, was backlash from victims and victim-rights groups.
- From 2003 to 2008, government monitors reported that the only acts of political violence in Northern Ireland were committed by groups that were not signatories to the original Good Friday Agreement. In fact, less than 3.5 percent of the 450 militants were rearrested for terrorist acts.
- In sum, the Northern Irish government evaluated the program to be “pivotal and successful in bringing peace to Northern Ireland.”

Colombia

- Colombian law states that persons involved in any of the country’s several militant groups are eligible for amnesty for their “political crimes.” This condition does not, however, extend to anyone involved in particularly heinous acts like “terrorism, kidnapping or genocide.” Anyone who is approved by the government is eligible to receive public health, economic, and educational benefits.
- According to the report, as of March 31, 2008, roughly 31,000 fighters demobilized as part of entire units of militants versus roughly 15,000 who demobilized individually.
- The report explains that Colombia’s Reincorporation Program begins with militants supplying a list of those who wish to turn themselves in. Once this list is verified, those on the list surrender their weapons to authorities, undergo a debriefing session and receive government ID cards to make them eligible for public assistance. These ex-fighters are then allowed to live wherever they choose, but must regularly check in with government monitors who also administer aid programs. This includes individualized workshops, training programs.

- The government has concluded that ex-militants have lost a sense of individuality due to their time with their paramilitary gangs, making personal decisions without the direction of a group difficult. The ultimate goal is to help these individuals in making independent choices and to divert them away from a mentality of violence.
- Similar to Northern Ireland, protest directed at Colombia's program have centered on victims' rights and compensation. The government has so far only allocated 2.5 percent of the land it promised to victims of terrorism. Further, though they are encouraged to do so, demobilized paramilitary groups have generally refused to provide any reparations.
- A Human Rights Watch report on the program's shortcomings noted that the government failed to: collect ex-militants' aliases, failed to keep accurate records of weapons transfers, ensure the human rights of ex-militants during debriefing, require ex-militants to give statements about their crimes, conduct thorough background checks, inform local authorities of the presence of ex-militants, evaluate the potential for recidivism, diminish the ability or radical groups to replenish their ranks.
- The report explains that there is still substantial debate regarding the success of the program. Studies have shown the public to be generally satisfied with the results.
- Regarding the program's success, the report cites government statistics that show that since 2002, murder rates have been cut in half and kidnappings have gone down 87 percent, results that many in Colombia attribute, in part, to the Reincorporation Program.
- With respect to recidivism, the government reports that 17 percent of gang members arrested between 2006 and 2007 were formerly demobilized militants.

Indonesia

- Along with robust military counterterrorism operations, Indonesia is engaged in reaching out to the country's militant group in order to reintegrate militants into the mainstream. Leading this effort has been a former commander of the Jemaah Islamiyyah (JI) militant group, Mohammed Nasir Bin Abbas, who is assisted by other former JI members.
- Bin Abbas has become the government's chief spokesman in the effort to counteract the radicals' interpretation of Islam in order to both persuade current militants to disengage from JI and prevent future radicalization. Bin Abbas's stature as a former senior leader of the movement commands great credibility with those he tries to re-educate. He has also provided tactical guidance to law enforcement on the locations of JI targets.
- Beyond Bin Abbas's efforts, however, Indonesia has no formal disengagement strategy for Islamic militants.
- The report explains, that once JI members are detained, Bin Abbas can spend up to a week with them, even before law enforcement authorities gain access. During this time, Bin Abbas attempts to discredit the detainees' radical ideologies, while also encouraging them to cooperate with the police.
- According to the report, coupled with this have been more informal measures by the police to emphasize humane treatment of JI detainees and providing allotments of financial support to their families.
- The report characterizes Indonesia's broad strategy as a "loosely-knit array of different soft-line approaches" that require more funding and staffing. Further, it relies too much of the abilities of Bin Abbas and the ad hoc tactics the police use to handle detainees.

- Notably, the report explains, Indonesia's plan is unique in that it employs former militants to lead its efforts.
- The report goes on to note that by late 2007, over 300 people were detained on terrorism charges in Indonesia. Of these, estimates on the numbers who have undergone disengagement treatment range 12 to 20. The report attributes this low number to the fact that short prison sentences and amnesties are common, proving to be a disincentive for radicals to agree to give up their beliefs.
- Further, the report states that there are lax government standards and measures regarding those who have been released early as a result participating in the program. Such inaccuracy makes it hard to determine the effectiveness of Indonesia's efforts in both de-radicalizing and preventing recidivism.
- The report avoids definitively evaluating Indonesia's program. It does credit the government for extensively utilizing former militants, but condemns it for failing to create a more institutionalized system with standard performance measures.

Yemen

- In response to post 9/11 domestic terror operations, the government developed the Yemeni Committee for Dialogue program aimed at de-radicalization. This prison-base initiative aims to discredit radical ideology. A five member panel of religious scholars, the Religious Dialogue Committee (RDC), provides the theological underpinnings of the program.
- The report explains that the RDC engages in open debate about the legitimacy of targeting civilians with small groups of detained radicals. The RDC makes a point of challenging these people not on their familiarity with the content of the Qur'an, but with its message. The RDC points to passages that advocate more moderate interpretations of concepts like jihad, relationships with non-Muslims, and government.
- If, after weeks of these sessions, a detainee formally renounces violence, he/she is released and provided with vocational training and aid in finding employment.
- According to the report, the government has touted the program as a success, while objections have come mainly from foreign observers upset that anyone involved in attacks (e.g., the USS Cole bombing) has been released. To this, the Yemeni government counters that no one who actually committed an act of terrorism is eligible for early release. U.S. officials are also dubious of the idea that someone can legitimately renounce violence through talking alone.
- Government statistics show that Yemen released 364 individuals after completing the program. No data, however, exist on the rates of recidivism.
- In 2008, the RDC program was dissolved. The government claims that it was due to the departure of the program's leader. The report posits, however, that the real reason has more to do with American criticisms of the counseling model and the continued violence plaguing Yemen.

Saudi Arabia

- After the bombing attacks on March 12, 2003 in Riyadh, the Saudi government instituted, among other measures, a series of "soft" measures to try to counteract extremist

interpretations of Islam. One of these was a rehabilitative program predicated on open dialogue and psychological evaluation.

- According to the report, unlike Yemen's strategy, the Saudis took a much more structured approach to encourage militants to renounce extremism and reenter society.
- Those who have committed violent acts are eligible for the program, but not early release.
- The program is divided into four subcommittees. The Religious Subcommittee is analogous to the Yemeni RDC and is charged with intellectual engagement. The Psychological and Social Subcommittee employs psychologists and psychiatrists to evaluate any psychological problems among the participants and their level of compliance with the program. The Security Subcommittee monitors the participants during the program after their release. Finally, the Media Subcommittee is in charge of public anti-extremist outreach.
- The report states that upon their detention, prisoners are given the option of participating or serving their time in prison. Program representatives attempt to win trust by explaining that they are not from a security agency and make a point to treat the prisoners as victims and not criminals.
- After this initial contact, participants begin a short period of brief counseling sessions, followed by a six week seminar in which two clerics and one therapist teach instruct groups of up to 20 on issues like loyalty and jihad. This phase ends with an exam and psychological evaluation.
- Passing these tests funnels participants into an after-care facility that allows for more freedom of movement, communal living, and recreational sports. While experiencing this less restrictive lifestyle, participants are still undergoing psychological counseling and therapy.
- Throughout the entire process, the government involves participants' families by offering them counseling and holding them financially and socially responsible if a participant reverts to violence.
- Finally, after a participant renounces extremist ideology, the program provides employment assistance, transportation, money, and housing.
- The Saudis claim a success rate of 80 to 90 percent and that less than 35 participants have re-embraced extremism.

Conclusions

- These programs are facilitated by the government, but implemented in concert with non-governmental organizations.
- Targets of the programs include: former terrorists, terrorists at large, ideological and leadership figures, supporters, and family members.
- Benefits include: full amnesty, partial amnesty, reduced sentencing, improved prison conditions, contact with other ex-members in prison, education, job training, financial support, and psychological counseling.
- In exchange, program officials expect: disengagement from violent activity and radical groups, acceptance of reduced sentences, intelligence assistance, reconciliation meetings with victims, public renunciation of violence, and cooperation in future counter-radicalization efforts.

- Important areas for the future examination of these programs include: transparency of the programs' screening criteria, verifiable measures of sincere de-radicalization, post-release monitoring, effective recidivism deterrents, the agency (internal or external) should make these evaluations.
- Current barriers to evaluation include: absence of reliable performance measurements, scarcity of accurate data to inform these measurements, no previous attempts at evaluation on which to build.

19) Building Bridges to Strengthen America: Forging an Effective Counterterrorism Enterprise between Muslim Americans and Law Enforcement; Alejandro J. Beutel (Muslim Public Affairs Council); November 2009

Executive Summary

The purpose of this report is to outline a suggested “blueprint” for how Muslim American communities can be an asset in securing our nation and preserving the rights of all Americans, as defined by a Muslim American perspective.

This condensed report focuses on two key components discussed in the full version:

- Understanding the radicalization process
- A counterterrorism enterprise based on community policing.

There are five key theories explaining why some Muslims become radicalized:

- 1) “Socio-Economic Deprivation,”
- 2) “Identity Politics,”
- 3) “Social Affiliations,”
- 4) “Political marginalization/grievances,”
- 5) “Presence of radical ideology.”

While each theory makes important contributions to the study of radicalization, each theory on its own is insufficient to describe why radicalization occurs. Using the work of Quintan Wiktorowicz, an expert on radical Muslim groups, as its foundation, the report pieces together a hybrid theory of radicalization and terrorist recruitment.

Ultimately, radicalization is a complex and multi-faceted process that cannot be explained or dealt with through either simplistic analyses or unidimensional policy responses.

In order to effectively deal with the challenge of radicalization and terrorist recruitment, law enforcement and Muslim American community leaders must partner together.

This report argues for a domestic counterterrorism enterprise centered on community policing. Community policing is a proactive style of policing primarily focused on community partnerships and crime prevention.

In order to simplify explaining the nuances of radicalization and the community policing enterprise, this report uses a market analogy: *Both terrorist groups and the community policing enterprise are similar to business firms.*

A “terrorist business firm” uses recruitment “advertisements” to tap into and/or create a market of people experiencing identity crises. These identity-conflicted individuals are the labor pool or “market for martyrs” terrorist firms recruit from.

Terrorists also challenge law enforcement’s ability to maintain public security.

A community policing enterprise competes against terrorist firms in the “market for martyrs” and seeks to maintain public security. The enterprise is analogous to a “product-extension merger” and requires both a division of labor and cooperation between law enforcement and Muslim communities. *Law enforcement focuses criminal behavior while Muslim communities deal with ideological and social components to radicalization.*

Law enforcement needs to make sure its actions do not undermine Muslim communities' efforts and thus end up expanding the market for martyrs. Muslim communities need to maintain their willingness to assist legitimate law enforcement efforts to clamp down on terrorist firms' ability operate within the market without impunity.

The report ends by describing the tactical advantages to community policing over other forms of information gathering, such as intelligence-led policing. Unlike intelligence-led policing, community policing's heavier reliance on community partnerships reduces minimizing negative impact on both community-police relations and democratic values. *It also gathers and contextualizes various bits of information better to construct a fuller intelligence assessment.*

20) Rethinking the Causal Concept of Islamic Radicalization; Jonathan Githens-Mazer, Committee on Concepts and Methods; January 2010

Summary

In this article, Jonathan Githens-Mazer aimed to “reorient the study of radicalization away from subjective discussions of religion and violence” in an effort to research and implement the “best ways to prevent Islamically inspired political violence in the West.”

Githens-Mazer stressed that there is currently no single meaningful concept of the term ‘radicalization’ and thus political policies are often misguided and too subjective. He explained that historically, the term “has been used to describe English radicalism in the 16th and 17th centuries, meaning those that rejected ritualized religious practice of Catholicism...in favour of an individually experienced and textually defined form of worship.” He asked, “Does being ‘radicalized’ mean the same as leaving a secular or agnostic orientation to becoming a more committed religious practitioner?”

Githens-Mazer defined terrorism as “the asymmetrical deployment of threats and violence against enemies using means that fall outside the forms of political struggle routinely operating within some current regime.”

The author also defined radicalization as “a collectively defined, individually felt moral obligation to participate in direct action.”

- Shifts from rhetoric to practice
- Does not occur in a vacuum; affected by many factors
- Violence is not synonymous

Githens-Mazer claimed, “When applied to Islam and Muslims, the term radical is often being used interchangeably and opaquely with terms such as fundamentalist, Islamist, Jihadist and neo-Salafist or Wahabbist with little regard for what these terms actually mean, and instead indicate signals about political Islam that these members of the media and politicians wish to transmit.”

In his conclusion, Githens-Mazer stated, There is “no inherent causal relationship or necessary correlation between radicalization and violence, and any assumption of correlation between radicalization and violence can be easily refuted by empirical evidence.” Many current definitions of radicalization are leading to bad policies. It is important to that cases of violent radicalization exist among a small number of outlier cases and are abnormalities, not the norm.

Radicalization Conceptual Poles

Apathetic (-)

- Commitment to Rhetoric
- Mediated relationship with Political orientation, mobilization and action
- Mediated relationship with rhetoric and texts
- Elite defined political participation and behavior
- Power relationships maintained through practice of ritual

Radicalized(+)

- Commitment Direct Action
- Mobilization and Participation are individually obligatory and defined
- Relationship with agendas are personal, and non-elite defined
- Direct Action prized as defined by texts
- Rejection of ritual in favor of direct action

21) Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection? Alan Krueger and Jitka Maleckova; Journal of Economic Perspectives; Fall 2003

Summary

The authors concluded that their review of the evidence provided “little reason for optimism that a reduction in poverty or an increase in educational attainment would meaningfully reduce international terrorism. Any connection between poverty, education and terrorism is indirect, complicated and probably quite weak. Instead of viewing terrorism as a direct response to low market opportunities or ignorance, we suggest it is more accurately viewed as a response to political conditions and long-standing feelings of indignity and frustration that have little to do with economics.”

In conducting their research, the authors noted, “We begin with an overview of theoretical considerations involved in the occupational choice to participate in terrorist-type activities. Although the rational choice model of participation in terrorism can yield valuable insights, it does not yield an unambiguous answer to the question of whether higher income and more education would reduce participation in terrorism. Evidence on the determinants of terrorism is just beginning to be assembled, and the following sections of the paper consider a variety of types of evidence: the determinants of “hate crimes,” which can be viewed as a close cousin to terrorism; public opinion data from the West Bank and Gaza Strip on Palestinians’ attitudes toward violence and terrorism; a new statistical analysis of the determinants of participation in Hezbollah in Lebanon; biographical evidence on Palestinian suicide bombers and the backgrounds of 27 Israeli Jews who were involved in terrorist activities in the early 1980s; and finally, a new cross-country data set on whether a country’s economic conditions are related to the likelihood that citizens from that country will become involved in international terrorism.”

The authors two case studies of Hezbollah’s militant wing or Palestinian suicide bombers and the members of the Israeli Jewish Underground were just as likely “to come from economically advantaged families and have a relatively high level of education as to come from the ranks of the economically disadvantaged and uneducated.

The authors cited Russell and Miller’s report which (1983) assembled demographic information on more than 350 individuals engaged in terrorist activities in Latin America, Europe, Asia and the Middle East from 1966 to 1976, based on newspaper reports. Their sample consisted of individuals from 18 revolutionary groups known to engage in urban terrorism, including the Red Army in Japan, Baader-Meinhof gang in Germany, Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland, Red Brigades in Italy and People’s Liberation Army in Turkey. Russell and Miller found: “[T]he vast majority of those individuals involved in terrorist activities as cadres or leaders is quite well educated. In fact, approximately two-thirds of those identified terrorists are persons with some university training, university graduates or postgraduate students.” They also report that more than two-thirds of arrested terrorists “came from the middle or upper classes in their respective nations or areas.”

Taylor (1988) likewise concludes from his survey of the literature: “Neither social background, educational opportunity or attainment seem to be particularly associated with terrorism.”

Statement of

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Before the

**Committee on Homeland Security's and Governmental Affairs
United States Senate**

Presented on

October 30, 2007

I. Introduction

Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member Collins, and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Los Angeles Police Department's (LAPD) efforts to identify and counter violent extremism, which happens in this case, to be ideologically based.

Local law enforcement has a culture and capacity that no federal agency enjoys - the know-how and ability to engage communities that today are a vital part of the equation. Part of this engagement process is the demonstration of sensitivity to terminology that offends and/or isolates communities, hence, "*Ideologically Based Violent Extremism.*"

No agency knows their landscape better than local law enforcement; we were designed and built to be the eyes and ears of communities – the First Preventers of terrorism. What is important to law enforcement is that we carefully and accurately define those who we suspect will commit a criminal-terrorist act within our communities. That job needs to be done with the kind of balance and precision that inspires the support and trust of the American people in order to aid us in the pursuit of our lawful mission.

Prior to 2001, much of America overlooked Muslim communities in the United States (U.S). Iranians who immigrated to the U.S. following the hostage crisis received some media attention but the broader Muslim community in this country was not at the forefront of the national psyche. The reverse is now true as a result of the post-9/11 media coverage and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Muslim communities here and abroad have become centerpieces of coverage for the print and broadcast media. While this coverage has, in many cases, helped to educate the American public, it has also put Muslims under a very bright spotlight. Feelings of persecution and vulnerability by large swaths of Muslim communities have created anxiety and uncertainty about the future.

Before 9/11, law enforcement was equally unaware of this community, both at a federal and statewide level. Even with our newfound awareness, law enforcement personnel are working from a disadvantage because of the obstacles we face as we approach wary communities deeply concerned with issues such as the implications of the Patriot Act, racial-profiling in the transportation industry, and the mischaracterization of Islam in the media. High-profile arrests and investigations of violent extremists such as the Fort Dix 6 play into Muslims' fears that they are under increased scrutiny. These underlying dynamics play a role in how these communities interact with all facets of American society, especially law enforcement.

One major role that law enforcement can play in the fight against violent ideological extremism is that of educator. Teaching all communities about the dangers of extreme ideologies can dispel harmful rumors and myths that alienate already pressured communities. We have learned from the European experience how these alienated communities become a breeding ground for violent extremism and a safe haven for potential terrorists to hide among the population.

Granted, the U.S. does not have the same types of problems as England, France, Germany, or Israel. While the tactics terrorists employ are learned behaviors that migrate across national boundaries – through groups, training camps, and the Internet – the underlying motivations for

these violent acts are unique to the host countries. Consequently, the remedies (i.e., jailhouse de-radicalization in Malaysia, the Channel Project in northern England, and the BIRR Project in Australia) are often contextually bounded and dependent on the depth, strength, national allegiance and identity of the native Muslim community.

In Los Angeles, for example, there are many Muslim communities that do not share the same risk profile as those in the United Kingdom as they are much more integrated into the larger society. That said, the European example does provide U.S. law enforcement with a starting point when searching for early indicators of radicalization.

We have learned that Muslim communities in the U.S. are mistrustful of the mainstream media. Therefore, they may turn to other sources of information for news and socialization, such as the Internet. Unfortunately, despite all of the positive aspects of the Internet, it allows those individuals and groups with ideological agendas to easily make contact with like-minded individuals and access potentially destructive information.

As we move from the virtual to the physical, it is important to apply the hard-won lessons we have learned in combating gang crime to the problem of terrorism. Southern California was the birthplace of gang culture and in Los Angeles we are all too familiar with the threat of violent crime by street gangs. Regardless of how many police officers we deploy, we can only suppress specific incidents. While more police are part of the answer, the real solution lies in the community – with the strengthening of the family structure and the economic base; and the weakening of political power bases built on victimization and a cultural tolerance of violence. The problem of violent street gangs is based on deep community structures. However, so are the solution sets of youth-at-risk programs, parenting classes, economic infusion, job training, community activism against violence and religion-based interventions.

While it might seem counter-intuitive, the isolation of Muslim communities acts both as a wall and as a self-regulator. Similar to gangs, the signs of extremism are first seen on the most local levels: in the families, neighborhoods, schools, mosques, and work places. The wall built by the community is the barrier created to sustain cultural identity and values and protect against the pace of assimilation.

II. LAPD Strategies and Initiatives

One of the biggest challenges for law enforcement in this environment is separating political jihadists (i.e., those who intentionally plant seeds of division in an effort to alienate and isolate Muslim citizens from the rest of society) from legitimate actors. Teaching all communities about the dangers of extreme ideologies can dispel harmful rumors and myths that alienate already pressured communities. The LAPD has done much outreach in this area, both with Muslim and non-Muslim communities. For the 18 months, we have been involved in outreach and grassroots dialogue with Muslim communities, bringing the entire command staff to observe, learn, engage and, most importantly, listen. This has helped to build more robust trust networks at the divisional level of police service. One of our goals is to be viewed as trusted friends by Muslim communities in our city.

Our outreach to the non-Muslim community has combined education with prevention. We now have Terrorism Liaison Officers (TLOs) at all of our divisions and Fire Stations who serve as the principal points of contact for terrorism information and intelligence. These liaison officers educate Department personnel and the broader community about the indicators of violent extremism and have proven to be critical assets when it comes to raising the level of terrorism prevention and preparedness.

The education provided by the TLOs has been supplemented with training by outside experts. Within our ranks, we have worked to educate our officers in the Counter-Terrorism and Criminal Intelligence Bureau about Islam and the cultural sensitivities they should be aware of when they are in the field. Approaching Muslims with respect and integrity is a large piece of the counter-narrative that law enforcement can write for itself.

The LAPD must have the capability to hunt for signs of radicalization and terrorism activities on the Internet. We recently started a cyber investigations unit to do just that. The Internet is the virtual hangout for radicals and terrorists. It provides a plain-view means of identifying and gathering information on potential threats. Information gleaned from this open source, fed into the radicalization template, and combined with a thorough understanding of operational indicators, is critical to articulating suspicion and justifying the increased application of enforcement measures.

LAPD's Counter-Terrorism and Criminal Intelligence Bureau initiatives for both the present and future have aligned people, purpose, and strategy around the mission of building capacity to hunt and disrupt operational capability on the part of terrorists (recruiting, funding, planning, surveilling, and executing operations). However, just as important, we have aligned our resources to focus on the motivational side of the terrorist equation and have made great efforts and organizing, mobilizing and in partnership, raising the moderate Muslim voice to prevent the extremists from making inroads into this faith community. A few of these strategies are described below:

- Working in concert with our seven county regional and federal partners, we continue to build capacity to collect, fuse, analyze, and disseminate both strategic and operational intelligence. We are aligning our intelligence collection and dissemination process with an eye toward accountability and ensuring that our First Preventers have the information they need when they need it.
- Our Terrorism Liaison Officers are casting an ever-wider safety net to train more people in the city to be public data collectors and First Preventers.
- We have started a Muslim outreach program with our command staff to leverage resources, institutionalize the idea of developing the counter-narrative, and facilitate an educational process. In developing this counter-narrative, the goal is to inspire Muslim communities to responsibly partner with law enforcement to protect American values. We also aim to elevate the moderate Muslim voice and empower people to counter the extremist ideology with confidence. This enables community

leadership to assist law enforcement in identifying those individuals and groups who espouse extremism and work to divide Muslim communities from American society.

- We are working with a think tank to develop a training program for mid-level executives that will be tailored specifically to state and local law enforcers. It is our hope that this will develop into a model for a national counter-terrorism academy.
- We initiated the Regional Public Private Infrastructure Collaboration System – a tool that enhances communication between and within LAPD and the Private Sector.
- Our Archangel program is a Critical Infrastructure Protection System that includes a Protective Security Task Force.
- We are developing a Cyber Investigation Unit to hunt violent extremists on the Internet.
- Our Community Mapping project is described below in Section V.

III. A Different Problem

In contrast to much of Europe, which has suffered from a marked increase in violence and violent intentions – often by its own citizens, the problem we face in the U.S is mainly political. There are those among us, I call them political jihadists, who are attempting to create division, alienation, and a sense of persecution in Muslim communities in order to create a cause. They are the nemesis of community engagement. Their purpose is to create the conditions that facilitate the radicalization process for international political causes.

Law enforcement's *ultimate* goal is to engender the continued loyalty and good citizenship of American-Muslims – not merely disrupt terrorist activities. Let me be clear, I am not saying that law enforcement should relax its effort to hunt down and neutralize small numbers of “clusters” on the criminal side of the radicalization trajectory. That task remains, and must be done with precision and must also be carried out in the context of what is ultimately valuable. What good is it to disrupt a group planning a mall bombing if the enforcement method is so unreasonable that it is widely criticized and encourages many more to enter the radicalization process?

The point is not merely an academic one—it has operational consequence. In preserving good will and by in by Muslim communities, law enforcement is, in fact, advancing its intelligence agenda by fostering an environment that maximizes tips and leads surfacing from those same communities. The long-term solution to this radicalization problem will come from Muslim communities themselves.

The natural question is: What factors put a community at-risk? Taking a page from the European experience, diaspora communities are in transition from one culture to another, making its members particularly vulnerable to identity crises which may be very easily subverted by ideologues. As Eric Hoffer wrote in his book, “The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of

Mass Movements”: “Faith in a holy cause is to a considerable extent a substitute for the lost faith in ourselves.” If there is a real or perceived threat of discrimination between the new community and the host, then an “us against them” mentality may prevail making that final step towards radicalization that much easier. Some Muslim communities may view any local discrimination as linked to Muslim causes globally, and vice versa, any discrimination against the *Ummah* (the global Muslim community) may be felt locally.

The Pakistani-British community in the United Kingdom is a diaspora, which is significant, because it makes the 2nd and 3rd generations of the community particularly vulnerable to the social pressures of growing up in a country very different from their parents’ and grandparents’ homeland. As a diaspora community, they remain transnational, tending to maintain close family, social, and financial ties with Pakistan. Globalization allows a diaspora to maintain these transnational contacts via faster, cheaper air travel, global communications technology (Internet and cell phone), global mass media, and nearly instant transnational banking. If the first two risk factors are present, then one must ask, “Does the community also hail from an unstable homeland with Wahabbi-Salafi ties?” If so, that community, like the British-Pakistani Muslim community, might be at greater risk of incubating homegrown radicalization.

If social factors - such as enclaves where residents are culturally and linguistically isolated - contribute to radicalization, it is important for law enforcement to be aware of those potentially vulnerable communities. This is part of our next step. We want to map the locations of these closed, vulnerable communities, and in partnership with these communities, infuse social services that will help the people who live there while weaving these enclaves into the fabric of the larger society. While the role of the law enforcer is not one of religious scholar or social worker, there is the potential to build and strengthen bridges from communities to those resources. It is then we will know where to find our Pakistani, Iranian, Somali, Chechen, Jordanian, and North African communities and thus understand how better to support their integration into the greater society. It is then that local law enforcement becomes an enabler.

IV. Legitimacy and Constitutionality

It is our position that legitimacy and intelligence are equally important tools for U.S. law enforcement to use in counter-terrorism efforts. Legitimacy starts with an organizational knowledge and pride in operating constitutionally and within the law. The need for transparency – being perceived to be and authentically honoring this principle – in intelligence and counter-terrorism activities cannot be understated. Taking great care to ensure that intelligence and enforcement operations are narrowly targeted against terrorist cells determined to go operational is critical. Law enforcement and its advocates must also avoid name-calling exchanges with political jihadists, opting instead to engage them professionally on specific issues. Political jihadists will reveal themselves in these exchanges by being unreasonable and unable to articulate specific grievances, preferring instead to use personal attacks and blanket accusations. In doing so, they are failing in their purpose to attract converts.

Community policing initiatives in Muslim communities should aim to create a shared sense of threat: society as a whole fears the indiscriminate, mass violence we are seeing around the world. All forms of communication with the public (whether analytical reports or post-incident news conferences) should address this fear. In summary, law enforcement’s most pressing

challenge is to shield the public from this threat, while not advancing the purpose of political jihadists. It is a difficult balance to achieve, however, raising the moderate Muslim voice and creating the counter-narrative that offsets the fanatical trajectory of radicalization.

The LAPD has created the Counter-Terrorism and Criminal Intelligence Bureau with nearly 300 officers who are solely dedicated to counter-terrorism, criminal intelligence gathering, and community building. Policing terrorism must be a convergent strategy that enhances the fight against crime and disorder. In building the resistance to crime and disorder, we create hostile environments to terrorists.

V. Community Mapping

We need to understand the problem as it exists in Los Angeles before we roll out programs to mitigate radicalization. Historically, the temptation has been to turn to intervention programs before we have clearly identified problems within the community. In the past we have relied on interventions based on "experts," logic or previous programs that are either generic or insensitive to the constellation of issues. This has consistently produced unremarkable results. Public safety pays a high cost for this business practice. This is one of many reasons to support the rationale behind community mapping, a process that delivers a richer picture and road map that can guide future strategies.

In order to give our officers increased awareness of our local Muslim communities, the LAPD recently launched an initiative with an academic institution to conduct an extensive "community mapping" project. We are also soliciting input of local Muslim groups, so the process can be transparent and inclusive. While this project will lay out the geographic locations of the many different Muslim population groups around Los Angeles, we also intend to take a deeper look at their history, demographics, language, culture, ethnic breakdown, socio-economic status, and social interactions. It is our hope to identify communities, within the larger Muslim community, which may be susceptible to violent ideologically-based extremism and then use a full-spectrum approach guided by an intelligence-led strategy.

Community mapping is the start of a conversation, not just data sets: It is law enforcement identifying with its community and the community identifying with its families, neighborhoods, city, state, country and police. For the past 18 months, the LAPD's outreach and grassroots dialogue with Muslim communities has helped the entire command staff to observe, learn, engage and, most importantly, listen. This has helped to build more robust trust networks at the divisional level of the police service area.

Without a community mapping blueprint and methodical community engagement strategy, our outreach efforts will be sporadic. Our counter-narrative will be empty of meaning, leaving us talking about, rather than talking with, this community.

VI. Conclusion – The Evolving Threat

We need to show that our democratic principles built on the values, practices, and lives of American citizens are sacred and worthy of embracing. We need to show our belief in human dignity, the family and the value of the individual. We need to show how we honor the meaning of our lives by what we contribute to others' lives. We need to show that behind the badges of American law enforcement are caring Americans “doing” law enforcement. To do this we need to go into the community and get to know peoples’ names. We need to walk into homes, neighborhoods, mosques, and businesses. We need to know how Islam expresses itself in Los Angeles if we expect to forge bonds of community support. The LAPD has been involved in this process and we are now ready to evolve our outreach to a more sophisticated and strategic level.

The U.S. faces a vicious, amorphous, and unfamiliar adversary on our land. The principal threats will be local, self-generating and self-directed. If there are direct connections with overseas groups, these are most likely to be initiated by the local actors. Cases in point include the 7/7 bombers, the Glasgow car bombers, and, more locally, Lodi in which local individuals and groups sought out training in Pakistan. This is not intended to dismiss threats that emerge from overseas locations, which should continue to be of concern. Rather, it is an estimate of relative density—locally generated threats will manifest themselves with greater frequency.

Ultimately, preventing extremism will be up to neighborhoods and communities, but thread by thread, relationship by relationship, the police can help build a network of services and relationships that will make it very hard for terrorism to take root. American Muslim neighborhoods and communities have a genuine responsibility in preventing any form of extremism and terrorism. If the broader communities are intolerant of such things, these ideologies cannot take root in its midst. I believe no amount of enforcement or intelligence can ultimately prevent extremism if the communities are not committed to working with law enforcement to prevent it.



NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER

(U) Community-Oriented Policing Offers a Grassroots Framework for Counterradicalization

NCTC SPOTLIGHT 2010-93

25 October 2010

(U//FOUO) The community-oriented policing (COP) paradigm^a provides an existing framework for collaborative grassroots engagement that has the potential for success in counterradicalization outreach efforts. COP leverages already established community-based social service programs to address individual, group, and community radicalization factors.

- The COP philosophy can be easily applied to counterradicalization by capitalizing on existing program infrastructure and funding mechanisms without having to create a new structure for outreach.
- Building on established social service systems also mitigates the appearance of singling out Muslim communities for targeting.

(U) Grassroots Engagement Empowers Communities

(U//FOUO) COP strategies provide a proactive approach to reducing individual and community

^a (U) COP signifies police collaboration with community members to build trust, solve community problems, and promote public safety.

(U) This report was prepared by the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Radicalization and Extremist Messages Group, NCTC, on (571) 280-1149 or 17113 secure.

risk by building a sense of trust, mutual respect, and shared ownership of public safety through partnerships with community stakeholders—such as business owners, religious groups, and social service programs. By closely aligning with established programs, these strategies have made progress in such areas as child abuse, reduction of domestic violence, and gang and delinquency prevention.

(U//FOUO) These established programs tackle issues similar to those faced in countering violent extremism and are likely to be effective in addressing the personal and contextual risk factors for radicalization and to provide interventions to reduce vulnerability.

(U//FOUO) Surveys of police departments show that during the past 20 years—as police departments have increasingly incorporated the COP philosophy—this approach has been effective in reducing crime and improving community safety.

- Delray Beach, Florida, reduced drug-related crime activity in a tourist area by working with community members, business owners, and city departments to reduce opportunity for and

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create an environment not conducive to criminal activity.

- In Madison, Wisconsin, police reduced alcohol-related violence in a key shopping and entertainment district through problem-solving crime analysis, changes in departmental policies, and active engagement with key community stakeholders, such as the university and business owners.
- Police in Edmonton, Canada, improved information exchange between social service agencies and the police department, which increased the likelihood that domestic violence would be reported and prosecuted, by working with advocates and reaching out to develop partnerships with domestic violence shelters and child welfare authorities.

(U) Applying COP Philosophy To Counter Radicalization and Violent Extremism

(U//FOUO) Since 9/11, social science researchers and police increasingly have advocated community and problem-oriented policing as effective approaches to countering radicalization and preventing extremist violence. Problem-oriented policing is a strategy that builds on the relationships and grassroots community interaction practiced in COP and adds a focus on problem identification through crime analysis, intervention, and evaluation. Academic research indicates that COP practices, such as developing relationships with a broad range of community stakeholders, increases trust and a willingness to share information that could identify individuals at risk of radicalization or potential terrorist plots.

- A Muslim policy group this year argued that well-designed partnerships between police and Muslim communities offer a promising approach to counterterrorism because they empower community members to become stakeholders in establishing safety and community well-being.

(U//FOUO) By adopting the COP paradigm, social services, religious groups, and businesses

are well positioned to address multiple radicalization risk factors—such as perceived victimization, insularity, sociopolitical and economic circumstances, and lack of trust.

- According to behavioral science studies of factors underlying violent behavior, counterradicalization approaches—such as COP—that include interventions aimed at building trust and increasing individual, family, group, and community resilience are likely to reduce susceptibility to radicalization and violent action.
- Under a COP strategy, fears about individuals who may be influencing young people, as well as observations about unusual activities, can be brought up to authorities for problem analysis and intervention. Because the community participates in identifying and solving the problem, information sharing and trust are enhanced.

(U//FOUO) Communities in the US and other countries are building on COP strategies to develop counterradicalization approaches that increase local intelligence gathering and build community trust, according to academic researchers.

- In the US, some Muslim groups already have praised ongoing—or proposed new—COP efforts as a positive step in building relationships between law enforcement and Muslim communities.
- In Australia, police are effectively involved at the grassroots level to foster social cohesion and a sense that countering violent extremism requires a partnership involving police, intelligence agencies, and the community, according to academic researchers and press reports.

(U) Capitalizing on Existing COP Resources and Avoiding Pitfalls

(U//FOUO) Adoption of intelligence-led policing, an organizational philosophy that incorporates principles of COP and problem-

oriented policing, offers a targeted approach to disrupting and preventing violent extremism. Grassroots engagement, problem solving, and analysis in intelligence-led policing allow authorities to identify at-risk communities and individuals. Intelligence-led policing also assists in developing strategies to deter terrorism and reduce community factors that foster radicalization.

- Fusion centers and joint terrorism task forces offer a possible venue for identifying effective COP outreach programs and sharing best practices.

(U//FOUO) In the US, a multijurisdictional overlap of local, state, and federal efforts poses a challenge for integrating new counterradicalization programs into an existing service-delivery structure. COP efforts focused on counterradicalization could build off existing efforts in the area of gang and violence prevention, community capacity-building, and family support that are funded through a multitude of public and private resources (see chart on next page).

- Government agencies with authority to give grants could develop collaborative funding

projects that build on established methods of selecting and monitoring grant recipients' performance.

- Community entities could, in turn, join collaboratively to provide a range of community-based services—such as health, mentoring, mental health, and school readiness—that integrate public and privately funded programs, including COP efforts, into a cohesive outreach effort.
- By borrowing funding infrastructure, program design, and evaluation strategies from established efforts, community engagement initiatives increase their effectiveness and the likelihood that successes are replicated.

(U//FOUO) Partnering with already established social service systems and funding structures would probably reduce the risk of alienating Muslim communities. Using existing funding and social services that do not target specific communities might enhance credibility with vulnerable groups and be more consistent with COP principles.

(U) Community-Policing Models for Grassroots Engagement

Community-oriented policing is an overarching philosophy that is incorporated in two popular policing strategies: problem-oriented policing and intelligence-led policing.

Community-Oriented Policing (COP) is a grassroots philosophy that serves as the first point of contact with vulnerable communities and individuals. COP has been used to solve a number of public safety problems, such as neighborhood crime and gangs, and has been incorporated into the CT strategies of countries, including the UK and the Netherlands.

- Academic research suggests that COP practices, such as developing relationships with a broad range of community stakeholders, would increase trust and a willingness to share information that could identify individuals at risk of radicalization or potential terrorist plots.

Successful COP strategies contain the following elements:

- Personal engagement and regular interaction between police officers and community members. For example, many COP programs use officers on bicycles and have officers walking the streets in vulnerable communities. Officers interact regularly with homeowners' associations, property managers, local businesses, and schools to engage community members.
- Partnerships with key community stakeholders, such as child welfare and mental health services; the courts; probation, parole, and healthcare providers; and businesses.
- Focus on preventing community problems and building trust.

Problem-Oriented Policing builds on the relationships and grassroots community interaction practiced in COP and adds a focus on problem identification through crime analysis, intervention, and evaluation. Many departments use the "broken windows" theory that community disorder and criminal incidents are sensitive to context and situation, so that small changes, such as removing trash from the streets, and targeting enforcement of misdemeanors, such as loitering, can reduce the likelihood that disorder will be tolerated by the community or committed by problem individuals.


- The problem-oriented policing approach employs a systematic data collection and analysis model to identify and analyze specific problems and develop interventions. The data collection and analysis model includes crime mapping, interviewing victims and perpetrators, and analyzing crime data, such as specifics about locations, times, and types of victims. Applying the model allows police to tailor interventions to the specific problem.
- Problem-oriented policing provides situational crime prevention by organizing problem analysis using a tool called the crime triangle that assumes a criminal incident requires a motivated individual or group, an identified target or victim, and an opportunity to act. Situational crime prevention involves reducing the likelihood that all three elements would be present at a given time, thereby reducing the likelihood of an incident.

Intelligence-Led Policing is an organizational philosophy that incorporates principles of COP and problem-oriented policing; directs intelligence resources; makes extensive use of informants, data, and collaborative information sharing; and offers a targeted approach to violence reduction, disruption, and prevention. While intelligence-led policing uses information from the grassroots strategies of COP and problem-oriented policing, it is a top-down organizational model to develop a strategic approach to intervening against persistent and serious problems of disorder.

- Incorporating grassroots engagement, problem solving, and intelligence analysis into the decisionmaking process reduces the likelihood of radicalization and terrorist incidents.
- Such an integrated approach improves the strategic deployment of manpower and resources, deterring or disrupting potential terrorist actions.

(U) Community-Policing Models for Grassroots Engagement

Sample organization of a multiagency community-outreach program and funding consortium.



Statement of

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Before the

United States House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security

“The Threat of Muslim-American Radicalization in U.S. Prisons”

Presented on

June 15, 2011

I. Introduction

Chairman King, Ranking Member Thompson, and distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Los Angeles Police Department's (LAPD) view and strategy of this most important phenomena relating the evolving threat of Muslim-American radicalization in United States prisons.

II. Background

Much has been written about prison radicalization over the last five or six years and just as we have seen a surge in homegrown violent extremists targeting innocent civilians with violence or plotting against the United States, we have also seen a surge in both converts and a radicalization of those converts toward violent acts. Fortunately this still remains a phenomenon of low volume; however, the radicalization of even a small fraction of this population holds high consequence for Americans and innocent people around the world. The United States has the highest incarceration rate (701 out of every 100,000) and the largest prison population (over 2 million – 93% of whom are in state and local prisons and jails) of any country in the world.¹ Prisoners by their very nature, are at risk and susceptible to recruitment and radicalization by extremist groups because of their isolation, violent tendencies, and cultural discontent. Nearly 300 federal prisoners are serving sentences on terrorism related charges in the United States. The Bureau of Prisons incarcerates nearly two dozen al-Qaeda terrorists, including men involved in the 1993 World Trade Center, the 1998 East African embassy bombings, the 1999 millennial plot to bomb the Los Angeles International Airport, and the 2000 bombing of the USS Cole. New York is holding an additional fifteen al-Qaeda members awaiting trial.

Los Angeles is known for its outreach and engagement with Muslim communities and the commensurate strategy to overlay the community policing enterprise on top of communities who are either isolated, balkanized, feel oppressed, or are not integrated into the social fabric of society. And in this context, we have come to recognize Islam expresses itself differently than it does in New York, Minnesota, or even San Diego. There is no one organization, institute, or individual that speaks on behalf of the Ummah (the global Muslim community). Dealing with the motivational aspects to terrorism has been a great part of the Los Angeles Police Department's focus in delivering a counter-terrorism strategy. The expression of Islam in the prison system is a subject which brings great concern.

IV. Prison Converts

It is generally understood that the majority of prison converts assimilate back into what they were doing prior to going to prison, however, it is the exception cases that have and will continue to strike fear in the hearts of Americans. It was estimated that seventeen to twenty percent of the prison population, or approximately 350,000 inmates comprise of Muslim inmates in 2003, and that 80% of the prisoners who convert while in prison, convert to Islam.² It is further estimated that 35,000 inmates convert to Islam annually. A Senate Foreign Relations Committee report

¹ Roy Walmsley, World Prison Population (5th Ed.) (Home Office, Publication234, 2003)

² "Testimony of Dr. J. Michael Waller". United States Senate, Committee on Judiciary. 2003-10-12 http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=960&wit_id=2719. Retrieved 2010-06-05

released in 2010 announced that up to three dozen Americans who converted to Islam in prison have travelled to Yemen, to train with al-Qaeda.³

III. The Evidence and Explanation

I will leave the examination of these cases to my academic colleagues who have studied and analyzed the individuals and will be testifying before this committee. There are more than a few cases of concern:

- Jam’iyyat Ul-Islam Is-Saheeh (JIS), Arabic for Assembly of Authentic Islam - a radical prison organization led by a Rollin 30 gang member, Kevin James, who is serving time for robbery convictions at the New Folsom Prison near Sacramento, California. He recruited prisoners including a Rollin 60 gang member and preached the duty of members to target enemies of Islam, or “infidels,” including the United States government and Jewish and non-Jewish supporters of Israel. The JIS network was large and crossed prison boundaries. In 2005 the Joint Terrorism Task Force thwarted the plot to attack military institutions and synagogues.
- Jose Padilla, a former Chicago gang member, arrested in 2002, converted to Islam while in prison and was recruited at a mosque to become a mujahedeen fighter. He was accused of plotting to detonate a radioactive “dirty bomb” but was convicted of unrelated terror support charges.
- Richard Reid, a British citizen and follower of Osama Bin Laden, was a prison convert in England and become involved with militants after he was freed. He was apprehended while attempting to detonate a bomb on a United States commercial flight in December 2001. He is believed to have been radicalized by an imam while incarcerated in England. He is serving a life sentence at a maximum –security prison in Colorado.
- Michael Finton, a United States Citizen, a prison convert to Islam, attempted to bomb the Paul Findley Federal Building and the adjacent offices of a Congressman in downtown Springfield, Illinois on September 24, 2009. He pled guilty on May 9, 2011 and sentenced to 28 years in prison.

There are several ongoing cases whose story is yet to be told, however, the common denominator is conversion to a radical form of Islam while in prison.

If Islam expressed itself in the California Prison system as it does in the Los Angeles region, we would be talking about the strength and value that Islam brings to prisoners in terms of behavior and value based living. However, this is not the case and it is not the case because of the manner in which many prison populations are exposed to Islam, carrying the disguise of dysfunction, danger, and exploitation. Instead of providing a balanced, peaceful, contemporary perspective of one of the great and peaceful religions of the world, we are left with a hi-jacked, cut and paste version known to the counter-terrorism practitioners as Prislam, as my good friend Frank Cilluffo coined the phrase. This has been allowed to propagate through the three dynamic dimensions of People, Materials, and Places of Association.

People: Budgets for religious services in correctional facilities have fallen to economic shortcomings, enhancing opportunities for radical prisoners to conduct their own services and

³ “Al-Qaeda in Yemen and Somalia: A Ticking Time Bomb.” A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate. January 21, 2010, p. 4.

support system. As a matter of smart practices, the American Correctional Chaplains Association recommends one chaplain per 500 inmates. In California, there is one chaplain for every 2,000 inmates, and some Texas prisons the ratio is one to 2,500.⁴ It is essential that a thorough background investigation process for anyone entering a correctional institution be completed before access is granted. Additionally, consistent standards of qualification should be developed and adopted. There are numerous cases where on spiritual advisor or chaplain is denied access to a correctional facility and then admitted into another.

To better understand the competencies and qualifications of a Chaplain, consideration should be given to the following questions: What is the particular religious denomination to be supported by the individual? Is there a sponsoring religious institution associated with the individual? Is that institution locally established? Has the individual met any standards or permissions associated with the position they are seeking? Does the denomination advocate violence? Has the individual had recent travel outside of the United States? If so, where and when? Is there a foreign government sponsorship of this individual? Does the individual maintain any professional, regional or national associations that might evidence their legitimacy? In what manner are they involved with any such organization? Will the services be conducted in English or another language? If other than English, what language?

Materials: It is essential that effective policies and practices are designed to create an understanding of what prospective faith-based staffers may utilize by way of materials to facilitate their purpose. Frequent audits of books, video, audio, and other related material should be conducted to determine permissibility under existing facility security policies. These policies should be consistent throughout the prison system. *Out of the Shadows: Getting Ahead of Prisoner Radicalization*, a special report by the George Washington University, Homeland Security Policy Institute, published in September 2006 stated the following: “Radical literature and extremist translations and interpretations Radical literature and extremist translations and interpretations of the Qur’an have been distributed to prisoners by groups suspected or known to support terrorism. The Noble Qur’an, a Wahabbi/Salafist version written in English, is widely available in prisons. A recent review in the Middle East Quarterly characterized this version as reading “...like a supremacist Muslim, anti-Semite, anti-Christian polemic than a rendition of the Islamic scripture.” Of particular concern is its appendix, entitled “The Call to *Jihad* (Holy Fighting in Allah’s Cause).”

Anwar al-Aulaqi, a prominent United States born Islamic scholar of Yemeni descent and internet radicalizer is wanted by the United States for Terrorism prosecution. His radical literature has found its way into the prison system and has been used by known extremists to facilitate recruitment and radicalization activities within prisons.

Differences Between the Shee’ah and Muslims Who Follow the Sunnah, written in plain English, is another such example of radical material. Examinations of materials should not be limited to that which is brought in by faith-based service providers. Effective procedures and processes of screening inmate mail can be quite useful as prevention measures to discover prohibited, controversial or materials advocating violence, entering or leaving local correctional

⁴ Drum, V.L., “Professional Correctional Chaplains: Facts and Fiction,” presented at the American Correctional Association 137th Annual Congress of Corrections, Kansas City, Mo, August 13, 2007.

facilities. Other items of interest would be military manuals, training manuals, and documentation advocating the overthrow of the U.S. Government. Communicating this information throughout the law enforcement network will prove to be effective in preventing further mobilization toward violence.

The spiritual philosopher of al Qaeda, Sayyid Qutb, wrote the radical Islamist manifesto *Ma'alim fi al-Tariq* (Milestones Along the Road) while in an Egyptian prison. Copies of this document exist in the prison system and contribute to radicalization.

Meetings: Are inmate meetings and gatherings taking place using religion as a ruse for other activities? Religious and other gatherings of inmates within correctional facilities present challenges and opportunities for inmates, service providers, and correctional staff. Staff members should make the time to monitor inmate gatherings. Audio and video equipment may be effectively used for these purposes. Regimented activities of inmates may be indicators that activities incongruent with religious services are taking place. The principles of direct supervision, a contemporary method of inmate management that is currently in use in many local detention facilities, is also supportive of correctional staff presence in inmate gatherings and activities.

IV. Aligning People, Purpose, and Strategy/Leaning Forward

In the policing world, the efforts to reduce crime, mitigate risk, and teach communities how to build crime resistant neighborhoods, focus on targeting stakeholder resources around three thematic areas; High Risk People, High Risk Places, and High Risk Activity. This model also looks at ten percent of the victims who are victimized forty percent of the time because they expose themselves to high risk people, high risk places, and high risk activity. While it is understood that prisons are certainly different than a free society or a community in an urban or rural area, they do represent a type of community with resources at their disposal. In the same manner that police address the above crime model to include partnership, problem solving, and prevention, prisons should continue to lean forward in terms of managing risk with an eye toward People, Materials, and Places. Furthermore, this needs to be looked at from a whole of government/whole of community approach, utilizing non-governmental offices, vetted community volunteer groups and leadership organizations.

Islam is the fastest growing religion in the prison system, and while the majority of converts are African American, other minority groups are converting in prison as well. Would the Muslim-American Ummah in the United States be proud of what converts in prison are learning about Islam. I would say in some cases, they would be shocked and dismayed.

As a law enforcement executive, one who has worked in Los Angeles for over twenty-nine years with a primary focus on counter-terrorism for the last six years, one of my greatest concerns is the issue of convergent threats. We are beginning to see convergence in the areas of gangs, narcotic cartels, organized crime, terrorism, and human trafficking.

Los Angeles gained a reputation for being the gang capital of the United States and much of the prison structure is made up on gangs, i.e., Bloods, Crips, Mexican Mafia, Black Guerilla Family, Aryan Brotherhood, and Violent Ideological Extremists (Violent Islamic Extremists).

Just as isolated, and balkanized communities can become incubators of violent extremism, so too can prisons. If left unchecked prisons can and do become incubators of radicalization leading to violent extremism.

While I am certainly not advocating “thought policing” there is a lot that can be done to insulate prisons from the elements that create high risk environments that we are seeing today.

One major role that law enforcement can play in the fight against violent ideological extremism is that of educator. Teaching all communities about the dangers of extreme ideologies can dispel harmful rumors and myths that alienate already pressured communities. We have learned from the European experience how these alienated communities become a breeding ground for violent extremism and a safe haven for potential terrorists to hide among the population. Prisons are no exception.

Granted, the U.S. does not have the same types of problems as England, France, Germany, or Israel. While the tactics terrorists employ are learned behaviors that migrate across national boundaries – through groups, training camps, and the Internet – the underlying motivations for these violent acts are unique to the host countries. Consequently, the remedies (i.e., jailhouse de-radicalization in Malaysia, the Channel Project in northern England, and the BIRR Project in Australia) are often contextually bounded and dependent on the depth, strength, national allegiance and identity of the native Muslim community.

In Los Angeles, for example, there are many Muslim communities that do not share the same risk profile as those in the United Kingdom as they are much more integrated into the larger society. That said, the European example does provide U.S. law enforcement with a starting point when searching for early indicators of radicalization.

V. Strategies and Initiatives

- Our outreach to the Muslim and non-Muslim communities has combined education with prevention. We now have Terrorism Liaison Officers (TLOs) at all of our divisions and Fire Stations who serve as the principal points of contact for terrorism information and intelligence. These liaison officers educate Department personnel and the broader community about the indicators of violent extremism and have proven to be critical assets when it comes to raising the level of terrorism prevention and preparedness. The TLO program has been integrated into the California prison system with the effect of casting an ever-wider safety net to train more people in the state to be public data collectors and First Preventers.
- We have taken our model and counter-terrorism strategy for Los Angeles and as much as possible applied these principles to prisons: Terrorism Liaison Officer, Suspicious Activity Reporting (SARS) or Tips and Leads, Capitalize on the Fusion Center Structure and Capabilities, Integrate information and analysis, and disseminate value added intelligence, Prison Radicalization Team assigned to the Fusion Center and aligned with a Joint Terrorism Task Force Vetting Squad.

Note: I have an officer assigned to this Joint Terrorism Task Force Squad and the volume of Tips and Leads relative to Prison Radicalization in the seven county footprint, is fifteen to twenty tips a month which are vetted by the JTTF squad developing into three to four open investigations/year where there is a reasonable suspicion that an individual or group of individuals are actively engaged in developing operational capability and motivation to conduct a terrorist act. Initial investigations conducted by this squad show that most of the extremists interviewed, generally, have no interest fighting in the United States; however, there is interest in fighting overseas in the name of Islam.

- Working in concert with our seven county regional and federal partners, we continue to build capacity to collect, fuse, analyze, and disseminate both strategic and operational intelligence. We are aligning our intelligence collection and dissemination process with an eye toward accountability and ensuring that our First Preventers have the information they need when they need it.

VI. Recommendations

- Prison Officials are stretched thin trying to maintain order in overcrowded and underfunded facilities. Funding and organizational structure needs to be a priority so we stay on the front end of prison radicalization.
- Effectively monitor materials coming in, and provide enough qualified, vetted clerics to meet inmates' spiritual needs. Clear policy and regulations should be established, and should apply to both volunteer leaders of religious services and extremist inmates within the prison system.
- Prisoners are highly vulnerable upon release. Offer them social support at that moment to help reintegrate them into the community. Don't let them be easy prey for recruiters with malicious intent. Budget shortfalls spurring early release programs and early parole only exacerbate the challenge, as the potential for more radicalized prisoners being paroled increases. This becomes even more important considering the issue of convergent threats – when gangs and drug cartels consider connecting with terrorist networks.
- From the parole officer to the prison guards, we need to articulate and educate as to the nature of the threat and how to best counter it.
- State correctional officers should notify law enforcement of the pending release of a violent extremist, allowing law enforcement officers to monitor the released inmate's outside activities. The Federal Bureau of Prisons already has a warning system in place to alert the FBI about the release of violent extremists in federal institutions. Several FBI field divisions sponsor intelligence sharing working groups with State and Federal correctional investigators that have helped improve coordination. The FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force in Los Angeles hosts a monthly prison radicalization meeting that brings correctional officers, local, state, and federal law enforcement together to share intelligence on violent extremist prison groups and provides advance notice of a violent

extremist reentry into the community. Other state prison officials may see a benefit in promoting the establishment of local prison radicalization working groups in their regions.

VII. Conclusion

The natural question is: What factors put a community at-risk? Taking a page from the European experience, diaspora communities are in transition from one culture to another, making its members particularly vulnerable to identity crises which may be very easily subverted by ideologues. As Eric Hoffer wrote in his book, “The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements”: “Faith in a holy cause is to a considerable extent a substitute for the lost faith in ourselves.” If there is a real or perceived threat of discrimination between the new community and the host, then an “us against them” mentality may prevail making that final step towards radicalization that much easier. Some Muslim communities may view any local discrimination as linked to Muslim causes globally, and vice versa, any discrimination against the *Ummah* (the global Muslim community) may be felt locally. Prisons are in fact communities at risk.

Statement of

**Michael P. Downing
Commanding Officer
Counter-Terrorism/Criminal Intelligence Bureau
Los Angeles Police Department**

Before the

**Committee on Homeland Security's and Governmental Affairs
United States Senate**

Presented on

October 30, 2007

I. Introduction

Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member Collins, and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Los Angeles Police Department's (LAPD) efforts to identify and counter violent extremism, which happens in this case, to be ideologically based.

Local law enforcement has a culture and capacity that no federal agency enjoys - the know-how and ability to engage communities that today are a vital part of the equation. Part of this engagement process is the demonstration of sensitivity to terminology that offends and/or isolates communities, hence, "*Ideologically Based Violent Extremism.*"

No agency knows their landscape better than local law enforcement; we were designed and built to be the eyes and ears of communities – the First Preventers of terrorism. What is important to law enforcement is that we carefully and accurately define those who we suspect will commit a criminal-terrorist act within our communities. That job needs to be done with the kind of balance and precision that inspires the support and trust of the American people in order to aid us in the pursuit of our lawful mission.

Prior to 2001, much of America overlooked Muslim communities in the United States (U.S). Iranians who immigrated to the U.S. following the hostage crisis received some media attention but the broader Muslim community in this country was not at the forefront of the national psyche. The reverse is now true as a result of the post-9/11 media coverage and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Muslim communities here and abroad have become centerpieces of coverage for the print and broadcast media. While this coverage has, in many cases, helped to educate the American public, it has also put Muslims under a very bright spotlight. Feelings of persecution and vulnerability by large swaths of Muslim communities have created anxiety and uncertainty about the future.

Before 9/11, law enforcement was equally unaware of this community, both at a federal and statewide level. Even with our newfound awareness, law enforcement personnel are working from a disadvantage because of the obstacles we face as we approach wary communities deeply concerned with issues such as the implications of the Patriot Act, racial-profiling in the transportation industry, and the mischaracterization of Islam in the media. High-profile arrests and investigations of violent extremists such as the Fort Dix 6 play into Muslims' fears that they are under increased scrutiny. These underlying dynamics play a role in how these communities interact with all facets of American society, especially law enforcement.

One major role that law enforcement can play in the fight against violent ideological extremism is that of educator. Teaching all communities about the dangers of extreme ideologies can dispel harmful rumors and myths that alienate already pressured communities. We have learned from the European experience how these alienated communities become a breeding ground for violent extremism and a safe haven for potential terrorists to hide among the population.

Granted, the U.S. does not have the same types of problems as England, France, Germany, or Israel. While the tactics terrorists employ are learned behaviors that migrate across national boundaries – through groups, training camps, and the Internet – the underlying motivations for

these violent acts are unique to the host countries. Consequently, the remedies (i.e., jailhouse de-radicalization in Malaysia, the Channel Project in northern England, and the BIRR Project in Australia) are often contextually bounded and dependent on the depth, strength, national allegiance and identity of the native Muslim community.

In Los Angeles, for example, there are many Muslim communities that do not share the same risk profile as those in the United Kingdom as they are much more integrated into the larger society. That said, the European example does provide U.S. law enforcement with a starting point when searching for early indicators of radicalization.

We have learned that Muslim communities in the U.S. are mistrustful of the mainstream media. Therefore, they may turn to other sources of information for news and socialization, such as the Internet. Unfortunately, despite all of the positive aspects of the Internet, it allows those individuals and groups with ideological agendas to easily make contact with like-minded individuals and access potentially destructive information.

As we move from the virtual to the physical, it is important to apply the hard-won lessons we have learned in combating gang crime to the problem of terrorism. Southern California was the birthplace of gang culture and in Los Angeles we are all too familiar with the threat of violent crime by street gangs. Regardless of how many police officers we deploy, we can only suppress specific incidents. While more police are part of the answer, the real solution lies in the community – with the strengthening of the family structure and the economic base; and the weakening of political power bases built on victimization and a cultural tolerance of violence. The problem of violent street gangs is based on deep community structures. However, so are the solution sets of youth-at-risk programs, parenting classes, economic infusion, job training, community activism against violence and religion-based interventions.

While it might seem counter-intuitive, the isolation of Muslim communities acts both as a wall and as a self-regulator. Similar to gangs, the signs of extremism are first seen on the most local levels: in the families, neighborhoods, schools, mosques, and work places. The wall built by the community is the barrier created to sustain cultural identity and values and protect against the pace of assimilation.

II. LAPD Strategies and Initiatives

One of the biggest challenges for law enforcement in this environment is separating political jihadists (i.e., those who intentionally plant seeds of division in an effort to alienate and isolate Muslim citizens from the rest of society) from legitimate actors. Teaching all communities about the dangers of extreme ideologies can dispel harmful rumors and myths that alienate already pressured communities. The LAPD has done much outreach in this area, both with Muslim and non-Muslim communities. For the 18 months, we have been involved in outreach and grassroots dialogue with Muslim communities, bringing the entire command staff to observe, learn, engage and, most importantly, listen. This has helped to build more robust trust networks at the divisional level of police service. One of our goals is to be viewed as trusted friends by Muslim communities in our city.

Our outreach to the non-Muslim community has combined education with prevention. We now have Terrorism Liaison Officers (TLOs) at all of our divisions and Fire Stations who serve as the principal points of contact for terrorism information and intelligence. These liaison officers educate Department personnel and the broader community about the indicators of violent extremism and have proven to be critical assets when it comes to raising the level of terrorism prevention and preparedness.

The education provided by the TLOs has been supplemented with training by outside experts. Within our ranks, we have worked to educate our officers in the Counter-Terrorism and Criminal Intelligence Bureau about Islam and the cultural sensitivities they should be aware of when they are in the field. Approaching Muslims with respect and integrity is a large piece of the counter-narrative that law enforcement can write for itself.

The LAPD must have the capability to hunt for signs of radicalization and terrorism activities on the Internet. We recently started a cyber investigations unit to do just that. The Internet is the virtual hangout for radicals and terrorists. It provides a plain-view means of identifying and gathering information on potential threats. Information gleaned from this open source, fed into the radicalization template, and combined with a thorough understanding of operational indicators, is critical to articulating suspicion and justifying the increased application of enforcement measures.

LAPD's Counter-Terrorism and Criminal Intelligence Bureau initiatives for both the present and future have aligned people, purpose, and strategy around the mission of building capacity to hunt and disrupt operational capability on the part of terrorists (recruiting, funding, planning, surveilling, and executing operations). However, just as important, we have aligned our resources to focus on the motivational side of the terrorist equation and have made great efforts and organizing, mobilizing and in partnership, raising the moderate Muslim voice to prevent the extremists from making inroads into this faith community. A few of these strategies are described below:

- Working in concert with our seven county regional and federal partners, we continue to build capacity to collect, fuse, analyze, and disseminate both strategic and operational intelligence. We are aligning our intelligence collection and dissemination process with an eye toward accountability and ensuring that our First Preventers have the information they need when they need it.
- Our Terrorism Liaison Officers are casting an ever-wider safety net to train more people in the city to be public data collectors and First Preventers.
- We have started a Muslim outreach program with our command staff to leverage resources, institutionalize the idea of developing the counter-narrative, and facilitate an educational process. In developing this counter-narrative, the goal is to inspire Muslim communities to responsibly partner with law enforcement to protect American values. We also aim to elevate the moderate Muslim voice and empower people to counter the extremist ideology with confidence. This enables community

leadership to assist law enforcement in identifying those individuals and groups who espouse extremism and work to divide Muslim communities from American society.

- We are working with a think tank to develop a training program for mid-level executives that will be tailored specifically to state and local law enforcers. It is our hope that this will develop into a model for a national counter-terrorism academy.
- We initiated the Regional Public Private Infrastructure Collaboration System – a tool that enhances communication between and within LAPD and the Private Sector.
- Our Archangel program is a Critical Infrastructure Protection System that includes a Protective Security Task Force.
- We are developing a Cyber Investigation Unit to hunt violent extremists on the Internet.
- Our Community Mapping project is described below in Section V.

III. A Different Problem

In contrast to much of Europe, which has suffered from a marked increase in violence and violent intentions – often by its own citizens, the problem we face in the U.S is mainly political. There are those among us, I call them political jihadists, who are attempting to create division, alienation, and a sense of persecution in Muslim communities in order to create a cause. They are the nemesis of community engagement. Their purpose is to create the conditions that facilitate the radicalization process for international political causes.

Law enforcement's *ultimate* goal is to engender the continued loyalty and good citizenship of American-Muslims – not merely disrupt terrorist activities. Let me be clear, I am not saying that law enforcement should relax its effort to hunt down and neutralize small numbers of “clusters” on the criminal side of the radicalization trajectory. That task remains, and must be done with precision and must also be carried out in the context of what is ultimately valuable. What good is it to disrupt a group planning a mall bombing if the enforcement method is so unreasonable that it is widely criticized and encourages many more to enter the radicalization process?

The point is not merely an academic one—it has operational consequence. In preserving good will and by in by Muslim communities, law enforcement is, in fact, advancing its intelligence agenda by fostering an environment that maximizes tips and leads surfacing from those same communities. The long-term solution to this radicalization problem will come from Muslim communities themselves.

The natural question is: What factors put a community at-risk? Taking a page from the European experience, diaspora communities are in transition from one culture to another, making its members particularly vulnerable to identity crises which may be very easily subverted by ideologues. As Eric Hoffer wrote in his book, “The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of

Mass Movements”: “Faith in a holy cause is to a considerable extent a substitute for the lost faith in ourselves.” If there is a real or perceived threat of discrimination between the new community and the host, then an “us against them” mentality may prevail making that final step towards radicalization that much easier. Some Muslim communities may view any local discrimination as linked to Muslim causes globally, and vice versa, any discrimination against the *Ummah* (the global Muslim community) may be felt locally.

The Pakistani-British community in the United Kingdom is a diaspora, which is significant, because it makes the 2nd and 3rd generations of the community particularly vulnerable to the social pressures of growing up in a country very different from their parents’ and grandparents’ homeland. As a diaspora community, they remain transnational, tending to maintain close family, social, and financial ties with Pakistan. Globalization allows a diaspora to maintain these transnational contacts via faster, cheaper air travel, global communications technology (Internet and cell phone), global mass media, and nearly instant transnational banking. If the first two risk factors are present, then one must ask, “Does the community also hail from an unstable homeland with Wahabbi-Salafi ties?” If so, that community, like the British-Pakistani Muslim community, might be at greater risk of incubating homegrown radicalization.

If social factors - such as enclaves where residents are culturally and linguistically isolated - contribute to radicalization, it is important for law enforcement to be aware of those potentially vulnerable communities. This is part of our next step. We want to map the locations of these closed, vulnerable communities, and in partnership with these communities, infuse social services that will help the people who live there while weaving these enclaves into the fabric of the larger society. While the role of the law enforcer is not one of religious scholar or social worker, there is the potential to build and strengthen bridges from communities to those resources. It is then we will know where to find our Pakistani, Iranian, Somali, Chechen, Jordanian, and North African communities and thus understand how better to support their integration into the greater society. It is then that local law enforcement becomes an enabler.

IV. Legitimacy and Constitutionality

It is our position that legitimacy and intelligence are equally important tools for U.S. law enforcement to use in counter-terrorism efforts. Legitimacy starts with an organizational knowledge and pride in operating constitutionally and within the law. The need for transparency – being perceived to be and authentically honoring this principle – in intelligence and counter-terrorism activities cannot be understated. Taking great care to ensure that intelligence and enforcement operations are narrowly targeted against terrorist cells determined to go operational is critical. Law enforcement and its advocates must also avoid name-calling exchanges with political jihadists, opting instead to engage them professionally on specific issues. Political jihadists will reveal themselves in these exchanges by being unreasonable and unable to articulate specific grievances, preferring instead to use personal attacks and blanket accusations. In doing so, they are failing in their purpose to attract converts.

Community policing initiatives in Muslim communities should aim to create a shared sense of threat: society as a whole fears the indiscriminate, mass violence we are seeing around the world. All forms of communication with the public (whether analytical reports or post-incident news conferences) should address this fear. In summary, law enforcement’s most pressing

challenge is to shield the public from this threat, while not advancing the purpose of political jihadists. It is a difficult balance to achieve, however, raising the moderate Muslim voice and creating the counter-narrative that offsets the fanatical trajectory of radicalization.

The LAPD has created the Counter-Terrorism and Criminal Intelligence Bureau with nearly 300 officers who are solely dedicated to counter-terrorism, criminal intelligence gathering, and community building. Policing terrorism must be a convergent strategy that enhances the fight against crime and disorder. In building the resistance to crime and disorder, we create hostile environments to terrorists.

V. Community Mapping

We need to understand the problem as it exists in Los Angeles before we roll out programs to mitigate radicalization. Historically, the temptation has been to turn to intervention programs before we have clearly identified problems within the community. In the past we have relied on interventions based on "experts," logic or previous programs that are either generic or insensitive to the constellation of issues. This has consistently produced unremarkable results. Public safety pays a high cost for this business practice. This is one of many reasons to support the rationale behind community mapping, a process that delivers a richer picture and road map that can guide future strategies.

In order to give our officers increased awareness of our local Muslim communities, the LAPD recently launched an initiative with an academic institution to conduct an extensive "community mapping" project. We are also soliciting input of local Muslim groups, so the process can be transparent and inclusive. While this project will lay out the geographic locations of the many different Muslim population groups around Los Angeles, we also intend to take a deeper look at their history, demographics, language, culture, ethnic breakdown, socio-economic status, and social interactions. It is our hope to identify communities, within the larger Muslim community, which may be susceptible to violent ideologically-based extremism and then use a full-spectrum approach guided by an intelligence-led strategy.

Community mapping is the start of a conversation, not just data sets: It is law enforcement identifying with its community and the community identifying with its families, neighborhoods, city, state, country and police. For the past 18 months, the LAPD's outreach and grassroots dialogue with Muslim communities has helped the entire command staff to observe, learn, engage and, most importantly, listen. This has helped to build more robust trust networks at the divisional level of the police service area.

Without a community mapping blueprint and methodical community engagement strategy, our outreach efforts will be sporadic. Our counter-narrative will be empty of meaning, leaving us talking about, rather than talking with, this community.

VI. Conclusion – The Evolving Threat

We need to show that our democratic principles built on the values, practices, and lives of American citizens are sacred and worthy of embracing. We need to show our belief in human dignity, the family and the value of the individual. We need to show how we honor the meaning of our lives by what we contribute to others' lives. We need to show that behind the badges of American law enforcement are caring Americans “doing” law enforcement. To do this we need to go into the community and get to know peoples’ names. We need to walk into homes, neighborhoods, mosques, and businesses. We need to know how Islam expresses itself in Los Angeles if we expect to forge bonds of community support. The LAPD has been involved in this process and we are now ready to evolve our outreach to a more sophisticated and strategic level.

The U.S. faces a vicious, amorphous, and unfamiliar adversary on our land. The principal threats will be local, self-generating and self-directed. If there are direct connections with overseas groups, these are most likely to be initiated by the local actors. Cases in point include the 7/7 bombers, the Glasgow car bombers, and, more locally, Lodi in which local individuals and groups sought out training in Pakistan. This is not intended to dismiss threats that emerge from overseas locations, which should continue to be of concern. Rather, it is an estimate of relative density—locally generated threats will manifest themselves with greater frequency.

Ultimately, preventing extremism will be up to neighborhoods and communities, but thread by thread, relationship by relationship, the police can help build a network of services and relationships that will make it very hard for terrorism to take root. American Muslim neighborhoods and communities have a genuine responsibility in preventing any form of extremism and terrorism. If the broader communities are intolerant of such things, these ideologies cannot take root in its midst. I believe no amount of enforcement or intelligence can ultimately prevent extremism if the communities are not committed to working with law enforcement to prevent it.

LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT



WILLIAM J. BRATTON
Chief of Police

P. O. Box 30158
Los Angeles, Calif. 90030
Telephone: (213) 485-3202
TDD: (877) 275-5273
Ref #: 1.15

ANTONIO R. VILLARAIGOSA
Mayor

November 21, 2007

Honorable Antonio R. Villaraigosa
Mayor, City of Los Angeles
City Hall, Room 303
Los Angeles, California 90012

Dear Mayor Villaraigosa:

On November 15, 2007, the Los Angeles Police Department convened a meeting with key members of the Muslim community to address concerns about the Community Engagement Initiative. Subsequent to the meeting, a copy of the attached letter was forwarded to each of the meeting participants to reinforce the Department's commitment to continue dialogue and to work with the Muslim community as partners to address issues of mutual concern. The Los Angeles Police Department remains strongly committed to building lasting and harmonious relationships with all members of the Los Angeles community. Should you or your staff have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me at (213) 485-3201.

Respectfully,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "William J. Bratton".

WILLIAM J. BRATTON
Chief of Police

Enclosure

LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT



WILLIAM J. BRATTON
Chief of Police

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ANTONIO R. VILLARAIGOSA
Mayor

November 21, 2007

Mr. Ahmed Ali
Council of Pakistan American Affairs
739 North Main Street
Orange, California 92868

Dear Mr. Ali:

Thank you for attending the meeting between the senior staff of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) and representatives of local Muslim communities on Thursday, November 15, 2007. The candid discussion was informative, and we look forward to expanding our relationship and partnership.

As we discussed, the "mapping" component of this initiative will not be pursued, as we understand the sensitivities involved and want to be considerate of the community concerns on this matter. We are deeply appreciative of your candor and of the insight that we received. The intention of our outreach efforts is not to alienate those with whom we seek continued partnerships but to forge relationships built on mutual trust, respect, and an informed understanding of law enforcement and Muslim cultures. I hope that you believe, as I do, that Thursday's meeting was a positive step in that direction.

As we discussed, I am proposing the formation of a Chief of Police Muslim Outreach Forum, which will meet at least biannually, so that we may further explore these issues and identify public safety concerns. The Forums began in 1998 as an opportunity for the Chief of Police to establish a dialogue with various communities. I have directed my staff to schedule meetings with the newly created Muslim Outreach Forum in February and June 2008. I welcome and encourage you to participate. Simultaneously, we will also continue expanding our many other ongoing relationship building initiatives with the Muslim community. In addition, I am always ready and willing to meet with members of the Muslim community. Working together, we can reduce the fear and incidence of crime and improve the quality of life in neighborhoods Citywide.

One of the major advantages of these meetings and relationships is that they open channels of communication between the LAPD and the community. In light of recent events, that component seems useful and beneficial to all. I also invite you to attend a Community Police Academy for a better understanding of our training, policies, and procedures.

Mr. Ahmed Ali

Page 2

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A police department is only as strong as the community it serves. Together we, the Muslim community and the LAPD, will build strong, transparent ties and deepen our understanding of each other. I look forward to future dialogue.

All the best,

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WILLIAM J. BRATTON
Chief of Police

LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT

WILLIAM J. BRATTON
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ANTONIO R. VILLARAIGOSA
Mayor

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November 21, 2007

Mr. Shakeel Syed
Islamic Shura Council
2115 West Crescent Avenue, Suite 255
Anaheim, California 92801

Dear Mr. Syed:

Thank you for attending the meeting between the senior staff of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) and representatives of local Muslim communities on Thursday, November 15, 2007. The candid discussion was informative, and we look forward to expanding our relationship and partnership.

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Mr. Shakeel Syed

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WILLIAM J. BRATTON
Chief of Police

LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT



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ANTONIO R. VILLARAIGOSA
Mayor

November 21, 2007

Mr. Zabie Mansoor
Muslim Public Affairs Council
3010 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 217
Los Angeles, California 90010

Dear Mr. Mansoor:

Thank you for attending the meeting between the senior staff of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) and representatives of local Muslim communities on Thursday, November 15, 2007. The candid discussion was informative, and we look forward to expanding our relationship and partnership.

As we discussed, the "mapping" component of this initiative will not be pursued, as we understand the sensitivities involved and want to be considerate of the community concerns on this matter. We are deeply appreciative of your candor and of the insight that we received. The intention of our outreach efforts is not to alienate those with whom we seek continued partnerships but to forge relationships built on mutual trust, respect, and an informed understanding of law enforcement and Muslim cultures. I hope that you believe, as I do, that Thursday's meeting was a positive step in that direction.

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Mr. Zabie Mansoor

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WILLIAM J. BRATTON
Chief of Police

LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT



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November 21, 2007

Mr. Mohamad Khatibloo
Westwood College
3250 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 400
Los Angeles, California 90010

Dear Mr. Khatibloo:

Thank you for attending the meeting between the senior staff of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) and representatives of local Muslim communities on Thursday, November 15, 2007. The candid discussion was informative, and we look forward to expanding our relationship and partnership.

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Mr. Mohamad Khatibloo

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All the best,

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WILLIAM J. BRATTON
Chief of Police

LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT



WILLIAM J. BRATTON
Chief of Police

P. O. Box 30158
Los Angeles, Calif. 90030
Telephone: (213) 485-3202
TDD: (877) 275-5273
Ref #: 1.15

ANTONIO R. VILLARAIGOSA
Mayor

November 21, 2007

Mr. Gregory Estevane
Westwood College
3250 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 400
Los Angeles, California 90010

Dear Mr. Estevane:

Thank you for attending the meeting between the senior staff of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) and representatives of local Muslim communities on Thursday, November 15, 2007. The candid discussion was informative, and we look forward to expanding our relationship and partnership.

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Mr. Gregory Estevane

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Chief of Police

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ANTONIO R. VILLARAIGOSA
Mayor

November 21, 2007

Ms. Munira Syeda
Council on American-Islamic Relations
2180 West Crescent Avenue, Suite F
Anaheim, California 92801

Dear Ms. Syeda:

Thank you for attending the meeting between the senior staff of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) and representatives of local Muslim communities on Thursday, November 15, 2007. The candid discussion was informative, and we look forward to expanding our relationship and partnership.

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Ms. Munira Syeda

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Chief of Police

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ANTONIO R. VILLARAIGOSA
Mayor

November 21, 2007

Ms. Shazia Kamal
Muslim Public Affairs Council
3010 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 217
Los Angeles, California 90010

Dear Ms. Kamal:

Thank you for attending the meeting between the senior staff of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) and representatives of local Muslim communities on Thursday, November 15, 2007. The candid discussion was informative, and we look forward to expanding our relationship and partnership.

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Ms. Shazia Kamal

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WILLIAM J. BRATTON
Chief of Police

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ANTONIO R. VILLARAIGOSA
Mayor

November 21, 2007

Mr. Douglas Mirell
ACLU Foundation of Southern California
10100 Santa Monica Boulevard, Suite 2200
Los Angeles, California 90067

Dear Mr. Mirell:

Thank you for attending the meeting between the senior staff of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) and representatives of local Muslim communities on Thursday, November 15, 2007. The candid discussion was informative, and we look forward to expanding our relationship and partnership.

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WILLIAM J. BRATTON
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ANTONIO R. VILLARAIGOSA
Mayor

November 21, 2007

Dr. Sadegh Namazi Khah
IMAN Center
6325 Topanga Canyon Boulevard, Suite 515
Woodland Hills, California 91367

Dear Dr. Namazi Khah:

Thank you for attending the meeting between the senior staff of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) and representatives of local Muslim communities on Thursday, November 15, 2007. The candid discussion was informative, and we look forward to expanding our relationship and partnership.

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Dr. Sadegh Namazi Khah

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Mayor

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November 21, 2007

Mr. Affad Shaikh
Council on American Islamic Relations
2180 West Crescent Avenue, Suite F
Anaheim, California 92801

Dear Mr. Shaikh:

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Chief of Police

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ANTONIO R. VILLARAIGOSA
Mayor

November 21, 2007

Mr. Hussam Ayloush
Council on American Islamic Relations
2180 West Crescent Avenue, Suite F
Anaheim, California 92801

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Mr. Hussam Ayloush

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Ref #: 1.15

November 21, 2007

Mr. Jmam Moushtafu Al-Qazwihi
Islamic Educational Center of Orange County
3194B Airport Loop Drive
Costa Mesa, California 92626

Dear Mr. Moushtafu Al-Qazwihi:

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Mr. Jmam Moushtafu Al-Qazwihi

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November 21, 2007

Mr. Maher Hathout Shura
Muslim Public Affairs Council
3010 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 217
Los Angeles, California 90010

Dear Mr. Hathout Shura:

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Mr. Maher Hathout Shura

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WILLIAM J. BRATTON
Chief of Police

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ANTONIO R. VILLARAIGOSA
Mayor

November 21, 2007

Mr. Dafer Vakahil
Omar Ibn Al Khattab Foundation
1025 West Exposition Boulevard
Los Angeles, California 90007

Dear Mr. Vakahil:

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Mr. Dafer Vakahil

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ANTONIO R. VILLARAIGOSA
Mayor

November 21, 2007

Mr. Abdul-Karim Hassan
Masid Bilal
4016 South Central Avenue
Los Angeles, California 90011

Dear Mr. Hassan:

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Mr. Abdul-Karim Hassan

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November 21, 2007

Mr. Salam Al Marayati
Muslim Public Affairs Council
3010 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 217
Los Angeles, California 90010

Dear Mr. Marayati:

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As we discussed, the "mapping" component of this initiative will not be pursued, as we understand the sensitivities involved and want to be considerate of the community concerns on this matter. We are deeply appreciative of your candor and of the insight that we received. The intention of our outreach efforts is not to alienate those with whom we seek continued partnerships but to forge relationships built on mutual trust, respect, and an informed understanding of law enforcement and Muslim cultures. I hope that you believe, as I do, that Thursday's meeting was a positive step in that direction.

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One of the major advantages of these meetings and relationships is that they open channels of communication between the LAPD and the community. In light of recent events, that component seems useful and beneficial to all. I also invite you to attend a Community Police Academy for a better understanding of our training, policies, and procedures.

Mr. Salam Al Marayati

Page 2

1.15

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All the best,

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WILLIAM J. BRATTON
Chief of Police

LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT



WILLIAM J. BRATTON
Chief of Police

P. O. Box 30158
Los Angeles, Calif. 90030
Telephone: (213) 485-3202
TDD: (877) 275-5273
Ref #: 1.15

ANTONIO R. VILLARAIGOSA
Mayor

November 21, 2007

Ms. Fatma Saleh
Islamic Education Center of Orange County
3194B Airport Loop Drive
Costa Mesa, California 92626

Dear Ms. Saleh:

Thank you for attending the meeting between the senior staff of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) and representatives of local Muslim communities on Thursday, November 15, 2007. The candid discussion was informative, and we look forward to expanding our relationship and partnership.

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Ms. Fatma Saleh

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WILLIAM J. BRATTON
Chief of Police

LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT



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ANTONIO R. VILLARAIGOSA
Mayor

November 21, 2007

Ms. Ranjana Natarajan
ACLU Foundation of Southern California
1616 Beverly Boulevard
Los Angeles, California 90026

Dear Ms. Natarajan:

Thank you for attending the meeting between the senior staff of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) and representatives of local Muslim communities on Thursday, November 15, 2007. The candid discussion was informative, and we look forward to expanding our relationship and partnership.

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WILLIAM J. BRATTON
Chief of Police

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ANTONIO R. VILLARAIGOSA
Mayor

November 21, 2007

Mr. Peter Bibring
ACLU Foundation of Southern California
1616 Beverly Boulevard
Los Angeles, California 90026

Dear Mr. Bibring:

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Mr. Peter Bibring

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WILLIAM J. BRATTON
Chief of Police

LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT



WILLIAM J. BRATTON
Chief of Police

ANTONIO R. VILLARAIGOSA
Mayor

P. O. Box 30158
Los Angeles, Calif. 90030
Telephone: (213) 485-3202
TDD: (877) 275-5273
Ref #: 1.15

November 21, 2007

Mr. Najee Ali
Islamic Hope
P.O. Box 43A-122
Los Angeles, California 90043

Dear Mr. Ali:

Thank you for attending the meeting between the senior staff of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) and representatives of local Muslim communities on Thursday, November 15, 2007. The candid discussion was informative, and we look forward to expanding our relationship and partnership.

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WILLIAM J. BRATTON
Chief of Police

11-21-07
Commander,

PARTMENT

Here is the copy of the
letter and the list of
attendees.

Thanks,
Gerald

(M) JHP

P. O. Box 30158
Los Angeles, Calif. 90030
Telephone: (213) 485-3202
TDD: (877) 275-5273
Ref #: 1.15

Mr. Ahmed Ali
Council of Pakistan American Affairs
739 North Main Street
Orange, California 92868

Dear Mr. Ali:

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
All the best,

WILLIAM J. BRATTON
Chief of Police

Community Engagement Meeting

Attendee	Organization	Phone No.	Email Address	Business Address
Ahmed Ali	Council of Pakistan American Affairs (COPAA)	714-771-6911 714-412-6408	Ahmedali01@aol.com	739 N. Main Street Orange, Ca. 92868
Shakeel Syed	Islamic Shura Council	714-239-6473 310-384-7791		2115 West Crescent Avenue Suite 255 Anaheim, Ca. 92801
Zabie Mansoor	Muslim Public Affairs Council	213-383-3445	Zabie@mpac.org	3010 Wilshire Blvd. #217 Los Angeles, Ca. 90010
Mohammed Khatibloo	Westwood College	714-865-1709	MKHATTIBLOO@westwood.edu	3250 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 400 Los Angeles, Ca. 90010
Gregory Estevevane, J.D.	Westwood College	213-382-2328 ext. 625	Gestevean@westwood.edu	3250 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 400 Los Angeles, Ca. 90010
Munira Syeda	Council on American-Islamic Relations	714-776-1847	Myseeda@cair.com	2180 W. Crescent Avenue Suite F. Anaheim, California 92801
Shazia Kamal	Muslim Public Affairs Council	213-383-3443	Shazia@mpac.org	3010 Wilshire Blvd. #217 Los Angeles, Ca. 90010
Douglas Mirell	ACLU Foundation of Southern California	310-282-2151	Dmirell@loeb.com	Loeb and Loeb L.L.P. 10100 Santa Monica Boulevard suite 2200 Los Angeles, Ca. 90067
Dr. Sadeqh Namazi Khah	IMAN Center	310-702-6690	Namazikhah.sadeqh@verizon.net	6325 Topanga Canyon Blvd. Suite 515 Woodland Hills, Ca. 91367
Affad Shaikh	Council on American Islamic Relations	714-776-1847	Ashaikh@cair.com	2180 W. Crescent Avenue Suite F. Anaheim, California 92801
Hussam Ayloush	Council on American-Islamic Relations	714-776-1847	Havyloush@cair.com	2180 W. Crescent Avenue Suite F. Anaheim, California 92801

Naim Shah Ji	IIm Foundation	323-294-3744	Naimshahji@msn.com	
Jmam Moushtafu Al-Qazwihi	Islamic Educational Center of Orange County Costa Mesa	714-432-0060	Sayedqazwini@hotmail.com	3194b Airport Loop Drive Costa Mesa, Ca 92626
Maher Hathout Shura	Muslim Public Affairs Council	213-383-3443		3010 Wilshire Blvd. #217 Los Angeles, Ca. 90010
Dafer Vakahil	Omar Ibn Al Khattab Foundation	310-560-1575	Dmdakhil@aol.com	1025 W. Exposition Blvd Los Angeles, Ca. 90007
Abdul-Karim Hassan	Masid Bilal	323-233-7274	Bilalcenter@aol.com	1025 South Central Avenue 4516 Los Angeles, Ca. 90011
Salam Al Marayati	Muslim Public Affairs Council	213-383-3443	Salam@mpac.org	3010 Wilshire Blvd. #217 Los Angeles, Ca. 90010
John O'Brien	Muslim Advocates	415-378-3483	John0b33@gmail.com	
Fatma Saleh	Islamic Education Center of Orange County	714-432-0060	Fasaleh@hotmail.com	3194b Airport Loop Drive Costa Mesa, Ca 92626
Najee Ali	Islamic Hope	323-350-1065	MrNajee@aol.com	P.O. Box 43a-122 Los Angeles, Ca. 90043
Ranjana Natarajan	ACLU of Southern California	213-977-5236	Rnatarajan@aclu-sc.org	ACLU Foundation of Southern California 1616 Beverly Boulevard Los Angeles, Ca. 90026
Peter Bibring	ACLU of Southern California	213-977-5295	Piibring@aclu-sc.org	ACLU Foundation of Southern California 1616 Beverly Boulevard Los Angeles, Ca. 90026



Linda Nguyen
Tel (213) 978-8395
Fax (213) 978-8787
Linda.n.Nguyen@lacity.org

MICHAEL N. FEUER
CITY ATTORNEY

September 12, 2017

Mr. Brendan N. Charney
David Wright Tremaine LLP
865 S. Figueroa Street, Suite 2400
Los Angeles, CA 90017-2566

BY ELECTRONIC MAIL
brendancharney@dwt.com

Re: Muslim Advocates v. City of Los Angeles
LASC Case No.: BS 163755

Dear Brendan,

The Los Angeles Police Department has identified and attached to this letter an additional record responsive to Muslim Advocates' December 12, 2013 CPRA request, item number 2.

If you have any questions, please contact me at (213) 978-8395.

Thanks!

Very truly yours,

MICHAEL N. FEUER, City Attorney

By:

LINDA N. NGUYEN
Deputy City Attorney

LNN/mc
Attachment

cc: Thomas R. Burke, Davis Wright Tremaine LLP
Karen A. Henry, Davis Wright Tremaine LLP
Soraya C. Kelly, Deputy City Attorney
Debra L. Gonzales, Assistant City Attorney

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Media Brief HQ - April 16, 2015 Evening

1. [Manhunt For Gunman After Two Shot in Palms](#)
2. [Culver City man pleads not guilty to repeatedly raping 15-year-old girl](#)
3. [Black Officer Killed in the Line of Duty to be Remembered on 10th Anniversary](#)
4. [Report: African Americans most likely to be stopped by Oakland police officers](#)
5. [California cities, counties grapple with where sex offenders can live amid new guidelines](#)
6. [Sources: Supervisors told to falsify reserve deputy's training records; department announces internal review](#)
7. [Court deals Arizona sheriff a defeat in profiling case](#)
8. [State Supreme Court assigns judge to hear South Carolina officer's murder case](#)
9. [Report: Law enforcement cooperation on terrorism improving](#)
10. [In report, Bratton defends tech approach](#)

Articles:

[Manhunt For Gunman After Two Shot in Palms](#)

By Kelly Goff and Nyree Arabian

Police are searching for a gunman after a shooting in the Palms area of Los Angeles Thursday afternoon left one dead and another person injured.

The shooting prompted LAPD to go on a citywide tactical alert, a spokesperson said.

Eight shots were heard in the 3000 block of Mortor Avenue around 3 p.m., according to LAPD. A woman was heard screaming and a vehicle fled the scene at a high rate of speed, according to a spokesperson.

Two people were shot, according to LAPD. The extent of their injuries was not immediately clear. Police are looking for a man driving a white Ford Explorer.

Nearby Palms Elementary School was placed on lockdown as police launched a manhunt for the suspected shooter.

Aerial footage showed police activity in several nearby locations.

[Culver City man pleads not guilty to repeatedly raping 15-year-old girl](#)

By: Richard Winton – LA Times

Samuel Robert Duran Jr. appears in a Los Angeles courtroom where he pleaded not guilty to multiple counts of rape.

Richard Winton, Kate Mather

A Culver City man pleaded not guilty Thursday to charges that he repeatedly raped a 15-year-old girl who he allegedly kept in his home for the three weeks she was missing.

Samuel Robert Duran Jr., 33, was charged with a dozen counts in connection with the girl's disappearance, including multiple counts of rape and forced penetration, according to the Los Angeles County district attorney's office. Prosecutors also allege he tied and bound the girl.

Duran's bail was increased from \$8 million to \$12 million on Thursday. If convicted, prosecutors said, Duran faces 15 years to life in prison.

The girl, who had been missing since March 24, was rescued Monday after she was able to call her mother for help, her mother told the Los Angeles Times. The call disconnected, the mother said, but the phone number the girl was calling from appeared on the mother's phone.

The mother said investigators traced the number to Duran's Culver City home and found the girl inside.

The Times previously named the girl in reporting her disappearance. Since Duran has been charged with rape, The Times is adhering to its policy of not identifying victims of alleged sexual assault.

She was the subject of an intensive search by Los Angeles police and the FBI, in cooperation with her family, and those efforts received widespread coverage by the media, including The Times. Her mother set up a Facebook page asking for the public's help in finding the teenager and missing-child groups distributed fliers.

The girl's mother said her daughter disappeared after a disagreement over the teenager's cellphone. The mother said her daughter had autism and other cognitive issues that make her quick to anger and prone to impulsive behavior.

After her daughter was rescued, the mother told The Times that the girl said that Duran had kept her in a room at the house and rarely let her out. The teenager told her mother that Duran threatened her family's safety if she tried to escape.

The LAPD's investigation is ongoing, police said.

Duran was convicted of selling or manufacturing a dangerous weapon in 1999 and received 10 days in jail and three years' probation, according to court records and the district attorney's office. Records also showed he was charged with possession of marijuana in Orange County in 2005.

[Black Officer Killed in the Line of Duty to be Remembered on 10th Anniversary](#)

by EURNews



Los Angeles Airport Police Officer Tommy Scott

*In recognition of Los Angeles Airport Police Officer Tommy Scott's sacrifice and to commemorate the tenth year since his death, the *Tommy Scott 1st Annual Ride & Shine Memorial Ride and Car & Truck Show* will take place on Apr. 25 and the *Tommy Scott Memorial 5K & 10K LAX Run* on May 16.

Officer Scott was the first and to date only Airport Police Officer ever killed in the line of duty. He was killed on April 29, 2005 at the age of 35, in a carjacking incident after stopping a suspicious man near Los Angeles International Airport (LAX). In 2010, his killer, William Sadowski, was convicted of carjacking and first-degree murder and was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole.

About the Events

The Tommy Scott 1st Annual Ride & Shine Memorial Ride and Car & Truck Show

On Sat., Apr. 25, the Los Angeles Airports Police Athletics & Activities League (LAAPAAL), Los Angeles Airport Peace Officers' Association (LAAPOA) and the Association of Airport Employees (AAE) will host the Tommy Scott 1st Annual Ride & Shine Memorial Ride and Car & Truck Show. The ride will begin at the USS Iowa at 9 a.m. and end at Westchester Park (7000 W. Manchester Blvd.) where the inaugural Tommy Scott Memorial Car & Truck show will take place. The show will last until 3 p.m. and all rods, customs, classic and muscle cars as well as trucks are invited to participate. Advanced registration is \$25 and includes a T-shirt. On site registration is \$35. Proceeds will benefit the Tommy Scott Memorial Scholarship Fund. For more information and to register, please visit <http://bit.ly/19MzId4>.

On Sat., May 16, Los Angeles World Airports (LAWA) will join the LAAPAAL and AAE in hosting the Tommy Scott Memorial 5K & 10K LAX Run. The race kicks off at 8 a.m. at the Westchester/LAX Fire Station No. 5 (8900 S. Emerson Ave.) with on-site registration beginning at 6:45 a.m. Proceeds will benefit the Tommy Scott Memorial Scholarship Fund. For more information, please visit http://laapoa.com/lax_run_2015.php.

For more information on these events and the LAAPOA, please visit www.laapoa.com.

The Los Angeles Airport Peace Officers' Association (LAAPOA) represents the sworn police officers and firefighters of the Los Angeles Airport Police Department assigned to protect and serve Los Angeles International Airport (LAX), LA/Ontario International Airport (ONT) and Van Nuys Airport (VNY). For more information on LAAPOA, please visit www.laapoa.com.

Follow LAAPOA on Twitter [@AirportPoliceLA](https://twitter.com/AirportPoliceLA) and on Facebook at <http://www.facebook.com/laapoa>.

[Report: African Americans most likely to be stopped by Oakland police officers](#)

By Paul Chambers, (KTVU)

OAKLAND, Calif. -- The same day when people marched and protest against police brutality, the Oakland City Council's Public Safety Committee was scheduled to receive a report showing how OPD officers are still predominantly focusing on African Americans during discretionary stops.

The police department has been making efforts to address racial and religious profiling.

"We have been alleged to have been racially profiling. We need to in fact know if that has been occurring. So we do know that we stop a disparate number of African Americans," said Oakland Police Chief Sean Whent.

In fact, the most recent figures from July of 2013 through June of last year show African American were stopped 59 percent of the time. Latinos were stopped in the next largest

percentage at 17 percent of the time, while Whites were stopped 14 percent of the time. Asians were stopped 7 percent and others 3 percent.

Officers only collect data for discretionary stops, but not non-discretionary stops. Those stops involve arrests based on particular evidence and probable cause. Police say in those cases, officers do not need to use discretion or judgment.

"I was absolutely targeted from OPD for no other reason than I was a Muslim and member of Your Black Muslim Bakery," said John Bey, who now lives in the Central Valley.

Bey said he believes Oakland Police targeted the bakery based on religion and that's why he feels Oakland Police should not be allowed to handle its own data.

"Oakland Police department is the least qualified agency to check into their own data. So we're asking for an independent investigation of the data," argued Bey.

Police say although they've collected the data for several years, the best information is from the last year and a half. Officers say they're working hard to develop an even better system and look at the data monthly to see what they can learn from it and how to make things better.

"We can compare individual squads or officers to other officers in that area and against the department average. Look for outliers to see if corrective action needs to be taken," says Whent.

Police postponed the presentation and rescheduled it to take place in two weeks at the next meeting of the Public Safety Committee.

[California cities, counties grapple with where sex offenders can live amid new guidelines](#)

By PAUL ELIAS Associated Press

First Posted: April 15, 2015 - 5:44 pm

Last Updated: April 15, 2015 - 5:47 pm

SAN FRANCISCO — California cities and counties are grappling with how far they can go to restrict where sex offenders can live amid a shifting legal landscape.

The California Supreme Court last month struck down San Diego's blanket enforcement of a state law banning registered sex offenders from living near schools or parks. The Supreme Court said sex offenders can still be banned from living near parks and schools, but such a determination must be made on a case-by-case basis.

In response, several cities and counties have repealed — or are in the process of repealing — local ordinances with blanket residency bans. On Tuesday, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation issued new regulations requiring parole agents to individually determine residency restrictions for each of the 6,000 offenders they monitor.

The department loosened its residency policy after Attorney General Kamala Harris advised the department that the Supreme Court ruling applied statewide.

Still, some cities and state lawmakers are arguing the Supreme Court ruling applies only in San Diego. The city of Murrieta, for instance, said its ban doesn't conflict with the Supreme Court's ruling, and it plans to keep it in place.

At least two lawmakers said they plan to introduce legislation to impose new restrictions.

State Sen. Sharon Runner, R-Lancaster, said she is alarmed by the correction department's new policy and that she is working to cobble together a group of lawmakers to support legislation "that will clarify any confusion caused by the decision of the California Supreme Court."

Prison officials said they can still prohibit high-risk offenders from living near schools and parks. The corrections department said its parole officers can still bar other offenders from living near parks and schools depending on individual circumstances.

Janice Bellucci, a lawyer for sex offenders, said the new guidelines are being unevenly applied throughout the state. Bellucci said she is also concerned that too many of the sex offenders are labeled high risk and remain subject to the residency prohibition.

Bellucci and others said the residency restrictions are too restrictive and force many sex offenders into homelessness.

[Sources: Supervisors told to falsify reserve deputy's training records; department announces internal review](#)

By DYLAN GOFORTH World Staff Writer & ZIVA BRANSTETTER World Enterprise Editor

Update: The Tulsa County Sheriff's Office announced early Thursday it will conduct an internal review of the deputy reserve program.

The announcement comes just two weeks after 73-year-old Reserve Deputy Robert Bates fatally shot Eric Harris during an undercover operation on April 2.

"As with any critical incident, we are doing an internal review of our program and policy to determine if any changes need to take place," Tulsa County sheriff's Maj. Shannon Clark said.

Below is the Tulsa World story that appeared in the Thursday morning print edition and online

Supervisors at the Tulsa County Sheriff's Office were ordered to falsify a reserve deputy's training records, giving him credit for field training he never took and firearms certifications he should not have received, sources told the Tulsa World.

At least three of reserve deputy Robert Bates' supervisors were transferred after refusing to sign off on his state-required training, multiple sources speaking on condition of anonymity told the World.

Bates, 73, is accused of second-degree manslaughter in the shooting death of Eric Harris during an undercover operation on April 2.

The sources' claims are corroborated by records, including a statement by Bates after the shooting, that he was certified as an advanced reserve deputy in 2007.

An attorney for Harris' family also raised questions about the authenticity of Bates' training records.

Additionally, Sheriff Stanley Glanz told a Tulsa radio station this week that Bates had been certified to use three weapons, including a revolver he fired at Harris. However, Glanz said the Sheriff's Office has not been able to find the paperwork on those certifications.

The sheriff's deputy that certified Bates has moved on to work for the Secret Service, Glanz said during the radio interview.

"We can't find the records that she supposedly turned in," Glanz said. "So we are going to talk to her to find out if for sure he's been qualified with those (weapons)."

Undersheriff Tim Albin was unavailable for comment Wednesday but in an earlier interview, Albin said he was unaware of any concerns expressed by supervisors about Bates' training.

The Sheriff's Office has released a summary listing training courses Bates had been given credit for but have not released documents showing which supervisors signed off on that training.

He rejected claims that Bates' training records were falsified and that supervisors who refused to do so were transferred to less desirable assignments.

"The training record speaks for itself. I have absolutely no knowledge of what you are talking about," Albin said. "There aren't any secrets in law enforcement. Zero. Those types of issues would have come up."

During a press conference Friday, Capt. Bill McKelvey and Tulsa Police Sgt. Jim Clark, a consultant hired by the county, also said they were unaware of concerns about Bates' training.

The World has requested records showing which supervisors signed off on Bates' training. An attorney for the Sheriff's Office declined to provide them, saying the matter is under investigation.

Bates, a wealthy Tulsa insurance executive, turned himself in Tuesday after being charged on Monday in Harris' death. He is free on \$25,000 bond.

Harris was shot and killed during an undercover operation the Sheriff's Violent Crimes Task Force was conducting. Harris, according to the sheriff's office, had previously sold methamphetamine to undercover deputies and was in the act of selling them a stolen gun.

As deputies moved in to make the arrest, Harris bolted from the truck and ran, pursued by deputies until they brought him to the ground. Bates shot Harris while he was on the ground and immediately said, "Oh, I shot him! I'm sorry."

The Sheriff's Office has said Bates is typically in a support role assisting the task force. He told investigators he meant to stun Harris with a Taser but accidentally shot him with a handgun instead.

Bates was classified by the Sheriff's Office as an "advanced reserve." That means Bates would have had to complete 480 hours of the "Field Training Officer," or FTO, program to maintain that classification.

Dan Smolen, who represents Harris' family, said Wednesday that he believes Bates' field training records were falsified and that they no longer exist.

The Sheriff's Office previously said Bates had joined the reserve deputy force in 2008. However, Bates, in a statement he gave the Sheriff's Office following Harris' shooting, said he became an advanced reserve deputy in 2007.

The cause of that discrepancy is unclear.

In Bates' seven-page statement to Tulsa County sheriff's investigators, obtained by the World on Wednesday, the reserve deputy states he previously attended a five-day homicide investigation school in Dallas and received "active shooter response training" by the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office in Arizona.

Bates said in the statement that he had been involved in "at least 100 other" assignments, such as the undercover operation planned on April 2.

In that statement, Bates said he contacted a task force member on April 1 to ask if there was a "pending operation" he could assist with.

The task force member informed Bates of the plan to have an undercover officer buy a gun from Harris the following day.

Officials said Harris could have faced up to life in prison for selling the firearm because he had prior felony convictions.

During a briefing hours before the shooting, Bates said he was informed that Harris was "a bad son of a b----" who had gang affiliations.

Deputies in attendance were told Harris was known to carry a gun and to consider him armed and dangerous.

During a press conference last week, a consultant hired by the Sheriff's Office pointed to several scenes from the recorded video of Harris' shooting.

The consultant said the still images from the video showed why pursuing deputies would be concerned that Harris had a gun in his pants as he fled.

Bates mentioned this in his statement as well, noting he believed that Harris was running "in an unusual way," touching his right hand to his waistband.

It was later determined that Harris did not have a gun on his body when he was tackled and shot. The video shows his arms flailing as he runs.

Undersheriff Tim Albin has said the video cuts off after Harris was shot because the camera battery died. The video was filmed on a "sunglasses cam" purchased by Bates for the task force.

Bates was Glanz's 2012 re-election campaign manager and also was named reserve deputy of the year in 2011.

He has purchased five automobiles for the task force. Bates and other task force members drive the vehicles, which the Sheriff's Office equipped with lights and other police equipment.

In his statement, Bates said he was unsure if the pursuing deputy would catch the fleeing Harris. So Bates said he grabbed his pepper-ball launcher, a "less lethal" device meant to incapacitate much in the same way as pepper spray.

Bates said as he approached the scuffle, he thought he noticed Harris again reaching for his waistband. At this point, while two additional deputies were subduing Harris, Bates said he saw a "very brief opening" in which he could hit Harris with a Taser.

Bates noted "thinking I have to deploy it rapidly, as I still thought there was a strong possibility Harris had a gun on him."

At that point, as is evident in the video, Bates stated "Taser! Taser!" then fired one shot, striking Harris below the right arm.

Bates stated in his account that the time from which Harris was tackled by one deputy to the time Bates fired the fatal shot was "only about 5 to 10 seconds."

[Court deals Arizona sheriff a defeat in profiling case](#)

By JACQUES BILLEAUD, Associated Press

PHOENIX (AP) - The sheriff for metro Phoenix on Wednesday lost a bid to overturn a 2013 racial profiling ruling that blunted his signature immigration enforcement efforts and represents the thorniest legal troubles the defiant lawman has faced in his 22-year career.

The decision by the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals marks the latest in a long string of defeats for Sheriff Joe Arpaio in the case in which his officers were found to have racially profiled Latinos.

Arpaio and four aides face hearings beginning Tuesday on whether they should be held in contempt of court for violating a 2011 order by a judge who barred Arpaio's immigration patrols.

The sheriff has acknowledged the violation and offered to make a donation a civil rights group to make amends for disobeying court orders.

Arpaio, who voluntarily gave up his last major foothold in immigration enforcement late last year, vigorously disputes that his officers have racially profiled Latinos.

Over the past year, the judge in the profiling case has grown increasingly frustrated with the sheriff's office for mischaracterizing his profiling ruling during a training session and over what the judge said were inadequate internal investigations into wrongdoing by Arpaio's squad working immigrant smuggling cases.

The 9th Circuit upheld the previous ruling by U.S. District Judge Murray Snow that the sheriff's unconstitutional practices targeting immigrants had extended traffic stops in the Phoenix area.

The appeals court also backed Snow's requirements that Arpaio's officers video-record traffic stops, collect data on stops and undergo training to ensure they aren't acting unconstitutionally.

Arpaio's sole victory in his appeal came when the appeals court reined in a court-appointed official who is investigating misconduct at the agency.

The sheriff's lawyers contended that Snow imposed changes on the sheriff's office that have nothing to do with the profiling case.

The court said Snow's requirement that the court-appointed official consider internal investigations and reports of officer misconduct created a problem by being unrelated to the constitutional violations found by Snow.

Arpaio didn't contest Snow's 2013 ruling on the sheriff's special immigration patrols. Instead, the sheriff appealed the judge's conclusions on only regular traffic patrols - and lost.

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[State Supreme Court assigns judge to hear South Carolina officer's murder case](#)

By Harriet McLeod, Reuters

(Reuters) - South Carolina's chief justice has assigned a judge from outside North Charleston to preside over the murder case of a white former police officer accused of shooting a black man in the back in that city.

The order on Tuesday said Judge Clifton Newman would be in charge of deciding all legal matters in the case and would retain jurisdiction "regardless of where he may be assigned to hold court."

Newman, who is based in Kingstree, a town about 75 miles from Charleston, is a former prosecutor who became a judge in 2000, according to the state's judicial department website.

Lawyer Andy Savage, who is representing former police officer Michael Slager in the April 4 deadly shooting of 50-year-old Walter Scott, said the judge had an excellent reputation.

"A more competent member of the judiciary could not be found," Savage said in a statement on Wednesday.

Savage has not sought a change of venue or filed any motions in the case. Slager, 33, was dismissed from his patrolman job after his arrest on a murder charge in the shooting caught on video by a bystander.

Scott's death has drawn international attention and reignited a public debate over U.S. police treatment of minorities that flared last year after the killings of unarmed black men in Ferguson, Missouri, New York City, and elsewhere.

The Rev. Jesse Jackson is scheduled to attend events in South Carolina on Thursday and Friday prompted by the shooting, said Democratic state Representative Wendell Gilliard, who invited the civil rights activist.

Gilliard has been pushing a measure for more than a year that would require all law enforcement officers in the state to wear body cameras.

On Wednesday, Republican House Speaker Jay Lucas became a sponsor of the bill, and Gilliard said he expected it to be fast-tracked through the legislative process.

"We need this kind of technology," he said. "Is it a solve-all? No. But it's a step in the right direction."

[Report: Law enforcement cooperation on terrorism improving](#)

By PHILIP MARCELO, Associated Press

BOSTON (AP) — A congressional report released Tuesday suggests there's been progress in how federal and local law enforcement officials share information following the deadly 2013 Boston Marathon bombings.

But the House Committee on Homeland Security report, released on the eve of the second anniversary of the marathon attack, suggests more improvements are needed to avoid another attack on American soil.

The report, entitled "Preventing Another Boston Marathon Bombing," says closing gaps in information-sharing is especially important with the rise of the Islamic State group and other extremist groups that have been successful at recruiting new members from the U.S. and other countries.

"The threat to the homeland from abroad and from homegrown self-inspired radicals calls for agility, and strengthening the web of relationships that exists between state, local and federal partners to form a nationwide enterprise where state and locals collaborate and complement federal counterterrorism capacity," the report says.

The report is a follow-up to the homeland security committee's March 2014 report, "The Road to Boston: Counterterrorism Challenges and Lessons from the Marathon Bombings."

It comes as Boston prepares to commemorate the April 15, 2013, bombings, which killed three people and injured 260 others, on Wednesday. The city's subdued remembrance is expected to include a moment of silence and a call to commit random acts of kindness and generosity.

Homeland Security Committee Chairman Michael McCaul, a Texas Republican, said the country is safer because of progress made following the committee's 2014 report.

That report had generally called for expanded cooperation between federal and local law enforcement agencies, the development of more sophisticated efforts to mitigate terrorist threats and better policies around the screening of international travelers.

McCaul is slated to discuss the new report at a Wednesday roundtable on Capitol Hill with U.S. Rep. William Keating, a Massachusetts Democrat who also sits on the Homeland Security Committee, and others.

"The second anniversary of the Boston Marathon Bombings is not only a day to remember everyone directly impacted when the bombs went off, it is also a day to review the steps taken, and the steps still needed, to close the gaps that allowed this tragic event to occur," McCaul said in a statement.

[In report, Bratton defends tech approach](#)

By Azi Paybarah

The new issue of *Harper's* magazine includes a critical look at Bill Bratton's tenure as Los Angeles Police Department, and raises questions about Bratton's use of technology for policing purposes in New York City.

The story, titled "Beyond the Broken Window: William Bratton and the new police state," is written by Petra Bartosiewicz, a freelance journalist writing a book titled *The Best Terrorists We Could Find*, about terrorism trials in the U.S. after September 11.

Her story raises concerns about local police officials using their newly established roles as front-line fighters in the war against terrorism to expand previously curtailed surveillance efforts.

"By the time Bratton left the department, in 2009, Los Angeles had quietly become the most spied-on city in America and a proving ground for corporations to test out new surveillance technologies," Bartosiewicz writes. Among the Bratton programs Bartosiewicz examined were the proposed mapping of Muslim neighborhoods—which was quickly aborted—and the Suspicious Activity Reports, in which the public sends tips about questionable (but often legal) activities. According to Bartosiewicz, that information is shared with the F.B.I., which "can hold on to the same records for as many as thirty years."

Bartosiewicz also interviewed Michael Downing, the top counterterrorism official in the LAPD, who proposed the Muslim mapping program when Bratton was police commissioner.

"The difference between a terrorist and a gang member is that a terrorist wants to target innocent people with a political agenda," Downing is quoted as saying, adding, "The gang member has gone through the same radicalization but doesn't have the political agenda."

In an interview, Bratton tells Bartosiewicz, "I don't think the public is too concerned with us using technology to prevent crime. People don't get upset when doctors use technology to prevent Alzheimer's or cancer."

Bratton also tells Bartosiewicz that Broken Windows "is probably the most vivid example of community policing there is."

The piece is slated for the magazine's May issue, which is scheduled to be on newsstands on April 28.

Media Brief HQ-Thursday, July 28, 2016

1. **Audio: LAPD Chief Beck on violence involving cops across the nation**
In the aftermath of deadly attacks against law enforcement officers in Dallas and Baton Rouge, plus more controversial fatal shootings of black men by police in Louisiana and Minnesota, LAPD Chief Charlie Beck joined AirTalk to discuss tensions running high.
2. **A man LAPD officers tried to save in Nickerson Gardens died later at a hospital, his mother says**
I was a dramatic scene in Nickerson Gardens. Twelve hours after Los Angeles police fatally shot an 18-year-old man, angering the Watts housing project, a group of officers worked furiously to save another man's life.
3. **LAPD Sued for Withholding Records About 'Muslim Mapping' Plan**
Muslim activists are suing the Los Angeles Police Department for withholding records about a long-stalled Muslim mapping plan that was "postponed indefinitely" due to public concerns over religious profiling.
4. **Video: Sherman Oaks woman escapes after robbers invade her home and tie her up**
Three armed suspects invaded a woman's home, tied her up and robbed her home in Sherman Oaks on Tuesday night, police said. The woman managed to escape, but so did the robbers, unfortunately.
5. **SUSPECTS STEAL \$8K WORTH OF CELLPHONES FROM SOUTH LA STORE**
SOUTH LOS ANGELES (KABC) -- Two armed suspects were caught on camera stealing thousands of dollars worth of cellphones from a South Los Angeles cellphone store.
6. **Video: 'Lifelong Best Friends': Senior Couple Dead in Murder-Suicide**
Neighbors were horrified by an apparent murder-suicide in Venice Wednesday, saying that by all accounts, the couple loved each other and were lifelong best friends.
7. **Disgruntled man tries to set ex-girlfriend's house on fire**
A domestic dispute led a disgruntled man to try to set his ex-girlfriend's house on fire Wednesday morning in the Vermont Knolls area of South Los Angeles, authorities said.
8. **Drone Seized After Interfering With Los Angeles Brush Fire**
Los Angeles police have seized a drone and are looking for its operator after the device interfered with authorities fighting a small brush fire burning alongside a freeway.
9. **11 pounds of meth found in lining of passenger's suitcase at LAX**
Customs officers at Los Angeles International Airport found more than 11 pounds of methamphetamine in the lining of a woman's suitcase who had just arrived from Mexico, authorities announced Wednesday.
10. **Los Angeles Mayor Garcetti to Speak on DNC Closing Night**

[Los Angeles Mayor Eric Garcetti will take the Democratic National Convention stage in Philadelphia Thursday to speak at the event's closing night.](#)

11. [**San Francisco cop arrested on suspicion of building illegal AR-15-style rifle**](#)
[A San Francisco police officer has been arrested on suspicion of assembling his own illegal AR-15-style assault rifle, officials announced Wednesday.](#)
12. [**Former federal agent sentenced to prison in sex-slave bribery case**](#)
[A former U.S. immigration agent was sentenced Tuesday to 10 months in prison for soliciting a bribe from a South Korean businessman who had been falsely accused of trafficking a sex slave into the country.](#)

Articles:

Video: LAPD Chief Beck on violence involving cops across the nation

by KPCC

In the aftermath of deadly attacks against law enforcement officers in Dallas and Baton Rouge, plus more controversial fatal shootings of black men by police in Louisiana and Minnesota, LAPD Chief Charlie Beck joined AirTalk to discuss tensions running high.

In Los Angeles itself, Black Lives Matters protesters have been calling for the resignation of Beck — calls that grew louder after the police commission ruled the fatal shooting of Redel Jones in South L.A. to be "in policy." Beck also delivered a message in D.C. recently when President Barack Obama convened a meeting involving police officials, activists, academics and elected officials, including L.A. Mayor Eric Garcetti.

Beck also updated listeners on his #StopTheViolence campaign, extra patrols in South L.A. after a spike in homicides and shootings and the city council's approval of a body cameras program.

Interview highlights

Some terrible news has happened. Baton Rouge, the Dallas killing — one officer called in last time describing his experience as an LAPD officer and a black man.

Chief Charlie Beck: All of us feel deep deep sorrow in the pit of our stomach over this. You go to work to try to do the right thing, and through no fault of your own, you become the target for what you have chosen to do for a living, by the way a noble thing to do for a living. As as some people feel that they targeted for race, gender and orientation, to be targeted straight for wearing this uniform, for the vast, 99 percent honorable reasons. It's gut-wrenching. And people take this very personally. This could be your brother, sister. This could be your friend. This could be you. So it's very difficult.

Have you changed any of the procedures out of concerns for officers' safety ?

Well, we did initially. We have put more helicopters up to provide additional vantage points, not only that, but direction and a layer of safety for officers. We assigned additional metropolitan units and patrol divisions to back up calls. We didn't really know the scope of the incident, particularly in Baton Rouge. We did all of that. We are screening our calls better. Things that we typically do. But most of that has returned to a normal level now. Our officers are trained to work safe. We put two people to a car for a reason. We have sufficient units at the most dangerous parts of the city to make sure there's always backup. Those things are important. We've actually added some overtime for the summer to make sure we have adequate staffing. Those things will keep cops safe and we'll continue to do that.

You went back to DC and met with President Obama to talk about police-community relations, or the in the ways leaders talked about conflicts between police and community members.

I think everybody got to make some good points. We addressed what's missing now that is dialogue. Instead of people pontificating, only presenting their point of view and not listen to other people. We had a good opportunity on people on spectrum -- elected officials, activists, law enforcement, clergies, all to comment and put forth their point of view and hopefully everybody understood each other a little better. I think that's what's missing in the national conversation. Nobody strive for empathy, nobody tries to understand the view of others. Everybody just go to their polarized opposites. We'll never get closer to a solution if people try to do that. One of the things we have to do is all of us needs to talk about it, all of us needs to work through, particularly minority community issues and talk about them in real terms.

What specific messages do you want to deliver in D.C. that you thought was missing from the conversation that others needed to hear?

One is that you cannot expect the police department to work in communities that are under-served by the economy, housing, employment and education and have disparate impact through all those aspects of community and then think that law enforcement will stand alone and not have an disparate impact there. In communities where police make the most arrest, make the most stops, and there's the most crime, they are also the place with highest rate of unemployment, lowest rate of high school graduation rate, worst rate of pre-school entry, worst housing market. There are layers and layers and layers of failure in delivery of services and disparate impact. And yet, somehow, policing is expected to be completely different. First you have to recognize that. More crime means more resources, that's how the police office work. And for high level of violent crime, there needs to be 2 to 3 times more resources than areas that enjoy a safer situation. We talked about the need for discussion, which I think is very important. Then there's leadership, right now we are seeing that folks that don't want to lead through this. And the President echoed those sentiments. He talked about the multiple societal delivery. That is also the cause of conflict with police. The second part of the message, and this hits me the hardest, is that America has a violent problem. We are the most violent first world society on the planet. The level of homicide in places like Australia, Canada, Great Britain, and France, they are infinitesimal compared to what we deal with in the United States. You can't expect a society that rely on violence so heavily to be policed without using some level of force and conflict. We see folks with guns, knives, and bad intentions. And that's an unfortunate reality of policing in

America. When we look at ourselves, we look through the mirror of policing, and we don't like what we see. Well, it's not the police you are seeing, it's ourselves.

Some argue the media has a selective focus on police shooting on black men, that creates a false narrative of police bias that isn't statistically supported. When you factor in crime rate, the racial differential disappears. Do you agree with that view?

When you police communities that are violent, you are going to be exposed to more violence. And you are more likely to have to respond with violence. That is the unfortunate reality. In our communities where we have very little violence levels, we have very little police use of force levels. Conversely, in areas with higher level of violence we have higher use of force levels. That doesn't seem to be disparate treatment, that's just to respond to the different areas that we serve. Nobody should take this as saying we are perfect and the police use of force is optimal and we can't do better and all of that. I want us to do better and I want us to come up with other avenues to address folks with mental illness and with blunt weapons. But the reality is that until we can control violence at all levels, we'll never be able to use the level of force we would like.

The narrative of the Black Lives Matter movement is that law enforcement generally treats African American men in a racist way. There's a racially based differential in how African American men are perceived by law enforcement, how they are treated than a white person of the same demographic. Do you disagree with that narrative?

I cannot speak for all of policing, I can only speak for Los Angeles. And of course we are a big police department, second largest city in the America. We take biased policing very seriously. We have implicit-bias training for all our employees. We strive to treat everyone equally and I think we do a good job of it. Are we perfect at it? No. But we are working on it. I think everyone recognizes that's the goal and there are consequences to not working towards that goal. I see things across the nation the same things you see. We make every effort to make sure we treat people fairly and regardless of skin color. I think if you see our use of force, I think that bears that out. Last year, we had 48 officer involved shootings. That's a lot, but remember, we make over a million contacts a year and arrest over 10,000 folks over a year. A vast majority of them have absolutely no use of force involved what so ever. If I recall, the African American percentage of that is 20 percent, which, if you look at our contact ratio and policing ratio and the demographic of the city, it's actually a little bit less than you might expect.

Do you ever take into account the race and ethnicity of officers in terms their assigned communities?

We almost exactly reflect the community we serve. Even at the management levels, we are majority of minorities at LAPD. In regard to assigning people based on their race, that in itself is discrimination against our employees. We generally assign folks to based on their preference. We try to make everybody be able to work closer to home. But I think the real test is to look at the police cars when they drive by you, look at the two officers in the police cars. It's largely female, largely Hispanics, we have many African Americans. We have a good cross-section.

[A man LAPD officers tried to save in Nickerson Gardens died later at a hospital, his mother says](#)

Kate Mather, Los Angeles Times

It was a dramatic scene in Nickerson Gardens.

Twelve hours after Los Angeles police fatally shot an 18-year-old man, angering the Watts housing project, a group of officers worked furiously to save another man's life.

The unconscious 20-year-old was sprawled on a patch of hot asphalt on Tuesday morning, where the officers pumped his chest, ripped off their uniforms to wipe vomit from his mouth — anything they could to keep him alive. The man's mother shouted prayers as a group of people watched, waiting for paramedics to arrive.

When the man was loaded into an ambulance, one of the officers told the crowd of onlookers that he still had a pulse.

But Daveion Luckett died later that night at a hospital, his mother said Wednesday.

The coroner's office said that the cause of death had not yet been finalized. Luckett's mother said he died after not having enough oxygen going to his brain.

Tuesday's fast-moving events underscored the complicated duality of modern-day policing. The night before, the police killing of a black man had infuriated residents in the housing project, one of Los Angeles' toughest. The shooting, which occurred during what police described as a gun battle in which an officer was shot in the arm, came at a time of heightened tensions over race and policing, particularly how police use force against African Americans.

The anger in Nickerson Gardens, however, melted away — at least temporarily — when officers on Tuesday morning ran to another black man who needed help.

Luckett lived with his mother in one of the yellow apartments that make up the massive housing project, where relatives, friends and neighbors gathered to grieve late Wednesday morning. Candles spelled out Luckett's name on the sidewalk.

His mother, Latoya — she didn't give her last name, saying she wanted the focus on her son — said her only boy had an entrepreneurial spirit, rapping with a record label, selling cars and working as a janitor. He had a 2-month-old son he would cradle against his chest, she said with a smile.

But above all, his mother said, Luckett cared for his community. He'd greet people with "Good morning," try to stop fights, help others in need.

"He'd give anything," Latoya said. "You don't have clothes for work? He'd go buy 'em. You don't have food? He'd go get you some."

Growing up, she said, Luckett wanted to be a police officer. Then sheriff's deputies in Bellflower shot and killed his older brother, Dexter Luckett, in 2010. After that, she said, Luckett decided he would help his neighborhood without becoming a cop.

But still, she said, the officers who patrol Nickerson Gardens knew him as a friendly face — including some who tried to save him Tuesday morning.

Luckett and his mother had been out late the night before, she said, as part of the crowd that gathered after police shot and killed Richard Risher, 18. Latoya said they were waiting for Risher's mother to get to the housing project. Her son, she said, was upset by the shooting.

Later, she said, Luckett went to sleep in a car parked outside their apartment — it was too hot inside their home. On Tuesday morning, Latoya went outside to wake him.

“I know it was hot, so I went to go and get him out,” she said. “But when I shook the car, he wouldn't wake up.”

Latoya and a neighbor broke the car window and opened the door, dragging Luckett onto the ground, where they started CPR. The officers quickly arrived and took over. It felt like “beyond forever” until paramedics came, Latoya said.

She said she was grateful — but not surprised — that the police came to help.

“That's what they're there for. Not all of them are bad,” she said. “They are here to protect and serve, and they served us.”

Some of the officers stopped by the apartment Wednesday morning, asking about Luckett.

“They thought that he would make it,” his mother said. “We all did.”

[LAPD Sued for Withholding Records About 'Muslim Mapping' Plan](#)

By Jason Kandel, NBC 4

Muslim activists are suing the Los Angeles Police Department for withholding records about a long-stalled Muslim mapping plan that was "postponed indefinitely" due to public concerns over religious profiling.

Muslim Advocates, a nonprofit legal advocacy group, alleges in a lawsuit filed this week that the LAPD has offered "evolving justifications" for its refusal to produce the records.

First officials said they didn't exist, then they produced a handful of emails from a time well after the program ended, court documents said. Then LAPD officials said that the search for records would be too burdensome.

"The LAPD's arguments are not credible," court records said. "Indeed, they are contradicted by documents and statements authored by the LAPD itself, as well as by reliable press reports."

Muslim Advocates said that after repeated requests to refine the records request, officials at the LAPD have ceased responding, thus necessitating a lawsuit.

The American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California, which voiced strong opposition to the program but is not a party to the lawsuit, said the government should be transparent.

"Any singling out of people of any faith, including the Muslim faith, for increased government scrutiny would violate the equal protection and freedom of religion guarantees of the U.S. Constitution," said Ahilan Arulanantham, the legal director of the ACLU of Southern California. "The government should be transparent about the processes that led it to initiate this misguided program and then to rescind it."

LAPD Officer Rosario Herrera, a department spokeswoman, said she couldn't comment on pending litigation.

Then-LAPD Deputy Chief Michael P. Downing, who headed up the counterterrorism bureau at the time, talked about the "Community Mapping" plan in front of the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.

He said it would "give our officers increased awareness of our local Muslim communities" and identify Muslim enclaves to determine which might be likely to become isolated and susceptible to "violent, ideologically based extremism."

Shortly after the announcement the American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California and other Muslim rights activists, sent an open letter to the LAPD opposing the plan.

"There was a clear message from the Muslim community that they were not comfortable with it. So we listened," said Mary Grady, an LAPD spokeswoman told The Associated Press at the time.

[**Video: Sherman Oaks woman escapes after robbers invade her home and tie her up**](#)

Erica Evans, Los Angeles Times

Three armed suspects invaded a woman's home, tied her up and robbed her home in Sherman Oaks on Tuesday night, police said. The woman managed to escape, but so did the robbers, unfortunately.

The crime was reported to have occurred around 11 p.m. in the 3900 block of Ventura Canyon Avenue. Police said that the victim, a woman in her mid-30s who lives alone with her dog, opened her front door to check if she'd left her garage door open.

Standing on her front porch were three men between 5-feet-10 and 6 feet tall dressed in dark clothing and ski masks and armed with guns.

The suspects forced the woman into her home, where they tied her up and started ransacking her house, police said. At one point she was moved to a back room.

She was able to loosen the ties on her hands and then untie her feet. She escaped out a back window and fled to a neighbor's house, where she called police around 11:40 p.m.

But by the time law enforcement arrived, the thieves were gone.

The men stole more than \$60,000 worth of property including jewelry, a watch, a couple laptop computers and a high-end purse.

"Based upon the investigation it seems like they've done this before," said Lt. Jim Gavin of the Van Nuys Police Station. "I don't think it's happened in the San Fernando Valley, because I checked with surrounding areas, but that doesn't mean they haven't done it somewhere else."

Gavin said that the area where the robbery took place is relatively isolated. The home has a long driveway and sits by itself. Police are seeking security video from neighboring houses and commercial establishments that might have captured the suspects entering or exiting the neighborhood.

"There are only a few ways to get in and out of that area," he said. "It would have been difficult for them to escape without being seen."

SUSPECTS STEAL \$8K WORTH OF CELLPHONES FROM SOUTH LA STORE

By Leanne Suter, (KABC)

SOUTH LOS ANGELES (KABC) -- Two armed suspects were caught on camera stealing thousands of dollars worth of cellphones from a South Los Angeles cellphone store.

The incident happened Tuesday around 7 p.m. at a store on South San Pedro Street. Owner Armando Matias said he, two other employees and a customer were in the store at the time.

"One of them pulled out the gun and asks, 'Give me the money! Give me the money! Open the showcase and give us the phones,' and the other guy came in with a big bag," Matias said.

In surveillance video, a suspect cleans out a cellphone case, stealing \$8,000 worth of phones as the gunman orders employees to empty the register.

At one point, a father and daughter walk in in the midst of the armed robbery and quickly leave. Matias said several stores in the area have been targeted by thieves, but many of the victims have been too afraid to report the crimes.

The Los Angeles Police Department is now investigating if the two suspects at the cellphone store may be to blame for the other robberies.

Matias hopes the public will be able to help identify the suspects before anyone else falls victim.

"What I want is to catch these guys, absolutely. I just want to help the other stores in my community. I don't want them to tap somewhere else," he said.

He added that the robberies left him and his two employees traumatized.

Anyone with more information may call the LAPD and you can remain anonymous.

[Video: 'Lifelong Best Friends': Senior Couple Dead in Murder-Suicide](#)

By Angie Crouch, NBC 4

Neighbors were horrified by an apparent murder-suicide in Venice Wednesday, saying that by all accounts, the couple loved each other and were lifelong best friends.

When the 85-year-old woman, Nancy Wright, got Alzheimer's, her husband Jack doted on her, until apparently he saw no other way out. The two were found dead in their Venice home Wednesday morning.

"I know they always said they'd live and die together," said neighbor Diana Bergamini, who said she has known Jack and Nancy Wright for more than 50 years.

The Los Angeles Police Department was called to the couple's home in the 1000 block of Palms Boulevard at 7 a.m.

Investigators said construction workers building a home next door found the body of 83-year-old Charles "Jack" Wright hanging from a tree in the back yard. He'd also been shot.

"It appears the husband killed the wife and then took his own life afterwards," said Lt. John Radtke.

His 85-year-old wife Nancy was found shot to death in a front bedroom.

LAPD officers said they found a lengthy suicide note from Jack explaining he and his wife had previously discussed a murder-suicide plot.

"Based on his note, she suffered from dementia and pain," Radtke said. "It looks like they contemplated this for a while."

Bergamini said she never saw a couple so in love. They were inseparable -- retired teachers from Palisades High School.

Nancy's worsening dementia caused her to become increasingly agitated in recent months, Bergamini said.

"He said he was losing sleep. She wandered the house. He changed the locks so she wouldn't go out," Bergamini said.

California's Right-to-Die law legalizing assisted suicide took effect in June but requires the patient to be able to make health decisions, and have an illness that would end their life within six months, so it would not have applied in the Wright's case.

"I think it's a desperate decision and for him to take his life also," Bergamini said. "To know if she's going, he's going -- when he was completely healthy and had lots to live for."

The Wrights had no children, but are survived by several nieces.

[Disgruntled man tries to set ex-girlfriend's house on fire](#)

—City News Service

A domestic dispute led a disgruntled man to try to set his ex-girlfriend's house on fire Wednesday morning in the Vermont Knolls area of South Los Angeles, authorities said.

Officers were called to a home at 455 West 84th St. at 1:49 p.m. where they learned of the dispute between a woman who lived in the home and her ex-boyfriend, said Sgt. S. Blackman of the Los Angeles Police Department's 77th Street Station.

The victim's father told police he smelled something odd inside, Blackman said.

"The suspect was seen in the front yard pouring gasoline into an open window through a screen and attempting to throw a cigarette at the window," he said.

The man "had several warrants out for his arrest" and was taken into custody, Blackman said.

Arson investigators from the Los Angeles Fire Department were taking over the investigation, Blackman said.

[Drone Seized After Interfering With Los Angeles Brush Fire](#)

By The Associated Press

Los Angeles police have seized a drone and are looking for its operator after the device interfered with authorities fighting a small brush fire burning alongside a freeway.

LAPD Officer Tony Im says a helicopter couldn't drop water on the fire Wednesday for fear of a possible collision with the drone.

The fire burned along State Route 134 in the Eagle Rock area and was contained in less than an hour.

Images posted on social media show the small white drone flying just beneath a firefighting helicopter.

Im says police were able to seize the drone after seeing it land but haven't found whoever was flying it. He says the operator could face a charge of unauthorized use of a model aircraft.

[11 pounds of meth found in lining of passenger's suitcase at LAX](#)

Joseph Serna, Los Angeles Times

Customs officers at Los Angeles International Airport found more than 11 pounds of methamphetamine in the lining of a woman's suitcase who had just arrived from Mexico, authorities announced Wednesday.

The passenger, a 27-year-old woman from San Ysidro, had arrived from Guadalajara on July 18 and was stopped for a secondary inspection "due to her nervous behavior," officials with the U.S. Customs and Border Protection said in a news release.

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Inspectors who opened up her suitcase noticed an odd smell and found a false compartment that hid tape-wrapped packages of crystal meth worth about \$160,000, officials said. The packages weighed about 11 ¼ pounds.

"Once again, the training, expertise and commitment of our LAX CBP Officers prevented dangerous narcotics from entering and harming our community," CBP Los Angeles Area Port Director Mitchell Merriam said in a statement.

The agency seizes more than 9,000 pounds of drugs daily at the nation's 328 international points of entry, authorities said. The woman was arrested and turned over to Immigration and Customs Enforcement.

[Los Angeles Mayor Garcetti to Speak on DNC Closing Night](#)

By Wire Services

Los Angeles Mayor Eric Garcetti will take the Democratic National Convention stage in Philadelphia Thursday to speak at the event's closing night.

Garcetti is scheduled to speak at 4 p.m. His speech is among several that will precede Hillary Clinton's Democratic Party presidential nomination acceptance speech.

DNC Day 3 Top Moments: Obama Backs Clinton, Knocks Trump

Garcetti said earlier this week he wants to use his speech to help steer conversations from just responding to Republican candidate Donald Trump to addressing what the candidates will actually do if elected. He also said last week that he plans to address the feeling of alienation that many Americans feel toward their government.

"My message is that I think Americans right now feel shut out by government," he said. "They feel like Washington won't vote on immigration reform, won't take up infrastructure to rebuild our crumbling streets, won't do the things that the majority of Americans would want."
Women Who Ran for the Presidency[NATL] Cracking the Glass Ceiling Before Clinton:

Garcetti said he plans to represent mayors and other city officials who do not have the luxury "to play politics."

"We actually have to do things here, so that's why we have tens of thousands of people who we are making citizens," he said. "That's why we're rebuilding our port, our airport, paving our streets and our sidewalks. And for me, you know, that's what we need in our next leader, not somebody who is going to find a common enemy, but find a common purpose."

Tim Kaine Dad Jokes Take Twitter by Storm

Garcetti is one of several major-city mayors invited to speak at the event. The mayors of Atlanta, New York City, Philadelphia, Boston, Detroit and Tallahassee have also been invited to address DNC attendees.

Garcetti, who has been at the convention since Monday, said during a Tuesday panel discussion on Latino political participation that recognizing the power of the Latino vote is not enough, and that Latinos need to be appointed to top-level positions in the next presidential administration, and not just to positions focusing on immigration and labor.

DNC Attendees Share Their Opinions on Candidates [NATL] DNC Attendees Show What They Think of the Candidates

With appointments made under the recent two Democratic presidential administrations, "there's like this ceiling," he said.

"We have to figure out a way to make that very clear ... when President Clinton, the next President Clinton is in place, that you know, a cabinet position or two isn't enough."
WATCH LIVE Trump Says He 'Was Being Sarcastic' on Russia Hack

Garcetti added that those who have the power to make the appointments often complain there are not enough qualified Latinos for the positions, but he feels they are not searching hard enough. "I think they're looking for Latinos with big names," said Garcetti, whose paternal grandfather was born in Mexico. "Latinos don't have big names, and so it becomes a vicious cycle."

Southern California Images in the News[2016 UPDATED 7/26] Southern California Images in the News

Garcetti on Monday also took part in a news conference with labor groups to promote raising the minimum wage. He also joined a luncheon of the U.S. Conference of Mayors.

[San Francisco cop arrested on suspicion of building illegal AR-15-style rifle](#)

Joseph Serna, Los Angeles Times

A San Francisco police officer has been arrested on suspicion of assembling his own illegal AR-15-style assault rifle, officials announced Wednesday.

Officer Thomas Abrahamsen, an 18-year veteran of the department, surrendered to authorities Tuesday and was booked and will face two felony weapons charges, San Francisco police said in a statement.

Abrahamsen, 50, is accused of violating a state law against assembling an assault rifle or weapon capable of firing a large .50-caliber BMG bullet.

Under a law approved by Gov. Jerry Brown on July 1, rifles with a "bullet button" that allows for a clip to be dropped with the press of a button and quickly replaced were banned. The law Abrahamsen was charged with violating would include an AR-15-style rifle modified with a bullet button or any weapon that fired the large BMG bullet.

The department's Internal Affairs division had been investigating Abrahamsen since last summer, officials said.

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"In the spirit of the Not on My Watch initiative, Department members will continue to hold each other accountable and will act swiftly to report any behavior that might bring dishonor to the Police Department," acting Police Chief Toney Chaplin said.

The Not on My Watch initiative was launched by the previous police chief after the department was rocked by a series of scandals, including revelations that dozens of officers had exchanged text messages loaded with homophobic and racist language discussing the communities they served.

Several officers have been fired or resigned over the last 18 months because of the discoveries.

Abrahamsen is on unpaid leave and being held on \$150,000 bail. Jail records show his arraignment is scheduled for Wednesday afternoon.

[Former federal agent sentenced to prison in sex-slave bribery case](#)

Matt Hamilton, Los Angeles Times

A former U.S. immigration agent was sentenced Tuesday to 10 months in prison for soliciting a bribe from a South Korean businessman who had been falsely accused of trafficking a sex slave into the country.

While handing down the sentence in a downtown Los Angeles courtroom, U.S. District Judge Michael W. Fitzgerald said Joohoon David Lee committed “a very, very grave crime.” Still, the judge opted for a lower prison term than the 18 months sought by prosecutors.

Lee, who was working for Homeland Security Investigations’ human trafficking division, interviewed a woman in 2012 who alleged that she was brought to the U.S. as a “sex slave” for a Korean businessman, according to court papers.

After the interview, Lee placed a notice in the homeland security database that would trigger an alert if the businessman, identified only as H.S., tried to enter the U.S.

In March 2013, the businessman’s lawyer met with Lee and another immigration officer to try to resolve outstanding immigration issues.

Both Lee and his colleague advised the lawyer that clearing the man’s entry issues into the U.S. would require him to submit a waiver to the U.S. consulate in South Korea.

But two days later, prosecutors alleged, Lee offered a faster, if more costly method: H.S. could pay for Lee’s trip to South Korea, where Lee could interview the man and later file a positive report on his behalf.

A family member of H.S. traveled to Las Vegas to give Lee \$3,000 cash, according to court papers. One day later, Lee deposited \$1,000 in his bank account and bought a plane ticket to Seoul.

In South Korea, Lee’s hotel and entertainment were paid by H.S., and Lee solicited a second bribe for \$100,000 “to make [his] immigration issues go away,” according to court papers. He eventually received about \$6,000 to \$8,000 in cash, prosecutors said.

After returning to the U.S., Lee filed an entry into the law enforcement database stating that although H.S. was suspected of human trafficking, the case was closed because of a lack of evidence.

Federal authorities said they did not detect any of Lee's malfeasance until he interfered in a separate sex trafficking probe involving a brother of H.S.

The officer handling that probe said that Lee vouched for a Korean woman suspected of working as a prostitute. Lee insisted that she was eligible to enter the U.S. and that she was actually in a romantic relationship with H.S.' brother.

The interference by Lee prompted the officer to alert internal watchdogs to possible misconduct.

"This defendant sold his position of authority as a law enforcement officer for a few thousand dollars," United States Atty. Eileen M. Decker said. "As a consequence of this abuse of trust, he will now pay a far more significant price."

This defendant sold his position of authority as a law enforcement officer for a few thousand dollars.

— United States Atty. Eileen M. Decker

Lee, now 43, pleaded guilty in December 2015 to a count of bribery.

Lee's defense lawyer asked the judge not to place her client in prison, arguing that he risked being abused.

Attorney Jennifer Uyeda also told the judge that Lee fell in love with the woman who claimed to be a sex slave. Through the relationship, Lee learned that the businessman was not harboring her in a human trafficking scheme, the lawyer wrote.

The attorney also stated that Lee had already closed the felony investigation into H.S. when he solicited the free trip to South Korea, which he saw as an opportunity to get financial compensation for the woman who had claimed to be a sex slave. Whatever he later wrote into the law enforcement database after the trip did not impact any investigation into H.S. because it had concluded, she argued.

"He got caught up in a fantasy where he could be the hero, and abused his position of authority," Uyeda wrote in a sentencing memo. At the time of the crime, Lee was embroiled in a custody dispute over his two sons with his ex-wife, and the relationship with the woman gave him "comfort and confidence," his lawyer said.

Lee has since turned in his badge and works as a limousine driver, according to his attorney.

INTRADEPARTMENTAL CORRESPONDENCE

May 21, 2015

1.15

TO: Commanding Officer, Legal Affairs Division

FROM: Commanding Officer, Counter-Terrorism and Special Operations Bureau

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR PUBLIC RECORDS REGARDING DOCUMENT ON MUSLIM MAPPING PROJECT

Staff from Counter-Terrorism and Special Operations Bureau (CTSOB) has reviewed our records and are unable to locate any correspondence, dated on or about November 14, 2007, from the American Civil Liberties Union requesting records on a “Muslim mapping” project, as per your request under the California Public Records Act.

If you have any questions or concerns regarding this correspondence, please have a member of your staff contact Sergeant II Michael Seguin, Counter-Terrorism and Special Operations Bureau, at (213) 486-8780.

MICHAEL P. DOWNING, Deputy Chief
Commanding Officer
Counter-Terrorism and Special Operations Bureau

Staff Officers:

- Chief William J. Bratton
- First Assistant Chief James McDonnell
- Deputy Chief Michael Downing, Commanding Officer, Counter Terrorism and Criminal Intelligence Bureau
- Deputy Chief Michel Moore, Commanding Officer, Operations Valley Bureau
- Commander Joan McNamara, Assistant Commanding Officer, Counter Terrorism and Criminal Intelligence Bureau

Guests:

- Commissioner Alan J. Skobin, Los Angeles Board of Police Commissioners
- Mr. Dafer Dakhil, Director, Omar Ibn Al Khattab Foundation
- Rabbi Allen J. Freehling, Director, City of Los Angeles Human Relations Commission
- Mr. Arif Ali Khan, Homeland Security, Office of the Mayor, City of Los Angeles
- Mr. Peter Begring, Esquire, American Civil Liberties Union
- Salam Al Marayati, Executive Director, Muslim Public Affairs Council

Welcome and Introductions – Deputy Chief Michael Downing

Deputy Chief Michael Downing introduced Mr. Dafer Dakhil, Director, Omar Ibn Al Khattab Foundation. Mr. Dakhil welcomed everyone to the Khattab Foundation and offered the invocation. Mr. Dakhil shared how the Muslim community is a very diverse community.

Deputy Chief Michael Downing greeted and thanked everyone for their attendance and support. He noted Los Angeles has the second largest Muslim population in the United States after New York City.

Remarks – Chief William J. Bratton

Chief William J. Bratton said he was returning from an officer involved shooting in Northeast Area where the suspects had fired upon the victim and the officers with AK-47s. The victim was killed and the little girl he was holding was not injured. The Chief agreed with Mr. Dakhil, the Muslim community is very diverse. He said during the past week he had participated in many events celebrating the diversity of Los Angeles. The events included the African American Forum, the Chinese New Year and a meeting with the Armenian community. He noted Commander Terry Hara had been promoted to the rank of deputy chief and was the first Asian American in the Department, to be promoted to that rank. Chief Bratton shared how the Department was saddened by the loss of Police Officer III + I Randy Simmons and was grieving for this officer.

Chief Bratton gave a synopsis on the Department's forums. The forums are a good thing that emerged from a time of crisis. Each forum meets twice a year. The relationship between the Department and the community are developed when the two work together. During times of crisis, the two come together as a result of the relationships that have been built. He invited those present to attend the other five forums. Chief Bratton said membership in the forums consists of those invited to attend and those desiring to participate. The public is welcome at the forums.

Chief Bratton announced Deputy Chief Downing would be the Department coordinator for the Muslim Forum. Chief Bratton said as the Commanding Officer of Hollywood Area, Deputy Chief Downing had brought about a sense of community to a diverse community and a 65% reduction in crime. The reduction of crime brought new businesses and new construction projects to the Hollywood Area.

Chief Bratton said his first visit to a Mosque occurred when Sheriff Lee Baca had taken him on a tour of a Mosque. Chief Bratton asked how many present were involved with the Sheriff's Multi-Faith Council. Approximately eight people raised their hands. Chief Bratton noted he wanted to build bridges with the Sheriff's Department, the FBI and other cities to reach out to the Muslim community.

Chief Bratton addressed the issue of recruitment of police officers from the Muslim community. The percentage of Muslim police officers on the Department is lower than the percentage of Muslims in the community. He said the Muslim community represented many cultures that were united by the Muslim religion and the Department needs officers from the Muslim community.

The Department has developed a Community Police Academy for citizens. He shared how there were also Latino and Korean Community Police Academies and a Muslim Community Police Academy was in the works. Chief Bratton asked for feedback on the efforts of the Department and the Mayor in their outreach to the Muslim Community.

Guests:

Commissioner Alan J. Skobin greeted the forum and said he attends the meetings because he values the forums. As he attends the meetings he sees how important the diversity in the community is and how much we have in common.

Mr. Arif Ali Khan, Homeland Security Advisor to Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa, greeted everyone on behalf of the Mayor. He said the Muslim community is misunderstood. Mr. Ali Khan said while it is important for the police department to understand the Muslim community, it is also important for the Muslim community to gain understanding of the police.

Mr. Salam Al Marayati, Executive Director, Muslim Public Affairs Council said the forum was a good opportunity for those present to cause the Bureau Chiefs and the Commanding Officers of the nineteen Areas to come together and bring about an understanding of the Muslim community. He invited Imam Abdul Karim Hasan to be a community liaison for the Muslim Forum. Mr. Marayati said the agenda for public safety could be set by the Department and the Muslim community working together in the forum. The forum could be used as a model for other cities to follow. He shared how he had been asked to co-chair the Muslim Forum.

Open Discussion – First Assistant Chief James McDonnell

First Assistant Chief James McDonnell opened the question and answer period by saying relationships between the Department and the community had been strained in the past, but currently are better than ever. The emphasis on policing that involves building relationships with the community is bringing about results. He said the shooting in Northeast Area was an illustration of the importance of understanding between police and community. The media had been broadcasting the position of the officers while officers were attempting to apprehend the suspects. The broadcasts had presented a challenge due to the fact an officer's position should never be given up due to safety issues. He thanked the group for their work in shaping the relationships between the Department and the community and bringing about greater understanding between the two.

The open discussion included the following comments, questions and answers:

Relationships between the Muslim community and law enforcement - Concern over the perception the police have of the Muslim community were expressed by one forum participant saying, officers need to decide if the Muslims are suspects or in partnership with the Department. The Muslim community also has the desire to be respected and feel like they are being treated equally with other American citizens. It was also noted the film industry has released several films depicting Muslims in a very negative light. Those present said they would let the Department know about these films as they are released.

Some encouraged those present to know their Area Commanding Officer and the officers serving their area. They also said to bring their complaints to the commanding officer.

A forum participant shared how he had represented the Muslim community to the Department, since 1992 as a participant in the *Welcome to Wilshire* training for new officers. He also said after 9/11 he had requested extra patrol for his Mosques and was sent two vehicles to provide the patrol.

Some expressed a lack of trust between the community and law enforcement. Due to the desire of the Muslim leaders present to build bridges between police and community members, it was suggested the Imams be allowed to visit with the officers to tell about Islam and the Muslim community.

Chief Bratton responded to the issue of relationships by saying the Department had many opportunities for contact between the Muslim community and the Department. The opportunities included the Muslim community attending the Area C-PAB meetings and having representatives from the Muslim community in attendance at supervisory training, speaking to recruit officers in the Academy and meeting with Area Commanding Officers. Chief Bratton also said he would find out which Areas have new officer orientation training similar to Wilshire Area's to offer an additional opportunity for community members to speak to the officers. The Department will move forward to facilitate these opportunities.

A forum participant highlighted the diversity of the Muslim community when he noted the Muslim Latino Association.

A member of the group said Muslims in the twenty-six and under age group do not trust the police due to the mapping issue.

Deputy Chief Downing responded by saying mapping was a done issue. It was originally intended to be a partnership between the Muslim community and the Department. He also noted the Muslim Forum was the next step in the partnership between the Muslim community and the Department. He shared how he and Mr. Salam Al Marayati had been interviewed by *Al Jazeera* and had discussed building the quality of life in the community. Chief Bratton added the Department would continue to build personal relationships with the Muslim community through C-PAB, the Community Police Academy, programs similar to the Wilshire Area officer orientation program and youth programs. Currently, the Department is creating the framework to increase the number of Explorer Scouts and increase the participation of Muslim youth in the program.

Chief Bratton was asked what concerns he had regarding the Muslim community in Los Angeles since 9/11. Chief Bratton said the mapping experience had brought about an understanding of issues in the community. The forum was formed to address and understand the many complexities of the community. He invited the forum to engage in dialogue on the issues and stand together on common ground. Chief Bratton shared how his background, experience and education had caused him to know and understand diversity. He noted the promotions and appointments he has made since he became Chief demonstrate his understanding. In addition, members of the Muslim community becoming officers will add to the Department's understanding of the Muslim community.

Mr. Salam Al Marayati said his organization had made a film depicting the history of the Muslim community in the City of Los Angeles. Interest was expressed in obtaining a copy of the DVD to show Department personnel.

Forums- Questions regarding the structure, goals and the selection of the civilian chairperson for the Muslim Forum were voiced. Some suggested the position of chairperson should be shared among several people.

In response to the questions about the forums, Chief Bratton told the group there was no universal structure for choosing a chair and they could shape how they wanted to choose a chair for the forum. They could choose one chairperson or several. The issue for choosing a chairperson would be addressed at the June meeting.

Recruitment – A Youth minister offered the Department the opportunity to speak to the youth he works with- ages 12 to 21 years during their Boy Scout, Girl Scout and summer camp meetings. Some shared the job of police officer was not considered to be as affluent as a doctor or lawyer in the Muslim community.

Deputy Chief Downing asked those present to give the Department the opportunity to show the Muslim community what we have to offer in the area of jobs and youth programs. He said the Department would speak to the youth groups

Action Items

- Place the selection of chairpersons for the Muslim Community Forum on the agenda for the June meeting of the Muslim Forum
- Consider Amin Abdul Kareem Hasan as the Muslim Community Forum chairperson
- Obtain copies of the Documentary on Muslims from Mr. Salam Al Marayati of the Muslim Public Affairs Council for viewing by commanding officers
- Encourage the Muslim community to participate in C-PAB, the Community Police Academy and Area new officer orientation training
- Recruit officers from the Muslim community
- Check to see what Areas have similar programs to Wilshire's officer orientation
- Implement the Exposure Initiatives to expose the Muslim community members to
 - Command Staff
 - Academy Recruit Officers
 - Police Officers
- Develop an education program to address issues of common concern
 - Include a problem solving mechanism in the program
- Increase the awareness of Area Commanding Officers of the Mosques and the Muslim community in their Areas
- Provide C-PAB information to the Muslim Forum members
- Follow-up with Lieutenant Miller, Officer in Charge, Community Relations Section and Mary Grady, Public Information Director, Public Information Office on the creation of an LAPD Forum web site to post forum minutes and information
 - Create a web site for each forum.
- Create an LAPD BLOG of forums
- Use e-mail bursting to get information out to forum members
- Speak to the youth of the Muslim American Society Youth Outreach (ages 12 to 21 years) with Mr. Nauman Khan regarding recruitment and Department youth programs

MUSLIM FORUM NOTES
FEBRUARY 21, 2008

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- First Assistant Chief James McDonnell
- Deputy Chief Michael Downing, Commanding Officer, Counter Terrorism and Criminal Intelligence Bureau
- Deputy Michel Moore, Commanding Officer, Operations Valley Bureau
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A forum participant shared how he had represented the Muslim community to the Department, since 1992 as a participant in the *Welcome to Wilshire* training for new officers. He also said after 9/11 he had requested extra patrol for his Mosques and was sent two vehicles to provide the patrol.

Some expressed a lack of trust between the community and law enforcement. Due to the desire of the Muslim leaders present to build bridges between police and community members, it was suggested the Imams be allowed to visit with the officers to tell about Islam and the Muslim community.

Chief Bratton responded to the issue of relationships by saying the Department had many opportunities for contact between the Muslim community and the Department. The opportunities included the Muslim community attending the Area C-PAB meetings and having representatives from the Muslim community in attendance at supervisory training, speaking to recruit officers in the Academy and meeting with Area commanding officers. Chief Bratton also said he would find out which Areas have new officer orientation training similar to Wilshire Area's to offer an additional opportunity for community members to speak to the officers. The Department will move forward to facilitate these opportunities.

A forum participant highlighted the diversity of the Muslim community when he noted the Muslim Latino Association.

A member of the group said Muslims in the twenty-six and under age group do not trust the police due to the mapping issue.

Deputy Chief Downing responded by saying mapping was a done issue. It was originally intended to be a partnership between the Muslim community and the Department. He also noted the Muslim forum was the next step in the partnership between the Muslim community and the Department. He shared how he and Mr. Salam Al Marayati had been interviewed by *Al Jazeera* and had discussed building the quality of life in the community. Chief Bratton added the Department would continue to build personal relationships with the Muslim community through C-PAB, the Community Police Academy, programs similar to the Wilshire Area officer orientation program and youth programs. Currently, the Department is creating the framework to increase the number of Explorer Scouts and increase the participation of Muslim youth in the program.

Chief Bratton was asked what concerns he had regarding the Muslim community in Los Angeles since 9/11. Chief Bratton said the mapping experience had brought about an understanding of issues in the community. The forum was formed to address and understand the many complexities of the community. He invited the forum to engage in dialogue on the issues and stand together on common ground. Chief Bratton shared how his background, experience and education had caused him to know and understand diversity. He noted the promotions and appointments he has made since he became Chief demonstrate his understanding. In addition, members of the Muslim community becoming officers will add to the Department's understanding of the Muslim community.

Mr. Salam Al Marayati said his organization had made a film depicting the history of the Muslim community in the City of Los Angeles. Interest was expressed in obtaining a copy of the DVD to show Department personnel.

Forums- Questions regarding the structure, goals and the selection of the civilian chairperson for the Muslim Forum were voiced. Some suggested the position of chairperson should be shared among several people.

In response to the questions about the forums, Chief Bratton told the group there was no universal structure for choosing a chair and they could shape how they wanted to choose a chair for the forum. The issue for choosing a chairperson would be addressed at the June meeting.

Recruitment – A Youth minister offered the Department the opportunity to speak to the youth he works with- ages 12 to 21 years during their Boy Scout, Girl Scout and summer camp meetings. Some shared the job of police officer was not considered to be as affluent as a doctor or lawyer in the Muslim community.

Deputy Chief Downing asked those present to give the Department the opportunity to show the Muslim community what we have to offer in the area of jobs and youth programs. He said the Department would speak to the youth groups

Action Items

- Place the selection of chairpersons for the Muslim Community Forum on the agenda for the June meeting of the Muslim Forum
- Consider Amin Abdul Kareem Hasan as the Muslim Community Forum chairperson
- Obtain copies of the Documentary on Muslims from Mr. Salam Al Marayati of the Muslim Public Affairs Council for viewing by commanding officers
- Encourage the Muslim community to participate in C-PAB, the Community Police Academy and Area new officer orientation training
- Recruit officers from the Muslim community
- Check to see what Areas have similar programs to Wilshire's officer orientation

Muslim Community Forum Minutes
Page 6

- Implement the Exposure Initiatives to expose the Muslim community members to :
Command Staff
Academy Recruit Officers
Police Officers
- Develop an education program to address issues of common concern
Include a problem solving mechanism in the program
- Increase the awareness of Area Commanding Officers of the Mosques and the Muslim community in their Areas
- Provide C-PAB information to the Muslim Forum members
- Follow-up with Lieutenant Miller, Officer in Charge, Community Relations Section and Mary Grady, Public Information Director, Public Information Office on the creation of an LAPD Forum web site to post forum minutes and information
- Create a web site for each forum.
- Create an LAPD BLOG of forums
- Use e-mail bursts to get information out to forum members
- Speak to the youth of the Muslim American Society Youth Outreach (ages 12 to 21 years) with Mr. Nauman Khan regarding recruitment and Department youth programs

ASIAN PACIFIC ISLANDER COMMUNITY FORUM

*Empress Pavilion Restaurant
988 North Hill Street No. 201, Los Angeles
Tuesday, November 13, 2007, 6:00 p.m.*

AGENDA

I. WELCOME □ INTRODUCTION

*Commander Terry Hara, Asian Pacific Islander Forum Coordinator
Captain Blake Chow, Assistant Forum Coordinator
Mr. David Iwata, Community Co-Chair*

Guests

*Mr. Frank Quiambao, Special Assistant to the Governor's Office of Homeland Security
Commissioner Anthony Pacheco, President, Los Angeles Board of Police Commissioners
Commissioner Alan Skobin*

II. REMARKS - *Chief William J. Bratton*

- **POLICING STRATEGIES FOR THE NEXT FIVE YEARS**
- **SIGNIFICANT EVENTS**

III. REMARKS - *Captain III Matthew Blake, West Los Angeles Area Station*

- **NEW MID-CITY POLICE FACILITY**

IV. PRESENTATION BY - *Officer Donna Cornejo, Operations-Central Bureau*

- **COMMUNITY POLICE ACADEMY**

V. OPEN FORUM

VI. ADJOURNMENT

UPCOMING EVENTS

FORUM SUMMITT

December 4, 2007, 6:00 p.m.
Wilshire United Methodist Church – Banquet Room
711 South Plymouth Boulevard, Los Angeles

KOREAN COMMUNITY POLICE ACADEMY

January 23, 2008, 6:00 p.m.
Korean Education Center
680 Wilshire Place, Los Angeles

Staff Officers:

Chief William J. Bratton
Deputy Chief Kenneth Garner, Operations-West Bureau
Deputy Chief Michael Downing, Counter Terrorism and Criminal Intelligence Bureau
Commander Andrew Smith, Assistant Commanding Officer Operations-Central Bureau
Captain Joan Wakefield, Central Area
Captain John Egan, Rampart Area
Captain Evangelyn Nathan, Wilshire Area
Captain Mathew Blake, West Los Angeles Area
Captain Dennis Kato, 77th Area
Captain Mariani, Recruitment and Employment Division

Guests:

Mr. David Iwata, Asian Pacific Islander Co-Chair
Commissioner Anthony Pacheco, President, Los Angeles Board of Police Commissioners
Commissioner Alan Skobin, Los Angeles Board of Police Commissioners
Mr. Frank Quiambao, Special Assistant to the Governor's Office of Homeland Security
Mr. Alex Kim, Deputy Director to the Office of Governor Schwarzenegger
Ms. Lisa Thong, Office of Senator Jack Scott
Ms. Daisy Na, Office of Assemblyman Mike Eng
Ms. Crystal XU, Office of Congresswoman Linda Sanchez
Ms. Michelle L. Esperanza, Office of Congresswoman Lucille Roybal-Allard
Mr. Melvin Tabilas, Office of Congressman Xavier Becerra
Mr. William Kil, President's Advisory Commission on Asian American/Pacific Islanders

Welcome/Introduction - *Commander Terry Hara, Asian Pacific-Islander Forum Coordinator*

Commander Terry Hara welcomed everyone and introduced the special guests in addition to Department command staff.

Commander Hara presented Mr. George Yu, Executive Director, Chinatown Business Improvement District, with a certificate of appreciation for his outstanding service and commitment to the residents of the City of Los Angeles.

Remarks - *Chief William J. Bratton*

Chief William J. Bratton welcomed and thanked everyone for their continued commitment to improve the quality of life for all residents in the City of Los Angeles.

Chief Bratton discussed his four priorities and accomplishments during his first term as Chief of Police of the Los Angeles Police Department.

1. Reduction of Crime - Crime has declined over the past five-years. Currently, crime is down by 8% year to date and homicides are at the lowest in the Department's history.
2. Consent Decree - The Department has successfully implemented provisions of the Federal Consent Decree and has now moved into a maintenance mode in order to sustain the level of compliance of Department personnel.
3. The creation of Counter Terrorism and Criminal Intelligence Bureau under the command of Deputy Chief Michael Downing.
4. Recruitment - The Department received approval by Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa and the City Council to hire 1,000 police officers during the 2007/2008 fiscal year. Chief Bratton's goal is to attain 10,300 personnel for the Department.

Chief Bratton also discussed the addition of two new police facilities next year, Mid-City Area and Northwest Area.

Chief Bratton requested the continued support and assistance of the community to recruit more Asian Pacific Islander applicants/candidates.

Remarks - Frank Quiambao, Special Assistant to the Governor's Office of Homeland Security

Mr. Quiambao welcomed everyone and expressed the support of Governor Schwarzenegger's office. Mr. Quiambao praised Chief Bratton for his leadership and dedication to residents of the City of Los Angeles.

Remarks - Deputy Chief Kenneth Garner, Operations-West Bureau

Deputy Chief Kenneth Garner announced that the Department will have a Korean Police Academy that will begin on January 23, 2008. Chief Garner thanked Mr. William Kil for hosting the Korean Police Academy at the Korean Education Center.

Chief Garner introduced Captain Matthew Blake who was recently appointed as the commanding officer of the new Mid-City Area, the newest police facility under his command.

Commander Hara thanked KSCI - Channel 18, for their partnership with the Los Angeles Police Department and Recruitment and Employment Division. Throughout the day, KSCI provides public service announcements in a variety of Asian languages, in an effort to assist the Los Angeles Police Department's recruitment efforts.

Remarks - Captain Matthew Blake, West Los Angeles Area

Captain Matthew Blake thanked Chief Bratton for being appointed as the new commanding officer of Mid-City Area.

Captain Blake discussed his aggressiveness approach on fighting crime, as he did in West Los Angeles Area as well as partnering with the community to assist the Department in further reducing crime.

Korean Community Police Academy - Officer Donna Cornejo, Operations-Central Bureau

Officer Donna Cornejo provided an overview of a joint effort between Operations-Central and West Bureau in organizing the Korean Community Police Academy. The academy will be a 10-week course and will be held at the Korean Education Center located at 680 West Wilshire Place, Suite 201, Los Angeles. The academy will commence on January 23, 2008, from the hours 6:30 p.m. to 9:30 p.m. The academy will provide a history of the Department, in addition to training in the following subject matters; Vice, Homicide, and Gangs. Participants will also be provided a tour of Air Support Division, Elysian Park Academy, and Metropolitan Communications Dispatch Center.

Adjournment

DOUGLAS G. MILLER, Lieutenant
Officer in Charge
Community Relations Section
Office of the Chief of Police

Open Forum – Commander Terry Hara

- Mr. David Gee, President of Chinatown Public Safety Association
Mr. Gee expressed his concern regarding the lack of footbeat units in the Chinatown.

Commander Andrew Smith advised that he recently conducted a walk through of the Chinatown Area. He further stated if the need arose, Central Area would allocate personnel to deploy footbeats in Chinatown. Currently, crime is at a all time low in Chinatown.

- Pastor Marshall Lew, Associate Pastor, First Chinese Baptist Church
Pastor Lew advised that members of his congregation are being victimized by property crime, which is causing the parishioners to attend other churches. The church has hired private security in an attempt to address this problem.

Commander Hara inquired if Pastor Lew contacted the Senior Lead Officer in his area in order to address and resolve his concerns.

- Ms. Christina Kan, Pacific Alliance Medical Center
Ms. Kan praised the hard work of the Department, however she expressed her concern of the overall safety in Chinatown. Ms. Kan advised that the center has hired private security 24/ 7 to patrol the parking areas as patients and employees leave the center. Ms. Kan was interested in either joining or starting a neighborhood watch group.

Commander Hara encouraged Ms. Kan to contact Senior Lead Officer Ken Lew, Central Area.

- Mr. David Won, General Manager, PROPAC Distribution
Mr. Won expressed his fear and concern regarding a robbery that took place in an adjacent store twice in one month.

Chief Bratton requested Newton Area personnel to respond to Mr. Won's concern, however, no one was in attendance. Chief Bratton directed Mr. Won to Lt. Miller as a point of contact to address his concerns.

- Mr. Jason Hwang, Senior Chairperson, Korean American Federation of Los Angeles
Mr. Hwang expressed his concern regarding the increase in crime during the holiday season in Koreatown.

Commander Garner advised bike units will be patrolling the area during the holiday season. In addition, footbeat units will also be patrolling the area as well as a surveillance detail. You won't know we're there, but we will be watching and protecting the community.

- Ms. Susan Dixon, teacher
Ms. Dixon expressed her concern regarding the graffiti in Chinatown and inquired if a DARE officer could come to her school.

Commander Hara advised that we no longer have the DARE program due to the lack of personnel, however, Area Senior Lead Officer's can serve similar functions in the area of community education. In regards to graffiti problem, Commander Hara advised it starts from the home. Learning respect for other people's property.

- Ms. Hyepin Im, Korean Churches for Community Development
How are community members going to partner with personnel the new police station?"

Captain Blake advised her that his first priority was to open the facility. Obtaining the personnel to staff the station, organizing the layout and facility logistics. Once the station is up and running he will reach out to the community to partner with. Creating a Police Advisory League and other groups to assist the police station in serving the community. Lastly Officers will partner with the community. The Officers will be responsible for their areas and will get to know the community.

- Ms. Hyepin Im, Korean Churches for Community Development
Ms. Im brought up the issue of Asian gangs, which are the fastest growing gangs in Southern California.

Detective Terry Carlos advised Ms. Im that most Asian gang members reside outside of the City of Los Angeles and reside in surrounding areas such as, Orange Country, Riverside or San Bernardino County. Gang members and their associates will come into Koreatown on the weekends and commit their crimes and leave. The Department works with surrounding agencies to document gang members and their activities.

Captain Blake advised he has an aggressive plan to combat and reduce gang violence. Captain Blake has worked as a gang officer, gang supervisor and a gang lieutenant. He shared his experience and expertise in combating gang crimes. Captain Blake also reiterated how crucial the partnership between the community and the Department is in ridding neighborhoods / communities of gangs and graffiti.


- Ms. Sara Sadhwani, Asian Pacific American Legal Center
Ms. Sadhwani was concerned with the recent mapping of Muslim community issue as racial/religious profiling.

Deputy Chief Downing stated that on Oct 30th he spoke during the congregational hearing and used the wrong term of mapping. Instead of mapping it should have been a community engagement initiative. Los Angeles has the second largest Muslim population estimated at 500 to 700 thousand Muslims. For the past 18 months the LAPD has been in dialogue with the Muslim Communities and a deeper engagement is needed. Due to recent media coverage it has allowed the LAPD to make relationships with the Muslim Community that otherwise would not have. LAPD wants to support and protect these communities.


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LAPD-LINCT INTERNATIONAL COUNTER-TERRORISM CONFERENCE

April 4-6, 2012



Los Angeles Police Department
Leadership in Counter -Terrorism (LinCT)



Sponsorship for the conference was generously provided by:

Raytheon

 **Palantir**



An IBM Company



Conference Proceedings

Los Angeles, California – April 4-6, 2012

Hosted By
The Los Angeles Police Department



ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The LinCT organization would like to extend special recognition to the following organizations for their support of the 2012 LinCT Conference.



Los Angeles Police Department, Counter-Terrorism and Special Operations Bureau

Thank you to the entire Counter-Terrorism and Special Operations Bureau for the detailed and extensive work done to plan and host the conference. We would like to extend a special acknowledgement to Assistant Chief Michael Downing and Lieutenant Anita McKeown for their leadership that made for such a successful and productive event.

Signature



Hydra Foundation

Thank you to Jonathan Crego and his Hydra and 10,000 Volts team for providing their support to the conference proceedings and insights provided as a result of their dedication and hard work.

The Conference Proceedings were developed with staff support from Lafayette Group and the National Consortium for Advanced Policing.



**LAFAYETTE
GROUP**

National Consortium

NCAP

— for Advanced Policing

Photography was provided by the Los Angeles Police Department.


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LinCT President Welcome




Rob Delaney will provide

DRAFT



Host Agency Welcome



In our roles as law enforcement counter-terrorism officials, the demands on us are constant and ever changing. We are always fire-fighting against the challenge, or more likely multiple challenges, of the day, leaving us with little time to think strategically. The LinCT organization – with its annual conference and partnerships and friendships I rely on – has been key to identifying new strategies to defend ^{our}my city and country. We need alliances and partnerships like those among our LinCT alumni and our Five Eyes

countries where we can share practices and experiences and find opportunities to work together. Following the sentiments of Los Angeles Police Chief Charlie Beck and Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa, it is only through strong and active partnerships across all levels of government that we have any chance of creating safe communities. That is why I have been a strong advocate of State and local law enforcement agencies being a more integrated participant in a structured National Criminal Intelligence Enterprise (NCIE). With the expressed support of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), we now have the guidance needed to make this a genuine operational organization through the Major Cities Chiefs Police Association (MCC). It has been the pleasure of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) Counter-Terrorism and Special Operations Bureau ^{to host} the LinCT conference once again this year. We worked with our LinCT President Rob Delaney to make the approach of this year's conference more action-oriented. The main theme this year, *Meeting the Challenge*, is reflected in these conference proceedings. The theme was meant to identify areas where we have the greatest need to take action. From the panel presentations we were able to begin to identify what each of us is doing to address those needs. Hopefully, this theme will also challenge all of us to think innovatively and push to develop actual programs and approaches that will make us all safer. Within each panel summary is a *Meeting the Challenge* section where actions suggested by panel members have been documented. These notes can continue to serve as a reference over the coming year as we work together to improve our practices. Your advances over the coming year will help to make next year's conference even more focused on taking action.

I would like to acknowledge the hard work done by ^{Counter-Terrorism and Special Operations Bureau}my Bureau to attend to every detail needed to make this conference a success. The staff did a superior job during the conference and in the months of planning and preparations leading up to the event. We look forward to being able to support and host the conference into the future.

Sincerely,

Michael P. Downing

Commanding Officer, LAPD Counter-Terrorism and Special Operations Bureau
Past President, Leadership in Counter Terrorism Alumni Association (2010-2011)



Host Agency Profile: Los Angeles Police Department Counter-Terrorism and Special Operations Bureau

The Counter-Terrorism and Special Operations Bureau (CTSOB) is responsible for planning, response, and intelligence activities related to terrorism and other crimes. CTSOB's mission is: "To Prevent terrorism by effectively sharing information aimed at disrupting terrorist's operational capability and addressing the underlying causes associated with the motivational component; to Protect the public and critical infrastructure by leveraging private sector resources and hardening targets; to Pursue terrorists and those criminal enterprises that support them; and, to Prepare the citizenry and the city government for consequences associated with terrorist operations against the city."

Deputy Chief Michael Downing is the Commanding Officer of CTSOB and reports to Assistant Chief Michel R. Moore, Office of Special Operations. CTSOB is comprised of the Major Crimes Division (MCD), the Emergency Services Division (ESD), Metropolitan Division, Air Support Division (ASD), and Emergency Operations Division (EOD).

The Major Crime Division's primary objective is the prevention of significant disruptions of public order in the City of Los Angeles. MCD investigates individuals or groups who plan, threaten, finance, aid, abet, attempt, or perform unlawful acts which threaten public safety. MCD investigators are committed to preventing individuals or groups from harassing or harming others on the basis of race, religion, national origin, or sexual orientation. The division's Commanding Officer is Captain Steven S. Sambar. MCD sections include:

- Criminal Conspiracy Section
- Anti-Terrorism Intelligence Section
- Liaison Section
- Organized Crime Section
- Surveillance Support Section
- Source Development Unit
- Criminal Investigative Section
- Analysis Section
- Joint Regional Intelligence Center

The Emergency Services Division is charged with safeguarding the public by preventing and/or mitigating terrorist and other criminal activities through threat assessments, detection, deterrence, and the rapid response to criminal incidents. The division's Commanding Officer is Captain ~~Horace Frank~~ and its sections include:

- Archangel Section
 - Critical Asset Assessment Team
 - R&D Training Unit
 - Advanced Technology Unit
 - Asset Protection Cadre
- Hazardous Devices/Materials Section
 - Bomb Squad Unit
 - Hazardous Materials Unit
- Bomb Detection K-9 Section
 - Bomb Detection K-9 Unit

Handwritten note: Captain Horace Frank? McE...?






Leadership in Counter Terrorism Alumni Association

The Leadership in Counter Terrorism Alumni Association (LinCT- AA) membership consists of program graduates. The purpose of the Association is to continue and extend the learning, cooperation and relationships developed between the senior law enforcement, intelligence, and military officials who have completed this international counter terrorism (CT) program. The following is a brief overview of the LinCT program and its history:

- LinCT was initiated in 2004 as a joint leadership project between the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Scottish Police College, the Police Service of Northern Ireland, The Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Harvard University and St. Andrews University;
- Focus is on the prevention of terrorism;
- There are three primary threads of content that are integrated throughout the program: Counter Terrorism, Intelligence and Leadership;
- The program is primarily strategic rather than operational;
- The critical outcomes are to improve inter-agency cooperation through enhanced communications, information sharing and personal relationships;
- In 2006 the program was expanded to the Pacific Region in partnership with the Australian Federal Police and the Australian Institute of Police Management;
- Participants represent the partner countries' domestic and Federal Law Enforcement, Military, and Intelligence Communities;
- Program format includes an annual reconvention for program graduates to stay current and to expand important relationships; and
- The LinCT program is governed by an international Board of Governors consisting of the Chief Executive Officers from the participating countries' lead agencies.





2012 Leadership in Counter Terrorism Conference Theme: *Meeting the Challenge*

In the opening remarks of the 2012 Leadership in Counter Terrorism (LinCT) conference, a challenge was posed to the entire group of conference participants. The challenge was to take the time during the three days of the conference to think strategically and develop new strategies to defend our cities and countries. This became the major theme of the conference; the conference organizers hope it will continue to inspire participants when they return home and throughout the coming year.

There are constant and ever-changing demands on all of us. The normal day-to-day responsibilities of most of the participants do not often allow for free and creative thought to consider new and better options. This conference, through reconnecting with old friends and partners or meeting new contacts to exchange ideas and share practices, may be just what is needed to spark the next great strategy in our field.

2012 LinCT Conference Theme: Meeting the Challenge

THE CHALLENGE: *Take time to think strategically and generate new strategies to defend our cities and countries.*

While the main theme of the conference was to challenge the participants to continue to innovate, there were also some major topical themes:



Building Partnerships



Countering the Violent Extremist



Criminalizing Terrorism



Ensuring Global Information Exchange



Optimizing Limited Resources



Balancing Need to Know and Need to Protect

The remainder of this section provides an overview of each of the themes as they were presented by panel speakers throughout the conference. Additionally, to reflect the action-



oriented theme of this conference, each overview is followed by a list of opportunities within those themes for strategic improvement as mentioned by each of the panels. The hope is that these lists will help conference participants to continue to try to meet the challenge over the coming year.



Building Partnerships

The LinCT organization and the annual conference are always about finding opportunities where alumni can work together. The panelists this year stressed the importance of building partnerships at all levels. The following opportunities for building partnerships to improve policing practices were mentioned by panelists:

- Foster information sharing partnerships between national and local level law enforcement by collocating offices.
- Formalize horizontal information sharing partnerships to gain better awareness of trends and information needs.
- Use joint role-playing exercises with law enforcement and communities to understand roles and perspectives.
- Foster public/private partnerships to improve security.
- Develop a model that can be inclusive of many organizations.
- Institute the use of family liaison officers to provide immediate and continuing support that builds personal and community resiliency.
- Work with technology vendors to challenge them to develop solutions that uphold our existing privacy boundaries.
- Establish integrated security units where uniforms and ranks are checked at the door to foster cooperation.
- Build international partnerships to counter crimes with international reach.
- Work with communities to develop a counter narrative plan.
- Find shared values or areas of commonality to begin to develop trusting relationships with communities.



Countering the Violent Extremist

LinCT participating nations and individuals are continuing to find new strategies to counter and deradicalize extremists. Some suggested strategies included:

- Improve chances for deradicalization by involving family members of radicalized individual.
- Refer to terrorism as crime and terrorists as murderers and criminals to lessen the appeal for youth at risk of radicalization.
- Provide standardized training to prison staff and religious leaders to prevent criminals from extremist messaging.
- Adopt technologies with a potential to identify online users before they transition from a passive to active threat.
- Make upholding CRCL the basis of any plan to counter violent extremists.
- Provide individuals that are vulnerable to extremist ideology with a link to traditional support resources (e.g., health, education).



Criminalizing Terrorism

Multiple panelists stressed the importance of treating terrorism as a crime as a way to disrupt the terrorist planning cycle and to diminish the terrorist messaging. Specific strategies included:

- Ensure information collection procedures consider the need to provide evidence to support prosecution.
- Identify the criminal elements leading up to a terrorist attack plot to interrupt the planning cycle.
- Identify associated criminal activity of extremist website managers to disrupt extremist messaging online.
- Improve operational success by identifying criminal activity of suspected violent extremists.



Ensuring Global Information Exchange

Since crime and terrorism continue to be transnational in nature, it is all the more important for law enforcement to be able to see a complete international picture when combating these threats in their own countries and cities. The following were suggested as opportunities for continuing to ensure the exchange of information globally:

- Improve information sharing with governments in high risk countries.
- Look for support from international partners to fulfill information requirements.
- Embed officers internationally to improve information sharing.



Balancing Need to Know and Need to Protect

Intelligence organizations continue to recognize the importance of the "need to share" just as much as the "need to protect." The following were presented by panelists as ways to continue to improve the sharing of information with all partners:

- Find ways to share information even when there is sensitive information to protect.
- Plan in advance for how to share sensitive information with victims and families in a timely fashion.
- Implement technologies with built in privacy protections but still allow data access and analysis.
- Determine information needs of all partners to achieve widest distribution of sensitive information.



Optimizing Limited Resources

At all levels of government, agencies are trying to find ways to do more with less.

The current reality of limited resources was presented as an opportunity to think more creatively about law enforcement solutions. The following were proposed as strategies that, while optimizing limited resources, may present an improvement in practices:

- Determine which groups have the capabilities combined with the intent to do harm to better focus limited resources.
- Use partnerships and a risk-based approach to pool resources and identify priorities.
- Prioritize use of resources through access to more data that will better inform resource allocation decisions.
- Build on established structures and proven practices, improving what is already there rather than starting over.
- Incorporate other non-law enforcement partners to meet needs that are the underlying causes of tensions.



HYDRA – 10,000 VOLTS



Hydra – 10,000 Volts Audience Feedback Overview

Audience feedback to the LinCT 2012 panels was captured throughout the conference using 10,000 Volts, a debriefing tool developed in the United Kingdom to analyze decision-making processes during critical incidents. During some of the panels, LinCT audience members anonymously entered questions or feedback into one of the multiple laptops that were placed on each table. The entries were immediately viewable by all during the conference and at the end of each day were analyzed by a team from London that reported back on the prevalent themes the following day.

The 10,000 Volts methodology was developed by the same team – led by Jonathan Crego – that created Hydra, a training simulator that immerses participants in a scenario complete with audio and video and documents the decisions they make along the way. The group then collectively reviews and critiques the decisions at the end of the training. In 2008, the Los Angeles Police Department became the first police department in the United States to acquire Hydra, which was named after the multi-headed beast of Greek mythology. Hydra training locations exist throughout England, Scotland and Wales.

LinCT is grateful to Mr. Crego and the Hydra and 10,000 Volts team for providing their support to the conference proceedings and insights provided as a result of their dedication and hard work.

****Please look for call out boxes like this throughout the document for some of the feedback collected from the audience during select panel presentations.*





KEYNOTE SPEAKERS

James R. Clapper Jr., Director, Office of National Intelligence



Spending time in the field with law enforcement is refreshing and energizing and I have gained a different perspective on law enforcement from inside the police cruiser during ride-alongs. It is very obvious to me that law enforcement puts their lives on the line every day, and as a citizen I appreciate that.

In the United States (US), since 9/11, we are now experiencing the most intimate of intelligence relationships. This is largely in part to the work of the

International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) the Major Cities Chiefs Police Association (MCC) and their various component groups and the creation of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. The idea is to promote integration among government intelligence operators, with horizontal integration being just as important as vertical integration (e.g., State, local, tribal, allies).

The biggest challenge for the DNI today is due to the confluence of three forces: (1) the responsibility to share, (2) the need to protect sensitive information, (3) and limited financial resources. The pairing of the responsibility to share and the need to protect is sometimes portrayed as an either or scenario, but both need to be balanced, and both need to be done. Balancing the two protects both privacy and civil liberties. The sincerity of desire I have experienced from law enforcement to protect civil rights and civil liberties (CRCL) is a striking testament to the profession. Budget challenges exist at all levels of government and painful decisions are being made all around. At the Federal level there have been 10 years of steady growth, but now we are in a different mode. We are in a similar circumstance as what I experienced at the Defense Intelligence Agency after the end of the Cold War. We might do well to consider what Earnest Rutherford, a great scientist from New Zealand said, "We haven't the money, so we've got to think."



Terrorism is now what has brought us together. It is apparent the Al Qaeda of today is not the same as it was. That is largely due to the relentless pursuit of Al Qaeda by all of us. We have vigorously attacked their leadership, but now we need to worry more about their franchises, by denying their partners a sense of security, and undermining training and planning. Despite our hard work and the sense of closure we may feel from the elimination of Osama bin Laden, we still have terrorists out to get us. Their intent is undiminished and the nature of their threat continues to evolve.

There have been three main factors to our counterterrorism success in the last few years, (1) the dedication and skill of the intelligence community workforce, (2) integration of activities, and (3) intelligence sharing. Intelligence integration has worked because of laws that have been passed and policies and mechanisms that have been instituted to encourage responsible intelligence sharing. The integration of activities at the field level has also been a key to true integration. The federal agencies have become better organized to integrate and share intelligence. The National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) is now the primary organization to integrate intelligence. The FBI has become intelligence driven and coordinates with local law enforcement to prevent crime, which is a huge change in mindset and they have become a very different organization. The United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has strengthened their ties to State and local law enforcement. At the DNI we are working to integrate into local offices since it is at the local level where so much of the important information comes from the local level. The local information will be so valuable to confront our biggest challenges of identifying the homegrown extremist or lone wolf and for determining serious versus aspirational or delusional terrorist plots. Our expertise to identify terrorists has mushroomed and matured over the last ten years, and that will be vital since terrorists are conducting less operational planning before an attack and are downscaling their attack schemes. France has started to refer their terrorists as Nike terrorists, because they "Just Do It," rather than having a prolonged planning phase.

All of the determined collection and exhaustive analysis by so many intelligence community partners is what led to the eradication of Osama bin Laden. We will continue our shared resolve to make the life of terrorists miserable. We have an obligation to do all we can to stop all of the threats and I am very proud of this group for being so dedicated to protecting our citizens.



Richard Esposito, Senior Investigative Reporter, ABC News



Civil rights and civil liberties – and how they intersect police domestic intelligence gathering in the US – can serve as two of the best tools to combat homegrown terror. When police use civil liberties effectively as a frame rather than as a perimeter, they will have a core business that is built to last. Police collect intelligence for the community. Being overwhelmingly sensitive to its concerns, its issues, its needs will go a lot further than post hoc discussions of whether police activity was necessary, constitutional, or appropriate.

By being able to engage your communities and articulate how intelligence gathering protects civil liberties, you will capitalize on the good will of the public. That good will help ensure that when you

make the case to your city managers for maintaining a strategic, predicative function like intelligence collection in a tactical, response driven business like policing you have the strength of your community's self-interest behind you. This requires a great deal of community engagement.

Another set of critical challenges comprises public perception, public support for the role of police in the area of domestic intelligence gathering, and overcoming the danger that can come when that support is corroded and when apathy and cynicism take hold. In order for this set of critical challenges to be met police must explain the steps they will take to ensure that in their efforts to protect they do not trample the rights they are intending to protect.

Consider the presence of these challenges a maturing of the post-9/11 role of police intelligence gathering – its parameters, its mesh with federal operations, and the maturing of public understanding of these operations, their impact on society and the way in which these operations ought to be managed and held accountable. I consider that police role to be critical for our national security. In fact I cannot envision any way in which we can have a complete national security framework without a full and equal involvement of police. I consider "street intelligence" or "human intelligence," as your federal colleagues call it when it is under their umbrella, to be essential.

If your core business – intelligence gathering – is built to last it will survive. This approach will require negotiation; it will require community policing as part of the information collection apparatus, it will require an intelligence operation, like the police agency as a whole, which is accountable, transparent when possible, and is managed by executives who listen and are open



to compromise. In other words, one that is prepared to spell out the role of civil liberties and overcome any perception of damage to civil rights.

When police arguably operate in a realm whose nature may require the gathering of demographic data, the long term monitoring of potential threats before they mature, the use of intrusive technology – cell phone tracking, toll pass usage, license plate readers, -- and even the trolling of web sites – it is simply good business to go into the community and engage on each of these issues – engage, explain, educate, listen, discuss, be educated. In my wisdom or ignorance I question whether enough has been done. I also firmly believe that these technologies should be used judiciously and with a most conservative view of what might be proper. Because I believe focused intelligence collection, however deep, is far less intrusive than the technological solutions, and so far, more effective.

Civil liberties including freedom of speech, the right to privacy the right to be free from unreasonable searches, are fundamental to our society; they are givens. There is little doubt that these are under some pressure, that the expectations surrounding what is a reasonable search, how great is the expectation of privacy and in what setting, are changing. That is all the more reason to engage in a conversation with your customer – the citizens you serve and protect.

Ask yourself:

1. Is there any reason not to engage in a public discourse about gathering demographic data?
2. Is there any reason not to discuss – even warn – parents and students that radical websites will be monitored?
3. Is there any reason not to explain to communities that contain subjects of interest, or might hold subjects of interest, what kinds of methods police might use, and why?
4. Is there any reason where if there is community push back, law enforcement cannot make accommodations while still maintaining a robust intelligence operation?

I do not think so. These are the elements of engagement that constitute community policing. They exhibit a profound regard for civil liberties. But they require a great deal of work. And they require it repetitively. The pact made is that only what must be done in shadows is done in shadows, and the community helps set the standard for what that is.

America has something special to offer: the guarantees against discrimination on the basis of gender, race, religion, disabilities, in areas of education, housing, and employment. These rights, a British author writing about homegrown terrorists rightly noted, are among the most powerful tools in the American arsenal against homegrown radicalization. These guarantees limit balkanized communities. They are the tenets of enfranchisement. But the perception of these rights being damaged, even if they are guaranteed, will undermine any success.



Panel Overviews

Each panel overview begins with the learning objective published in the conference agenda to help set the context. The summary encompasses all of the panelist presentations, group discussions, and any remarks made during the question and answer sessions. Major conference themes covered in each of the panels are represented in the call out box between the list of panelists and the beginning of the summary.

Day 1, Panel 1 – Current Threats, Issues and Responses: A “Five Eyes” Review

Learning Objective: Conference participants will be exposed to national and international strategies for the reduction and prevention of terrorism as well as developments in partnership building within and among the “Five Eyes” community.

- Moderator - **Rob Delaney**, First Assistant Director General, Attorney General’s Department, Australia
- Moderator – **Mike Downing**, Deputy Chief, Los Angeles Police Department, USA
- **Stuart Thorn**, Deputy Director General, Australian Security Intelligence Organization, Australia
- **Dr. Warren Tucker**, Director, New Zealand Security Intelligence Service, New Zealand
- **Wade S. Blizzard**, Superintendent, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Canada
- **Jon Boucher**, Assistant Chief Constable, Hertfordshire Constabulary

Meeting the Challenge: Current Threats, Issues, and Responses for Five Eyes



Building Partnerships: Foster information sharing partnerships between national and local level law enforcement by collocating offices.



Countering the Violent Extremist: Improve chances for deradicalization by involving family members of radicalized individual.



Criminalizing Terrorism: Ensure information collection procedures consider the need to provide evidence to support prosecution.



Ensuring Global Information Exchange: Improve information sharing with governments in high risk countries.



Optimizing Limited Resources: Determine which groups have the capabilities combined with the intent to do harm to better focus limited resources.



In the current threat environment partnerships are even more relevant to detecting, disrupting, and responding to terrorism. Partnerships are needed within and between nations. Within nations, there is a real premium on maintaining a partnership between local law enforcement and national security organizations to make sure that "street intelligence" is captured. Local knowledge will have to come from local law enforcement and a way is needed, namely through partnerships, to bring fragmented information together. On an international basis, the LinCT partnership has been invaluable to terrorism investigations, interrogations, and arrests. Investigations in national security will inevitably need to be done in conjunction with an international network since crimes are increasingly transnational in nature. International partners will be required to involve practitioners in their strategies in order to emphasize tactical components.

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon and prior to 9/11 it was broadly characterized by the taking of hostages and little loss of life. In the 1990s things changed as Al Qaeda's key message became widely publicized and controlled through central leadership with regional branches of the organization recruiting and training. In the last few years, Al Qaeda leadership has been severely downgraded and their single narrative has been attacked and rendered less powerful. Much of the Islamist struggle is now in specific countries and among distinct groups. The Al Qaeda single narrative is being crowded out by others from affiliate groups such as Al Shabab, which is based in Somalia. Small terrorist groups are acting autonomously, with loose inspiration from the Al Qaeda brand. In regions where there is intra-Islamic conflict, like between Shia and Sunni, a more intricate understanding is needed of the nature of the conflict. On a similar front, the tensions that gave rise to the Arab Spring will take a long time to resolve and have the potential to continue to cause problems. A consequence of these trends is that we will need a much more nuanced understanding of motivators and drivers of these groups and our responses will need to be tailored to different regions.

Although the specificity and distinctiveness of threats facing each member country of the Five Eyes are varied, all face similar plaguing issues of terrorism and its corresponding longevity, the reactive nature to threats, evolving and adapting capabilities by terrorists, the challenges surrounding our respective criminal justice systems, and global communications. The *United Kingdom* (UK) faces threats from actors across the globe because of the nation's multi-cultural population and its colonial past. The threats to the UK are not going away and the Irish troubles of the past have returned with attacks, especially against police officers, on the rise. Future threats to the UK are expected to continue to come from Pakistan, Yemen, and East Africa, although there have been significant reductions in the presence of terror groups. Al Shabab in Somalia is not a current threat but it is not a big leap to think they could try something in the UK. There is a continuing threat from Al Qaeda affiliates, prison radicalization, lone wolves, and Irish-related conflicts. Also, a number of convicted terrorists are scheduled to be released from prison in the near future and while their threat is unknown, they are still terrorists with terrorist ideals. Looking ahead to the 2012 Summer Olympics, it will be remembered for a great sporting event, and everything has been done to make it safe.



However, it will always be difficult to prevent a lone wolf attack, so some sense of reality needs to be maintained to understand that not everything is preventable. ✓

Australia is currently at a medium threat level largely due to being named as a specific Al Qaeda target and because of identified terrorist preparations in the country. However, there are no immediate "threats-to-life" investigations. While there is concern for Australians traveling to terrorist training camps in places like Syria, the focus is predominantly on Sunni threats and Shia groups with ties to Iran. Other concerns are related to the sizable Lebanese community due to the known previous links of Hezbollah to Australia. There has also been a resurgence of national extremist (e.g., racist, hate) groups developing access to weapons and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). In the future, there may be an increased threat from Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET) as it disbands and some members make their way to Australia. Also, trials against terrorists have required the disclosure of security procedures which makes it difficult to protect sensitive law enforcement and intelligence capabilities.

New Zealand has a low threat for terrorism – a very low threat for a lonewolf attack, and negligible threat for an international terrorist attack. There are no known terrorist groups operating in New Zealand and the country has not been singled out as a prime target. The threat is higher from a lonewolf attacker than from a defined organization. Trials of lonewolf terror suspects are publicly revealing sensitive methods which may help potential attackers evade detection. Cyberattacks are another challenge that will require a shift in emphasis and resources. For *Canada*, Hezbollah is a priority based on information from the Persian community that indicates activity with links back to Venezuela. There are six separate teams within the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) to address their main threats and help ensure quick action: (1) terrorist financing; (2) Islamist extremism; (3) Hezbollah; (4) domestic terrorism, which includes Earth Liberation Front and Animal Liberation Front; (5) border services, which has tremendous access to inbound and outbound flight sources, and (6) community outreach.

The ever-changing nature of the threats has made it hard to get ahead of the game, but updates to the justice system (e.g., laws, government infrastructure, prisons) and law enforcement operations are being enacted to find the best way to address the evolution of the threat. The primary *UK* government counterterrorism strategy, CONTEST, with its main tenets of Prevent, Pursue, Protect, and Prepare has recently been updated to address the continuing evolution. *Canada's* primary counterterrorism strategy is similar to the *UK* strategy, but the main tenets include Prevent, Detect, Deny, and Respond. Prevent focuses on the motivations of criminal actors. Detect concentrates on identifying terrorists, their organizations and supporters. Deny identifies how law enforcement can deny the opportunity to commit the crime, and Respond addresses the response to and recovery from an attack. Between the rewriting of the Federal Emergency Response Plan and the Building Resilience Against Terrorism: *Canada's* Counter-Terrorism Strategy in 2011, all of the counterterrorism agencies are getting better at working together. The Canadian system also emphasizes following the evidence, with a timely speed and flow of investigation being paramount. On the more innovative side, the Counter



Terrorism Information Officer (CTIO) initiative expands the eyes and ears of the police. Over eighty agencies have been trained on how to identify suspicious incidents. Private sector partnerships and community engagement have also been crucial. Junior police academies and interfaith outreach has brought significant success and a lot of feedback from vulnerable communities.

Australia has determined that it needs to be more efficient and place resources where priority demands them. The Control Center in the Australian Security Intelligence Organization sets priorities and makes sure information is properly shared across the intelligence communities. To help focus efforts, there is a need to determine which groups have real intent and which are just about rhetoric. At this time, even among groups with weapons caches, they do not yet seem to have the intent. Small groups organized around one charismatic leader can also be an early sign of the formation of another group. *Australia* is also trying to improve the efficiency for sharing information and is planning ahead for how to respond to emerging threats and for being able to address other priorities like human smuggling. Planned improvements include co-locating all counterterror resources, which includes bringing law enforcement into major national offices for evidentiary purposes and to be more coordinated. Additionally, the level of tradecraft for analysis and investigations will be standardize, new legislation will make sure sensitive capabilities are only disclosed to the presiding judge, human source coverage will be broadened, and community contacts will help conduct targeted deradicalization to improve on current successes. *Australia* has had some deradicalization success by working with family members of suspected radicals.

To find future solutions the level of the debate needs to be raised beyond financial challenges. However, it is difficult to move past this issue when there has not been a recent attack to provoke action, especially when serious and organized crime is still a problem. Continually advancing global communications technologies present strong opportunities for improving counterterrorism strategies. With new communications technologies continually coming out, it is important to work with the private sector to understand what is becoming available and how they can be used. The messaging side of communications also needs to be considered. It is important to develop a plan to prevent global "blowback" after an international incident that could have an impact on communities in your country or region. Consider what message will help convince local actors that they do not need to take retribution for an event that takes place in another part of the globe, in spite of affects this may have on their local community.

Australia its
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HYDRA – 10,000 VOLTS

Day 1, Panel 1 – Current Threats, Issues and Responses: A “Five Eyes” Review

Is there a perception that we talk about information sharing but don't actually do it? If that is the case, what are the tensions? - If we do, where does it work particularly well?

- We have gone through the era's of right to know need to know responsibility to share - this is both passive and politically correct "lingo" - we are either authentic partners or we are not.
- I think that is absolutely correct which is why we need the informal network. Perceived national interests get in the way of effective penetration of our enemies networks
- In times of austerity information sharing is the only way to ensure buy in from key partners.
- There is a definite tension between Federal and Local officials due to caveats and a belief (mistaken) that the local authorities may not protect the information in such a manner as to protect "the source" or "the collector" at the Federal level. Conferences such as this one increase the trust factor as in the Intelligence World it is mostly about the personal relationship rather than formal processes.
- The irony of information sharing is that there does exist a lack of transparency. While sharing exists, it is often not disseminated in a timely and appropriate manner which facilitates the response from those actually getting the work done.
- There is still a disconnect between the needs of the intelligence world and those of the evidentiary world. In the worst cases in the UK experience this manifests itself in collapsed criminal trials and Public Inquiries. Clearly there is a need to protect covert methodology but this needs to be balanced against the evidentiary requirements within the current legal environment.



Day 1, Panel 2 – The New Landscape: Adapting to an Ever-Changing Threat

Learning Objective: This panel will address the Arab Spring and the ever-changing CT landscape. The panel will also focus on the impact of the death of key players in Al Qaeda and other groups on the threat and the response.

- Moderator, **Clark Kimerer**, Chief of Staff, Seattle Police Department
- **Philip Mudd**, President, Mudd Management (Retired FBI National Security Branch)
- **Mitchell Silber**, Director of Intelligence Analysis, New York City Police Department

Meeting the Challenge: New Landscape – Adapting to an Ever-Changing Threat



Building Partnerships: Formalize horizontal information sharing partnerships to gain better awareness of trends and information needs.



Countering the Violent Extremist: Refer to terrorism as crime and terrorists as murderers and criminals to lessen the appeal for youth at risk of radicalization.



Criminalizing Terrorism: Identify the criminal elements leading up to a terrorist attack plot to interrupt the planning cycle.

The counterterrorism landscape has changed dramatically with the events of the Arab Spring combined with the deaths of several key inspirational terrorist group leaders. As a result, the terrorist narrative, namely that from Al Qaeda, is no longer single-minded. The Arab Spring has awakened civic consciousness in Tunisia, Yemen, Syria, Bahrain, Kuwait, Morocco, and elsewhere, with different versions of civic, political, and labor revolutions taking place. Countries involved in the Arab Spring may find that their newfound civic aspirations will conflict with the ideologies of terrorist groups with interests in the region. This may result in a new wave of terrorism. It is imperative to understand that major terrorist players, waiting to exploit opportunities, still exist in this new and emerging environment.

Wide sweeping change began for terrorist organizations after 9/11, when Al Qaeda lost its sanctuary in Afghanistan. From this part of the world they had been able to successfully plan, train, and equip members for many years. Another shift occurred when groups not linked operationally to core Al-Qaeda carried out attacks – as in the Madrid train bombings. There has also been an increase in citizens of Western countries traveling to the Middle East, only to return home radicalized and ready to carry out an attack in the name of the cause. Radicalization has also been on the rise in prisons around the world. Affiliates of Al Qaeda have also started plotting and executing attacks in Western countries rather than in their own countries against Western targets. One example was the January 2008 arrests of Pakistani

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Taliban in Barcelona who were plotting to carry out suicide attacks in Spain. In this case, these individuals were inspired by the Al Qaeda ideology but planning the attacks on their own. This massive shift might have occurred in part because of the failure of a revolution on the part of Al Qaeda, which underestimated the global response to its attacks. The failure has also been attributed to loss of support due to the mass casualties inflicted on Muslims around the world rather than on non-Muslims who are largely the intended victims. Additionally, Al Qaeda leadership has been taken out so quickly that the organization has not been able to recover fast enough. Despite these failures, the threat of well-trained and highly motivated individuals and the remnants of core Al Qaeda have in no way disappeared and these individuals are still very capable of training others, planning, and executing attacks, even on a large scale.

With the death of Osama bin Laden and the successful attacks against core Al Qaeda and its leaders, the spotlight is now being directed toward stateless, ungoverned places where radical ideologies can breed and flourish and potential terrorists can find sanctuary. We need to continue to look systematically at global events and consider the impact they will have on local diaspora communities in our own countries. When identifying a counterterrorism strategy it helps to understand that the terrorist groups are prepared to take hundreds of years to achieve their objectives so we must also have a long-term view. Realizing the threat is decentralized helps practitioners shape a corresponding decentralized organizational structure. The cornerstone of this decentralized counterterrorism force needs to be local police forces that have the street intelligence and are in a position to recognize the myriad crimes that are preludes to terrorism. Partners at all levels must be ready to collect and share information and to provide the proper resources to protect our cities. With a horizontal network among major cities, partners would have the ability to share information on the trends seen in their jurisdictions. A National Criminal Intelligence Enterprise is being formally established in the US to address the need for a horizontal information sharing structure. It will help connect information between cities and help create a path for two-way information sharing between local and federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies. The complete information sharing will help inform threat domain identification and collection plans at all levels.

Law enforcement also has the opportunity to continue to improve operations by identifying metrics for intelligence performance, gaining direct human source access to each terrorist group, and standardizing information collection. To standardize information collection, sets of very specific questions need to be scripted to address typical situations faced by law enforcement officers so trends can be identified across time and geography. This will also improve law enforcement's ability to be more predictive and systematic in analysis. In the US, the IACP and the MCC can help provide guidance on areas of concern to their regions.

Beyond organizational strategy, an approach that treats terrorism as a crime needs to be adopted for a variety of reasons. Terrorism has become an idealistic pursuit for some young immigrant populations in Western countries. The more terrorism is mentioned in policy and the media the more weight is given to its impact. Additionally, terrorism is a crime and usually involves a series of crimes to execute the attack. From an operational perspective, law



enforcement can integrate counterterrorism into its existing policing strategies to optimize resources and have a more complete understanding of the threat picture. Treating terrorism as a crime also recognizes the relatively low casualty rates from terrorism compared to traditional crime which may help lessen some of the larger emotional impact than if they are continued to be referred to as attacks. Consider the situation of Northern Nigerian immigrants as an example. Immigrant youth may consider terrorists as revolutionaries and feel that by joining their cause they have become revolutionaries themselves. That has a lot more appeal to youth at risk for radicalization than if they thought the terrorists were just crooks. When law enforcement reaches out to these youths they should not talk to them about terrorism and who they idealize and why. Rather, ask them what they think about the message because they will not be able to respond since they have no idea of the theological underpinnings. Finally, terrorism, like organized crime, is based on hierarchies so some of the same strategies could apply.





Day 1, Panel 3 – Countering Radicalization and Violent Extremism: International Views on an Ever-Changing Problem

Learning Objective: This panel will look at community issues, partnership building and emerging trends in working with at-risk communities. The panel will also address the developing threat that stems from the incarceration of a significant number of terrorists over the past ten years.

- Moderator – **Paul Vrbanac**, Director General, Toronto Region, Canada Security Intelligence Service
- **Peter Neumann**, Professor of Security Studies, Department of War Studies, King’s College, London
- **Steve Lancaster**, Assistant Commissioner, Australian Federal Police
- **Mark Collins**, Detective Chief Superintendent, Deputy National Coordinator PREVENT

Meeting the Challenge: Countering Radicalization and Violent Extremism: International Views on an Ever-Changing Problem



Building Partnerships: Use joint role-playing exercises with law enforcement and communities to understand roles and perspectives.



Countering the Violent Extremist: Provide standardized training to prison staff and religious leaders to prevent criminals from extremist messaging.



Criminalizing Terrorism: Identify associated criminal activity of extremist website managers to disrupt extremist messaging online.

This panel included discussion of topics including community issues, partnership building, outreach to at-risk communities, and issues arising from the protracted incarceration of terrorists. Several questions were posed that help provide context around these issues such as: How do we engage with communities that do not trust us? Are we criminalizing young people in our societies? Can findings from research on this topic be applied to our own jurisdictions? And lastly, what do those individuals, who have influence in the prison and corrective services, need to hear from this conference? From this discussion three objectives came forth. The first was to respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat we face from those who promote it. Next, prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure that they are given appropriate advice and support. And finally, work with the different sectors and institutions to foster deradicalization efforts.



An important topic is the developing threat that comes from the incarceration of terrorists. When we think about the legacy of the war on terror, it is easy to forget that the most visible legacy is the people still serving time in prison. The following points shed light on issues concerning the actual prison environment:

- *What kind of prison regime should we have for terrorists?* Terrorists are not ordinary criminals and will often use their time to mobilize and radicalize other prisoners. Terrorists should be separated from the larger prison population to prevent the infection of any radical ideology or behavior. Having the majority of terrorists in one general location creates a focal point and these individuals might use the prison environment to recreate or develop battlefield command structures. To that end, it is rarely a good idea to keep leaders and followers in the same proximity, particularly in the context of lone wolves where a single person is now connected to the main party of the organization.
- *How do we prevent prisons from becoming incubators for radicalization?* Prisons are places where overcrowded populations of angry disaffected people co-exist, all of them searching for meaning, vulnerable to powerful messages and struggling to ensure their individual security. Prisons may not even realize radicalization is taking place until they start to examine activities more closely. Solutions that were provided to mitigate against these conditions include the following: (1) Treating inmates with respect and dignity, bearing in mind that the prison is used as a theatre of propaganda for every instance of abuse; (2) Overcrowding and understaffing need to be avoided and adequate training must be provided to staff so that they can properly recognize the indicators of radicalization versus someone with a legitimate display of faith and to help prevent corruption; (3) Providing mainstream religious services with religious leaders - trained and evaluated against an established standard - to fill the vacuum so that extremist ideologies never have the chance to flourish, and (4) Planning aftercare that establishes webs of commitment, through family connections or mentoring, where inmates ultimately have something to lose if they return to terrorism.
- *How can we prevent individuals from becoming terrorists after they are released?* Not every prisoner will have the same experience and thus there is no one solution in terms of aftercare. In the case of the hard-minded ideologues, there is little that can be done in terms of reformation. In the case of the drifter and hanger-on types, who are by and large looking to fit in, there may be good opportunities for deradicalization. These opportunities for reform should not be missed especially as individuals are transitioning back into society. By giving people a sense of perspective or a system of support, through family reconciliation or other mentoring activities, the hope is that the individual will think twice before letting someone down. This is especially true concerning youth mentoring, as this age group can be very impressionable.

Followers

Another issue relevant to this panel is Internet radicalization and the profound impact that one single individual can have while radicalizing from the comfort of his or her own home. The Internet exists as a physical place for many, much like a mosque, and in the eyes and imagination of an extremist, they are not acting alone. To more effectively counter this threat, better monitoring and a corresponding punitive component are needed for associated criminal



activity. The managers of the websites in question need to be dealt with, which could ultimately eliminate or decrease their ability to continue to recreate these sites even after the sites have been taken down. The UK has a Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit (CTIRU) to reduce Internet radicalization by providing a place for suspicious Internet activity to be reported.

To this end, developing a counter narrative is one of the most important steps. With programs such as those in UK's Prevent Strategy, law enforcement can respond with a counter narrative. The second and most recent version of UK's Prevent Strategy has gone beyond the youth leagues used as a strategy in the first version and is about harder edge case management. It is still community based but it is all about proactive engagement and gaining a better understanding of emerging and under-represented communities. The disorganized nature of most of the newer radical cells means poor operations security and a greater opportunity to identify and deradicalize members. Whether an individual is part of a radical cell or a lone actor, they are difficult to detect, seldom belong to established international network, are more likely to suffer from some psychological disturbance, may have a history of family or social problems, and often are unknown to security services prior to their acts of terrorism. If local law enforcement does not identify these individuals, then the community is the remaining safety check. By engaging with the community to develop a partnership and improve their awareness of radicalization, the hope is information sharing with law enforcement will increase. Some additional programs and efforts addressed by panelists are discussed below:

- **Community Mapping** - In some countries community mapping is making it easier for law enforcement to understand the makeup of a community, such that they are able to direct resources in a more effective way while at the same time encouraging and empowering these communities.
- **Community Exercises** - In these exercises, law enforcement and communities swap roles and make decisions during the exercise scenario in their newly assumed positions. Operation Nicole in the UK is one example of an exercise that helped to improve understanding between communities and law enforcement.
- **Grassroots Organization Partnerships** - Working closely with organizations like community media outlets, university student groups, and women's groups can help with engagement and give law enforcement the opportunity to shape messages in the community. Some areas have given small grants to help these organizations.
- **Government Community Resources** - Bringing together other government agencies that are usually commissioned to provide support to the vulnerable has been helpful. When individuals are identified to be at risk, they can be directed toward mainstream interventions (e.g., health, housing, education) or specialized support (e.g., mentoring, theological). The Channel Program in the UK uses a number of intervention tools to support people at risk for radicalization.
- **Road Shows** - Visit cities with a team of outreach and support resources to do field interviews with the community about the perception of engagement strategies.



To conclude, it is well known that a general sense of apathy can set in after a significant lapse in time since a large-scale attack or event. Inevitably law enforcement and those charged with countering radicalization and violent extremism aim to attack the symptoms that might lead a person to radicalization. Since prosecution alone cannot be a strategy, the key is to prevent these symptoms from taking root. The youth demographic needs increased attention in the fight against radicalization because the Internet and various media outlets can play such a significant role in their lives. To target this demographic, outreach and engagement needs to occur at a much earlier stage if the goal is to dissuade a young person from going down this path. This type of strategy can initially be viewed as superficial, in some instances, but these types of efforts serve to ensure a basic level of trust and understanding. Ultimately, more direct conversations can take place and a deeper level of understanding can be achieved so suspicious activity will have an increased likelihood of being reported to law enforcement.

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HYDRA – 10,000 VOLTS

**Day 1, Panel 3 – Countering Radicalization and Violent Extremism:
International Views on an Ever-Changing Problem**

How do we engage with communities that do not trust us?

- LE spends far too much effort on the ones that are gone. Efforts must be spent on the counter narrative to reach people that are skeptical or otherwise on the fence. There are members of the community that are supportive but lack the information or evidence to use as leverage against the more radical.
- In the engagement strategy there is a need to create a true understanding of each other's intentions, responsibilities and practices. The community in question needs to be given the opportunity to learn why we as the 'government authority' need to do certain things and most importantly why we have to do those things. For example, there needs to be a strong effort on our behalf to explain the legal framework in which we exist and work, and a layman's explanation of those legal issues, like police powers, the reason for those powers, the limitations under which we can use them, with an emphasis on our efforts to use them appropriately.
- If we offer support in areas which are not typically associated with LE or IC then we can establish relationships and trust which may be seen by members of the identified community as a possible vehicle to pass on information relative to bad actors in their community which will bring embarrassment, discredit, or a negative view of all of their members. If we don't fill some of their needs and establish relationships then others entities will and leverage the same level of trust then exploit it in support of their agenda.
- We need to work with those who have been radicalised or convicted of terrorism related offences and who have matured and changed their perspective from one of violence to being nonviolent. This can involve significant risk as governments do not want to be seen working with convicted terrorists. However we do need to move into this space. These convicted but reformed individuals provide credibility to disaffected youths which traditional community leaders or imams do not have.



Day 2, Panel 1 – The Role of Private Industry: Protecting High Value Targets

Learning Objective: The panel will address the issue of the protection of high value targets from the viewpoint of the commercial enterprise itself and the need to continue to foster engagement between governments and industry.

- Moderator – **Brian MacDonald**, Acting Deputy Chief, Transit Police, Lower Mainland British Columbia
- **Alan Orlob**, Senior VP, Global Safety and Security, Marriott International
- **John McDonald**, Director of NOC, 24/7 Watch Desk, United Airlines Corporate Security
- **Paul Crowther**, Deputy Chief Constable, British Transit Police

Meeting the Challenge: The Role of Private Industry: Protecting High Value Targets



Building Partnerships: Foster public/private partnerships to improve security.



Ensuring Global Information Exchange: Improve information sharing with governments in high-risk countries.



Optimizing Limited Resources: Use partnerships and a risk-based approach to pool resources and identify priorities.

While the majority of critical infrastructure is held by private industry, they are not active collectors of intelligence. They rely on information and intelligence collected by the government. However, they play a key role in ensuring the security of the facilities and the people they are serving. Three industries in particular – airlines, hotels, and mass transit - have been the target of an increasing number of attacks. There are indicators that will not change and the rate of attacks may actually be increasing. Public transit may be a public or public/private enterprise in some locations, but since it is often patrolled by separate law enforcement operations and has more of a revenue interest it is similar to a private enterprise.

Each of these industries has a slightly different reason for being an attractive target for terrorists. Hotels hold an allure because they can be iconic targets, symbols of depravity, a host to a specific high-value occupant, difficult to protect, and a way to create an economic impact through an attack. Airlines and mass transit are desirable targets as well because they have the potential to exact a high mortality level and create a widespread economic and psychological impact.

Security has become even more difficult for hotels and airlines now that they are serving places where risk and security needs are high. Airlines have found it very important to develop relationships with the governments in the foreign host countries. However, it can be



challenging to get these countries to share security information, and often companies have to take duplicative efforts (i.e., rescreening of baggage) to have the security and information needed. In the case of the airlines, many of the security measures they take are regulated by governments. The law enforcement community should be recognized for the support they provide and the lengths to which they go to ensure safety. To underscore this point, airlines have seen an increase in subpoena requests from law enforcement for access to information about passengers and to be able to talk to crews.

Equally as important, are partnerships developed with other commercial operations in the same sector and location. Hotels in the same market can benefit from working together to address security and as a group. The private sector has noticed a definite return on their security investments because of these partnerships. Businesses will not flourish or enter the industry if there is not strong security. People simply will not stay at a hotel or travel on airlines or mass transit if they can not be guaranteed strong security. Demonstrated strong security in high-risk areas is a proven method to ensure business development.

In general, private industry is moving to a risk-based model of security, which is especially important as they are tasked with focusing limited resources. However, when taking a risk-based approach, the advantage is always on the side of the perpetrator of an attack, especially in a free society. When managing risk, pragmatism, proportionality, and perception can be the guiding principles. Pragmatism moderates any propensity to overreact to events and reduces the likelihood that early signs or symptoms of emerging threats will be overlooked. For proportionality, any security that is seen as disproportionate will potentially clash with CRCL, harm law enforcement credibility, and undermine trust. However, there is the potential on the other side of proportionality that the community will perceive that individual lives are being taken for granted if not enough is being done. As an example, the shift in public opinion led to British police losing the power to stop and search individuals. ✓

The public should have a realistic expectation of the level of security that can be obtained. While it is impossible to protect against all scenarios, risk can be mitigated. The level of security also needs to be balanced with the needs of a free and commercial society. To help maintain the balance between security and freedom and improve understanding of the costs of each, build a sense of joint endeavor among individuals and commercial enterprises in the community.

The unpredictable nature of the terrorist threat creates an environment where there is a rush to implement security measures, regardless of what is effective, so something is being done. However, the community and commercial enterprise can then lose faith in law enforcement when waste or overreaching powers are perceived. One example of the evolution of the threat is that while many high-profile attacks on hotels in the past may have used explosives as the means of attack, recent raids have uncovered stockpiles of ammunition rather than explosives. This may indicate that an active shooter scenario, like in the case of Mumbai, may be more likely. One reason for this evolution might be that the the number of casualties from an active shooter attack can be high.



A high-level security effort might include the following elements:

1. Implement a system for risk analysis to understand the threat and implement preventative measures to defeat/mitigate an attack.
2. Screen employees for criminal history, but realize it is hard to screen for ideology so maintain awareness of signs of radicalization.
3. Promote security awareness among employees.
4. Train first responders to triage.
5. Conduct joint training exercises with authorities and share current plans.
6. Carefully consider evacuation scenarios and only execute when there is imminent danger and only if there is a cleared area to receive evacuees.
7. Install window film as a proven method for saving lives.
8. Keep initial crisis meetings brief and confined to immediate needs and have a plan to access lists of guests and employees.
9. Consider how to deal with media – become a “myth buster,” by telling your version of the story.
10. Ensure that relationships with authorities are developed in advance.
11. Make counseling available for associates of the organization.
12. Conduct an after action review.

Referenced Resources

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HYDRA – 10,000 VOLTS

Day 2, Panel 1 - The Role of Private Industry: Protecting High Value Targets

Perceptions are seen as facts - What perceptions need to be addressed?

- Community perception regarding the rise in crime. Though that is not the case, the fact is that they perceive that and it is just as important that we address that perception, as it is that we address any real increase in crime.
- There is a continuing perception that confidential information cannot be shared downward from the federal level to local law enforcement and private industry, despite the fact that there are many individuals in both of these entities that currently hold or have held clearances.
- The perception that all government entities are completely ineffective. Government approval and confidence in the government are at historically low levels. But everyone here knows that there are many agencies, especially in public safety, law enforcement and national security that are very effective. These agencies need to take a note from the private sector and learn to market themselves as successful and effective organizations. A good example is what Nike did. In the 90s they came very close to bankruptcy due to their role in sweat shop scandals. Along with changing the bad practices that got them into the situation they made an enormous investment in re-imaging and re-branding. It worked and they are once again a titan. We could learn a lot from them.



Day 2, Panel 2 – Public-Private Partnerships

Learning Objective: This session will highlight how we can work with private industry and communities. The panel will address how Operation Intersect has been used as a tri-government framework for information sharing and decision making. The panel will build on the Operation Intersect concept from its use in the Vancouver Olympics and Critical Infrastructure Protection to the assessment of its application in the UK. The Private Industry perspective will be explored through a case study on how critical infrastructure protection was handled between private industry and public safety for the Salt Lake Olympics prior to and shortly after 9/11.

- Moderator: **Peter Dein**, Assistant Commander, Counter Terrorism and Special Tactics, New South Wales Police Force
- **Charles Bordeleau**, Chief, Ottawa Police Service
- **Robert Bartlett**, Manager of Command, UK Government Organizing Committee, 2012 Olympics
- **TJ Kennedy**, Director of Public Safety and Security, Raytheon

Meeting the Challenge: Public-Private Partnerships



Building Partnerships: Develop a model that can be inclusive of many organizations.



Optimizing Limited Resources: Prioritize use of resources through access to more data that will better inform resource allocation decisions.



Balancing Need to Know and Need to Protect: Find ways to share information even when there is sensitive information to protect.

The role of law enforcement in the regional counterterrorism business is to bring together the broad range of groups in the public and private sector and ensure that they are working on countering terrorism as partners. An inclusive, rather than exclusive approach should be taken to involve the correct and necessary partners. The focus among the partners should be on the need to share, rather than the need to know.

Operation Intersect is a good example of an established public-private partnership model developed in Ottawa, Canada, that is now being adopted in other locations including Vancouver and in London for the 2012 Summer Olympics. This multi-jurisdictional initiative aims to better organize and optimize existing resources. The emphasis is on integrated governance, joint planning, and collaborative training with the basic understanding that strong information sharing will increase readiness. The experience gathered from responses to past disasters has



demonstrated that a collaborative approach is needed. There is a need to leverage the strength of the entire region to amplify successful results.

Operation Intersect is a by-product of a LinCT 2004 action paper, which discussed a collaborative approach that was later endorsed by the Ottawa National Capital Region. Intersect was launched in 2008 with nearly thirty participating agencies. A governance body meets monthly and is supported by four working groups: Media, Planning, Communications/Training, and Private Sector. The mandate of the group is to increase emergency management awareness, motivate community partners to take ownership, maximize cooperation, and leverage existing partnerships. Using a threat dashboard framework, all hazards are compared against a standardized threat level to help guide appropriate operational preparations and responses among the stakeholders. As threats increase in frequency and complexity so too does the pre-planned standardized response. This program has been integral to bringing the eighty-five percent of critical infrastructure that is privately owned into the fold of a comprehensive effort. The resiliency of the region could not grow without this successful working relationship.





Five principles for integrating the public and private sector were presented:

1. **Intersect/Intelligence Approach** – This addresses how to integrate key stakeholders into one group to improve response and planning. Every level of government and industry should be represented. Developing a decision tree could help guide how the group works together.
2. **Critical Infrastructure Assurance** – The biggest takeaway from the Intersect program has been that partnerships are the only way to guarantee access to enough information in order to fully understand what needs to be protected and when. The information can be used to assign levels of criticality to infrastructure to be able to prioritize the use of limited resources (i.e., fuel to airports) or to be able to identify previously unknown needs and deliver support (i.e., air conditioning to data centers). This can also enable more advanced efforts like sending email or text communications to sectors affected by a threat or disaster.
3. **Information Architecture** – Identifying the decisions that need to be made can be a very complex effort. Most decisions will need to be made at the venue level, so it is important to give them the information they need to make the best decisions. An information structure can help provide the information and prioritize the decisions to be made.
4. **Information Assurance** – Exchanging information is key to building partnerships, but people will not share if there is not an established trust. Technology can be an enabler of a trusting information exchange partnership if it is reliable. However, the key is to supplement the technology only after a problem has been defined.
5. **Communications, Culture, Education, RT&E** – This category encompasses many components. Organizations need to identify how leadership will send messages internally and externally. Academia inform practical solutions through research. This is also an area where innovation can take place – investment in “designing out terrorism” by engaging with key professions, vocations, and academia. An example of this is



buildings designed to be a less attractive or a less accessible terrorist target, which can often be cheaper than having to retrofit a building to enhance security.

Finally, one of the many challenges in developing an enduring public-private partnership is identifying the benefit provided to the private sector. Each partner expects the other to provide information, but a two-way exchange of information is really what should be expected. While law enforcement may anticipate that the private sector partner will provide information to better inform critical infrastructure operations, they also need to think of a tangible element that they can return to the private sector. This extra element might include aerial photographs of a venue to document its footprint and appearance or cataloging emergency contacts of employees - all the while making sure that information is protected by working with other appropriate legal agencies.





Day 2, Panel 3 – Meeting the Needs of Victims

Learning Objective: Conference participants will be exposed to strategies and lessons learned in relation to the needs of victims and victims' families. The panel will address: a) 9/11 and the immediate aftermath of a terrorist incident to ten years later, and the evolution of change and the voices of 9/11; and b) the police response to terrorism, meeting the needs of victims and families of the London Bombing, a survivor's perspective.

- Moderator – **Sue O'Sullivan**, Retired Deputy Chief, Ottawa Police Service, Federal Ombudsman for victims of crime, Canada
- **David Gardner**, 7/7 Survivor, United Kingdom
- **Mary Fetchet**, Founding Director of Voices of September 11th
- **Pete Sparks**, Detective Inspector, Counter Terrorism Command, Metropolitan Police, United Kingdom

Meeting the Challenge: Meeting the Needs of Victims



Building Partnerships: Institute the use of family liaison officers to provide immediate and continuing support that builds personal and community resiliency.



Balancing Need to Know and Need to Protect: Plan in advance for how to share sensitive information with victims and families in a timely fashion.

The panel convened to present three very different and poignant perspectives on meeting the needs of victims and victims' families in the aftermath of a crisis situation or attack. Throughout the panel discussion, the underlying message was that through communication and support, survivors, victims, and all of those affected by an incident must have their evolving needs met. The audience was asked to consider what matters most when victims are put at the center of the thinking process and how existing plans might already address their needs. In addition to those directly affected by an incident, victims include the bereaved families, survivors and their families, witnesses, first responders, forensic body recovery teams, and investigators. Through the dedicated efforts of organizations such as Voices of 9/11, support is given to communities throughout the world affected by terrorism or other heinous attacks. The stark reality of the global reach of a large-scale attack like 9/11 is seen in the fact that citizens of ninety-five countries around the world were lost in that single attack. After many years of reflection since the 9/11 attacks, the London bombings, and other large-scale attacks, the consequences of terrorism are clearly evident. Families have been weakened and broken in some cases. Yet despite the devastation these attacks have rendered, they have also



brought transformation and positive outcomes to people around the world through the establishment of foundations, communities, friendships, and government reform. Through these positive outcomes there has been advocacy for commemorative events, victims' compensation funds, and memorials at Ground Zero and other sites. Advocacy for the identification of remains and the notification of belongings is critical. As each year passes the DNA process becomes more and more sophisticated. In the case of the Coroner's office in New York this means a more rapid identification of remains for the more than twelve hundred families who are still, over a decade later, without remains of their loved ones.

Over the past decade, the police response to global terrorism has also evolved. With the role of the Family Liaison Officer (FLO) many of the issues that arise with survivors of attacks are now being handled. FLOs act as investigators gathering identification material, evidence, and information from the victims' families. In the aftermath of an attack they complete victim identification forms, take relevant witness statements, and retrieve property. In essence they serve as a conduit for the families and the senior investigative officer, and they attempt to do so in a sensitive manner.

The lessons that have been learned over the past several decades are multi-faceted and they stem not only from victims who have survived an attack but also from the families of those whose lives have been lost. Some of the issues that have arisen from the families' perspective are the following:

- Number of days that pass before a FLO is appointed can seem excessive
- Hotlines unable to assist in telling a family member about the well-being of their loved one.
- Speed and conduct of post mortems, intrusive autopsies, or lack of autopsies performed
- Cause of death of one's loved one may not have been determined
- Delay in removing the body from the scene
- Length of time to identify the deceased
- General condition and return of personal property
- Families want to know all details and want to be kept updated on any development
- In the aftermath of the London bombings, a well-intentioned family briefing day was provided and could have been potentially helpful. As feelings were still very raw, it broke down into angry exchanges.

With the establishment of departments such as the Central Casualty Bureau (CCB), other issues pertaining to the needs of victims can be addressed. Through the careful review and analysis of lessons learned from past attacks, CCB and other such facilities are open four hours after an incident, which allows for staff to be mobilized. The bureau also provides for a missing person reporting line but does not constitute a hotline - an important discrepancy. FLOs are deployed from the CCB, and in an effort to maintain neutrality, staff of the CCB is never informed of the identity of those found at the scene of an attack.



Other lessons learned revolve around the continuity of care for all individuals, whatever their proximity to the attack might be. Information and support services are now available for an individual who may not necessarily need mental health service but is simply seeking answers to their questions. Provisions have been made to connect family members of victims with one another to better cope with the lifelong challenges that they face. There is now a better understanding that bereavement, in all of its many forms, is a lifelong process and allowing a person to tell their story is a critical part of the healing process. This process can be very emotional and challenging.

To that end, the audience was honored to hear a compelling story of one survivor of the London bombings and how he was touched by the work of a FLO who forever changed and positively influenced his life and that of his family. The liaison officers provided unyielding assistance when needed, and from a respectful distance allowing the family and the survivor the space they needed to come to terms with the events that had transpired. The police officers and other law enforcement officials also acted with the utmost professionalism as they provided the necessary phone numbers and a listening ear. In this instance, the survivor was given the opportunity to view the bombed out subway carriage, which proved to be cathartic. Uninjured witnesses of an attack might even be more traumatized by the event than those with injuries. ✓

Through partnerships, technology, and the general awareness of the needs of victims and their families, outreach and support can be expanded and no one will be forgotten. In essence, after having heard from the panelists, audience members were asked to consider how to ensure that victims and survivors are central to their planning.





HYDRA – 10,000 VOLTS

Day 2, Panel 3 – Meeting the Needs of Victims

Having heard the panel - what matters when you put victims and their communities into the center of your thinking? What plans do you have in place?

- Putting victims and the community into the center of your thinking is absolutely vital. Doing so in advance of the next tragedy will ensure that victims, the community and public safety will work as an integrated team.... I have learned much from the presenters today and will incorporate much of this learning into my agencies response. Thank you!
- The most important thing is a connection with the community. We use a District Policing model that gives us direct contact to many stakeholders in the community and the opportunity to exchange information with them on a regular basis, as well as through social media such as Twitter and Nixle.
- Having a family liaison as part of the investigative process provides an instrumental channel of intelligence regarding victims, which would be otherwise unavailable, and simultaneously adds a direct information resource to the bereaved.
- It is very important that the Police keeps victims' families updated on the status of the investigations of their loved ones death. It is important that the Police Department provide victim services to assist with the healing process and to direct them in what to expect in the court process leading up to court and trials. Invite the families to share their concerns with other survivor families as a support network. Finally utilize these victims as volunteers to assist your department with other victims of violent crime as contacts and liaisons with your department's victim services program.



Day 3, Panel 1 – The Impact of Technology: A Help or Hindrance in Countering Terrorism

Learning Objective: The panel will address the impact of emerging technologies on the way that we counter the threat. Participants will be exposed to the complexities involved in the integration of systems, programs and human expertise required to support CT operations. Privacy requirements and issues will also be addressed.

- Moderator – **Charles Lawson**, Director General, Ottawa Region, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
- **H. Bryan Cunningham**, Senior Counsel, Palantir Corporation
- **Michael Dougherty**, Director of Law Enforcement Solutions, Raytheon Homeland Security, Raytheon Company
- **Wes Rhodes**, Deputy Chief, Technology Officer, Federal CTO Strategy and Technology, IBM

Meeting the Challenge: The Impact of Technology: A Help or Hindrance



Building Partnerships: Work with technology vendors to challenge them to develop solutions that uphold our existing privacy boundaries.



Countering the Violent Extremist: Adopt technologies with a potential to identify online users before they transition from a passive to active threat.



Balancing Need to Know and Need to Protect: Implement technologies with built in privacy protections but still allow data access and analysis.

The amount of new information available to law enforcement on a daily basis is staggering. For the information to be of real value, agencies must not only access the vast quantities of data but more importantly must determine what is relevant and be able to make sense out of it and do all of that quickly enough to take action. This difficult task can be greatly enhanced by technology but there are still aspects that must be handled by an individual. People and not machines are accountable for actions taken, judgments that must be made, and laws that must be followed. Technology provides an advantage, but nothing can replace the work of a determined and dogged investigator or analyst. Our most important resources are still our human resources.

The legal field is working to keep up with all of the technological advances and how they can be used. Part of the difficulty faced by legislators and the courts is the change in privacy



expectations, which is often the basis of judgment, now that younger generations have a different relationship with technology and information. The recent Federal court decision on the Jones case cited the Fourth Amendment regarding the placement of GPS tracking devices and the requirements for obtaining a warrant. This and future Federal courts actions will continue to provide the needed legal guidance for the rest of the legal field to address some pressing areas: social media, real-time tracking across cell towers, and locating communication from non-US citizens. For law enforcement this has applications at all levels – investigation, prosecution, and information storage and analysis. Likely, these changes will mean that law enforcement will have to follow some additional controls.

Technology can actually help law enforcement to meet the additional controls, namely with protecting privacy and CRCL. There are a certain set of protections that absolutely must be “baked” into data collection and analysis solutions, rather than added later. When decisions need to be made on how to use sensitive information, humans need to be a part of the process. As an extra layer of protection the technology also needs to enable a real-time auditing capability to protect against human corruption. This monitoring capability can also be helpful on the justice side for determining innocence more quickly without the drawn out investigations that were previously required to access the same information. Technology solutions also have the ability to protect the proportionality of available information that can be used and seen. Known as selective revelations, these information searches reveal basic information; only when a set of controls have been met can more private information be made available.

Law enforcement should continue to challenge technology vendors to adapt to our needs within existing privacy boundaries. Technology vendors should also be willing to test and prove the solution in the environment in which it will be used and they should do that free of charge. Panelists discussed various capabilities currently being advanced:

- Communication Attribution – Cyber communication gets routed all over the globe no matter where it originated. It is important to know the identity and location of the messenger and whether it is a teenager, unaffiliated individuals in an enemy state, or a foreign country. Knowing who is plotting against us will help us develop a better counter strategy. Also, this might help to identify those people that may not leave their computer desk until just before they become a threat.
- Collection Tracking - Technologies are needed to proactively track when access has been gained to private or sensitive data sources and when information is being copied or downloaded.
- Object Behavior Analysis – Build rules based on analysis to see how an object behaves. As an example, small boat detection is a challenge because they are low to the water and made of wood or fiberglass, making them basically a stealth vehicle. The use of small boats for smuggling or waging an attack is a problem.
- Video Analytics - Closed circuit television is now mostly used to look back after an event. In the future, police cruisers might be able to accept feed from private sources to help with real-time response. We should also be able to do real-time analysis with




capabilities like gunshot detection and facial recognition to alert police to criminal activity as it happens.

- Insider Threat Detection – Insider threats are a serious problem. Technology can help identify signs of anger or resentment in computer activity (e.g., email, keystrokes, social networking) and the parameters can be individualized to an agency’s needs. Computer activity audits can also identify threatening patterns of activity: access to sensitive information or network, downloads of information and hacker toolsets, mishandling of information, unauthorized receipt or sending, improperly encrypted, and copying or pasting.
- Natural Language Interpretation – This type of analytics system, which can reason over different hypothesis on top of text was the basis for the Big Blue supercomputer winning the Jeopardy game show tournament. The system can determine what is relevant and take away the tunnel effect a seasoned analyst might experience.
- Network Science and Analytics – This can reduce time to action and increase sense making among a large amount of information. The challenge for an intelligence agency that takes in massive amount of data is to be able to conduct analytics in real time. Improvements in this area will focus the attention of intelligence analysts on only the information they need to have and help them quickly determine if new pieces of data are useful.

Surprisingly, if you are drowning in data what actually helps is to get more data because it provides greater context for the analytic tools. Even bad data is good because it can help identify the anomalies. With the advancement of technology solutions, law enforcement will have the capacity to assess even more information, bringing us closer to the goal of making sense of what we are observing fast enough to do something about it while we are observing it.

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Day 3, Panel 2 – Special Events: Changing the Planning Horizon in the Current Threat Environment

Learning Objective: This panel discussion will focus on the development of counter-terrorism plans with relation to special events.

- Moderator – **Jon Boucher**, Assistant Chief Constable, Hertfordshire Constabulary
- **Pat Koch**, Senior Risk Management Advisor, Transit Police, British Columbia
- **Janice Fedarcyk**, Assistant Director in Charge, New York Field Office, FBI
- **Cressida Dick**, Assistant Commissioner, Special Operations, London Metropolitan Police, United Kingdom

Meeting the Challenge: Special Events: Changing the Planning Horizon in the Current Threat Environment



Building Partnerships: Establish integrated security units where uniforms and ranks are checked at the door to foster cooperation.



Ensuring Global Information Exchange: Look for support from international partners to fulfill information requirements.



Optimizing Limited Resources: Build on established structures and proven practices, improving what is already there rather than starting over.



Balancing Need to Know and Need to Protect: Determine information needs of all partners to achieve widest distribution of sensitive information.

Any special event requires individual planning and preparations. The same plan that was used for one event cannot just be applied to the next event. However, preparations for any event will certainly require: 1) early and detailed planning, 2) a thorough and continuing threat assessment, 3) strong partnerships, and 4) practiced execution of plans.

The most important aspect of planning is to start the process early, often years ahead of time, which leaves time to cope with the multiple contingencies that arise. Planning should start small with a focus on fully defining each problem before trying to develop a solution. Starting small also helps the team look at issues, threats, targets, or venues on an individual basis – including the best and worst case scenarios for each before developing a big picture scenario that addresses them collectively. In the early stages of planning, relationships are established or renewed, trends are identified, information requirements are established, and timely and



actionable intelligence is provided. The geographical magnitude and size of the event, the international interest, the number of agencies involved in the planning, and the expected number of attendees are but a few of the items to be addressed in the planning process. It might help to initially start by identifying the end-state and putting less emphasis on the "how." Consider an approach that uses effects-based planning because it can be understood by all involved agencies regardless of the language or lingo used since it describes the effect. At some point, except in the highest risk areas, perfection in planning cannot be expected and good enough should be acceptable. Later in the planning process, as time and resources permit, it may be possible to improve the solution.

The best set of people to conduct the planning will be different than those that actually carry out the plan. Among the planning group, consider identifying a group of critical thinkers to do "Red Teaming," specifically tasking them with finding contrary solutions to the identified plan as a way to come to the best solution. Start the planning with the formation of an executive committee and determine the lead agency. The executive group will ultimately need to sell the plan and the emphasis should be on the potential lives saved rather than the cost. This group will primarily think about prevention but should also consider the following questions:

- What happens if an incident occurs requiring a transition from watch to crisis mode?
- Who will be in charge and who owns the event from the beginning?
- How can activities be sustained over a long timeframe, across wide geographic boundaries, or in the event of an incident?

Another important element of planning is conducting thorough threat assessments. Special events have their own unique threat environment and all participating agencies need to understand the threat picture as it relates to the event. Along the way, the worst case scenario needs to be identified so that an accurate capability assessment can be done to inform resource allocations and priorities. Organizational factors related to the planning and execution of the event can create their own threats. The heightened level of scrutiny from the media, government, financial stakeholders, and others have their own impact on planning and response and have the potential to increase threats if not properly addressed. The media scrutiny and widespread coverage of the event can ultimately create an opportunity for a person looking to stage a spectacular terrorist event to have a captive media audience. The cyber threat needs to also be considered and it may be difficult to convince people it is an actual threat. It is important to remember, however, that no threat should be allowed to define the event.

Ultimately, the relationships that are forged and solidified in the planning process will carry the day, making it all the more important to foster partnerships. Information sharing is one of the most important factors in developing productive partnerships, which is why some event planning efforts have started with the establishment of an intelligence/information unit. This unit can help establish the essential information requirements of all involved agencies so priority can be given to fulfilling those needs. Knowing the information requirements can also help with the distribution of sensitive information. If sensitive information is needed by non-



law enforcement partners then it can be packaged to meet the lowest common denominator. This also helps with providing information to the widest possible network if all involved understand what information is really needed. The London Olympics will incorporate the use of a unique Olympic Intelligence Center that will produce products two or three times a day to keep all partners in the loop. Partners should not expect, however, an open door when it comes to information sharing, but should work towards a “semi-permeable membrane.” There will always be the possibility that shared information will be improperly distributed or misused, so a plan should be developed to address that. Also, take care when drafting initial intelligence reports as partners less familiar with the type of information may have a tendency to overreact.

Besides traditional public safety partners, consider other beneficial relationships and start including them as early as possible. The public, military, business community, foreign agencies, and building industry are just a few additional potential partners. Military support has been integrated into the London Olympics because the existing law enforcement and security resources are not numerous enough. The London Olympic officials have also worked with the building industry to construct facilities and venues that were safe from the start. The public’s expectations for a secure event have to be measured against their level of acceptance for security measures. To this end, the London Olympics, while using a tremendous amount of human security resources, both law enforcement and military in nature, is trying to balance the visible security. Hopefully this will instill confidence among the public, but not create a security presence that overwhelms the event.

Two things have to be avoided in partnerships: hubris and boundaries. Ultimately, these can create an even greater threat than terrorism. Boundaries, whether physical or not, create friction which creates vulnerabilities. Take the hard boundaries and turn them into grey areas through liaison, coordination, education, or exercises. Also, never underestimate the value of face-to-face contact over phone and email correspondence. To this end, integrated security units, where uniforms and ranks are removed, can be very beneficial at certain levels of operation.

Leading up to the event, extensive exercises serve a variety of purposes: continued relationship building, testing of plans, and target hardening. Target hardening can be enhanced through exercises because they can have a distracting or disrupting effect on the terrorist planning cycle. It might be worth holding back on demonstrating a certain set of capabilities and physical security measures until right before the event to create a change in circumstance that could throw off an attacker’s plans. Exercises can also demonstrate to the public that preparations are taking place. The panelists mentioned the following additional goals of exercises:

- Determining the readiness of a joint operations center and the contingency plan to relocate in a worst case scenario.
- Ensuring that participating agencies understand their roles and responsibilities for when the event actually takes place.
- Running through contingencies that could include a variety of simultaneous attacks.
- Identifying how to make any last adjustments to close vulnerability gaps.



To conclude, it is important to use a consistent national approach, and ideally one that has been tested and proven. Improvements can then be made to that existing base. While no amount of planning and preparations can prevent or address every scenario, the best hope is that partners will understand each other so well that they will be able to handle an event even if from a reactionary position. Perpetuating the lessons learned from event to event, even when complacency may set in between major terrorists incidents, will ensure the continued safety of our citizens and countries hosting large-scale and high-profile special events.





Training Session Overviews

Training Session: Current Cyber Threat Landscape - Evolution and the Impact on Law Enforcement

- Pete Cordero, Acting Section Chief, FBI
- Facilitator: Dr. David Corderman, Associate Executive Director, LinCT

Meeting the Challenge: Training Session - Current Cyber Threat Landscape



Building Partnerships: Build international partnerships to counter crimes with international reach.



Ensuring Global Information Exchange: Embed officers internationally to improve information sharing.



Cybercrimes have become a form of “electronic jihad” for Islamist extremists. However, any terrorist organization, nation, or proxy state can use cyber tools against us. The FBI, with its sixty-two cybercrime task forces and Cyber Action Teams (CATs) that deploy around the world, has made countering and dismantling criminal cyber operations a high priority. This strategic emphasis stems from a 2008 presidential mandate that placed the National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force – which the FBI developed and supports – in the lead for sharing information related to domestic cyber threat investigations.

One of the challenges in countering these cyber threats is that they are international in scope, which provides legal challenges when trying to capture a server located in another country. If the wrong server is captured there is the potential to leave millions of people without access to the Internet. This is part of what makes international partnerships with the public and private sector key to these operations. Forging these international relationships has led to FBI agents and legal attaches being embedded in foreign police agencies in countries like Estonia, Ukraine, Latvia, Romania, and the Netherlands. An ongoing example of an FBI public-private partnership effort is InfraGard, an information sharing platform that links government with the private sector.



Operation Ghost Click –which led to the dismantling of an international cybercrime ring and the arrest of six Estonian nationals - is one specific example of an international FBI operation that relied on such partnerships. The malware deployed by the Estonian nationals infected millions of computers worldwide.

There are a variety of different motivations for cybercrimes. Hacktivism is committed by hacktivists, cybercriminals who gain unauthorized access to a single computer or computer system to promote an ideological, political, or social message. Anonymous is considered a hacktivist group. Hacktivists use tactics that range from defacing a website to the more serious ones listed below:

1. Release of Personal Information – Targeting of law enforcement and other government websites is on the rise. Known as Doxing, this involves the public release of personal information about police or other government officials. Operation Upload is an example of this.
2. Denial of Service – These Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks involves flooding a website with so many requests for service that it is temporarily knocked offline.
3. Infrastructure – The functionality of critical infrastructure can be disturbed, interrupted, or totally incapacitated. Gaining access to these sites' Industrial Control Systems (ICS) is increasingly a threat.
4. Financial Sector Fraud - Banks and other financial institutions remain high-value targets.
5. Advanced Persistent Threat - This is a sophisticated and organized cyberattack designed to steal information from compromised networks by maintaining a persistent presence.

Cybercriminals are hard to track online. They have their own underground forums where they sell support materials and custom-made services to each other, such as bots that are designed to avoid detection by anti-virus software. The use of various types of online payment services help them remain harder to follow. Another stealth tool of the cybercriminal is a botnet. These are collections of compromised computers, each of which are known as a bot and are connected to the Internet to make a collective computer network that can be controlled by a criminal using a Remote Access Tool (RAT). Criminals are also finding ways to take advantage of newer technological developments. Cloud computing presents an opportunity for criminals to pursue and monetize protected information stored on the cloud servers. Malware, which previously targeted computers, is now being developed to target smartphones and tablets.

The cyber realm offers criminals a welcome environment to evade law enforcement detection through the use of diverse targets, low criminal investment, and the ability to operate from anywhere in the world. Law enforcement's greatest challenge to confronting these cyber threats is being able to recruit technically proficient personnel that will be able to identify and locate the criminals. Personnel need to at least have the Certified Information Systems Security Professional (CISSP) qualification. Much of the qualified talent is in the private sector. Even with the right personnel, law enforcement management still needs to receive proper training that will help them understand the threat. The costs of management training and personnel training can be quite expensive.



Training Session: Civil Liberties and Civil Rights – Current Trends and Issues

- Jenny Presswalla, Inter-Agency Coordination Officer, National Counter Terrorism Center
- Facilitator: Michael Ferrence, Executive Director, LinCT-AA and Senior Partner Academy Leadership Associates

Meeting the Challenge: Training Session - Civil Liberties and Civil Rights



Building Partnerships: Work with communities to develop a counter narrative plan.



Countering the Violent Extremist: Make upholding CRCL the basis of any plan to counter violent extremists.



Criminalizing Terrorism: Improve operational success by identifying criminal activity of suspected violent extremists.



This training session addressed CRCL issues in the US, and focused on how it relates to countering violent extremists. CRCL requirements in policing differ in each of the individual countries represented in the “Five Eyes.” It is crucial to have a complete understanding of CRCL requirements and how they need to be followed on an operational level in law enforcement.

Not only is it a legal obligation, but it also goes to maintaining the integrity and respectability of law enforcement and their mission. The violent extremist narrative often tries to take advantage of perceived violations of CRCL to recruit followers. Knowing this provides additional incentive to ensure no law enforcement actions ever have the perception of violating CRCL.

Being familiar with the profile of violent extremists can help law enforcement plan actions that will be most effective in countering the violent extremist while still being respectful of CRCL.



Recent studies by the DHS, the FBI, and the NCTC have identified four patterns that were present in seventy percent of twenty-two case studies on violent extremists they examined. The patterns of activity included:

1. Link to known extremists
2. Strong ideological commitment
3. International travel
4. Pursuit of weapons or weapons training

While none of the above are necessarily a predictor of violent activity, taken together they might be an indicator of an individual trending toward violent activity. The fourth pattern – pursuit of weapons or weapons training – is particularly important for law enforcement because it is the only one of the four patterns that is potentially unlawful. If law enforcement focus^{es} on activities that are potentially unlawful then there is the presence of a criminal element to enable more operational flexibility.

When considering a counter narrative strategy, it helps to understand what makes the violent extremist narrative so compelling. As an example, what compelled Faisal Shazad, the would-be Times Square bomber, to connect with the messages of Anwar Al-Awlaki, the Al Qaeda cleric? Al-Awlaki was at one time a respected, mainstream cleric which may be one reason he initially gained followers. The following are elements common to Al-Awlaki's and Al Qaeda compelling violent narrative that capitalize on real or perceived injustices against Muslims:

- Muslims are part of a global community and not a part of any one country, so you cannot be both Muslim and American.
- The West has brought ruin and disgrace to Islam.
- Since the West is at war with Islam (as evidenced by US military in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq), Muslims must take action.
- Muslim-Americans have been increasingly harassed and investigated and something must be done to address this injustice.
- Non-violent political activism has been tried and has not worked, so similar to gang recruitment, they profess they have "an easier way" to take care of injustice.
- Muslims have turned against their own people and joined with the US government.

The breakout session then addressed what law enforcement can do as a part of a counter narrative strategy that is still respectful of CRCL:

- Make sure all countering violent extremism (CVE) training is appropriate and accurate.
- Address misconceptions about law enforcement publicly.
- Engage the community in developing a plan to counter violent extremism and violent crimes.
 - Encourage religious leaders with community credibility to denounce violence.
 - Develop trusting relationships to help create a comfort level within the community to reach out to law enforcement with information on criminal activity.



- Support community-led efforts to counter violent narratives, which will help develop community resilience against the messaging.
- Be proactive with supporting communities, which naturally will help develop a positive impression of law enforcement.
- Make sure any CVE strategy addresses criminal indicators rather than cultural practices.
- Reference the reality that Al Qaeda kills Muslims and non-Muslims in their attacks.
- Consider how to address international events that will affect specific communities.

Being respectful of CRCL in the US is really the means to protecting our country's way of life. First Amendment (i.e., freedom of speech, religion, press, right to assemble, and right to redress our government) and Fourth Amendment (i.e., freedom from unreasonable search and seizure) freedoms and other rights are greatly valued. Continuing to be respectful of these is the greatest counter narrative to the violent extremists.

Referenced Resources

- Anti-Terror Lessons of Muslim-Americans, Davis Schanzer, Charles Kurzman, Ebrahim Moosa, January 6, 2010.
http://www.sanford.duke.edu/news/Schanzer_Kurzman_Moosa_Anti-Terror_Lessons.pdf



Training Session - Countering Violent Extremism

- **Dr. Luann Pannell**, Director, Police Training and Education, Los Angeles Police Department
- **Facilitator: Joumana Silyan-Saba**, Senior Policy Analyst, City of Los Angeles Human Relations

Meeting the Challenge: Training Session – Countering Violent Extremism




Building Partnerships: Find shared values or areas of commonality to begin to develop trusting relationships with communities.



Countering the Violent Extremist: Provide individuals that are vulnerable to extremist ideology with a link to traditional support resources (e.g., health, education).



Optimizing Limited Resources: Incorporate other non-law enforcement partners to meet needs that are the underlying causes of tensions.



The breakout session examined different outreach strategies for law enforcement to counter violent extremism. The presenter challenged participants to build trusting relationships through community policing. Community policing has a long history in successful law enforcement practices yet windows of opportunity with communities are still often missed; conversely citizens often have opportunities to report information to law enforcement but do not. What is at the root of this disconnect between law enforcement and the community? A lack of trust has been suggested as the answer. Individuals may not trust law enforcement, potentially because of media generalizations or previous negative experiences with law enforcement. Immigrant communities, especially, may have lived in a country where it is legitimate to fear or not trust law enforcement, so it is understandable that they would carry those feelings to their new home countries. Extremist messaging from groups looking to attack Western societies may also be part of the problem. Engagement strategies may help law enforcement to counter these extremist ideologies and developing a counter narrative may need to be a part of the outreach efforts. The following outreach strategies integrated into an existing community policing strategy may help engage people who may have a lack of trust in police:

1. Operating community engagement programs
2. Separating outreach from intelligence collection operations
3. Building channels of trusted communication through engagement programs
4. Addressing community problems or grievances



Since there are not enough officers to police our way through this problem, law enforcement must find a way to leverage the positive connection that comes from community engagement. Engagement is an inoculation for violent extremism and it serves as a prescription for building healthier and more resilient communities. Through this, community problems and grievances can be addressed. As a result, terrorism has a harder time taking root. Law enforcement professionals need to identify the groups not attending community meetings just as much as those who are staying involved so they have a complete picture of the landscape. CVE efforts and engagement programs are separate from intelligence collection operations.

A video was played to demonstrate the struggle small towns, in this case Lewiston, Maine, have had incorporating new immigrant communities. In this small town and others throughout the country, there is a clash of culture and the new immigrants are not able to connect with an already established close-knit society. In Lewiston, there is clear frustration on the part of both the new Somali immigrants and the people of Lewiston as they struggle to find common ground upon which to build their community. Police have become the flashpoint. Ostracizing a group like Somali immigrants, especially in difficult times, gives their youth a vacuum to fill. People need to find a place to feel connected. We are used to things being a certain way, but it cannot be all about us versus them. Clearly there was frustration on both sides. You are only as good as the information you have, otherwise people fill the gaps with their own information.

In policing, everything is fluid and law enforcement tends to be very good at training to an event rather than through an event. An event cycle was depicted in the presentation slides with the red area representing the critical event and the analysis phase after an incident. The yellow area represented the window right after an event and the blue area represented the time in between. Law enforcement dedicates a lot of training to the red area, the critical event, but improvements can be made to training through an event so that improvements are continuing to be made. In the yellow area, after a critical event, people, including the community, are pumped up and emotions are high and that is a window of opportunity. People have a memory of what happens right after an event, especially if things did not go well. There are certain things people need to hear right after an event and if they do not have good information they are going to make up their own.

What we do in the blue will help us improve how we handle the red event. After 9/11, the Incident Command System language was developed to help manage an event, but there is not a common language for when we are operating in the blue. In the same event cycle on the presentation, there was also a ring around the red, yellow, and blue portion of the cycle representing the context or the elements that might change the environment. These are the contextual factors that might lead a community to not trust the police. The media, events occurring overseas, prior experiences with the police, family, and English as a second language are all examples of the fluid context. Making the investment by attending meetings and being aware of the commonalties may mitigate the next red event.



The following concepts were discussed as they relate to an individual: the cognitive (what you think), psychomotor (what you do), and affective (the emotional). There is a negative connotation attached to the emotional. The affective may present a range of different emotions such as fear, anger, and distress. When a person is in a state of anger, they might look for a physical outlet and their ability to communicate effectively may be affected, but there is room to use emotions like anger for positive. When a person has fear, it tends to override everything else. Communities typically come at issues from the affective side. Leaders, for the most part, are coming from the cognitive. The psychomotor or physical side must first be addressed so that the person is able to hear. Law enforcement needs to understand these dynamics in order to be able to do effective outreach so they know which part of the person or community to address. Training for law enforcement also needs to address all of these dynamics because once emotions have been surpassed then solutions can be identified. ✓

To further understand the individual – whether a police officer, a violent extremist, or a disaffected youth - it is helpful to also understand groups. People try to find a group where they fit. When an individual is put into an unfamiliar situation, they will try to find a group that shares their own values. Groups also tend to relate to other groups with similar values. Law enforcement as a group is like this too, relating most closely with other public safety groups. These trust borders that develop between groups with similar values keep us in our comfort zone. Other groups that are less similar are a little more inconvenient to reach and so we do not tend to contact them often. Law enforcement might try to train together with different agencies, but it means something different than to exchange information with these same agencies. The hope is that if law enforcement continues to do outreach with groups, in time, we will continue to build a shield across the country and eventually across the globe. ✓

In terms of radicalization, the individual who spends a lot of time with his or her emotions reinforces everything they are thinking and feeling to the point that they find it hard to shift their beliefs. The physical part can get stretched when a person is always in the emotional. Consequently, when a person like this attempts to fit in with a group that is more balanced they tend not to fit. However, they will find that they fit with others who tend to be more on the emotional side. In this vein, research has shown that hate groups that put out written products are less likely to be violent. However, others that read it may not have the same reaction.

Communities and law enforcement both want to have safe streets. They just need to identify where there is commonality to be able to start to develop a partnership. Officers indicate they are already doing outreach and are concerned about doing more outreach. It may help officers to bring in other non-law enforcement partners, like social services, health, or education to meet needs that are the underlying causes of tensions. Doing community outreach is a balancing act and law enforcement is being asked to stretch its capabilities and area of responsibility. However, if community issues are left unresolved, they are likely to become the business of law enforcement. Remove fear from both side and allow dialogue to happen.



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for Advanced Policing

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SPEAKERS




Robert Bartlett
Manager of Command
UK Government Organizing Committee, 2012 Olympics
 Robert has a track record of success in complex, multi-stakeholder environments, including direct experience managing Security, Integration and Assurance programs.

He is currently on a career break from the UK Cabinet Office to the London Organizing Committee for the Olympic and Paralympic Games where he is Manager of Command, Coordination and Communication structures with specific focus on the information and decision architectures for Games Time coordination and incident response across the UK.

Robert was seconded to Vancouver, British Columbia between 2007 - 2010 for the Vancouver 2010 Winter Olympic Games. He was Programme Director for 'IntersectBC' and responsible for ensuring a risk-based approach to the development, integration and implementation of key infrastructure and security programs to deliver the Vancouver 2010 Games and provide a legacy platform.

Through the UK Cabinet Office, Robert has chaired several NATO work programmes, as Head of the UK delegation to NATO for Civil Communications Planning Committee Emergency. He was Stakeholder Manager for the UK's Contingency Telecommunications Project and supported activity for National Information assurance strategy.



Charlie Beck
Chief of Police
Los Angeles Police Department
 Chief Charlie Beck was appointed Chief of the Los Angeles Police Department in November 2009. Chief Beck oversees the third largest police department in the United States, managing 10,000 sworn officers and 3,000 civilian employees, encompassing an area of 473 square miles, a population of

approximately 3.8 million people, and an annual budget that exceeds one billion dollars. Having facilitated his predecessor's successful reengineering and reform effort, Chief Beck continues to evolve and refine those strategies to further the Department's ascendancy to the pinnacle of 21st Century Policing. Major components of this endeavor include the mitigation of crime, the reduction of gang violence, the containment of terrorism, and the continuation of the reforms that brought the Department into compliance with the Consent Decree.

Chief Beck was appointed to the Department in March 1977 after serving two years in the Los Angeles Police Reserve Corps. He was promoted to Sergeant in June 1984, to Lieutenant in April 1993, to Captain in July 1999, Commander in April 2005, and to Deputy Chief in August 2006.



Wade S. Blizard
Superintendent,
Assistant Criminal Operations Officer
Royal Canadian Mounted Police
 Wade S. Blizard joined the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in 1977.

In 1992 Supt Blizard was posted to the British Columbia Provincial Serious Crime Unit and travelled extensively assuming conduct of Major Crime investigations.

In 1996 Wade was integral to the formation of the first British Columbia Unsolved (Cold Case) Homicide Unit. In 2001 Wade was 'Commissioned' to the rank of Inspector, transferred to Ottawa and assumed a Senior seconded position with the Canadian Forces (Department of National Defense) 'National Investigation Section' where he had operational oversight of all Major and Sensitive Investigations involving Canada's Military. Returning to British Columbia in 2003 Wade was the Divisional Intelligence Operations Officer. Under his direction Criminal Intelligence was advanced in a significantly 'tactical' manner to leverage intelligence in support of enforcement opportunities and prosecution. In 2008 Supt Blizard was assigned to the Team Commander position of a National Security Investigation in Winnipeg Manitoba known as Project Darken. This investigation resulted in various Anti-Terrorism Act charges against three radicalized Canadian Nationals who had travelled overseas to conduct Military Jihad. In 2010 Supt Blizard assumed the position of Assistant Criminal Operations Officer for the RCMP 'E' Division (British Columbia) National Security Team. Supt Blizard was instrumental in the creation of a methodology, known as the One Vision Concept.

Supt Blizard retired on March 9th of 2012 with 35 years of service in the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.




Charles Bordeleau
Chief
Ottawa Police Service
 Charles Bordeleau has 27 years of policing experience in the Ottawa area. He was sworn in as Chief of the Ottawa Police Service on March 5, 2012. He sits on the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police Emergency Management Committee, he is

Director for Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police's Zone 2 and he chairs the "Operation INTERSECT" Steering Committee, an integrated readiness and response framework designed to mitigate, prevent, respond to, and recover from, emergencies and disasters in the national capital region. He is also co-chair of the CACP's International Committee.

He is a member of United Way Ottawa's task force on the Critical Hours initiative which works to develop programs in the Community to children and youth in the critical hours outside of school. In 2011, he received the Dean's Philos Award from the University of Ottawa's Telfer School of Management.

He holds a Masters in Disaster and Emergency Management from Royal Roads University and a Bachelor of Administration Degree from the University of Ottawa. He is co-chair of the Ottawa Police Service COMPAC committee which is a city-wide community-police advisory and coordinating body representing a partnership between police and visible minority and Aboriginal communities in Ottawa. He is the current Chair of the Youth Services Bureau Charitable Foundation.



Jon Boutcher
Assistant Chief Constable
Hertfordshire Constabulary

Jon has 27 years police service that has been spent almost entirely as a detective in covert policing. Jon was the Senior Investigating Officer for operation 'Rhyme' that identified a group of British men who planned mass casualty attacks in Washington, New York and Newark in the USA. The group also planned chemical and biological and bomb attacks in London, the plotters leader Dhiron Barot was sentenced to 80 years imprisonment.

Jon was responsible for the 'manhunt' that identified and arrested the 21/7 failed terrorist plotters. He also led the investigative response in Scotland following the terrorist attack at Glasgow airport.

Jon held the position of the National Coordinator for Pursue under the UK Contest strategy. He worked recently within the Home Office acting as an advisor on policing issues specifically those related to national security. Jon is now working within the Counter Terrorism Command at New Scotland Yard.



James Clapper
Director
Office of National Intelligence, USA

The Honorable James R. Clapper, Jr. was sworn in as the fourth Director of National Intelligence (DNI) on August 9, 2010. As DNI, he leads the United States Intelligence Community and serves as the principal intelligence advisor to the President.

He retired in 1995 after a distinguished career in the U.S. Armed Forces. His intelligence related positions included Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence at U.S. Air Force Headquarters during Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm and Director of Intelligence for three war fighting commands.

He also served as a consultant and advisor to Congress and to the Departments of Defense and Energy. He was a member of the Downing Assessment Task Force that investigated the Khobar Towers bombing in 1996, and was vice chairman of a commission chaired by former Governor Jim Gilmore of Virginia on the subject of homeland security.

In September 2001 he was the first civilian director of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, he served as Director for five years.

He served for over three years in two Administrations as the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, where he served as the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense. He was also dual-hatted as the Director of Defense Intelligence for DNI.




Mark Collins
Detective Chief Superintendent
Deputy National Coordinator Prevent

Mark joined the Metropolitan Police Service in 1991 and transferred to Dyfed Powys Police in 1995. He has served in both uniform and Criminal Investigation Department (CID) posts in every rank up to, and including, Chief Inspector. He is a Senior Investigator Officer (SIO) and Counter Terrorism SIO.

He was promoted to Detective Superintendent in 2005, and was the coordinator on 'Exercise Oystercatcher' which was the largest maritime level Counter Terrorism Exercise that has taken place in the United Kingdom.

In October 2006, Mark took up a new post as Head of Wales Extremism and Counter Terrorism Unit (WECTU). During this period, he worked with the four Chief Constables and Police Authorities in Wales to create one Special Branch, bringing together 250 Special Branch resources. This collaboration model was identified as best practice and has been replicated throughout the UK.

In August 2008, Mark was appointed to the role of Detective Chief Superintendent, Deputy National Coordinator *Prevent*. He works to Assistant Chief Constable John Wright, National Coordinator *Prevent* and coordinates the role of *Prevent* and national community engagement projects across the UK. Mark's role ensures that the UK Police response to the governments *Prevent* Strategy is delivered and monitored working in partnership with key stakeholders.



Dr. David Corderman
Associate Executive Director LinCT-AA
Senior Partner

Academy Leadership Associates
As a senior partner of the Academy Leadership Associates, LLC (ALA), a

former instructor of graduate studies in human behavior and leadership at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia, and an adjunct faculty member of the University of Virginia, David S. Corderman's career in leadership, training and development spans three decades. Prior to assuming his current position with ALA, in January 2007, Dave retired from the FBI following 24 years of duty, eight and half of which were spent on the FBI's Hostage Rescue Team.

He retired as Chief of the Leadership Development Institute, where he was responsible for all the FBI's external and internal leadership development programs including the National Executive Institute, the Law Enforcement Executive Development Seminar, and the international Leadership in Counterterrorism Program. During his tenure in the FBI he received numerous awards for bravery and merit.



Pedro D. Cordero
Acting Section Chief, Cyber Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation
FBI Special Agent Pedro D. Cordero currently serves as the Acting Section Chief, Cyber Criminal Section, where he manages the FBI's program for criminal computer intrusions, intellectual property rights and internet fraud.

Prior to joining the Cyber Division in 2010, Mr. Cordero managed two major FBI Headquarters special projects: initiating and serving as Deputy of the Yemen Fusion Cell, as well as initiating and supervising the domestic-focused Lone Offender Task Force. From 2005-2008, he served in a joint duty assignment at the CIA's Counterterrorism Center. From 2001-2002, Mr. Cordero was a Supervisory Special Agent in the Usama Bin Laden Unit, where he managed numerous al Qaeda investigations, including the Lackawanna Six investigation, for which he received the Attorney General's Award for Exceptional Service and the Service to America Medals - Justice Award. He also served as both a SWAT Operator and a Special Agent Bomb Technician.

Mr. Cordero joined the FBI as a Special Agent in 1991, and holds a B.B.A. in Accountancy from the University of Texas at El Paso, and a M.S. in National Resource Strategy from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces War College with a Concentration in Information Operations from the National Defense University Information Resources Management College.



DCC Paul Crowther
Deputy Chief Constable
British Transport Police
Paul became Deputy Chief Constable with British Transport Police in September 2009. Prior to this he was Assistant Chief Constable responsible for the Crime portfolio. He has served 31 years with BTP.

As DCC, he has responsibility for Information, Communications and Technology, Professional Standards, Strategic Development and Media and Marketing. He is also responsible for organizational performance delivery of BTP's Futures programme which focuses on organizational change, service improvement and efficiency.

He has been Incident Commander at several major train crash incidents including Hatfield. He was the Senior Investigating Officer at the Potters Bar train crash in 2001 as a Detective Superintendent. In 2004 Paul was appointed as the Area Commander responsible for policing the London Underground with a staff of 720 police officers and 200 support staff. In 2005 Paul was the BTP Tactical Commander for the terrorist attacks on the 7th and 21st July and led the BTP operational response. Paul led the development of Behavioral Assessment training for front line operational officers to address the terrorist threat. He leads the National CCTV Alignment project across the rail transport infrastructure. He also leads nationally for ACPO on metal theft and co-ordinates activity across UK police forces, partner agencies and engagement with Government.



Bryan Cunningham
Senior Counsel
Palantir Corporation
Bryan Cunningham is a data

privacy and information security expert, counseling clients, including Fortune 500 and multinational entities, as a principal in the Denver, Colorado law firm of Cunningham Partners LLC. Cunningham authored legal and ethics chapters in authoritative information security textbooks and served in senior intelligence and law enforcement positions in the United States Government for Administrations of both political parties, most recently as Deputy Legal Adviser to the White House National Security Council.

Cunningham was founding vice-chair of the American Bar Association CyberSecurity Privacy Task Force and serves as a Member of the non-partisan Markle Foundation Task Force on National Security in the Information Age, and served on the National Academy of Sciences Committee on Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures. At the White House, Cunningham drafted significant portions of the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, the Homeland Security Act, executive orders on terrorism and intelligence, and other terrorism-related policy documents, and was one of the primary attorneys working with the 9/11 Commission. He also served six years in the Clinton Administration, as a senior CIA Officer and federal prosecutor.

Bryan Cunningham is now Senior Counsel to Palantir Technologies, whose software platform is widely deployed for cyber-defense analysis and currently serves on the Bipartisan Policy Center's Cyber Security Task Force.



Peter Dein
Assistant Commissioner
Commander,
Counter Terrorism and Special Tactics
New South Wales Police Force
Peter joined the NSW Police Force in 1973. All but 3 of his years of service has been spent as a detective, with the majority in the CIB/Major Crime

Squad/Crime Agencies/State Crime Command/Counter Terrorism & Special Tactics Command.

Author of internal papers on armed robbery and service wide SOPs for kidnap response. OIC of AHU Unit SW Region in 1990s and recognized by the Industrial Court as an "expert witness" in armed robbery response in 1996. In 2000 appointed in the Olympic period as Crisis Team Commander for investigative response to terrorist kidnap, extortion, bombings, hostage debriefs.

From 2007 to February 2008 Commanded the Anti-Terrorism & Security Group. In March 2008 promoted to Assistant Commissioner, Counter Terrorism & Special Tactics Command.



Rob Delaney
First Assistant Director General
Attorney General's Department,
Australia

Mr. Delaney commenced employment within the Australian Intelligence Community in 1987. Between 1987 and 1998 he worked in a variety of areas including Collection, Analysis and

Operational Training. In 1998 he was posted to the Australian High Commission in London as a Liaison Officer.

In December 2005, Mr. Delaney was promoted to the Senior Executive Service. In July 2006 he assumed the role of Manager New South Wales, based in Sydney. In July 2007, Mr. Delaney was promoted to First Assistant Director-General but remained in charge of the NSW Office, managing all of the organization's activity in Australia's most populous state.

Mr. Delaney is the only member of the Organization's Senior Leadership Group who is permanently based outside Canberra. In 2008, Mr. Delaney was elected to the position of Vice President of the Leadership in Counter Terrorism Alumni Association, representing the Pacific region. In 2011 he was elected President of the Alumni Association.




Cressida Dick
Assistant Commissioner, Metropolitan
Police, UK

Assistant Commissioner Cressida Dick, QPM is a senior officer in London's Metropolitan Police. In June 2009, she was promoted to the rank of Assistant Commissioner, the first woman to hold

this rank substantively. She holds the Queen's Police Medal for distinguished service.

In 1983, she joined the Metropolitan Police as a Constable. In 1993, she joined the staff of the Accelerated Promotion Course at Bramshill Police College, and in 1995, joined Thames Valley Police as a Superintendent. She was Superintendent Operations at Oxford, and later, as a Chief Superintendent, served as Area Commander in Oxford for three years. She completed the Strategic Command Course in 2000 and was awarded a Master of Philosophy degree in Criminology from the University of Cambridge, in 2001, with the highest grade of her class. In June 2001, she returned to the Metropolitan Police as a Commander where she was head of the Diversity Directorate until 2003. She then became the head of Operation Trident, which investigates gun crimes within London's black community.

In September 2006, the Metropolitan Police Authority announced her promotion to the rank of Deputy Assistant Commissioner Specialist Operations and on 30 June 2009 the Metropolitan Police Authority announced her promotion to Assistant Commissioner in charge of the Specialist Crime Directorate.



Michael Dougherty
Director of Law Enforcement Solutions
Raytheon Homeland Security
Raytheon Company

Michael Dougherty served in the Federal government for 20 years before joining Raytheon in 2009. Among other positions, he served on the staff of the Senate Judiciary Committee,

Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security.

At the Department of Homeland Security headquarters, he performed as a Senior Policy Advisor at the Border and Transportation Security Directorate. At the Department of Justice, he served as a Special Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Eastern District of Virginia, and as a Trial Attorney with the Office of Immigration Litigation.



Michael Downing
Deputy Chief
Los Angeles Police Department

Deputy Chief Michael P. Downing is the Commanding Officer, Counter-Terrorism and Special Operations Bureau where he leads five operational divisions: Major Crimes Division,

Emergency Services Division, Metropolitan Division, Air Support Division, and Emergency Operations Division. These divisions include the Anti-Terrorism Intelligence Section, Criminal Investigative Section, Organized Crime, Surveillance Section, Hazardous Devices Section, Operation Archangel, LAX Bomb K-9 Section, Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT), Mounted Unit, Underwater Dive Team, and Emergency Preparedness and Response. Deputy Chief Downing is also a member of the Executive Board of the Los Angeles Joint Regional Intelligence Center (JRIC).

Since his assignment to Counter-Terrorism, he has worked with the New Scotland Yard's Metropolitan Police Counter-Terrorism Command SO 15 during an eight-week attachment. He has testified before Congressional subcommittees relative to intelligence, homeland security and information sharing. In April 2010, he served as a member of the Department of Homeland Security Advisory Council working group on developing a national strategy for countering violent extremism. He has worked with the Department of Justice, in an effort to transition large national police organizations into democratic civilian policing models. He is a strong advocate of State and Local law enforcement agencies relative to a more integrated National Intelligence Enterprise.



Richard Esposito
Senior Investigative Reporter
ABC News

Richard Esposito is the Senior Investigative Reporter for ABC News. A journalist with more than 30 years of experience, Esposito's focus is Homeland Security, National Security and the complex issues of the nation's criminal justice system. He is a winner of the 2005 George Polk Award for Television Reporting, as well as an Emmy award for his ABC News investigation into the CIA's network of secret prisons.

Esposito shares in a Pulitzer Prize for coverage of a fatal subway crash by New York's Newsday. Additional Newsday probes exposed spying on African American politicians by New York City's police and the largest police corruption scandal since the Knapp Commission investigation in 1970. For his contribution to Newsday's team coverage of the Happy Land unlicensed social club arson fire, he shares in a Sigma Delta Chi award. Esposito became the City Editor of Newsday and went on to become Metro Editor of the New York Daily News where his paper's extensive coverage of the 1993 World Trade Center attack won the Associated Press Spot News award.

He is the co-author with Ted Gerstein of "Bomb Squad: A Year Inside the Nation's Most Exclusive Police Unit" (Hyperion, 2007) and of one prior non-fiction book: *Dead on Delivery* (Warner Books, 1992) with Drug Enforcement Administration agent Robert Stutman.



Janice Fedarcyk
Assistant Director in Charge
Federal Bureau of Investigation,
New York Field Office

Ms. Fedarcyk entered on duty as a Special Agent with the FBI in 1987. In November 1996, she promoted to FBI Headquarters (FBIHQ), Strategic Information and Operations Center. In 1998, she was the first FBI liaison assigned to the National Center for

Missing and Exploited Children. She transferred to the Baltimore Division in 1999, where she supervised an Innocent Images National Initiative squad.

In 2001, she returned to FBIHQ as an Assistant Inspector Team Leader in the Inspection Division. In 2003, she was selected as the Assistant Section Chief of the Terrorist Financing Operations Section. She promoted to Assistant Special Agent in Charge in the FBI's Critical Incident Response Group, National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime.

Ms. Fedarcyk promoted to serve as the FBI's representative to the National Counterterrorism Center, Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning in March 2005. In January 2006, she promoted to the position of Inspector at FBIHQ, where she led inspection teams in comprehensive assessments of FBI offices and entities.

In February 2007, she was named Special Agent in Charge of the Counterterrorism Division in the Los Angeles Division, a challenging multi-threat environment.

On January 23, 2008, she reported to the Philadelphia Field Office, where she led all FBI programs to address threats and crime problems. Ms. Fedarcyk reported to the New York Division as Assistant Director in Charge in August, 2010.



Michael Ferrence Jr.
Executive Director, LinCT-AA and
Senior Partner

Academy Leadership Associates
As a senior partner of the Academy Leadership Associates (ALA), LLC, Michael Ferrence Jr. specializes in leadership training and development,

program design, organizational program and process evaluations, and performance consultation. Mike was a former program manager of an international counter-terrorism leadership training program which he co-designed and currently serves as the Executive Director for a professional association of program graduates. He was a managing Subject Matter Expert on the design and development of an international training academy counter terrorism curriculum, and advisor for several other terrorism training related projects.

Mike has 36 years of law enforcement experience including ten years of municipal policing (two years as a Police Chief), 26 years with the FBI including nine years as program manager for leadership development at the FBI Academy as the Chief of the Leadership Development Institute.



Mary Fetchet
Founding Director
VOICES of September 11th

Mary Fetchet, LCSW, Founding Director of VOICES of September 11th, co-founded VOICES following the death of her 24 year old son Brad at the World Trade Center. Ms. Fetchet worked as a clinical social worker since 1994.

Ms. Fetchet's expertise as a social worker and victims' advocate influenced VOICES' innovative approach to providing a wide range of long-term support services for those impacted by 9/11.

Ms. Fetchet has advocated for the 9/11 Commission to promote the creation of the 9/11 Commission and recommendations for government reform. She testified before the 9/11 Commission and US Congress on five occasions. Her work has received national recognition including the 'Connecticut Hero' award by Senator Joseph Lieberman, ABC News Person of the Year and Making a Difference, NBC Nightly News with Brian Williams. Voices of September 11th was founded in 2001 to provide information, a wide range of support services and commemorative events, as well as promote public policy to make the country safer. With offices in Connecticut, New Jersey and Washington, DC, VOICES membership has grown to over 14,000 and in 2011 VOICES website had over 18 million hits.



David Gardner
7/7 Survivor
UK

David survived the London bombings on 7th July 2005. Reading a play script, seated feet away from Mohammed Siddique Khan as he detonated his bomb on a tube train leaving Edgware Road station, David

was thrown from his seat as the carriage became engulfed in fire, smoke and debris. David sustained life-threatening injuries. David is an Ambassador for the Douglas Bader Foundation, a charity providing support and encouragement for people with limb loss in the UK and overseas. He has also attended the annual Amputee Games at the Stoke Mandeville Stadium in the UK in recent years, where David has relished the opportunity of trying out a number of paralympic sports alongside other amputees. David's response to 7/7, as reported in the press, has been one of determination to get on with life and focus on the positive. In a Testimony Films documentary: The Angels of Edgware Road (2008) David speaks of the love and compassion he experienced on the tube train and in the weeks and months that followed. David gave evidence at the Coroner's Inquests into the London Bombings of 7th July 2005. In her final remarks to David, Lady Justice Hallett commented: "I'm sure we are really glad that you are alive and you haven't allowed your most horrific ordeal to dampen your spirit."



TJ Kennedy
Director of Public Safety and Security
Raytheon


Mr. Kennedy is the Director of Public Safety and Security for Raytheon. The area he leads is focused on Mission Critical Communications, Public Safety, and large Security Systems. Mr. Kennedy brings twenty years of Public Safety and Security experience to this leadership position. Prior to joining

Raytheon, he was a Vice President at Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC).

Mr. Kennedy has international business experience gained through two years of leading a large integrated C4I program team for the Athens, Greece office of SAIC as consulting related to Public Safety work at multiple Olympic Games. He served as the Deputy Program Manager for the Public Safety C4I project for the Athens 2004 Summer Olympic Games in Athens, Greece.

Prior to working at SAIC, Mr. Kennedy was the public safety project manager for Police, Fire and EMS agencies on the Wasatch Back. He also served as the Director for Olympic Aviation for the Utah Olympic Public Safety Command (UOPSC).

Prior to working on the Olympics full time he was the EMS Coordinator for the Utah Highway Patrol and also served in numerous sworn officer capacities within the Utah Department of Public Safety. Mr. Kennedy is currently on the National Center for Spectator Sports, Safety, and Security (NCS4) Lab Advisory Board.



Clark Kimerer
Deputy Chief
Chief of Staff – Seattle Police
Department

Clark Kimerer is beginning his 29th year with the Seattle Police Department. As Deputy Chief, he is second-in-command to Chief John Diaz. He promoted to Sergeant in July of 1987

and was assigned to the 1990 Goodwill Games Planning Group. He promoted to Lieutenant in 1989, and continued as Lead Planner for this group through its completion. From 1985 to 1992, he was Chief Negotiator for the SPD Hostage Negotiation Team. He served as Captain of the West (Headquarters) Precinct from 1992 to 1996, and later commanded the Internal Investigations Section and the Vice & Narcotics Section. Chief Kimerer promoted to Assistant Chief in January 1999, and served as Department Chief of Staff until his promotion in October 2001 to Deputy Chief.


He is also the Director of the City of Seattle Emergency Operation Center. He oversaw the planning and execution of the TOPOFF2 exercise held in Seattle. He was asked to join the Editorial Board of "Homeland Security Affairs." In 2006, he was appointed as a syndicate leader and instructor for the first "Leadership in Counterterrorism (LinCT)" program. He currently serves as a Facilitator and Subject Matter Expert for the Center for Homeland Defense and Security Mobile Education Team.



Pat Koch
Senior Risk Management Advisor
Transit Police in the Province of
British Columbia

Patrick retired from the Canadian Armed Forces at the rank of Lieutenant Colonel after a career spanning 26 years. Almost half of Patrick's career was spent within a multi-agency, multi-

national environment dealing with counter-terrorism. Specific missions included Canada's role in the province of Khandahar Afghanistan, and as a military embed in the RCMP led Integrated Security Unit responsible for the planning and delivery of security for the 2010 Winter Games. Patrick is currently employed as the Senior Risk Management Advisor to the Transit Police in the Province of British Columbia.



Steve Lancaster
Assistant Commissioner
Australian Federal Police

Assistant Commissioner Steve Lancaster began his policing career with the Australian Federal Police in 1982. Since then, Steve has held a range of roles across local, national and international operations.

As Superintendent Sydney Operations, Steve coordinated general Federal Operations and led investigations into Counter Terrorism Operations. Steve was then promoted to Commander and appointed as Deputy Chief Police Officer - Response, ACT Policing. In this role he commanded General Duties, Specialist Response and Security and Traffic Operations.

In 2006, Steve was selected to command Operation Serene - the AFP response to civil unrest in Timor Leste. Steve was awarded the Australian Police Medal (APM) in 2007 for distinguished service, particularly as the AFP Contingent Commander to Operation Serene.

Following the successful transition of the AFP mission in Timor Leste to a United Nations Police mission, Steve was transferred to establish and command the newly formed Operational Response Group (ORG). The ORG combines tactical policing capabilities with a high readiness crisis response to international peacekeeping missions and is functionally aligned to the AFP's International Deployment Group.

In June 2009, Steve was transferred to the Counter Terrorism (CT) portfolio as the Manager of CT International and in December 2009 was promoted to Assistant Commissioner, taking on the role of National Manager CT.



Charles Lawson
Director General, Ottawa Region
Canadian Security Intelligence Service

After graduating from the University of British Columbia and spending some time living and working abroad, Mr Lawson joined the CSIS in 1990 as an Intelligence Officer. Over the course of his 22 years with

the Service, Mr Lawson has worked in a variety of headquarters and field settings across Canada and has had responsibilities cutting across all of the Service's major operational program areas.

Appointed to the CSIS Executive Level in 2004, Mr. Lawson has held senior management positions in both headquarters and the field. In 2006, Mr. Lawson was assigned to the Headquarters International Terrorism Branch where he spent the next 5 years; the last 2 of these as the Branch's Director General. In 2007, Mr. Lawson completed the Leadership in Counter Terrorism (Atlantic) course. In September 2011, Mr. Lawson assumed responsibility for his current position as Regional Director General, Ottawa. In this capacity, Mr. Lawson is responsible for the overall administration and operational management of the CSIS' responsibilities in Canada's National Capital Region, Eastern Ontario and Southwestern Quebec, much of Northern Ontario, and the Territory of Nunavut.



Brian MacDonald
Acting Deputy Chief
Transit Police,
Lower Mainland British Columbia

Brian MacDonald is the acting Deputy Chief (Operations) of the Transit Police for the Lower Mainland of British Columbia serving Vancouver and surrounding municipalities. In 2010

Brian retired from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police having served in Drug Enforcement, Patrol, Major Crime, National Security Enforcement and the 1985 Air India Disaster Task Force. He is a LINCT program alumnus from the Atlantic program in 2005.




John McDonald
Director of NOC, 24/7 Watch Desk
United Airlines Corporate Security

John McDonald is the Director of the NOC 24/7 Watch Desk and Crew Security with United Airlines Corporate Security. In his current role John oversees and manages all aspects of crew security. He also supervises the 24/7 watch desk which serves as a single point of contact for all companywide security-related issues. John has been with United Airlines for 25 years.

During his employment, he held various positions with the company, such as a Manager of Corporate Security, a Senior Staff Representative and a Security Supervisor at O'Hare International Airport. Prior to joining United Airlines, John worked as a Director of Airport Operations at O'Hare International Airport with Andy Frain Services. He was responsible for security not only at O'Hare Airport, but for providing security services at various sporting and other special events, such as Kentucky Derby, the Democratic National Convention in San Francisco in 1984 and others.



LAPD-LINCT International Counter-Terrorism Conference



Philip Mudd
President
Mudd Management

Philip Mudd joined the Central Intelligence Agency in 1985. He began work in the CIA's Counterterrorist Center in 1992 and then served on the National Intelligence Council as the Deputy National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia (1995-98). Mr. Mudd then went on to manage Iraq analysis at the CIA (1999-2001).

Mr. Mudd began a policy assignment at the White House in 2001, detailed from CIA to serve as the Director for Gulf Affairs on the White House National Security Council. He left after the September 11 attacks for a short assignment as the CIA member of the small diplomatic team that helped piece together a new government for Afghanistan. He returned in 2002 to become second-in-charge of counterterrorism analysis in the Counterterrorist Center. He was promoted to Deputy Director of the Center in 2003 and served until 2005.

In 2005, FBI Director Mueller appointed Mr. Mudd to serve as the Branch's first-ever deputy director. He later became the FBI's Senior Intelligence Adviser. Mr. Mudd resigned from government service in March 2010.

Mr. Mudd is President of Mudd Management, a company specializing in security consulting; analytic training; and public speaking about security issues.

THE INTERNATIONAL
CENTRE FOR THE STUDY
OF RADICALISATION AND
POLITICAL VIOLENCE




Peter Neumann
Professor of Security
Studies
Department of War
Studies, King's College

Peter Neumann is Professor of Security Studies at the Department of War Studies, King's College London, and serves as Director of the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, which he founded in early 2008.

Professor Neumann has authored or co-authored five books, including *Old and New Terrorism* and *The Strategy of Terrorism* (with MLR Smith). He is the author of numerous peer-reviewed articles, dealing with different aspects of terrorism and radicalization, especially 'homegrown' radicalization in Western countries.

He has led research projects and written influential policy reports about issues such as online radicalization, prison-based de-radicalization programs, and terrorist recruitment in Europe. The most recent "Preventing Violent Radicalization in America."

Professor Neumann is a member of the editorial boards of two leading, peer-reviewed journals, *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* and *Democracy and Security*, and serves as investigator for the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism at the University of Maryland. He is an Affiliate of the European Commission's European Network of Experts on Radicalisation, a member of the German Federal Criminal Office's European Expert Network on Terrorism Issues, and sits on the advisory boards of numerous other think-tanks and institutions. He has given evidence before committees of the U.S. House of Representatives and the UK House of Commons, and served as an expert witness for the UK's Crown Prosecution Service.



Alan Orlob
Senior Vice President,
Global Safety and Security
Marriott International

Alan is Vice President of Global Safety and Security for Marriott International. In his role, he oversees all safety and security operations and directs the crisis management program. Prior to working for Marriott, Alan was the corporate security director for Al Ghanim International, managing a close protection

detail and had been the Director of Public Safety at Snowbird, Utah. He served with U.S. Army Special Forces, both active and reserve for a total of 24 years.

He is a member and former committee chairman of the U.S. State Department's Overseas Security Advisory Council and was a founding member of the Hotel Security Working Group.

He has spoken on how businesses identified as soft targets can protect themselves against the threat of terrorism. He has written several articles on this subject as well as a chapter in the book, "Homeland Security". He serves on the Board of Directors of the International Security Management Association and on the Board of Directors for the Orange County Sheriff's Homeland Security Advisory Council. He served as a consultant with the U.S. State Department's Anti-terrorism Assistance Program on hotel security and was a stakeholder on a RAND initiative on counter-surveillance. Following the Mumbai terror attacks, he testified before the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security in January, 2009.



Sue O'Sullivan
Federal Ombudsman for Victims of Crime
Canada

Sue O'Sullivan, a 30-year Law enforcement veteran and former Deputy Chief of Police for the Ottawa Police Services, began her term as Canada's Federal Ombudsman for Victims of Crime August 16, 2010.

Throughout her law enforcement career, Ms. O'Sullivan has served in Patrol, Criminal Investigative Services and Operations Support. Ms. O'Sullivan has been a member of the Leadership in Counter Terrorism Alumni Association, a group of senior professional executives who work together to influence local, national and international counter terrorism strategy, and has acted as an advisor to the Auditor General of Canada on National Security in Canada - The 2001 Anti-Terrorism Initiative Audit.

Throughout her career, Ms. O'Sullivan has continually advocated to increase the efficiency of services to victims. Prior to her appointment, Ms. O'Sullivan worked with stakeholders from the victim services community and all three levels of government to develop a coordinated victim assistance program.

Ms. O'Sullivan has been recognized for her leadership both within the service and in the community. Her honors include the Governor General's Officer of the Order of Merit of the Police Forces Award, the Queen's Golden Jubilee Medal, the Governor General's Exemplary Service Medal and the House of Commons Leadership Award, the YWCA Women of Distinction Award, the St. Joe's Women's Centre Quality of Life Award, and the Circle of Canadians Community Service Award.



Luann Pannell
Director, Police Training and Education

Los Angeles Police Department
Dr. Luann Pannell, began her career with LAPD as a Police Psychologist in 2000, in 2006 she was promoted to Director of Police Training and Education. She is responsible for the review and evaluation of all LAPD training curricula to ensure relevancy,

continuity, and compliance with State and Federal criteria and Department policy.

Her commitment to collaboration has enhanced a variety of community relationships with LAPD and has resulted in new training. By designing new LAPD training, LAPD has been able to incorporate feedback from several key communities on topics such as Fair and Equitable Policing for the Lesbian Gay Bisexual Transgender Community, Mental Illness and Autism.

Dr. Pannell is a distinguished instructor in several LAPD schools including the LAPD and LAFD Leadership Programs and the Command Development Course. She has been one of the co-authors and presenters of the "Vicarious Trauma: Why it Hurts to Help" course to law enforcement professionals and first responders throughout the country.

Prior to joining LAPD, Dr. Pannell spent several years working within Community Mental Health and the Veteran's Administration. Dr. Pannell has written articles and presented at psychological conferences on the relationship between exposure to community violence and psychological distress, the collaboration between Mental Health Professionals and Law Enforcement, and improving training outcomes for law enforcement.



Jenny Presswalla
Inter-Agency Coordination Officer
National Counter Terrorism Center

Jenny Presswalla is an Inter-Agency Coordination Officer for the Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Group at the National Counterterrorism Center in

Washington, DC, where she leads the Federal Government's coordination on CVE Training. Prior to joining NCTC, she was a Policy Advisor in the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, where she created and delivered CVE training for government officials and law enforcement.

Also at CRCL, Jenny managed the office's engagement program of diverse American communities in Los Angeles and of young leaders nationwide, leading regular roundtables between communities and government on civil rights issues. Before joining DHS, Jenny was a National Security Education Program Boren Fellow in Mumbai, India. She graduated with a Master of Arts in International Relations from American University and a Bachelor's in Psychology at the University of Florida.



Wes Rhodes
Deputy Chief
Technology Officer
Federal CTO Strategy and Technology,
IBM

Wesley Rhodes is the Deputy Chief Technology Officer. Mr. Rhodes has 34 years of information technology experience in National Defense, National Security, Retail, Manufacturing, Food Service, Chemical,

Petroleum, Utility, and Energy Services industries. Mr. Rhodes specializes in high risk, cutting-edge technology development as well as program management, and has led many leap-ahead transformations leveraging CLOUD, cyber defense, advanced analytics, extreme scale information management, and STREAMS processing. Mr. Rhodes is the Director of the IBM Network Science Research Center, is on the board of advisors for the EDGE defense industry consortium, is the chairman of the board of directors for the NCOIC international defense industry consortium, and is the Chief Operating Officer of Sensemaking, a new IBM big data relevancy technology.

Wesley is the Co-Chief Architect for the 95th CAB (Airborne) (91st, 92nd, 96th, 97th, 98th battalions, Civil Military Operations Center) as well as the Canadian National Defense Forces' Human Effects Advisor Team (HEAT) (1st, 2nd, 4th Canadian Mechanized Brigades).

Wesley Rhodes has received numerous performance and special awards over his career. He was awarded the Eagle Award in 2006, awarded the Project Management Excellence Award in 2007, and awarded Supplier of the Year in 2009 and 2011.




Mitchell Silber
Director of Intelligence Analysis
New City Police Department

Mitch serves as the Director of both the NYPD Intelligence Division's Analytic and Cyber Units. As part of his responsibilities, he supervises the analysis of the portfolio of terrorism related investigations within the Intelligence Division. Mitch has been a member of NYPD for seven years.

Mitch is the co-author of the 2007 NYPD report - Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat. He has presented on behalf of the NYPD at the White House, National Security Council, CIA, FBI, National Counterterrorism Center and testified before the U.S. Senate. Mitch is a visiting lecturer at Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA) where he teaches a course on Modern Urban Counterterrorism. Mitch serves on the Dean's Advisory Board at SIPA and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. He is the author of the The Al Qaeda Factor: Plots Against the West, released in December 2011.

Prior to joining the NYPD, Mitch completed Columbia University's Masters Program in International Affairs where he specialized in Middle East studies, with a concentration on Saudi Arabia. Before earning his Masters Degree at Columbia, Mitch spent nine years in corporate finance as a partner at The Carson Group and as a principal at Evolution Capital, LLC.



Joumana Silyan-Saba
City of Los Angeles
Human Relations Commission
Community Development Department

Joumana Silyan-Saba is a Senior Policy Analyst for the City of Los Angeles Human Relations Commission (City HRC). She works directly with communities to promote healthy inter-group relations and create collaborative

templates to encourage civic engagement. Her efforts include working with faith and civic leaders, civil rights organizations, policy makers and academic institutes to bridge divides and address social justice concerns. Within the government structures her focus includes working with local, state and federal agencies to provide technical assistance and recommendations aimed to improve community-government relations and expand community engagement concepts.

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


Pete Sparks
Detective Inspector
Counter Terrorism Command
New Scotland Yard

Pete Sparks has 22 years policing experience in the Metropolitan Police. He has worked in Counter Terrorism and previously as a Homicide detective for the last 14 years. He is the Family Liaison Coordinator in terrorism investigations and for UK citizens killed

overseas in similar incidents. He was in this role for the 7th July London bombings, the Lashkar e Taiba led attacks in Mumbai and more recently in Kenya following a number of kidnaps and murder of UK citizens by Somali pirates. He is currently training Family Liaison officers throughout the UK in Counter Terrorism awareness and Disaster Victim identification to ensure that all Police forces are prepared for the London Olympics.

Detective Inspector Sparks was the Investigating Officer for the recent Coroner's inquest into the 52 murders that occurred during the terrorist attacks on the transport system in London on 7th July 2005. He is trained in Advanced DVI procedures and has attended the Inter Disciplinary Center in Herzliya, Israel dealing with the Psycho-Social after effects of terrorist attacks on victims. He is a regular presenter for the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime. He has been trained by the UK Military to enable him to be deployed in hostile environments internationally.



Joseph Stewart OBE LLB
FCMI FCIPD JP
Director of Human Resources
Police Service of Northern Ireland

As Director of Human Resources, Mr. Stewart is responsible for the department, which manages the Recruitment, Training and Development of all police and police staff. Responsibility for Equality and Diversity, Health and Safety and Occupational Health and Welfare also sits with this department.

Around 500 police and police staff in multiple locations are managed by the department with a spending of almost £40 million annum allocated to facilitate training and the various human resource functions.


Since his appointment Mr. Stewart has fully re-organized the Health and Safety and Occupational Health and Welfare function in the PSNI increasing their effectiveness and ensuring that they are class leading. Mr. Stewart is currently national lead for a Healthier and Safer workforce on behalf of the Association of Chief Police Officers.



Stuart Thorn
Deputy Director General
Australian Security Intelligence
Organisation

Mr. Thorn is the Deputy Director-General, Australian Security -

Intelligence Organisation. Mr Thorn joined the Organisation in 1985. He has worked in a range of analytical and operational areas. Mr Thorn has served as the Organisation's senior representative in Washington and as manager of the Sydney Office in the lead up to and during the 2000 Olympics. He has also served as head of the Organisation's Technical Division. Mr Thorn was promoted to Deputy Director-General in July 2007.



Warren Tucker
Director
New Zealand Security Intelligence Service

Warren was educated at Nelson College and the University of Canterbury. He graduated BE (Hons) and PhD (both in Electrical Engineering) in 1973 and 1978 respectively and qualified as a

Registered Engineer. Warren joined the New Zealand Army (RNZ Sigs) in 1979 as a specialist Defense communications systems planner. He retired from the Army in 1982 (with the rank of Major) and joined the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB). He held a variety of roles during his career in the GCSB, including a posting to the National Security Agency in Washington as the first formally accredited New Zealand Liaison Officer (NZLOW). He returned to GCSB in September 1989 as Director, SIGINT Operations. On 1 July 1996 he was appointed Intelligence Coordinator in the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Warren was appointed Director of the Government Communications Security Bureau with effect 13 December 1999.

From November 2000 until December 2010 he was Colonel Commandant of the Royal New Zealand Corps of Signals (with the rank of Honorary Colonel). He took up the position as Director of Security, New Zealand Security Intelligence Service, on 1 November 2006. Warren is a founding member and Patron of the New Zealand Institute of Intelligence Professionals (NZIIP).



Paul Vrbanac
Director General Toronto Region,
Canadian Security Intelligence Service
(CSIS)

Mr. Vrbanac is responsible for the overall administration and operational management of the CSIS's responsibilities for South and South Western Ontario, with offices in Toronto, Niagara Falls, Windsor and Pearson International Airport. Joining the CSIS in 1985 as an Intelligence Officer Mr. Vrbanac has served as an Investigator, Analyst and Liaison Officer in various Regional offices across Canada, at the Canadian Embassy in Washington DC as well as in the CSIS's National Headquarters in Ottawa.

Appointed to Executive Level within the CSIS in 2001, Mr. Vrbanac's previous management assignments have included the positions of Operational Chief Counter Intelligence Branch and Director General International Region at the CSIS HQ in Ottawa and Deputy Director General Operations Toronto Region. In September 2009 Mr. Vrbanac was appointed to his current position as Regional Director General Toronto. Mr. Vrbanac is a 2009 graduate of the RCMP co-sponsored Leadership in Counter Terrorism International course. Married to Meredith Vrbanac with 4 children, Mr. Vrbanac and his family currently reside in Georgetown, Ontario.



HARVARD Kennedy School

*Program in Criminal Justice
Policy and Management*

Policing Los Angeles Under a Consent Decree: The Dynamics of Change at the LAPD

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Todd Foglesong
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May 2009

www.hks.harvard.edu/criminaljustice

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City's Supplemental Disclosures 000117

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This report was produced by the Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management at the Harvard Kennedy School. Copies of this report are available at www.hks.harvard.edu/criminaljustice.

Executive Summary

The Los Angeles Police Department is today completing one of the most ambitious experiments in police reform ever attempted in an American city. After a decade of policing crises that began with the beating of Rodney King in 1991 and culminated in the Rampart police corruption scandal in 1999, the U.S. Department of Justice announced in May 2000 that it had accumulated enough evidence to sue the City of Los Angeles over a pattern-and-practice of police misconduct. Later that year, the city government entered a “consent decree” promising to adopt scores of reform measures under the supervision of the Federal Court.

The experiment in police reform in Los Angeles has two components: the consent decree produced by the Justice Department’s intervention, and the leadership of Chief William Bratton, who since 2002 has focused the Department’s attention simultaneously on reducing crime, improving morale, and complying fully with the consent decree. What has the experience in Los Angeles revealed about policing under a consent decree? Has the consent decree achieved its purpose? How is the Los Angeles Police Department controlling its use of force; what is the state of police-community relations; how rigorous is the governance and oversight of the LAPD; and how is the culture of the Department changing? Most important, as the LAPD has incorporated the policies and practices specified in the consent decree into its own operations and management, has the Department won the public’s trust and confidence while reducing crime and bringing offenders to justice?

To answer those questions, we examined the LAPD using multiple research methods. We undertook hundreds of hours of participant observation from patrol to the command staff; we analyzed administrative data on crime, arrests, stops, civilian complaints, police personnel, and the use of force. We compiled surveys conducted over the last decade of police officers and residents of Los Angeles, and then conducted three surveys of our own, one of residents, another of LAPD officers, and a third of detainees recently arrested by the LAPD. Finally, we conducted a series of formal focus groups and structured interviews with police officers, public officials, and residents of Los Angeles. While some questions remain unanswered, this ranks among the most comprehensive assessments ever conducted of a police department outside of a time of crisis.

We found the LAPD much changed from eight years ago, and even more so in the last four or five years. Public satisfaction is up, with 83 percent of residents saying the LAPD is doing a good or excellent job; the frequency of the use of serious force has fallen each year since 2004. Despite the views of some officers that the consent decree inhibits them, there is no objective sign of so-called “de-policing” since 2002; indeed, we found that both the quantity and quality of enforcement activity have risen substantially over that period. The greater *quantity* is evident in the doubling of both pedestrian stops and motor vehicle stops since 2002, and in the rise in arrests over that same period. The greater *quality of stops* is evident in the higher proportion resulting in an arrest, and the *quality of arrests* is evident in the higher proportion in which the District Attorney files felony charges.

Our analysis confirmed what others have previously reported: that serious crime is down substantially in Los Angeles over this same period. Indeed, recorded crime is down in every police division in the city. A majority of Los Angeles residents no longer rate crime as a big problem, substantially down from only four years ago, and that is true among Black and Hispanic as well as White and Asian residents.

We asked residents specifically if they think the LAPD could police effectively while also respecting people's rights and policing within the law. More than twice as many residents see improvement than see deterioration, and the vast majority of each racial and ethnic group is hopeful that this kind of policing will soon be routine.

Both the management and the governance of the LAPD have also changed for the better under the decree. The officer tracking system known as TEAMS II is forcing supervisors to pay attention to officers who attract more civilian complaints or more frequently use force than their peers; and the management tool known as CompStat has helped to transform the Department's captains into strategic commanders, accountable for reducing crime while maintaining integrity and building public trust in police, one of several initiatives that go well beyond what the consent decree requires. In terms of governance, the Police Commission and the Inspector General have, in particular, enhanced the scrutiny of the Department's use of force, and of its handling of civilian complaints.

We found persistent differences in the experience of policing among Hispanic residents of LA and more so for Black residents. More than two-thirds of Hispanic and Black residents think well of the job the LAPD is doing today, rating it as good or excellent; yet a substantial minority within each of these groups remains unsatisfied with the Department, and ten percent of Black residents report that almost none of the LAPD officers they encounter treat them and their friends and families with respect. We therefore found it encouraging that, when looking ahead to the next three years, Black residents of Los Angeles are among the most hopeful about the Department.

In sum, the evidence here shows that with both strong police leadership and strong police oversight, cities can enjoy both respectful and effective policing. The LAPD remains aggressive and is again proud, but community engagement and partnership is now part of the mainstream culture of the Department. The Department responds to crime and disorder with substantial force, but it is scrutinizing that force closely and it is accountable through many devices for its proper use. Will the management and oversight improvements persist if the consent decree ends? Better yet, will management and oversight become still stronger? While we cannot answer those questions in advance, the LAPD appears ready for that test.

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Acknowledgements

The research described in this report has its origins in conversations at the Executive Session on Policing and Public Safety, a joint undertaking of our program at the Harvard Kennedy School and the National Institute of Justice. Since January 2008, the Session has convened police executives in a structured discussion with scholars and others concerned with the future of policing. At the first meeting of the Session, several participants shared their own experiences of leading police departments subject to federal consent decrees or equivalent agreements with the U.S. Justice Department. Following that conversation, William Bratton suggested that the field of policing as a whole would benefit from a thorough, independent look at the experience in Los Angeles. Without his initiative and support, this research would not have been possible.

The Los Angeles Police Foundation provided financial support for the research, and Beth Ryan at the Foundation proved to be an invaluable partner throughout the research. At Harvard, Rachel Krebs at the Committee on the Use of Human Subjects shepherded our research design through several probing discussions with staff and committee members. Francine Cafarchia and the staff of the Interviewing Service of America also proved to be energetic, dedicated partners.

We benefitted from the insights of experts who have spent years studying and helping to improve policing in Los Angeles. Wellford Wilms and John Linder graciously shared the results of their own, earlier surveys of LAPD officers. Jennifer Magnabosco and Brianne Barclay at the Leavey Center for the Study of Los Angeles generously supplied us with data from several surveys of L.A. residents. Steve Cooley, the Los Angeles District Attorney, and Arif Alikhan, the Deputy Mayor responsible for public safety, kindly made themselves available for interviews. Merrick Bobb and Connie Rice spoke with us at length about changes in policing over time in the city of Los Angeles. Police Administrator Gerald Chaleff and the staff of the LAPD's Consent Decree Bureau shared both their offices and views about the evolution of policing in Los Angeles. Jeff Godown and the staff of CompStat unit repeatedly produced data we requested on crime and police activities. Maggie Goodrich and the staff of the TEAMS II Development Bureau handled our requests for data with patience and alacrity. Members of the Police Board of Commissioners generously shared their experiences and ambitions for the Department, as did the Commission's Executive Director, Richard Tefank, and Inspector General Andre Birotte. Captain Kevin McClure, Assistant Commanding Officer of the Consent Decree Bureau, has our enduring gratitude for coordinating all aspects of our collaboration.

We owe continuing thanks to our colleagues in the Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management and collaborators farther afield. Baillie Aaron made sense of voluminous survey and administrative data, Marea Beeman coordinated protections for our research subjects, and Brian Welch supported every aspect of the work. We could not have conducted this research without a superb group of students: Sarah Agudo, Salvador Arrona, Stephen Carrabino, Victoria Ianni, David Maynier, Justin Pasquariello, Angelica Salazar, Christina Sanchez, and Alexandra Schepens. We draw on their interviews and insights throughout this report. The research team also included two experts from outside our program who conducted field research and provided crucial analytic assistance: William Andrews, an expert in police systems management, and Dr. Andres Rengifo, a criminologist at the University of St. Louis, Missouri.

We reserve our deepest gratitude for the nearly two thousand officers of the LAPD and an equal number of LA residents who shared their experiences and views: completing our surveys, speaking in focus groups, and giving us their time. We hope this report advances their shared ambition for respectful and effective policing in the City of Los Angeles.

1. Introduction

A Noticeable Difference

Policing in Los Angeles today is noticeably different from what it was only a few years ago. The quality of service to residents is higher, the perception of the LAPD as fair has risen, and the use of force is down.

Many residents of Los Angeles have noticed the difference. Today, 83 percent of residents say that the LAPD is doing a good or excellent job, up from 71 percent only 2 years ago, with the subgroup answering “excellent” doubling. On the sensitive issue of relations between police and racial or ethnic minorities, the percentage of residents saying that the police in their communities treat members of all racial and ethnic groups fairly “almost all the time” or “most of the time,” rose from 44 percent in 2005 to 51 percent today. And a majority of every racial and ethnic group in Los Angeles today reports that, based on their personal experience, most LAPD officers treat them, their friends, and family with respect. Incidents involving a serious use of force by a police officer are down by 15 percent over that same period.

Residents and statisticians are not the only ones who have noticed the change. In confidential interviews, several police officers described the change in the Department’s treatment of the public. As one officer explained:

When I came on the job the department was a little more callous. We take a different approach now and it’s for the better.

And as another put it:

Are the patrol officers treating people better? Yeah, they have to. When I came on the job some cops treated people like shit. Now they can’t.

But another officer cautioned:

Cops are way better in their treatment of the public, but we still have to guard against becoming callous.

Even people who have been arrested many times over these years by the Los Angeles Police Department are able to describe the change in policing. As one fifty-year-old African-American told us a few hours after his latest arrest:

...the LAPD has been doing a better job. I don’t want to play the race card, but I see less racism. They talk to me like I’m a man, not a piece of trash.

These views are not unanimous. Indeed, we interviewed many LA residents, police officers, and arrestees who remain deeply unhappy with the performance of the police department and who want to see more improvement. The administrative data also tell a story of partial success; for example, the use of force is down overall, but not in every division.

Still, the trend is clear in every indicator we examined. As the chapters that follow describe in detail, public perceptions of the LAPD are improving, the satisfaction among police officers themselves is growing, management and oversight of the police department is stronger, and the quality as well as the quantity of enforcement activity are rising.

The Justice Department's Intervention and Consent Decree

We focus on these aspects of the police department's work and structure because controversy over these same aspects of policing gave rise to the federal, civil rights investigation that was settled in 2000 with a "consent decree." In that year, rather than fight a federal civil rights lawsuit alleging a "pattern-and-practice" of police misconduct, the Mayor, City Council, Police Commission, and Police Department signed a "consent decree" with the U.S. Department of Justice, giving the Federal District Court jurisdiction to oversee the LAPD's adoption of a series of specific management, supervisory, and enforcement practices. To monitor the LAPD's compliance with the terms of the consent decree, the Federal Court appointed a monitor on the joint recommendation of the Justice Department and the City.

The Federal Court's monitor has reported exhaustively on the City's and Department's compliance with the specific provisions of the consent decree, and we did not attempt to replicate that work here. Instead, this report takes a step back for a wider look at the issues that gave rise to the consent decree in the first place. We designed our research to answer the question: How has the LAPD changed since the consent decree? We focused on the professional work of the Department, its relations with the communities it serves, and its governance.

Some people believe that restraining a police department in its use of force, raising the standards for police stops, and tightening civilian oversight of police management all inevitably permit crime to rise by loosening the state's grip on criminals. The Los Angeles story proves such cynicism wrong. Indeed, the recent history of policing in Los Angeles demonstrates that respecting rights and reducing crime can be achieved together. Since 2003, as the police use of force declined, so did crime. As police-community relations improved, even in the poorest neighborhoods, so did public safety. The results in Los Angeles suggest that consent decrees can succeed and that the Justice Department can use its new power effectively at least in some circumstances.

Police work is difficult; police leadership complex. We undertook this study of the LAPD at the request of its chief, William Bratton. He believed that independent research would demonstrate that the Department had improved, though he knew the story would be uneven. And it *is* uneven. Crime is down in every police division, but plenty of police officers along with many LA residents are still unsatisfied with the Department's performance. This is not, in short, the end of the story. It is simply evidence that the Department knows how to improve, has improved, and will likely continue on that path, with or without the current level of scrutiny from the federal court.

Los Angeles and the Legacy of Police Misconduct

The Los Angeles Police Department may be the world's best known police service, but notoriety has not always been good for the LAPD. In March 1991, a home video of three Los Angeles police officers beating Rodney King while a sergeant supervised and other officers looked on appeared on television screens around the world, erasing whatever romantic images of the LAPD remained from television shows of earlier decades like *Dragnet* and *Adam-12*.

Within a month, the public outrage over the videotaped beating caused Los Angeles Mayor Tom Bradley to appoint an Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department, chaired by former U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher. The Christopher Commission, as it became known, examined the use of force in the LAPD and later that same year issued a blunt report:

The Commission found that there is a significant number of officers in the LAPD who repetitively use excessive force against the public and persistently ignore the written guidelines of the Department regarding force.... Graphic confirmation of improper attitudes and practices is provided by the brazen and extensive references to beatings and other excessive force in the M[obile] D[ata] T[erminal]s. The Commission also found that the problem of excessive force is exacerbated by racism and bias, again strikingly revealed in the MDTs. The failure to control these officers is a management issue that is at the heart of the problem. ... The Department not only failed to deal with the problem group of officers but it often rewarded them with positive evaluations and promotions.¹

In April 1992, when the three officers who beat Rodney King and their sergeant were acquitted of all criminal charges against them, Los Angeles exploded into several days of rioting that again filled television screens around the world and left more than fifty people dead. President George H.W. Bush addressed the nation on television from the Oval Office on the third night of the riots, describing his own reaction to the original videotape of Los Angeles police officers beating Rodney King:

What you saw and what I saw on the TV video was revolting. I felt anger. I felt pain. I thought: How can I explain this to my grandchildren? Civil rights leaders and just plain citizens fearful of and sometimes victimized by police brutality were deeply hurt. And I know good and decent policemen who were equally appalled. I spoke this morning to many leaders of the civil rights community. And they saw the video, as we all did. For 14 months they waited patiently, hopefully. They waited for the system to work. And when the verdict came in, they felt betrayed. Viewed from outside the trial, it was hard to understand how the verdict could possibly square with the video. Those civil rights leaders with whom I met were stunned. And so was I, and so was Barbara, and so were my kids.

¹ Forward to the Report of the Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department (1991), pages iii-iv.

As President Bush told the nation, he immediately directed the U.S. Attorney General to send lawyers from the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division to Los Angeles, but in 1992 these lawyers did not yet have the power to sue the City or the Department to stop any pattern of misconduct. All the Justice Department could do then was to seek criminal indictments against the individual police officers for violating Rodney King's civil rights. And that is what they did, winning convictions against two of the four officers, including the supervising sergeant, in April 1993.

The next year, Congress gave the U.S. Department of Justice new powers to address a pattern-and-practice of police misconduct, authorizing the Justice Department to sue a state or local government in federal court and seek civil, injunctive relief.² This is the provision of law under which the Department would later negotiate the 2000 consent decree with the City of Los Angeles.

In 1996, the Justice Department began a preliminary investigation to determine if it should use its new powers in Los Angeles, but the investigation did not progress until a further scandal erupted, centered on the anti-gang unit of the LAPD's Rampart Division. The scandal grew out of allegations made in 1999 by Rampart Division officer Rafael Pérez that approximately 70 officers had, along with him, participated in a wide array of illegal conduct, including shootings, beatings, framings, and perjury. The scandal led to the dismissal of more than a hundred criminal cases and payments of approximately 90 million dollars to settle civil law suits filed by victims of police misconduct.

In May 2000, the Justice Department announced it had assembled enough evidence to file a pattern-and-practice suit, but Justice Department officials said that they would wait to file the lawsuit in hopes of reaching a voluntary settlement. In September, as the Rampart Scandal grew, the mayor and police chief dropped their opposition to the consent decree and the City Council voted 10-2 to accept it. In November, three of four police officers tried as part of the Rampart scandal were the first to be convicted of misconduct, in this case planting evidence and framing alleged gang members.

The city's agreement to the consent decree was news across the United States. As *USA Today* explained in a front page story:

This week, the Los Angeles Police Department is expected to make a confession to the public: Corruption is widespread, and the department can't handle the problem by itself.

The admission will come in the form of a consent decree, a legally binding agreement with the Justice Department that calls for reforms in the nation's second-largest police force. ...

Officials hope the decree marks a new beginning for a department that hasn't shaken its dirty-cop image since the 1991 beating of Rodney King. ...

"Police reform has been an unfinished item on the Los Angeles agenda for almost a decade," says Bill Lann Lee, head of the Justice Department's Civil Rights

² The law, section 14141 of Title 42, United States Code, was adopted as part of the 1994 Crime Act.

Division. "This time, reform must be at the top of the agenda for as long as it takes to get the job done."³

The consent decree reiterated the Justice Department's allegations that the LAPD had engaged in a pattern of misconduct, but the decree also noted that the City and the Department denied any such misconduct. Instead, the parties settled the case "to provide for the expeditious implementation of remedial measures, to promote the use of the best available practices and procedures for police management, and to resolve the United States' claims without resort to adversarial litigation."⁴

The decree describes, in nearly two hundred numbered paragraphs, dozens of changes that the City committed to make in the way the LAPD operates. Some promised changes were huge:

- creating a new data system that tracks the performance of every sworn officer and alerts supervisors to signs that individual officers are headed for trouble
- creating new definitions, new rules, and new management systems governing the use of force by police officers
- creating new systems for tracking police stops of motor vehicles and pedestrians, breaking down the patterns by race and ethnicity, by the reasons for the stops, and by the results of the stops in terms of crime detected
- creating new management procedures in the LAPD's anti-gang unit and its other special divisions, tightening the management of "confidential informants" and otherwise increasing checks against possible corruption.

Other reforms that the City agreed to make were less comprehensive, but the result was a mass of changes so complicated that simply monitoring the City's compliance has cost tens of millions of dollars.

The consent decree gave the federal court continuing jurisdiction to enforce compliance with the decree. By the terms of the consent decree itself, the court's jurisdiction continued for at least five years, but could be extended. In June 2006, five years after the City began implementation, U.S. District Court Judge Garry Fees concluded that the City was not yet in substantial compliance with the decree and extended its term for three years. At this writing, Judge Fees is expected to consider again whether or not the City is in substantial compliance with the decree.

³ Scott Bowles, "LAPD agrees to list of reforms; U.S. will be watching" in *USA Today*, October 3, 2001, page 1A. Officials involved in the negotiations over the consent decree give varying accounts of the reasons for the city agreeing to settle the case without litigation, such as the political fallout from Rampart, or the Police Department's failure to follow through on earlier commitments to the Department of Justice over the implementation of an officer tracking database. We know of no authoritative account.

⁴ Consent Decree, paragraph 6.

The Crime Problem

No responsible official would pursue the reforms required by this kind of consent decree without attending simultaneously to the problem of crime. The consent decree itself does not discuss the need to reduce crime in Los Angeles, but no chief of police can afford to reform a department in ways that do not attend to crime problems, even while focusing on relations with residents and legal restraint on the use of force. By the same token, one way that police officers resist reforms required by a consent decree is by telling themselves and others that the reforms prevent them from dealing effectively with crime.

Indeed, the problem is more complex than this, for the fact of federal oversight itself, even apart from the specific provisions of the decree, can erode morale in a police department, sapping the confidence and spirit that effective policing requires. As one senior law-enforcement official outside the LAPD told us in describing the Department in 2000, after Rodney King, Rampart, and the consent decree, “morale was in the toilet.” The challenge for the leadership of the LAPD was not merely to carry out the reforms required by the decree, but to do so while rebuilding morale and reducing crime. The federal monitor would be measuring progress only on the first of those, but the Department’s leadership needed to attend to all three.


What is perhaps most remarkable about the story of policing in Los Angeles under the consent decree is that success in implementing the terms of the decree went hand-in-hand with improved morale and reductions in crime. In the first years, when the Department was led by officials who failed to implement the decree (perhaps because they had resisted and resented it from the start), crime in Los Angeles increased. Then, when new leadership in the Department began to drive implementation of the consent decree, the crime trend turned and fell. The pattern is unmistakable: recorded crime fell after 2002 during the period in which the decree was embraced by the leadership of the LAPD, after rising during the period in which implementation was stalled.

To understand this pattern, it helps to examine trends in recorded crime over a longer time frame.⁵ Between 1992 and 1999, as the chart below shows, the number of reported “index” (or Part One) crimes – rape, robbery, homicide, aggravated assault, larceny, burglary, and auto theft – decreased by 52 percent in Los Angeles.⁶ Property index crimes and violent index crimes fell in tandem, with the reduction in property crimes slightly exceeding that of the violent crimes (a 53% decline vs. a 48% decline). As Figure 1 illustrates, the rate of decline in both types of crime slowed in 1999 and then briefly reversed course. Between 2000 and 2002, total number of recorded index crimes increased 5 percent in the city of Los Angeles (from 179,483 to 188,341). From January 2003 to the end of 2008, the number of these crimes decreased 33.5 percent.

⁵ Rates of recorded crime decreased throughout the state of California as a whole in this period by 48 percent. The sustained reductions in reported crime in the US in the 1990s as well as in Canada are discussed by Frank Zimring in *The Great American Crime Decline*, Oxford, 2007.

⁶ The Uniform Crime Reports, compiled by the FBI from reports submitted by police agencies across the United States, divide crime into Part One and Part Two offenses. Part One offences are also termed “index crimes.”


Figure 1. Recorded Index Crime, Los Angeles, 1992-2008



The modest increase in recorded crime from 2000 to 2002 deserves special attention since it coincided with the signing of the consent decree. Did the signing of the consent decree in some way cause the increase in crime?


A thorough answer to these questions would require elaborate data on demographics, employment, and changes in policing in multiple jurisdictions, well beyond the scope of this research. But we did compare changes in recorded crime in Los Angeles in this period with trends in several adjacent communities as well as in the state as a whole and found that recorded crime rose and fell in similar ways until 2002. In Long Beach, Anaheim, Santa Ana, and Pasadena, for example, recorded index crime increased between 2000 and 2002. After 2002, index crime fell in all of our comparison cities with the exception of Pasadena, but in none of these cities did the magnitude of the reduction in crime match that of Los Angeles.⁷ Moreover, in Santa Ana, where total index crime fell 15 percent, nearly all of the reduction was in property crime. Violent index crime actually increased in Santa Ana, Anaheim, and Pasadena in this period, whereas it fell 48 percent in the city of Los Angeles.

⁷ Throughout the state of California, total index crime increased 9.3% between 2000 and 2002. Between 2003 and 2007, violent index crime fell 7.1%, and property index crime decreased 8.8%.




Recorded crime did not fall equally in all parts of the city of Los Angeles, though it did fall everywhere. In Harbor Division, recorded serious violent crime fell by more than 60 percent between 2000 and 2008, while in Newton it declined 25 percent. In all of the other divisions for which it is possible to measure change over time, there was at least a one-third decrease in recorded serious violent crime. In Central Division, the extent of the decline in property crime was greater than the decrease in recorded serious violent crime, but in every other division, the converse was true. The apparent decrease in violent crime is in some part the result of the change in the way that the LAPD classifies certain assaults described earlier.

Figure 3. Change in Recorded Index Crime in Los Angeles, 2000-2008, by Police Division



Source: LAPD Note: The apparent decline in violent index crime over this period is partly the result of a change in the way that the LAPD classifies certain assaults, in order to comply more strictly with guidelines for participation in the national Uniform Crime Reporting system. An unknown proportion of assaults that, before 2004, would have been classified as "aggravated" and therefore included as "Part One" or "index" crimes, have, since 2005, been classified as "Part Two" crimes. These assaults would be included in the 2000 baseline, but not in the 2008 comparison number.

Before we leave the issue of crime, it is important to recognize that Los Angeles residents have noticed the change in crime. Even over the last few years, crime as a problem among residents of Los Angeles has been receding. For example, when researchers asked residents in 2005 about crime, 58 percent described it as “a big problem.” In 2009, that had fallen to 38 percent. Indeed, fewer than half of LA residents in each racial and ethnic group today think of crime as a big problem, as shown in Figure 4.



Leadership

This research was originally requested by LA Police Chief William Bratton, who wanted an independent assessment of how the LAPD had changed. He did not want us to focus on his leadership, and we did not do so. Well before we began this research, Chief Bratton was firmly established as one of the world’s best known and most admired police leaders. Yet two features of the Los Angeles story seem to require that we highlight his role. First, Chief Bratton figures prominently in many if not most accounts of what has changed in the Los Angeles Police Department. In his public and private statements, he makes clear that he works for the Police Commission and he gives credit for any successes to the team he has assembled and the Department he leads. Still, his vision, his experience in other departments, and his confidence that the City and Department can meet the requirements of the consent decree are widely reported as factors driving the success of the LAPD. Second, his concern with professionalism, transparency, performance management in policing, and race relations in the United States are at least as important as the requirements of the consent decree in understanding what motivates the LAPD in its senior ranks. Before becoming chief, Bratton was a consultant to the monitor overseeing the consent decree in Los Angeles, a sign that his commitment to the consent decree process predates his leadership of the Department. Although this research does not separately examine Chief Bratton’s leadership, it is an essential element of every part of this story.

This Research

Against this backdrop, our research sought to understand how the LAPD has changed over the years of the consent decree. We specifically sought to understand changes in the Department itself, changes in its activity and performance, and changes in its relations with the communities it polices.

Conducting such research at the end of the period under study presents a range of methodological difficulties. Most challenging, we had no systematic baseline data of our own from which to measure changes. With the full cooperation of the LAPD, however, and with financial support from the Los Angeles Police Foundation, we were able to overcome that challenge by using a complex, multi-method design.

First, the research team conducted hundreds of hours of participant observation, riding along with patrol officers and sergeants, accompanying lieutenants and captains on their supervisory rounds, and joining meetings of the command staff on several occasions. We sat with the TEAMS II Development Bureau as its members worked through the data and reports, we observed CompStat meetings at the Bureau level and the Crime Control Meetings held at individual police divisions,⁸ and we attended meetings of the Police Commission and community meetings at which LAPD officers spoke.

Second, we conducted our own analyses of administrative data provided to us by the LAPD. Specifically, we conducted analyses on personnel data, arrest data, stops data, and civilian complaint data all covering the period 2000 to 2008. In addition, we analyzed crime data from 1992 to 2008, and data on the use of force from 2004 to 2008. Where, in tables and charts in this report, we identify the source as the LAPD, we mean the underlying data came from the Department, but the analyses and presentations are our own.

We did not conduct any surveys ourselves prior to 2009, but we did compile all of the previous surveys that we could find, including surveys of Los Angeles police officers conducted by Wellford Wilms in 1997, 1998, and 1999; a survey of Los Angeles police officers commissioned by a consultant to Chief Bratton in 2003; a series of surveys of Los Angeles residents conducted by the Public Policy Institute of California from 1998 to 2005; and a set of surveys conducted by the Leavey Center for the Study of Los Angeles from 1999 to 2007.

We then conducted three surveys of our own in 2009, repeating questions from the earlier surveys in order to draw comparisons. We commissioned a telephone survey, both to land-lines and to cell phones, in both Spanish and English, of a random sample of LA residents. The telephone survey generated 1,503 completed interviews, which we then weighted by age, race, ethnicity, and gender to produce a representative data set. We also commissioned a secure, internet-based survey of sworn officers within the LAPD. This survey produced 1,636 responses, which we weighted in order to produce a data set

⁸ The divisional level meetings are often also referred to by police officers as “CompStat” meetings, although they have a different format and narrower focus.

representative of the LAPD in terms of years of service in the Department. Finally, our team personally conducted a face-to-face survey of detainees recently arrested by the LAPD, asking many of the same questions that we asked in our telephone survey of Los Angeles residents about police-community relations.

Finally, we conducted a series of formal focus groups and structured interviews with police officers, police managers, members and staff of the Police Commission, the Inspector General and his staff, the District Attorney, community leaders, community residents, and youth in heavily policed neighborhoods.

Although many questions inevitably remain, this may be one of the most complete assessments ever conducted of a United States police organization outside of a time of crisis.⁹ This was possible only because of the goodwill of citizens with whom we spoke in many settings, and the complete cooperation and active assistance of officers and civilian staff throughout the Los Angeles Police Department.

⁹ This research does not approach the depth or subtlety of the empirical examination of the Chicago Police Department that Wesley Skogan and his colleagues have carried out over more than a decade. See: Wesley G. Skogan and Susan M. Hartnett, *Community Policing: Chicago Style*, Oxford University Press, 1999. We were inspired and guided by research similar to ours conducted before and after the termination of the consent decree concerning the Pittsburgh Bureau of Police. See: Robert C. Davis, Christopher W. Ortiz, Nicole J. Henderson, Joel Miller, and Michelle K. Massie, *Turning Necessity Into Virtue: Pittsburgh's Experience with a Federal Consent Decree*, Vera Institute of Justice, September 2002,

2. Change Inside the LAPD

Police organizations do not change easily. As in any high-stakes activity, stability and routines protect against risks, and the risks in policing can be deadly: both for police officers and for ordinary citizens. It is a good thing that changing a police organization is difficult.

Yet change in police organizations is also necessary. Like any modern enterprise, police agencies operate in complex, dynamic environments, requiring their leaders continuously to monitor not only their own organization's performance, but changes in the contexts within which they work. As new technologies become available, as migration reshapes the communities they police, and as public expectations grow, police leaders must find ways to promote change in their departments while managing the risks of innovation.


We looked for signs of change throughout the Los Angeles Police Department: from the composition of the Department itself to its front-line enforcement actions, its supervision, and its management. The fact of change inside the LAPD is widely acknowledged: everyone with whom we spoke described a panoply of changes, and every data set we analyzed showed a department performing differently than it was three, five, or ten years ago. Yet there is little agreement on the precise nature of the changes or their implications. For example, consider the mundane observation, ubiquitous among police officers of every rank, that the consent decree has burdened the police with increased paperwork and record keeping. In a focus group of front-line officers, one voiced the general consensus that "a report that took an hour before the consent decree, takes five now." In a focus group of front-line supervisors the paperwork burden was described as "a monster" to a room of nodding heads. Yet in a third focus group of front-line officers, we found apparent unanimity that performance reviews were "much improved." As these officers explained, better record keeping and the tracking of individual officers and detectives made their evaluations more accurate and meaningful. Despite their other complaints about the consent decree, this group agreed that improved evaluations were one of its good results. Increased paperwork, it seems, brings advantages as well as burdens, and the same is true for most of the changes we documented.

In the sections that follow, we describe the changes we found inside the LAPD, drawing on interviews and focus groups, analysis of administrative data, and hours of participant observation. On some topics, we were able merely to trace the differences in perspective, surfacing the competing hopes and concerns that some changes have provoked. On other topics, despite differing opinions within the Department, we were able to draw factual conclusions with a high degree of confidence, such as in our investigation of so-called "de-policing." We turn first, however, to the most basic of changes: the women and men who form the ranks of the LAPD.

The People of the Department

Because of a substantial reduction in size in the late 1990s, the recent growth of the LAPD has produced an organization only slightly larger today than it was a decade ago, but composed of quite different people. In June 1998, the Department employed 9,637


sworn officers. A decade later, in December 2008, it employed 9,830: an increase of two percent. Across this same period, the population of the City of Los Angeles grew about 10 percent, to slightly more than 4 million residents. The LAPD did increase its civilian employment during these years by 13 percent, and this kind of hiring can relieve sworn officers from desk assignments, producing an increase in the number of officers engaged in policing with the public, but as Figure 5 depicts, almost all of the increase in civilians occurred in a single year, 2007.



The gradual changes in the number of sworn officers—three years of contraction, a pause, and then four years of expansion—are not the product merely of a single policy in flux, but reflect simultaneous changes in three factors: the numbers leaving the Department, the numbers recruited, and the graduation rate of those who enter the police academy. From 1998 to 2001, all three factors were driving down the ranks: there was a rash of retirements, the Department attracted fewer recruits, and graduation rates at the academy fell from 85 to 75 percent. All three factors were reversed after 2004, with


larger recruitment classes, higher graduation rates, and lower rates of attrition combining to fuel growth.

Figure 6. Racial and Ethnic Composition of Graduating Classes from the Los Angeles Police Academy, 1990 to 2008



This ebb and flow of personnel brought significant changes to the racial and ethnic composition of the Department. In 1990, just over 30 percent of the graduates from the Academy were Latino, 19 percent African American, 5 percent Asian or Filipino, and fully 45 percent Caucasian. Almost two decades later in 2008, 53 percent of graduates were Latino, 7 percent African American, 11 percent Asian/Filipino, and 29 percent Caucasian. As Figure 6 shows, the changes in racial composition of academy graduates occurred at two discrete moments: first in the early 1990s, when the percentage of Latinos among graduates rose, and the percentage of African-Americans and Caucasians declined; and then since 2006, when the percentage of Latinos surged and the percentage of Caucasians fell, while African-American percentages remained relatively stable.¹⁰

¹⁰ Much of the change in the composition of recruits is the result of two consent decrees entered into by the Department. The Blake Consent Decree, signed in 1981, required the LAPD to recruit more female and minority police officers and remove impediments to their promotion. The Hunter La Ley Consent Decree, signed in 1992, obliged the Department to ensure fair practices in the training and promotion of minority sworn officers to management ranks. For both of these decrees, the Department set annual and long-range goals for the recruitment, training, and promotion of females and minorities. Reports on these targets are routinely delivered to the Police Commission and posted on the website of the LAPD, www.lapd.online.org




Attrition rates today are low, averaging 5 percent in recent years, so the new recruitment and graduation rates have had a substantial effect on the racial and ethnic composition of the Department. In 2008, Latinos comprised 42 percent of all sworn officers, up from 33 percent in 1999. The proportion of Caucasian officers has correspondingly declined—from 47 percent to 37 percent.¹¹ The proportion of Black officers has declined only slightly, from 14 to 12 percent, but the distribution of Black officers has shifted toward

¹¹ The scale of the increase in the representation of Hispanics in the LAPD exceeds the growth in their estimated share of the LA county population as a whole. Between 2000 and 2010, Latinos grew from 44.6 to 48.3 percent of the county population (+3.5%).

longer years of service, so while African-Americans comprise only 8 percent of all officers with fewer than 10 years experience, they account for 22 percent of officers with more than 10 years of service, and more than 20 percent of the LAPD’s captains.


Although African-Americans constitute a declining proportion of new officers in the LAPD, these same officers are the most likely to believe that the LAPD has been improving as an organization in recent years. In our 2009 survey of sworn officers across the LAPD, African-American officers were far more likely than any other group to “strongly agree” that “the LAPD today is a better organization than it was three years ago.”



Alongside this largely encouraging portrait of the officers of the LAPD, we heard many police officers complain that recruitment standards in the LAPD are falling, and several of those who spoke this way seemed to be referring in particular to recruits from ethnic and racial minority groups. One officer in a focus group said: “The new officers are not much better than thugs. We’ve lowered our standards. Now we’re hiring gang members.” A supervisor in a different focus group told us: “We get people who are hired that get to our Division who don’t even speak English, and I’m talking about basic everyday English—cannot speak the language.” In yet another focus group, the officers present seemed to agree with their colleague who explained simply: “The hiring process is all politics.” To senior officers of the LAPD who work hard to recruit and train the very best

police officers, these complaints seem outrageous; but we report them here because the fact that they could be stated in focus groups without refutation suggests that rifts remain within the culture of the Department.

Figure 9. LAPD Sworn Officers who agree that “the Department today hires qualified people” by Race/Ethnicity, 2009



Source: Harvard Kennedy School Program in Criminal Justice Policy Management

The best news in this regard is that the cynicism about new hiring is declining. Attitudes that denigrate the newest recruits have been commonplace among LAPD officers over the last decade. Indeed, one senior law enforcement official told us that the hiring wave in the mid-1990s was truly accompanied by lower standards that allowed the recruitment of gang members and others who then abused their positions. Yet it appears that satisfaction with the Department’s hiring is somewhat higher today than it was a decade ago. In a 1997 survey of LAPD sworn officers, only 35 percent agreed that “the department hires qualified people”¹² Today, that has risen to 46 percent, and African-American officers, who make up the smallest group among the newest recruits, are most likely to agree that the Department hires qualified people.

¹² The same question was asked of sworn officers in the LAPD in 1997, 1998, and 1999, with percentages agreeing of 35, 47, and 41 respectively, for an average of 40 percent over the three administrations of the survey.

Claims of “De-Policing”


When police officers find themselves facing increased scrutiny for their use of force or their enforcement powers, claims are commonly heard that the scrutiny will lead to “de-policing.” Officers, it is claimed, will hesitate to intervene in difficult circumstances for fear that, despite their best intentions, their actions will be criticized and they may even be disciplined. In every instance where the U.S. Department of Justice has entered into a consent decree with a state or local government to address an alleged pattern and practice of police misconduct, concerns have been raised that the consent decree would lead to de-policing or what one law enforcement official describe to us as the “drive-and-wave syndrome.”

We heard such claims frequently during our interviews and focus groups with police officers, with many officers insisting that the consent decree remains an impediment to effective policing as well as a deterrent to the kind of work in communities they consider necessary to reduce crime. In focus groups, officers commonly said they sometimes avoid contact with citizens and “look the other way” when observing illegal behavior in order not to create additional work for themselves or provoke the intervention of a sergeant or watch commander. They also said they are “timid” in encounters with suspects or handle them with “kid gloves” in order to avoid generating a use-of-force report, inciting a complaint, or triggering an action item (or a “red-flag”) in the computer system that monitors officer performance. As one officer explained to us: “Now officers just back away because they don’t want to get red-flagged.” We heard similar statements in private interviews, where one officer told us: “You’re afraid to deal with people on the street because of false complaints they file.”

Observers of the LAPD over these years describe the effect of the decree on the officer morale in similar terms. As one law enforcement official told us, “the decree hurt their pride, hurt their morale, hurt their productivity.” Although this official said that the decree “provoked a bit of self-awareness,” he claimed its overall effect was to undermine the pride that officers had historically taken in their department.

A survey conducted for the Department in 2003 suggested widespread belief in de-policing among LAPD officers. Seventy percent of officers agreed with the statement “paper work deters officers from making arrests,” and 79 percent believed that the consent decree impeded the ability of the LAPD to reduce crime. As the chart below shows, a larger share (89%) agreed with the statement that “because of fear of being unfairly disciplined, many LAPD officers are not proactive in doing their jobs.” A higher percentage still (93%) agreed with the statement that “the threat of community complaints prevents police officers from being proactive on the street.”

Figure 10. Agreement among LAPD Officers with Selected Statements, 2003




Source: LAPD

These opinions may have less to do with the consent decree in particular than might at first appear. LAPD officers reported similar concerns about the Department’s accountability systems even before the consent decree. A survey conducted in 1999, for example, found that only 15 percent of officers thought the disciplinary system was administered fairly, and that 79 percent of officers were afraid of being punished for making “an honest mistake.” The survey also found that 58 percent of officers said their career had been negatively affected by the new complaint system, and that 90 percent thought that it *could* be negatively affected.¹³ Indeed, distrust of the Department’s accountability systems seems to have diminished during the period of the consent decree, not increased, as the chart below illustrates.


¹³ See Wellford Wilms, October 2000 report.

Figure 11. Agreement among LAPD Officers with Selected Statements, 1999, 2003, and 2009




The fear of being punished for making an honest mistake today is diminished, but still strong. More than 60 percent of sworn officers in 2009 said they fear being punished for making an honest mistake, and the level of such fear is greater among non-supervisory police officers than for those at higher ranks. The fear of punishment for honest mistakes, for example, declines markedly as rank increases. Even among lieutenants, however, such a fear remains among more than 40 percent today, as is shown in Figure 12, below.

Figure 12. LAPD Sworn Officers who agree that “I am afraid I will be punished for making an honest mistake,” by Rank, 1999 and 2009



The fear of departmental discipline is not necessarily based in facts. As we discuss later in this report, the numbers of officers named in any complaint of misconduct has declined substantially over recent years, and the fraction that has been disciplined has not risen. Nevertheless, we must ask if the fear of punishment—whether or not connected to the consent decree—is holding the LAPD back from enforcing the law? The answer appears to be an emphatic *no*. When we turn to the actual use of police powers, we see that the LAPD has been increasing both the quantity and the quality of its enforcement activity. De-policing, in short, does not appear to be a problem in Los Angeles under the consent decree.

Consider, for example, the use of pedestrian and motor vehicle “stops.” A stop occurs when a police officer temporarily detains an individual whom the officer reasonably suspects to have committed a crime or to be on the verge of doing so. The decision to make such a stop is highly discretionary, and it is one reason why the Department began in 2001 to consistently collect and record data about who it stops, as well as when, where, and with what consequences such stops take place.¹⁴




In 2002, the first year for which we have reliable figures, police officers in Los Angeles recorded 587,200 stops. In 2008, there were 875,204 stops—49 percent more. The number of officers available to make stops also grew in this period, so the number of stops per sworn officer increased slightly less – by 39 percent, from 64 to 89. As Figure

¹⁴ At least two major analyses of stop activities have been published on the basis of LAPD data. Both studies mined the data on stops to assess whether or not law enforcement practices constitute “racial profiling,” a subject we take up in Section Three. Neither of these studies used the data on stops to understand change over time in the character of policing and the outcomes of officer-resident encounters, which is our focus here. See *Pedestrian and Motor-Vehicle Post Stop Analysis Report*, Analysis Group, Inc, July 2006, and Ian Ayres, *A Study of Racially Disparate Outcomes in the Los Angeles Police Department*, October 2008.

13 shows, the total number of pedestrian stops nearly doubled over this six year period, and the number of motor-vehicle stops increased nearly 40 percent.

The number of stops increased in every police division, but the scale of the increase varied considerably across divisions.¹⁵ The number of stops more than doubled in Central, Hollenbeck, Newton, Northeast and Southeast, but hardly increased at all in Foothill, Pacific, and West LA. In Rampart and Harbor, too, the increase was well below the city average. Overall, as the chart below shows, the greatest increase in stops between took place in Central Division, followed by Southeast, Newton, and then Hollenbeck.




Overall, there was little change in the racial and ethnic distribution of individuals stopped, despite the great increase in volume. Blacks comprised 22 percent of all individuals stopped in 2002, and 23 percent of all individuals stopped in 2008. Whites were 18 percent of all individuals stopped in 2002, and 15 percent in 2008. Hispanics comprised 43 percent of all persons stopped in 2002 and 48 percent in 2008. As in other

¹⁵ Nearly three-quarters of all stops are made by officers working in the area divisions. Specialized units, such as Metro Division, tend to make fewer stops. Accordingly, the rate of increase in the number of the stops in the divisions was considerably higher than the rate for the LAPD as a whole (77 vs. 49 percent).

cities, there are considerable differences in the racial composition of pedestrian and motor vehicles stops: Blacks made up 36 percent of all pedestrians stopped, but only 19 percent of all individuals stopped in motor vehicles.

There is no direct way to assess the quality of so many stops, but an indirect measure can be made by examining the results of the stops. When stops increase greatly without an increase in the number that lead to arrests, the pattern suggests that police suspicions are being aroused too easily and the decision to interfere with people’s liberty is being made too lightly, even if the stops are constitutionally justifiable in each individual instance. In contrast, when an increase in stops is accompanied by an increase in those that lead to an arrest, the pattern suggests that police officers stopped people for good reasons and were willing to have the District Attorney scrutinize those reasons. If, therefore, the large increase in stops from 2002 to 2008 were not accompanied by an equal increase in stops leading to arrest, we would be concerned about the quality of the stops being made.¹⁶

Figure 15. Proportion of LAPD Pedestrian and Motor-Vehicle Stops Resulting in Arrest, 2002 and 2008.




Source: LAPD

¹⁶ In practice, the situation is more complex. First, stops can result in more than one consequence, as a field investigation report can accompany an arrest, a citation, or a warning, or it can be the sole consequence of a stop. The recorded consequences are not mutually exclusive. Arrests are the surest sign, however, that stops are yielding evidence of crime. Second, even stops that result in no consequence can have strategic value for the police. Indeed, there is a danger that police will become heavily reliant on stops to deter people from carrying weapons or otherwise engaging in criminal activity, without taking into account the intrusion on liberty and concomitant dangers that such a strategy raises for innocent people stopped. For all these reasons, it is important to monitor changes in stops in relation to changes in stops that yield evidence of criminality and lead to arrests.

In fact, arrests have not only kept pace with the increase in stops, but the stops resulting in arrest have grown as a proportion of all stops, even while the volume of stops has grown. The main difference in the outcomes of stops today, in contrast to the early years of the consent decree, is that they are much more likely to result in an arrest. As Figure 15 shows, between 2002 and 2008, the likelihood of arrest nearly doubled for both pedestrian and motor-vehicle stops. The change is particularly significant for pedestrian stops, where the percentage resulting in arrest rose from 16 to 34 percent.


The corollary of this change in police practices is that the proportion of all stops that generated a citation declined substantially. Residents stopped by police officers in Los Angeles today are less likely to be ticketed and more likely to be arrested than in the early years of the consent decree.

A pedestrian stop in 2008 was also less likely to produce a warning and much more likely to generate a field interview record than in 2002. As Figure 16 illustrates, the changing use of stops between 2002 and 2008 is complex, but in general police officers were more accountable for their stops in 2008, as arrests and field interviews trigger greater scrutiny from colleagues, supervisors, and the district attorney than do warnings and citations. In sum, not only does the growth of stops belie any assertion that Los Angeles has seen de-policing under the consent decree, the changing pattern of stops suggests an increase both in the quality of the stops and in officer accountability for them.



While this is very good news, the pattern varies from one police division to another. The volume of stops increased in every division, as did stops resulting in an arrest, suggesting that de-policing was not a reality in any division. Moreover, the number of stops-resulting-in-an-arrest increased at the same rate or higher as overall stops, suggesting that there was no decline in quality of stops or accountability for stops in any division. Still, the degree of quantity and quality improvement varied greatly from one division to another. Between 2002 and 2008, the likelihood that a stop would culminate in an arrest increased in West LA (from 7 to 27 percent) and Harbor Division (from 12 to 32 percent), suggesting an increase in the quality of stops in those locations. But the likelihood remained fairly constant in Central, 77th, and Southeast Divisions. Figure 17 compares the increase in stops and stops-resulting-in-an-arrest in sixteen divisions between 2002 and 2008 (we excluded Foothill, Devonshire, and Mission divisions because changes in their boundaries confound the comparison over time).

Figure 17. Percentage Increases in All LAPD Stops and Stops-Resulting-in-Arrest by Police Division, 2002 to 2008



A large increase in the volume of stops is impossible to interpret without an understanding of the particular crime problems facing that division, but a good initial indicator of quality improvement is that the rate of increase in stops-resulting-in-arrest is at least twice the increase in stops overall. The divisions achieving this benchmark are shown with an asterisk in Figure 17.

Only about half of all arrests begin with stops, so we separately analyzed the trends in total arrests made by the LAPD in the years since the consent decree took effect. Between 2000 and 2008, the total number of arrests made by the LAPD increased 18 percent, from 147,605 to 173,742, but the increase did not follow a straight line. In the first two years of the consent decree, arrests fell eight percent. The following year, the total number of arrests increased 12 percent, and then by another 9 percent in 2004. Since 2005, arrests have increased at an annual average of 1.9 percent.


There were important changes in the types of arrests made, too, and, as with recorded crime, these shifts are best understood in a longer time frame. In 1982, there were 185,976 arrests in the city as a whole, about a quarter of which (27 percent) were for Part One offenses, sometimes referred to as index crimes: non-negligent homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft.¹⁷ The remaining three-quarters were for Part Two offenses, such as disorderly conduct, prostitution, driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol, and most other drug offenses. By 2007, in contrast, index crimes accounted for only 15 percent of all arrests.


The trends here are easier to see when arrests for Part One and Part Two offenses are shown on a single graph along different scales, as in Figure 18, allowing us to overlay the trend lines despite the much greater absolute number of Part Two arrests. The trend in Part One arrests follows the rise and then the decline in serious crime in Los Angeles, except that the numbers of Part One arrests did not slope upwards from 2000 to 2002 when Part One offenses briefly increased. Part Two arrests break sharply from this trend twice: first from 1995 to 1997, and then again from 2003 to 2007. These steep increases in Part Two arrests represent police management decisions to use arrest powers more aggressively for less serious crimes.

¹⁷ The UCR categories are described above at footnote 7.


Because it takes place during the consent decree period, the steep increase in Part Two arrests from 2002 to 2007 deserves a closer look. The number of Part Two arrests fell each year from 1998 to 2002, but then increased each year through 2007. In that year, the LAPD made 35,377 arrests for drug crimes and 108,608 arrests for other Part Two crimes, or an average of 97 drug arrests per day and 298 arrests per day for other minor crimes. As Figure 19 shows, the increase from 2002 to 2007 occurred in both drug arrests and other Part Two arrests, but most of the increase was in the “other” arrests. Over the same period, arrests for Part One crimes, both violent and property, were relatively steady, ending the period at 29 and 40 per day respectively.

Figure 18. LAPD Arrests by UCR Category, 1982 to 2007





There have been significant changes in the profile of persons arrested for Part Two offenses over time, as well. As Figure 20 shows, the number of adults arrested for Part Two offenses in Los Angeles is about half today what it was in 1990, having generally followed the trend for Part Two arrests overall. The number of juveniles arrested for Part Two offenses, by contrast, is now about twice what it was in 1990, breaking from the adult pattern in the late 1990s. Juvenile Part Two arrests stayed relatively flat from 1982 to 1994, shot upwards from 1995 until 2000, and then generally followed the adult trend since the consent decree came into force.




In sum, our analysis of the volume of arrests confirms what the first part of our analysis of stops revealed: the statistics refute any claim of de-policing in Los Angeles today as a result of the consent decree. Some de-policing may have occurred in the first two years of the consent decree, when recorded crime rose slightly while enforcement activity, both stops and arrests, declined; but there is no sign of de-policing since 2002. Indeed, enforcement activity has increased, with the increase in arrests concentrated on the minor crimes where management policy guides officer discretion.

Just as we examined the results of stops as an indirect measure of their quality, we examined the results of arrests as an indirect measure of their quality. Specifically, we examined the changes in the pattern of charges filed by the Los Angeles District Attorney following LAPD adult arrests. For both Part One and Part Two arrests, we found that the rate at which the D.A. filed felony charges increased over the years of the consent decree, suggesting indirectly at least that the quality of those arrests has improved. As the total number of Part One adult arrests fell from 27,907 in 2000 to 20,710 in 2007, the rate at which they were filed as felonies rose from 23 to 35 percent. Perhaps more impressive, as the number of Part Two adult arrests rose from 91,484 to 117,696, the rate at which they were filed as felonies increased from 13 to 17 percent.

Precisely because the LAPD does not control the filing decisions, the rate at which suspects are charged is a particularly good, if indirect, measure of quality. Indeed, the future course of justice in each case depends in large measure on the quality of the relationship and coordination between the police and prosecutor, and this depends in part on the quality of arrests. The LAPD now routinely uses the “filing rate” as part of its internal performance measurement process, treating it as an indicator of the quality of police enforcement activity.

Beyond the filing of felony charges, arrests can also result in misdemeanor charges or the release of arrestees, even before they get to court. Figure 21 depicts changes in all three possible outcomes for an arrest when screened by police supervisors and the District Attorney’s office. For Part One arrests, the felony filing rate increased while both the release rate and misdemeanor filing rate fell. For Part Two arrests, the felony filing rate increased, the misdemeanor filing rate fell, and the release rate remained steady, at 14 percent.



At the end of our analysis of de-policing claims, the meaning of the data seems clear, especially from 2002 onwards: both quantity and quality of enforcement activity have increased. Officers of the LAPD stopped more people on foot and in vehicles, and more of those stops resulted in arrests. Officers of the LAPD arrested more people as well, and more of their arrests were filed as felonies. If the consent decree has kept police officers

from dealing with crime or criminals, there is no sign of it in the data on enforcement activity. Indeed, arrests for the most serious offenses—the so-called Part One crimes—declined as serious crime declined in Los Angeles, but even within this smaller pool of arrests, the absolute number of felony filings increased, suggesting an increase in the quality of arrests.

Use of Force

Perhaps the most difficult change to effect in a police organization is to decrease the use of force, for it is here that protective routines are most firmly entrenched, and deep concerns for officer safety dominate other priorities. It is particularly impressive, therefore, to find the use of force declining in the LAPD under the consent decree.


Under the definitions contained in the consent decree, the LAPD distinguishes between two kinds of force used in the course of law enforcement activities. “Categorical force” occurs when an officer uses a firearm, a carotid artery control hold, or a head-strike with an impact weapon in order to apprehend a suspect; when a suspect suffers law enforcement related injuries, including dog-bites (or “canine contacts”) that require hospitalization; or when an arrestee dies while in the custody of the LAPD. “Non-categorical force” occurs when any employee of the LAPD uses a less lethal control device, such as an electric stun-gun or bean-bag shotgun, or physical force to compel a person to comply with the employee’s direction or overcome resistance during an arrest or a detention, or defend any individual from an aggressive action by another person. We follow these distinctions in this section as we describe trends in the use of force.

The consent decree prescribes in detail how the Department must train officers in the use of legitimate force and critically investigate all incidents in which force was used. It requires the Department to separate officers involved in such incidents, record all information about the impact on suspects of the use of force, and consider the employment history of officers involved in these incidents as it evaluates the events. In 2003, three years into the consent decree, officers in the LAPD were aware of and apparently anxious about the possibility of disciplinary action that might result from a finding that the use of force that was unlawful or out of policy. In that year, 86 percent of all officers surveyed strongly agreed or agreed with the statement “the risk of disciplinary action prevents LAPD officers from using reasonable and necessary force.”¹⁸

By 2009, officers’ nervousness about the possible consequences of using force had substantially subsided. More than half of all officers in 2009 say they are not hesitant to use any type of force. Still, a substantial minority of police officers (18 percent) strongly agree with the statement “I am hesitant to use force because of the possible impact on my career.”

¹⁸ Survey conducted under the direction of John Linder for the LAPD.


Figure 22. LAPD Sworn Officers who agree that “I am hesitant to use force because of the possible impact on my career” by Rank, 2009



Source: Harvard Kennedy School, Program in Criminal Justice Policy & Management. Note: The survey asked separately about hesitation to use categorical and non-categorical force. The results here show the percentage of officers who “strongly agree” that they hesitate to use either type of force or both, and those who “agree” (but not strongly) that they hesitate to use one or both types of force.

Since 2004, the first year for which we have consistent information on all incidents of the use of categorical force, including the race and ethnicity of the suspects and officers involved, the total number of categorical force incidents declined by almost 30 percent. We found a reduction in the use of all types of categorical force in those years, including officer-involved shootings. There was a reduction in the shootings in which a suspect was hit as well as those in which no one was hit. The number of in-custody deaths, carotid-restraint choke holds, head-strikes, and “law-enforcement related injuries” (uses of force that require hospitalization) also fell at roughly equal rates. As Figure 23 shows, the only types of categorical force which increased in this period were K-9 contacts, and three kinds of force grouped together as “other”: the negligent discharges of weapons, the shooting of animals, and the use of lethal force by other law enforcement agencies.


Figure 23. All LAPD Categorical Force Incidents, 2004 to 2008



Key:
 Other = the negligent discharges of weapons, the shooting of animals, and the use of lethal force by other law enforcement agencies
 K9 Contact = Dog bites
 CRCH = carotid-restraint choke holds
 Non-Cat = the use of non-categorical force resulting in a hospitalization
 LERII = any other uses of force that require hospitalization
 OIS = officer-involved shootings
 Source: LAPD.

Over these years, so far as we can tell, the incidence of categorical force used against Blacks and Hispanics decreased more than such force used against Whites. As Figure 24 shows, the number of suspects identified as Black involved in categorical force incidents fell from 35 in 2004 to 20 in 2008. The number of suspects identified as Hispanic involved in such incidents fell from 47 to 27 over the same period, while the number of suspects identified as White decreased negligibly, from 12 to 11. The racial and ethnic identities of persons subject to categorical force are not always recorded in the LAPD data, especially for certain kinds of force, such as accidental and negligent firearm discharges.

Figure 24. All LAPD Categorical Force Incidents by Suspect Race/Ethnicity, 2004 to 2008




Sources: LAPD. Note: Racial/Ethnic data were often unknown for certain kinds of categorical force, such as accidental and negligent firearm discharges. Data available from the Office of the Inspector General shows a lower number of incidents for the period 2001 to 2003, but a similar pattern of annual declines, suggesting that an increase in 2004 may be due in part to improved reporting.

The decline in the incidence of the use of categorical force is all the more striking when examined against changes in the level of law enforcement activity in this period. As we have already seen, the annual number of arrests increased considerably during the consent decree period, growing by six percent between 2004 and 2008. The incidence of the use of categorical force per 10,000 arrests thus fell in this period from 8.1 to 6.2.


We found roughly similar declines in the use of non-categorical force. Overall, the number of incidents in which an officer used non-categorical force fell from over 500 in the first quarter of 2004 to less than 400 per quarter in the third quarter of 2008, the last period for which we were able to collect information. In the same period, as Figure 25 shows, the number of suspects complaining of an injury in the course of such an incident initially rose and then declined slightly from approximately 120 in the third quarter of 2005 to under 100 in the third quarter of 2008.¹⁹

¹⁹ We were told by officers in the Use of Force Review Division that some of the volatility in the levels of incidents and injuries in 2004 may be the result of changes in the systems for recording these incidents.



The use of non-categorical force did not decline in all bureaus or divisions. According to data collected and analyzed by the LAPD’s Use of Force Review Division, there was a 17 percent *increase* in the number of non-categorical force incidents in the Central Bureau between 2006 and 2008. In all other bureaus in these years, the number of such incidents fell. Most of the increase in the Central Bureau was attributable to changes in the incidence of non-categorical force in Rampart and Hollenbeck divisions. In these same divisions, however, the number of arrests increased by 13 and 24 percent, respectively. The likelihood that an arrest was accompanied by the use of non-categorical force thus decreased.

Because so many kinds of force are collected within the term “non-categorical,” it is useful to note that one type of force in particular is driving the trends here: what the LAPD calls a “take-down.” As the chart below illustrates, take-downs far out-number every other kind of force described as non-categorical, and it is take-downs that decrease over this period, while the other types of force persist at roughly the same low levels.




A troubling pattern in the use of force is that African Americans, and to a lesser extent Hispanics, are subjects of the use of such force out of proportion to their share of involuntary contacts with the LAPD. As Figure 26 shows, Black residents of Los Angeles comprised 22 percent of all individuals stopped by the LAPD between 2004 and 2008, but 31 percent of arrested suspects, 34 percent of individuals involved in a categorical use of force incident, and 43 percent of those who reported an injury in the course of a non-categorical force incident.²⁰ While we do not question appropriateness of the use of force itself revealed in these figures, the need to use force is often the result of discretionary, tactical decisions made minutes and sometimes hours before the use of force itself. The Department is focusing today on improving the tactics that lead to the use of force, and these figures underscore the importance of that effort.

In 1991, the Christopher Commission concluded that a significant number of officers repetitively used force against the public and persistently ignored Department guidelines. Nearly two decades later, we found a department much changed from this description. The use of force seems to be declining even while enforcement activity is growing. The Department is beginning to do its own analyses of trends, and these are being pursued with energy and commitment. Nevertheless, it is difficult to compare precisely the use of force today in the LAPD with that before the consent decree, since the data for categorical force are only reliable from 2004 onwards. Our direct observation of the LAPD confirmed for us that the culture of the Department remains aggressive: we saw a

²⁰ The arrest percentages are based on all arrests in the City of Los Angeles, and these include a small fraction of arrests (<10%) made by agencies other than the LAPD. The head of the LAPD’s CompStat unit assured us that the proportions excluding these non-LAPD arrests would not differ significantly.

lot of force displayed in what seemed to be routine enforcement situations. Our quantitative research found every indication that uses of the most controversial forms of force are declining; we also observed that the use of force is carefully scrutinized by supervisors and managers. The most serious complaint of the Christopher Commission in 1991 was that management rewarded those who used force inappropriately, so it is to changes in the Department’s management that we now turn.

Figure 27. LAPD Stops, Arrests, and Uses of Force by Race/Ethnicity of Suspect, 2004 to 2008 Combined



Key:
 CUOF □ Categorical Use of Force, excluding accidental and negligent firearm discharges □ dog bites. N □ 579
 NCUOF Injury □ Non-categorical use of force resulting in injury. N □ 1,873.
 Stops: N □ 1,837,321
 Arrests: These figures are for the City of LA, but they include a small fraction (□10□) of arrests made by other law enforcement agencies, such as the California Highway Patrol. N □ 878,327
 Source: LAPD

Managing the Department

Three substantial innovations in management accompanied the changes already described in the composition of the Department and in its enforcement activity. The first of those was the construction and implementation of the TEAMS II computerized system for tracking individual officer behavior, explicitly required by the consent decree. TEAMS II is the LAPD’s version of what other police departments sometimes call an “early warning system,” a database that collects information about each officer’s uses of force, civilian complaints, training activity, commendations, vehicle accidents, and many other indicia of performance, and then alerts supervisors about those officers whose patterns of activity seem riskier than their peers. The second innovation was the CompStat process of data

analysis and meetings introduced by Chief Bratton. CompStat forces supervisors to focus their attention on crime trends, encouraging them to design and execute strategies to reduce crime. The third innovation was the development of an audit capacity within the LAPD. The creation of an Audit Division, which tracks the implementation of recommendations adopted by the Commission, allows the Department to scrutinize and test its own internal controls over police activity in much the same way a large corporation conducts audits of its internal financial controls.

Each of these three management innovations has its strengths and weaknesses. TEAMS II, for example, years behind its original schedule, has only been operational for a couple of years. Nearly every manager whom we interviewed about TEAMS said it was a useful innovation, gathering important information about an officer in a single place so that supervisors can make at least tentative judgments about what kind of officer they are supervising. Yet many of these same supervisors complained that TEAMS does not produce enough value for all the time and effort that it requires.

The mixed view of TEAMS II was evident in most of our interviews. According to one sergeant:

TEAMS has created more work for the watch commander. It's easily 20 percent more work. If it would save me 30 percent of my time, if it changed the way cops do the job, I would say great. But it just doesn't have that great of an impact.

And as a captain explained: "The TEAMS report is practical, but the action-item system is really an overlay on the existing comment card and notice-to-correct system." Many managers echoed this complaint about the "action-items" generated by TEAMS II. As one explained:

Action items are flawed. The system tries to relate actions of officers to those of their peers. A lot of officers who are not high-risk will pop. We have to go through the action-item process even with obvious false positives. I'm not saying it's a bad thing, but it does create additional work.

Still, this same captain acknowledged the benefits of TEAMS II: "It forces sergeants to pay attention to their people. It keeps supervisors on top of their game." We note, as well, that we conducted our interviews at a time when TEAMS II was relatively new to most users, so the time required may diminish with experience. As one member of the Police Commission and a noted critic of the LAPD told us, "We thought TEAMS II was pie in the sky, but guess what: It's doing what it's supposed to do."

The CompStat system of data analyses and meetings gets similarly mixed reviews from within the Department.

Much has been published about CompStat both as Chief Bratton first introduced it into the New York Police Department in the mid-1990s, and since then as dozens of other police departments and government agencies have adapted it to their own purposes. In the LAPD's version of CompStat, a central unit monitors crime trends and produces reports that the detective in charge of the unit uses at monthly meetings with each division

commander, questioning the commander in front of his or her peers. The division commander uses similar data to prepare for the meeting in advance, and the result is a test of the commander's knowledge of his or her area, awareness of crime trends, and initiative in designing and executing strategies to bring crime down.


While in some police departments, the CompStat meetings are held in a central headquarters building, the LAPD rotates its meetings among the four Bureau offices. Once every four weeks, all of the division commanders in each Bureau are questioned about the trends in their division, while the other commanders from within that Bureau watch and listen. In addition, in the weeks between these monthly meetings, the divisional commanders hold their own CompStat meetings in their own divisions, working through the weekly crime trends with their own management teams.

In a focus group of supervisors, there was general agreement that CompStat is a useful innovation, but still complaints surface about the time it takes. CompStat, one said, is "a good tool that is being beaten to death." In much the same way they spoke of the frustration of dealing with the paperwork to comply with the consent decree, they complained of the frequency of CompStat meetings and the wasted time and stress associated with preparing for them. These supervisors also felt it a waste of time to sit and listen to the captains in other divisions describe crime patterns that had no relevance to them. "Who cares about crime in [a neighboring division]? If the information needs sharing, we do it. Most crime is territorial. CompStat to a certain degree doesn't allow you to grow. It stifles you. It's a meeting for the meeting for the meeting."

Many senior officials with whom we spoke seemed concerned that CompStat may focus so heavily on crime reduction that other goals are neglected. As one told us, "as long as you just push on crime, other stuff will go by the wayside.... The Chief may not fully appreciate how CompStat and the constant push on crime squeezes out space for supervisory oversight in the organization." Another problem with this push on crime data—of which all managers are keenly aware—is the risk that crime recording will be manipulated by police officers trying to game the CompStat process. Indeed, one officer suggested to us that he had personal knowledge of officers recording burglaries as vandalism in order to produce reductions in burglary numbers. New audit procedures, well beyond what the consent decree actually requires, have been implemented to detect and prevent just this sort of manipulation.

The actual experience of CompStat may be more heartening than its second-hand reputation. As one detective explained in a focus group, before attending any CompStat meetings himself, he had thought that they were a "dog and pony show." After attending a few Compstat meetings, he changed his mind and now says that he likes the concept.

Figure 28. Example of LAPD CompStat Report, 2009



The most profound effect of CompStat, however, has been to accelerate the transformation of the role of captain in the LAPD. Instead of merely implementing crime fighting tactics specified by headquarters, today's captains are expected to design and implement strategies and tactics using their own knowledge and understanding of their divisions. And then they are held accountable for the results. As one officer explained the change:

The role of the captain twenty years ago was to read the paper and have coffee and maybe walk around the station or sign some papers. Now it has turned 180 degrees. It's really wrong how much they expect of these captains. It's a 6 am to 9 pm. job. And they are called out for homicides and other big events. They are held accountable for everything.

And a sergeant reported much the same transformation with somewhat greater appreciation:

I never spoke to a captain as a young officer. Now anyone can walk into the captain's office. They are much more accountable and much more hands-on. There is more accountability up and down the line.

As one captain explained in detail:

Managing crime has been an evolving process for us. We started by looking at dots on a map in 24-hour to 24-hour periods. Now we're looking at three-month trends and identifying crime spikes.... The recaps show who's up and who's down. It's all about accountability and a sense of urgency. I work better under pressure and I think they will too.... I am real excited about our growing ability to anticipate and forecast and then to deploy and prevent. Some of it is so obvious that it's embarrassing that we didn't think of it years ago. Now you're forced to focus on what's important.

Of the three management innovations considered here, the audit capacity is probably the least appreciated within the Department, yet the creation of the audit division is as impressive as any management achievement in the LAPD. We know of no other police organization with as thorough and professional an internal audit capacity, and the audit reports are heavily relied upon by the consent decree monitor. Testing compliance with internal controls designed to reduce risk and promote integrity is not exciting work; the audit reports themselves have not yet acquired the power within the Department that would allow them to improve the practices they test; and the administrative burdens that multiple audits place on personnel in the divisions are resented. Still, the Department's leadership recognizes the crucial nature of audits in a high-stakes organization, and the LAPD's audit division is increasingly seen as a national leader.

Among busy supervisors in the field, the new audits seem to overvalue bureaucratic precision. As one especially astute lieutenant explained to us, the watch commander's job is:

a lot of detail work with a lot of interruptions. Stuff is always coming up, a use of force in the tank, an irate citizen at the desk, a breaking incident in the field. Then you miss one box on the detention log and you get dinged on an audit.

Still, even the audits are received with the same mixture of appreciation and regret that greet TEAMS II and CompStat. As one sergeant explained:

The consent decree made us a much better, more proficient organization. We now have people looking at all the right things, but it is top-heavy, using resources that could be better used elsewhere. Every audit is done at the cost of something else.

In our observation, the consent decree, combined with the Department's leadership, has indeed made the LAPD a more proficient organization, but equally impressive is the way that captains and other managers are continuing to innovate, further enhancing the management tools described here. For example, the director of the TEAMS II Development Bureau has, on her own initiative, produced a prototype dashboard for

possible use at CompStat meetings that presents several key risk indicators drawn from the TEAMS II database. Similarly, the captain in charge of the Use of Force Review Division has taken the initiative to produce an annual report that will, for the first time, publicly discuss trends in the use of force. In a third example, a deputy chief explained the new outlook of the Department nationally and internationally: “We used to be proud of being obstinate, a force unlike any other. Now we don’t thumb our noses at other people.” That these members of the command staff believe that such initiative will be rewarded, and expect encouragement for looking beyond the Department for examples of good practice is perhaps the most impressive sign of the quality management culture that the LAPD has acquired.


3. Police-Community Relations

Public Satisfaction and Confidence

At the heart of the federal consent decree is the question of public confidence. What do Los Angeles residents think of their police department and the service it provides? Do they believe that the Department treats people of all ethnic and racial groups fairly? Do they believe it operates with integrity?


In our survey of Los Angeles residents we asked respondents separately, and in different sections of the interview, to rate the quality of the “job” that the LAPD is doing, and the quality of the “service” that the LAPD provides. We asked separately about these because different surveys in earlier years had asked either about the “job” or about the “service” and we wanted to be able to track the change from these earlier years. The results are impressive. In both cases, as the chart below illustrates, substantially greater proportions of residents rate the Department as “good” or “excellent” today, and in both cases, the percentage rating the Department as “excellent” doubled from the earlier survey. Moreover, the high ratings in 2009 are remarkably consistent across ethnic and racial groups.

Figure 29. Residents’ Assessments of the Quality of the LAPD, 2005, 2007, 2009



Source: Harvard Kennedy School, Program in Criminal Justice Policy & Management (2009); Leavey Center for Study of Los Angeles (2007); Public Policy Institute of California (2005)


Figure 30. Residents' Assessments of the Job Done by the LAPD, by Race/Ethnicity, 2009



Source: Harvard Kennedy School, Program in Criminal Justice Policy Management


It is one thing for the LAPD to convince residents that it is doing a good job, but it is much harder to convince the public that police officers can do their job within the law and with respect for the rights of the people they police. It is heartening to discover, therefore, what is shown in Figure 31. When asked if it is more or less likely today than three years ago that the LAPD would bring offenders to justice while respecting their rights and complying with the law, more than twice as many answered that this is more likely today than thought it was less likely. Moreover, as Figure 32 shows, the vast majority of residents in every racial and ethnic group are hopeful that such policing will soon be routine.

Figure 31. Residents' Assessment of Change in LAPD Effectiveness and Integrity, by Race/Ethnicity, 2009



Interviewers asked: "Compared with the LAPD three years ago, do you believe the police department in Los Angeles today is more likely, less likely, or equally likely to bring offenders to justice while respecting their rights and complying with the law?" Percentages not shown thought it was equally likely, or preferred not to answer.
 Source: Harvard Kennedy School, Program in Criminal Justice Policy Management

Figure 32. Hopefulness of Los Angeles Residents Concerning Police Effectiveness and Integrity, by Race/Ethnicity, 2009



Interviewers asked: "How hopeful are you that the LAPD, three years from now, will routinely bring offenders to justice while respecting their rights and complying with the law?" Percentages not shown were "not hopeful."
 Source: Harvard Kennedy School, Program in Criminal Justice Policy Management

Our focus groups with community residents confirmed this generally positive but nevertheless mixed picture. Older residents who attend community meetings and know the police in their neighborhoods spoke in overwhelmingly positive terms in the groups, describing changes in recent years that brought crime down and their respect for the police up. One resident in East Los Angeles mentioned the consent decree explicitly, saying that it had been necessary a few years earlier, but was no longer needed. In the group, no one disputed this claim. After this particular focus group, however, we were approached by one resident who described himself as the father of a former gang member and who relayed an experience when a police officer came to his house in the early morning hours, asked permission to look around, and then walked through the house with his hand on his gun. He told us he had been extremely uncomfortable although nothing else happened. His point, he said, was that the positive stories are true, but they are not the whole story.

At a “community forum” organized and attended by LAPD officers from the community relations division, we were not surprised when attendees expressed positive feelings about the LAPD. Several participants claimed there had been “a change in the organizational culture” of the LAPD, exemplified by the willingness of leaders to “listen to criticism,” “admit mistakes,” and participate in sometimes “painful dialogue” with communities. “It’s no longer all about just crime statistics,” said one person. Most participants also could cite a concrete example of such change – the rapid and rigorous response to problems at MacArthur Park, joint planning with community organizations to prevent retaliatory violence at funerals, officers reading books to children at school, the reform of the Rampart division, the promotion of minorities to responsible positions, the use of gang intervention officers, and the renunciation of the tactics used in a notorious project of “mapping of Muslim communities” with the FBI. Two participants, both Latino, reported quite negative personal experiences (officers hauling away parked autos in a predominantly immigrant neighborhood, or glaring at drivers of dilapidated pick-up trucks), but still seemed to have a positive appreciation of the LAPD. The general sentiment was that the LAPD “has come a long way.” “The old LAPD ruled by fear,” said one person, “but that is no longer the way the police work.”

Even in these gatherings of people friendly to the LAPD, there were concerns. For example, many were unsure how deep into the LAPD the cultural change had penetrated. One person said: “we are hopeful, but fearful” that changes will last. Another sensed “resistance to change from below” and several thought that changes might not withstand the departure of Chief Bratton or the flare-up of a new social conflict. Alluding to tensions over cross-racial homicides, one person said ominously: “our community is full of ‘dry brush.’” Another person said: “That’s why we need random check-ups -- to prevent the Department from looking all bad when a tragedy occurs.”

Among the members of the community forum were some religious leaders. One African-American church leader told us that he is most impressed by the strategic use of gang intervention officers by the LAPD and the extensive, laborious collaboration between gang enforcement division officers and community leaders in the management of funerals

of gang members. He believes the decline in homicides over the past few years in LA is the result of a reduction in “retaliatory killings” which he says frequently follow, and sometimes occur at, funerals of gang members. He thought this joint work to improve public safety had left positive impressions on both the police and community. “The gang members exchange information with the cops, and are astounded at their sensibility. The cops also show a humorous, humane side, saying ‘yes, we’ve got some knuckle heads in our organization, too,’” he told us.

Our focus groups with older teenagers and young adults were understandably dominated by complaints about police officers, reflecting trends nationwide that show young people especially discontent in their experiences with police. Even if some of the young people had had positive encounters with police on some occasions, formal focus groups are designed to reveal what is, and is not, acceptable to talk about in a group setting, and we did not expect that the culture among these young people would encourage positive statements about the police. It seemed significant, therefore, when one young woman listened to another young woman in the group complain that she had frequently seen police officers whistling and cat-calling at women in the neighborhood, diminishing her opinion of them and making it less likely that she would ask them for help if she were ever in trouble. The other young woman interjected, reminding the group that the situation in Los Angeles has gotten better. “I don’t know, but in my neighborhood I think it has gotten better. There use to be a lot more gangs and shootings and now there aren’t so many,” she said, and no one argued with her.

Detainee Interviews

Just as our focus groups with active community residents, youth, and police officers allowed us to look more closely at how these three important groups see police-community relations, we also sought to examine more closely the opinions of those residents who have frequent, involuntary contact with the LAPD. How do the people whom the LAPD arrests feel about relations between the police and their communities?

Our research team interviewed 71 detainees within a few hours of their arrests. The detainees were randomly selected but this was not a representative sample of detainees. Rather, it was a convenience sample allowing us to probe more deeply the same questions we were asking residents, gaining the perspective of many more residents who have frequent contact with the police. Of the 71, most had been stopped at least three times by the police in the last two years, and 13 told us they had been stopped more than 20 times in that period. All but four were men, and they ranged in age fairly evenly from 18 to 65. Their most common communities of residence were South Central LA (23), Downtown (22), and East LA (7). Fifteen of the interviews were conducted in Spanish.

Many members of our research team were surprised at the positive responses to the questions we asked. For example, 39 of the detainees—just over half—told us the LAPD is doing a “good” or “excellent” job. That is not the 83 percent that we found in our survey of residents, but it is still impressively high among a sample of recently arrested individuals. Between a third and a half of the detainees told us that in the last two-to-

three years, the LAPD had improved in its professionalism, its community relations, its respect toward residents, and the quality of its performance.


In two open-ended questions, we asked the detainees to tell us the best experience and the worst experience that they had ever had with an LA police officer. The worst experiences included examples of allegedly wrongful arrests, handcuffs being applied too tightly, and many examples of disrespect. The best experiences were equally telling, if not more so. One immigrant detainee said he had been comforted by his arresting officer when he expressed fear of being deported as a result of his arrest. Another detainee described a sergeant who helped him file a civilian complaint against another officer whom the detainee felt was harassing him for no reason. The research team noticed a pattern of positive experiences that involved police acknowledging a detainee's feelings or individual circumstances.

Relations with Racial and Ethnic Minority Communities

In our survey, we asked a series of questions designed to explore the sensitive question of police relations with members of racial and ethnic minorities, asking about both general beliefs and about personal experience with police treatment of friends and family. In every case, the responses to questions asked in earlier surveys improved in 2009. In addition, we found strong expressions of confidence in the fairness of the LAPD and the respect it shows to members of racial and ethnic minority groups. Within the 2009 results, however, there is a worrying trend: a lower level of confidence among African-American respondents.

This general pattern is evident in the most straightforward question we asked: "Do you think that the police in your community treat all racial and ethnic groups fairly?" The same question was asked in a 2005 survey, and by 2009 the positive answers had risen from 39 to 51 percent of respondents. Moreover, the results for separate racial and ethnic groups in 2009 showed a relatively consistent and strong pattern, as shown in the chart below. Yet Black residents of Los Angeles answered less positively to the question, with 23 percent of Black residents responding, "almost never." That is far higher than the percentage of other groups answering "almost never" (14 percent for Hispanics, 10 percent for Whites, and 6 percent for Asians).

Figure 33. Residents' Assessment of Frequency of Fair Treatment by LAPD, 2005 and 2009





Interviewers asked: "Do you think the police in your community treat all racial and ethnic groups fairly?"

Source: Harvard Kennedy School, Program in Criminal Justice Policy Management (2009); Public Policy Institute of California (2005)

We asked residents to tell us, based on their personal experiences, how many of the LAPD officers they encounter treat them, their friends, and their families with respect. Issues of respect figure prominently in conceptions of fairness and equal treatment across all racial and ethnic groups, as well as in people's conceptions of justice. Again, the general pattern was very positive, with majorities of every racial and ethnic group reporting that most, if not all, of the LAPD officers they encountered treated them and their friends and family with respect. But among Black respondents, 10 percent reported that almost no LAPD officers treat them with respect, and the figure was even higher for the small number of residents who identify as something other than Hispanic, White, Black, or Asian. On its own, this 10 percent figure might not cause too much concern, but it is twice the rate for Hispanics and it fits the pattern we observed across most questions, suggesting that in a portion of African-American communities, relations with the LAPD remain tense.

Figure 34. Residents' Experience of How Many LAPD Officers Treat Them with Respect, by Race/Ethnicity, 2009



Interviewers asked: "Based on your personal experiences, how many of the LAPD officers you encounter treat you, your friends, and your family members with respect?" Percentages not shown answered "about the same treat us with respect as do not treat us with respect" or preferred not to answer.
 Source: Harvard Kennedy School, Program in Criminal Justice Policy Management

We can see the same pattern in responses to our general question about relations between the LAPD and our respondents' own communities. A majority of each racial and ethnic group described relations between the LAPD and their communities as positive, and in a separate question, the vast majority of respondents saw those relations as either stable or getting better over the last three years. Again, however, there are troubling responses from African-Americans, 22 percent of whom described relations as negative, with 10 percent describing them as very negative.

We observed several of the efforts that the LAPD is making to strengthen its relations with communities, especially in predominantly Black and Hispanic neighborhoods. Of particular interest, amid a variety of programs and priorities, is the role of the Senior Lead Officers in each police division. While the role itself dates back at least a couple of decades, the SLOs have taken on greater significance since the consent decree. Removed from the obligations to respond to routine calls-for-service, these officers become specialists in their neighborhoods, not only attending the usual panoply of community events, but building strategic relationships with community leaders, activists, and respected neighborhood residents.



We found the SLOs whom we interviewed to be impressively well informed about the neighborhoods they police and the people who live and work there. Moreover, unlike community liaison officers in some other departments, the SLOs are able to direct and monitor the work of officers in their divisions. For example, we observed one SLO make an effort to re-assign an officer whom he believed was not well suited to a particular neighborhood. We also observed division commanders assess the work of SLOs as part of the core business of their divisions, not merely as an add-on program. In a meeting to select the "officer of the year" in one division, the captain indicated his preference for a SLO over a sergeant who had made many arrests that year because the SLO had "prevented crime as well as stopped it."

Positive attitudes about the role and contribution of SLOs to the mission of the LAPD permeate the Department. Seventy-seven percent of all officers completing our survey strongly agreed or agreed with the statement "the work of Senior Lead Officers helps reduce crime," with one quarter strongly agreeing. Eighty-eight percent of officers agreed or strongly agreed with the statement "SLOs do valuable work for the Department," with one-third strongly agreeing. The work of the SLOs is unlikely to resolve all of the remaining difficulties in police-community relations, but they appear to represent an important strategic asset in that effort.

In sum, the rift between the LAPD and its communities has narrowed, and the communities across the City of Los Angeles are increasingly confident in the professionalism of the LAPD. We found a spectrum of opinion, but not a divided city. From the detainees who had just been arrested, to the older teenagers, to the most committed community activists, we found remarkably similar opinions: mostly cautious optimism that the police in Los Angeles could treat them with respect while effectively providing a service of high quality. Perhaps the most significant pattern to emerge from our study of public attitudes is that the city's African-American communities, often the

least satisfied with the Department today, are also the most hopeful about its continued improvement.

Figure 35. Residents' Assessment of Police Relations with Their Communities, 2009



Interviewers asked: "How would you describe relations between the LAPD and the community where you live?" Percentages not shown answered "Neither positive nor negative" or declined to answer.
 Source: Harvard Kennedy School, Program in Criminal Justice Policy Management

4. Changes in Governance of the LAPD

The Commission and the Inspector General

The governance and oversight of police work in every democratic society is multifaceted. While police in authoritarian societies are answerable only up the chain of command to a chief autocrat, police in democracies are answerable to many bodies: chief executives, courts, legislatures, auditors, commissions, neighborhood associations, journalists, and more. Governance of policing in a democracy is never straightforward.

The Los Angeles Police Department is formally governed by the Board of Police Commissioners, a five-person, civilian body with each member appointed by the Mayor and confirmed by the City Council for a five-year term, renewable once. The Police Commission's own materials describe it as the equivalent of a corporate board of directors, but the Commissioners serve without pay and are expected to work harder than any independent corporate directors, attending weekly Commission meetings and devoting between 25 and 50 hours per week to Commission business. Unlike a corporate board, the Commission is served by an executive director and staff.²¹ The Commission has formal authority to hire the Chief of Police (also for a five-year term, renewable once) and to set broad policy for the Department. Two years into the consent decree, the Police Commission decided not to renew the appointment of then-Chief Bernard Parks, subsequently hiring William Bratton as Chief and renewing his appointment in 2007.

The Police Commission, like any governing body, must maintain a balance between critical review and public support. It must hold the LAPD and its Chief accountable and in compliance with its policies, yet it also must encourage them to align their work with changing public needs and expectations. The Commission must defer to the expertise of police officers and respect their exercise of discretion in operational matters at the same time as they require compliance with rules and procedures that can seem rigid. These challenges are multiplied when the work of the Department draws public attention and controversy, and they are complicated further by the web of relationships that binds the Department to other systems of governance and oversight—the courts, the media, and the local, state, and federal governments.

The consent decree represents a challenge and an opportunity for the Commission. Had the Commission been performing as an effective corporate board, it is unlikely that the U.S. Department of Justice could have intervened as it did. In that sense, the consent decree is a challenge to the Commission to step up and govern the Department more effectively. At the same time, the consent decree has provided the Commission with an opportunity to focus consistently on a few key issues: strengthening its review of uses of force and generally raising its prominence in debates about police-community relations.

²¹ The office of Executive Director organizes the meetings of the Commission and also manages labor and employment matters, issues permits, facilitates community policing activities, handles public information, and conducts reviews and research on change in policies and procedures in the profession of policing.

The Commission appoints the Inspector General, whose office audits, investigates, and oversees the handling of complaints of misconduct by Department employees, and conducts other investigations as directed by the Board. The Office of Inspector General was established only four years before the consent decree came into force on the recommendation of the Christopher Commission.

The Consent Decree formalized a particular role for the Inspector General in the oversight of the LAPD's use of force, requiring the Inspector General to review every instance of the use of categorical force, witness the Department's own investigation of each incident, offer an independent evaluation of the Department's findings, and make recommendations about how the Department might improve practices.²² The Commission issues a final ruling on each individual incident of the use of categorical force as well as an annual report on these decisions, but it relies on the Inspector General for the information that shapes its findings.²³

We observed both the public and private work of the Police Commission and Inspector General, including their interactions with the LAPD's command staff. We conducted a series of interviews with members of the Commission and its executive director, as well as the Inspector General and an assistant inspector general about their investigations. We witnessed the workings of the LAPD's internal Use-of-Force Review Boards at which a representative of the Inspector General is always present and may ask questions but not vote. Finally, we received wide access to data and reports maintained by the Office of the Inspector General.

We examined the changing roles played by the Commission and the Inspector General by focusing on two high-priority, controversial issues: the use of force and racial profiling. The response of these governing bodies to high-profile events, such as the policing of the May Day demonstrations in MacArthur Park in 2007, are important, but these have been extensively reviewed by others, so we focus here on more routine functions of governance. Before turning to these specific topics, however, we describe the general performance of the Commission and the Inspector General.

Our interviews revealed growing respect for the Commission under the consent decree. Several people described the Commission's current membership as "the strongest in a long time," or words to that effect. We heard frequent references to its elevated "status" and its greater "authority." In our observations, the Commission was able to challenge the LAPD leadership on questions of policy and performance, and to require greater attention to issues the Commission deemed essential to public confidence.

Structurally, the governance of the LAPD depends on a small number of unpaid Commissioners to devote at least half of their working hours to a delicate political, technical, and professional enterprise that is often in the midst of public controversy. It is

²² The Inspector General is also required to audit and review a sample of the Department's own investigations of the use of non-categorical force.

²³ Each year since 2003, the Office of the Inspector General has published an annual report on the use of categorical and non-categorical force as well as audits of the Department's own use of force investigations. For a recent example, see www.lacity.org/oig/Reports/2006_CUOF_Annual_Rprt_11-29-07.pdf

not surprising, therefore, that our interviews also uncovered criticism of the Commission, mostly for its lack of strategic focus. One person complained about its “wandering agenda.” A senior LAPD officer observed “it seems as if nothing gets finalized,” adding that “the Commission isn’t good at identifying priorities, and is distracted by newspaper headlines.”

The current Inspector General, André Birotte, has held the post since 2003, following Katherine Mader (1996-1998) and Jeffrey Eglash (1998-2003). Until the consent decree came into force, the Inspector General’s office was tolerated, but barely so, by the LAPD. Disagreements over the authority of the office led the first Inspector General to resign, and the second Inspector General faced similar difficulties, despite changes to the city charter in 2001 that gave the Inspector General subpoena power and the ability to investigate relevant matters without specific authorization.²⁴ The Police Commission has the power to order the Inspector General to terminate an investigation, but it has never used this power formally.

The role of the office has changed considerably since Birotte took up the post. A senior officer of the LAPD confirmed for us what seemed apparent in our own observations: the Inspector General today has adopted a less “adversarial” approach and the Department has, in turn, given him greater access than his predecessors enjoyed. Significantly, the Inspector General has codified this new access in “work rules” that should allow the good practice to be continued beyond his own term of office and that of Chief Bratton.


In our interviews, one senior officer said that the Office of the Inspector General had “earned respect” in the Department, and had competently conducted audits and reviews of Department investigations. “We need them,” said one officer, describing the Office of the Inspector General’s review of the complaints process. “They’re in the business of criticism, and we’re not perfect.” At the same time, several officers we interviewed believe that the Inspector General’s office has become bogged down in details of police operations: “Their role is oversight, not coaching,” said one officer. “They should be doing more than remind us to wear our vests,” he added. Another officer said: “I guess they’ve been taught to microscopize everything they see, but instead of getting a conversation about what activities comprise quality in policing, we hear about widgets.”

These comments come from headquarters personnel who deal routinely with the Office of the Inspector General, but most members of the LAPD do not have strong views about the Inspector General. Indeed, perceptions of the Inspector General across the Department have not changed much since the year before the consent decree was signed. A 1999 survey of LAPD officers found that only about a third of non-supervisors and a third of supervisors believed that the Inspector General added integrity to “the Department’s disciplinary system.” When we asked that same question in 2009, we received roughly similar responses, a little lower among non-supervisors and slightly higher among supervisors, as shown in Figure 36. But relatively few of those we surveyed had strong views on the subject, and a large fraction—more than a quarter of

²⁴ James Sterngold, “A Monitor of Los Angeles Police Seeks to Build Power” in *The New York Times*, June 6, 2001, page A18.

our respondents—did not answer this question at all, suggesting that the Inspector General does not figure prominently in the image of the Department held by a large fraction of sworn officers.

Figure 36. LAPD Sworn Officers Who Agree that the Inspector General Gives the Disciplinary System Greater Integrity, 1999 and 2009



Source: Harvard Kennedy School Program in Criminal Justice Policy & Management (2009); Wellford Wilms (1999)

Mixed impressions of governance and oversight structures in a police organization should be expected, especially from individuals and units that are being supervised. But it is important to appreciate their ambiguity. The frustrations of police officers with oversight could be a warning of outside interference and unproductive oversight, but the same frustrations might be a sign of a fresh influence on an organization that had previously considered itself impervious. Likewise, the allegations of excessively “fastidious” reviews of police work-products might be signs of redundant systems of quality control, but they could also be proof of the continuing need for painstaking oversight.²⁵

The comments made in our interviews raise important questions about the role and resilience of the work of the Commission and Inspector General in the direction and oversight of policing. “The Commission today appears strong,” said one senior officer,

²⁵ One of the tasks of the Office of the Inspector General is to review the quality and completeness of the work of the Department’s own internal governance operations, such as the inspections and audits of the Audit Division, which are themselves exhaustive and inquire into such apparently minor issues as whether or not notifications of CUOF incidents are actually received or recorded on an answering machine or BlackBerry.

“but how do we know it’s the organization and not the individual members that are strong?” Another officer asked: “Are the changes in the Department reversible? The previous chief undid many things, and the one before him scrapped a lot of good practices, too. Does that mean it all could change quickly with a new chief, or once the decree is over?” Coming from the present and future leaders of the Department, these questions command attention.

One test of the quality and resilience of governance would assess the dynamic character of the relationships within the LAPD. Governance and oversight of the LAPD is so multilayered that it is difficult to discern, isolate, and measure the independent contribution of any one body.²⁶ The effects of the Commission and Inspector General might better be detected in the character of the interactions and processes that connect the various bodies of governance. Another test would examine whether the volume and gravity of misconduct or complaints and the use of force are going up or down in response to the exercise of governance and oversight. When the Commission or IG find the use of force out of policy or recommend changes to the way complaints are handled, how does the Department respond? When they find lapses or honest mistakes that do not rise to the level of misconduct, does the Department embrace their findings? When they concur or even commend the Department for excellent work, does it matter?

In the section that follows, we focus on the role of the Commission and Office of the Inspector General in two discreet areas: (1) assessing its response to complaints, including complaints of racial profiling, and (2) overseeing the Department’s use of force. Uses of force and complaints of racial profiling are uncommon events in the lives of individual police officers, but they have earned a lot of attention in the press and in the weekly meetings of the Commission, and triggered a lot of activity and change within the Department’s own governance routines.

²⁶ Take the example of complaints: the Internal Affairs Group, part of the Professional Standards Bureau, not only receives, classifies, and assigns all complaints for investigation, but also conducts occasional tests of the integrity of the system, filing anonymous complaints and tracking their resolution. The Research and Evaluation unit performs quality assurance tests, assessing the completeness of investigations, ferreting out boiler-plate language in witness statements, and drafting letters to complainants that explain the outcomes of the investigations. The Audit Division reviews this performance, searching for inconsistencies and errors in the entire process. Finally, the complaints section of the Inspector General’s office scrutinizes these audits, examines a sample of the complaints, and publishes a review of the quarterly and annual reports, the data for which comes from the Teams II Development Bureau.

Handling Civilian Complaints

The receipt, investigation, and review of civilian complaints are the joint responsibility of the Inspector General, Police Commission, and Police Department, all of which can independently act on allegations of misconduct. In practice, most of the work managing these complaints falls to the Department's Internal Affairs Group (IAG), which investigates a small portion of all complaints and monitors the investigation and disposition of the majority, which are handled by supervisors in the 19 area divisions.²⁷

The overwhelming majority of complaints originate with the public as a result of some type of contact with police officers. Officers refer to these complaints as "1.28s" for the number of the form which they are required to provide citizens who wish to file a complaint. Each year since 2000, between 70 and 75 percent of all complaints recorded by the LAPD came from members of the public. The remainder involves allegations of police misconduct that are made by other police officers, with most common allegations being "neglect of duty" and "unbecoming conduct," about 16 and 11 percent of which, respectively, are sustained during a police investigation.²⁸

The most common allegation in civilian complaints is that officers were discourteous. Between January 1998 and October 2008, residents filed complaints involving more than 17,000 allegations of discourtesy – roughly 150 each month, or five each day. A small but steady proportion of these allegations are sustained in the course of police investigations. For example, of the 2,368 complaints the LAPD closed in 2008 that involved an allegation of discourtesy, 39 (1.6%) were sustained. Allegations of discourtesy made by the "person involved" or a "third-party" are sustained less frequently than allegations of discourtesy made by uninvolved members of the public, suggesting that the LAPD attaches great importance to these kinds of complaints.²⁹


The majority of LAPD police officers continue to have negative perceptions about the complaints process. As Figure 37 shows, nearly 85 percent of officers responding to our survey in March 2009 agreed or strongly agreed with the statement "most civilian complaints are frivolous," and less than 40 percent believe the investigation of civilian complaints is fair. Only 37 percent agreed or strongly agreed that the complaint system makes the Department more accountable to the public. A few officers we spoke with thought the easy accessibility of the complaints process was an asset to the Department, but negative perceptions are the norm, as the chart below shows. Most officers in the LAPD do not distinguish the complaints process from the discipline process.

²⁷ The IAG investigates allegations of misconduct mandated by the consent decree. In 2004, the IAG took direct responsibility for investigating less than 5 percent of all complaints. In the last four years, the IAG has directly investigated about 10 percent of all complaints.

²⁸ Some of the complaints in these cases are in fact generated by citizens, since in the course of investigating use of force incidents the LAPD sometimes opens a complaint form based on interviews of witnesses and participants who allege excessive force or verbal mistreatment and other misconduct.

²⁹ In 2008, the LAPD sustained 3 percent of all complaints that came from the "person involved" in an incident, and 3 percent of complaints from "third parties," but 26 percent of the complaints that came from other members of the public.


Figure 37. LAPD Sworn Officers Agreement with Certain Statements, 1999 and 2009



Source: Harvard Kennedy School Program in Criminal Justice Policy Management (2009); Wellford Wilms (1999)

Black residents have filed a slightly larger number of complaints of discourtesy than White or Hispanic residents, even though they comprise a smaller proportion of suspects stopped by the police. In 2008, Blacks filed 31 percent of all allegations of discourtesy and yet constituted 23 percent of all individuals stopped by the LAPD. Figure 38 depicts trends in discourtesy complaints over time, which remain relatively steady, with annual variations, despite substantial increases in enforcement activity during these years.

Figure 38. Civilian Complaints Received by the LAPD Alleging Discourtesy, 1998 to 2007



Source: LAPD

The Police Commission regularly reviews the Department's "quarterly discipline reports," which contain an array of figures on the volume and types of these complaints as well as their disposition but do not by themselves communicate an opinion about recent trends and progress toward Department goals.³⁰ It falls to the Commission to make these judgments and the Commission often invites the Inspector General to select topics or concerns for further investigation. Because of the large volume of complaints, however, the Inspector General's review is often limited to assessing the accuracy and completeness of statements collected and summarized by investigators, focusing on complaints that are investigated by the Department's Internal Affairs Group, the so-called "level two" or more serious complaints.³¹

Racial Profiling

In recent years, the LAPD has paid particular attention to the management of complaints of racial profiling. Among many reasons for this special attention is that the Commission has insisted that the Department review the process by which it investigates allegations of racial profiling.


In May 2007, the Department introduced a new set of protocols for handling allegations of racial profiling that required the Professional Standards Bureau to conduct an initial review of all such complaints and that the IAG conduct the investigation centrally. It also required that investigators take additional steps to document an officer's actions when they were not triggered by a call for service. The introduction of these protocols stemmed in part from the fact that, in January 2007, the Commission had received that a review by the Inspector General that expressed "some concern regarding the penalty imposed upon a supervisor accused of failing to take appropriate action when a subordinate made ethnic remarks," and observed that none of the 85 allegations of racial profiling that quarter had been sustained. None of the 116 allegations of wrong searches that quarter had been sustained either, but the null finding on racial profiling stood out.

As Figure 39 illustrates, the number of allegations of racial profiling had generally increased since 2002, although there was a pronounced decrease in 2006. The following year, the number of these complaints surged to an all time high.

³⁰ The "QDRs" could function as a barometer for understanding change in the public experience of policing as they do in other cities as well as guide and facilitate the Commission's oversight. For an example of a report on civilian complaints of misconduct that analyzes trends over time by the social status and racial identity of complainants, see the Annual Report of the New York City Civilian Complaint Review Board, <http://www.nyc.gov/html/ccrb/home.html>

³¹ Each year, the Office of the Inspector General selects one aspect of complaints process for special consideration. A recent review, for example, focused on the investigation of complaints adjudicated as "Not Resolved." These reviews help identify concerns that the Commission raises with the leadership of the Department.

Figure 39. Civilian Complaints Received by the LAPD Alleging Racial Profiling, 2000 to 2007



Source: LAPD

Eager to know the impact of the protocols, the Commission in October 2007 directed the Inspector General to audit and review a sample of complaints involving allegations of racial profiling. The review, which was completed in February 2008, found shortcomings in five of the six complaints of racial profiling whose investigation had been initiated and closed between May and October 2007. Teams II data showed that none of the Department's investigations into 320 allegations culminated in a sustained finding of racial profiling. In April 2008, the Commission met to discuss with the Department the findings from these reviews.

At the Commission meeting one board member expressed consternation that the Department's investigations into racial profiling produced a "big fat zero." Representatives of the Department explained that they did not sustain any allegations because it was impossible through ordinary investigations to know the "state of mind" of its officers at the time of a stop.³² The meeting concluded with the Commission requesting the Executive Director to work with the Department's Internal Affairs Group, which investigates all such allegations, on a study of the investigation and adjudication of similar complaints in other jurisdictions. Simultaneously, the Department contracted with an academic expert to reexamine its training processes.

The Commission returned to the subject of the investigation of complaints of racial profiling again in October 2008, with board members reiterating their commitment to

³² See for example, Joel Rubin, "320 complaints of racial profiling and not one had merit, LAPD says," *Los Angeles Times*, April 30, 2008.

sustaining the credibility and integrity of the complaints investigation system, which one commissioner had called “the most fulsome in the country.” The head of the Professional Standards Bureau acknowledged shortcomings in the new methods and documentation of some of the allegations of racial profiling before the Commission, and proposed a different remedy structure for the investigation of such complaints in the future, including an alternative dispute resolution mechanism. Citing data contained in Teams II, the head of the Internal Affairs Group noticed that that some portion of the allegations of racial profiling were actually about discourteous treatment, a finding which could be used to adjust the classification system and thus also open a new avenue for responding to citizen concerns. As the head of the Internal Affairs Group said at the Commission meeting in October 2008, “we’ve got a community that feels it’s not being treated well, and we have to do something about it.”

The way the Department handles allegations of racial profiling continues to evolve. The Professional Standards Bureau is testing out the new system of dispute resolution for citizens that complain of racial profiling, and in December 2009 introduced further enhancements to the protocol for investigating allegations of “biased policing.” The Department has installed videos in police cars in the South Bureau order to more accurately record the nature of police-public encounters, and the devices should be operational soon. In March 2009, the Commission approved the Department’s new policy prohibiting racial profiling.

The Department has assumed leadership of this issue, and yet it is important to recognize how the intervention of the Commission and the Inspector General helped the Department set out on this path, reinforcing its efforts to build better systems of integrity and public confidence. By scrutinizing data on complaints process, the Commission uncovered a worrisome trend in Department practices. By insisting on a review of practices in other jurisdictions, the Department examined its protocols from a fresh perspective and considered solutions that were tested in other cities and Departments. And by doing so, the Commission strengthened the commitment of the Department to transparency and respect in community relations. As the Assistant Chief of Police put it at the conclusion of the meeting of the Commission, “we’ve got to do more to ensure we provide the most respectful policing we’re capable of.”

Use of Force

No problem of police management and governance is of greater concern than the use of force by police. As recently as 2000, the LAPD’s internal Board of Inquiry examined the possibility that LAPD officers were concealing instances of the use of force, a problem discovered during the Rampart scandal. It investigated whether or not supervisors and commanders in that division were still permitting such concealment as part of an earnest effort to fight gang crime. The Department’s report found that, “unfortunately, ...this pattern has occurred within Rampart once again.”³³

³³ See “Board of Inquiry into the Rampart Area Corruption Incident,” March 2000, p. 56.

With the implementation of the Consent Decree, the Department redoubled its efforts to document and critically evaluate every incident of the use of force. The Department first converted the Critical Incident Investigation Division into the Force Investigation Division, whose work, all our interviewees said, was “vastly superior” to the investigations completed in the past. The Department also reorganized the meetings of the Use of Force Review Board, which now analytically reviews each shooting, listens to a recommendation from the supervising captain, and then issues a ruling on the appropriateness of the tactics and use of force. Each incident of the use of categorical force is then reexamined carefully by the Commission in a closed session, drawing on a briefing and independent analysis of the facts prepared by the Office of the Inspector General.

The Office of the Inspector General plays a special role in the governance of the use of force, shadowing investigators at the scene of critical incidents, conducting real-time reviews of the work of Force Investigation Division (FID), and later summarizing exhaustively the quality and outcomes of investigations in its annual reports.³⁴ We cannot say whether or not the Inspector General’s efforts have had a direct effect, but the FID investigations do seem to be improving. In 2005 and 2006, the Office of the Inspector General identified shortcomings in nearly two-thirds of all investigations of alleged excessive force. In 2007, the Office of the Inspector General found shortcomings in less than half of the cases it sampled. As one person within the Office of the Inspector General told us, there have been “huge” improvements in the quality of the investigations completed by FID over this time.

Disagreements between the Inspector General and the Chief of Police are rare, but when they occur the Commission seems influenced by the Inspector General. Between 2005 and 2008, there were 449 incidents involving the use of categorical force. In rare instances, the Department’s own investigation leads the Chief of Police to administratively disapprove of officers’ tactics, and in a smaller subset to find the use of force “out of policy.” In the vast majority of cases however, the Department approves the tactics and use of force, and the Inspector General almost always agrees. In only ten instances between 2005 and 2008, did we find the cases where the Office of the Inspector General recommended a finding substantially different from that of the Chief. In each of these ten instances, the Commission adopted the position of the Inspector General in its final ruling, and these were the only instances of which we know where the Board of Police Commissioners adopted a finding contrary to the recommendation of the Chief of Police.

The Department has made its own efforts to improve training and incorporate the findings and decisions of oversight organs into its routines. We found many examples of scrupulous investigations of individual incidents that raised questions about tactics that may have led to the use of deadly force. For example, the Use of Force Review Boards

³⁴ Only some of these findings are contained in the Inspector General’s Annual Report Regarding the Use of Categorical Force. The Office of the Inspector General also publishes findings in its reviews of the Departments “Quarterly Discipline Report” and “Categorical Use of Force Investigations Audit.” See www.lacity.org/oig/isgrp1.htm

have found numerous instances in which officers in plain clothes had engaged suspects without identifying themselves, without notifying supervisors of their locations, and without following various other standard procedures.³⁵ The Use of Force Review Division has reminded personnel of such shortcomings in its newsletter, and communicated concerns about the “loose supervision” of officers in the narcotics division in connection with multiple incidents of so-called “waist-band shootings” involving plain-clothes officers. This combination of thorough investigation, tactical debriefing, adjustments to training, and reminders in the newsletter is intended to keep such uses of force to the minimum necessary, and the efforts of the Department, the Inspector General, and the Police Commission together certainly appear to have produced more careful reviews of the use of force in individual cases. The analysis of trends in the use of force seems less developed.

The Quality of Governance

Good governance aligns internal management and leadership with external oversight and direction. In the case of the LAPD, the Commission and Inspector General exert their influence largely by strengthening internal processes of accountability and management, though the Department also cultivates innovation in government and key management processes on its own. Without the prodding of the Inspector General or any specific direction by the Commission, for example, the Department improved the complaints process above and beyond the requirements of the Consent Decree. In 2006 and 2007, staff in the Teams II Development Bureau created a special intake template and training module for officers in the area divisions in order to facilitate and streamline the process of opening and completing an investigation. In 2008, Teams II staff designed a prototype dashboard by which to chart change in the character and resolution of complaints across the organization over time. If the dashboard is implemented, command staff will be able to compare trends in the types of complaints filed and sustained over the diverse units that comprise the LAPD, and thus be in a position to detect emerging patterns of problems or successes before an alarm sounds or calls for change come from outside agencies.

There are other signs of innovation in governance that may well be below or beyond the radar of the Commission and Inspector General. The Use of Force Review Division, for example, is developing new ways of disseminating information about troubling patterns in tactics as well as insights about how to better train officers in use of force situations. The Tac-Ops newsletter is becoming a rich source of information for officers in the LAPD and other agencies as well, and staff members in the Use of Force Review Division actively push out the information through email blasts and other reminders. Some of the insights and innovations are the result of interactions with the Inspector

³⁵ The Use of Force Review Boards typically generate careful reviews of the practices that lead up to a categorical use of force incident, and we were impressed by the seriousness of those we observed. For example, in one of review we observed, the captain who supervised the officers involved in a shooting candidly raised critical questions about the situation, asking why these particular officers were in plain clothes in light of the limited experience and training, why they seemed poorly equipped for the traffic stop they made, and why they seemed not to have identified themselves as police officers. It is a sign of integrity in the Review Boards that these kinds of questions can be explicitly discussed.

General, but others are the product of the staff's own ingenuity and desire to lead the Department and profession.

What does this tell us about the quality of external governance today?

In our estimation, the Office of Inspector General has come a long way since it was first created in 1996. The first two occupants of the position of Inspector General left frustrated by the difficulties of obtaining information and cooperation from the Department and without finding an effective voice in the governance system. Since the consent decree, however, the Department and the Inspector General have gradually strengthened cooperation to the point where it is now noticed by rank and file members of the Department and appreciated by others. The Office of the Inspector General now has standing to speak at the Use of Force Review Boards and its opinions are generally respected by members of both the Force Investigation Division and Use of Force Review Division.

Our reviews of the reports prepared by the Office of the Inspector General for the commission reinforce the impression of good cooperation and the high quality of its products. The Inspector General's reports on the use of force in particular find lapses in Department investigations, identify areas for improvements, and make reasonable recommendations for how the Commission can encourage better officer training and learning from the review of use of force incidents.³⁶ These reports are taken seriously by the Department, which now requests copies before Commission meetings and at times requests opportunities to discuss their findings. The Inspector General, in short, has chosen to influence Department practices through a steady but gradual process, avoiding public criticism and relying on the sound quality of its work. While it has rarely used the authority to initiate an investigation or audit without prior authorization of the Board, each year, the Inspector General addresses at least one issue that is unrelated to the consent decree, slowly expanding its role in the governance of the Department.

There are limits here. The adoption of the Inspector General's recommendations and advice is optional and its formal powers are modest. The Inspector General cannot recommend an out of policy finding in the use of force unless the practice *substantially* deviates from policy, and that standard is, as one person put it, "fuzzy." The Inspector General also does not consistently check up on the implementation of recommendations made by the Commission. There is also little capacity with which the Inspector General can assess the long-term impact of its decisions and recommendations on Department practices, a limitation that is lamented by staff as well as some members of the Commission. In the present arrangement, in short, the Office of the Inspector General plays as much an auxiliary role as an oversight role and it is heavily dependant on the Commission. As one member of the Office of the Inspector General put it: "We have influence on the Department only in so far as the Commission has power."

³⁶ These products are used by outside agencies to learn about the Department and engage the Commission in a conversation about progress in the LAPD. See, for example, the letter from the Southern California chapter of the ACLU to the Board of Commissioners, dated March 3, 2008 (on file with Executive Director of the Commission).

The Commission, too, has evolved and improved substantially since 2000. Every observer of the Commission noted its growing strength and competence as well as its ability to question a prominent and renowned chief of police.

Still, everyone we interviewed about the Commission had their lists of how the Commission could improve. As with Police Department itself, there is more to be done in the Commission's development. Three features of the Commission's role recur repeatedly in areas identified for improvement.

First, except for the yard posts established by the consent decree, which it regularly reviews, the Commission has no measures or indicators of its own by which to evaluate progress in policing over time. An explicit discussion about the goals of policing in Los Angeles and measures against which the Commission might count progress might be helpful as the Commission moves beyond the era of the consent decree.

Second, the Commission does not appear to have a clear way to group issues that come up for consideration. "If you look at the agenda," one senior officer told us, "you'll see that 95 percent of the topics on the agenda concern a single incident." Commissioners are attentive to this problem, too, apparently, and have begun asking questions about the mixture of reactive and directive roles it should play in governing the Department. "We need to strike the right balance between letting the chief create an agenda, on the one hand, and telling him what he needs to address on the other," said one board member. "We are looking into long-term planning," said another.

Third, the Commission does not yet possess independent sources of routine information about Department practices. The Inspector General's office does not conduct independent or parallel investigations, but rather exhaustively reviews the information unearthed in the course of the Department's internal reviews. As a result, Commission members sometimes rely on press reports and other sources of information by which to assess the completeness and accuracy of Department reports. There is no standard way of filling this need, but this hard working, unpaid board is probably at the limit of what can do with its current sources of information. At least one senior official we spoke with suggested that the Department would probably benefit from a "genuine civilian oversight commission."

Concluding Observations

Stepping back from the dozens of specific provisions of the LAPD consent decree that have been implemented, we see a staggering scale of change. The LAPD is the largest and most complicated police agency ever subjected to the oversight of a Federal Court under the 1994 law giving the Justice Department authority to bring pattern-and-practice cases against states and municipal governments; and the consent decree in LA is among the most complex ever entered by a police department. If local governments and police departments elsewhere are ever going to consent to such reform programs in the future, they will need to know that success is possible. The changes in Los Angeles should be encouraging in that respect.

The consent decree alone does not explain the changes in the LAPD. Indeed, it is unlikely that a consent decree can ever make these kinds of improvements without strong and effective leadership. At best, federal oversight and a consent decree can keep shortcomings in view, but only police leadership and strong local governance can bring the changes that the parties to such litigation agree they want to see.

The evidence presented here shows that with both strong police leadership and strong police oversight, cities can enjoy both respectful and effective policing. We have seen that the officers of the LAPD have regained their commitment to the institution: attrition is down and was down even while the economy was booming. On a variety of survey questions, officers signaled their renewed satisfaction on the job. And residents, too, are highly satisfied.

The LAPD of today is a changed organization. Within Los Angeles, community engagement and partnership is part of the mainstream culture of the Department. Not everyone embraces it, and not everyone practices it, but the commanders we observed take relationships with communities seriously as an essential part of their work. The precise forms that accountability takes remain subjects of intense debate, but the fact of accountability has entered the lifeblood of the organization. Even on the most sensitive issue of the use of force, officers of the LAPD are willing to act when necessary, but the Department scrutinizes each use of force closely and is accountable through many devices for its proper use.

Time and again we heard police officers and community residents pose the question: will the improvements persist if the consent decree ends? Research cannot answer such a prospective question, but in our opinion the officers and residents with whom we spoke seem ready for that test. It is not that policing in Los Angeles is all that it can ever be, but the balance of local leadership and local oversight is healthy enough to carry the process of continuous improvement forward.



HUMAN TERRAIN MAPPING: A Critical First Step to Winning the COIN Fight

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Major Brandon Garner, U.S. Army; and Captain Richard Thompson, U.S. Army

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PHOTO: CPT Brian Jennings, commander of C Company, 1-15 Infantry talking with the sheik of Vin Jan Village, Iraq, August 2007. (U.S. Army, 1LT Aaron Wilkerson)

ACCORDING TO CURRENT U.S. MILITARY DOCTRINE, the path to victory in a counterinsurgency (COIN) runs through the indigenous population. Experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, where the people are centers of gravity, have driven this doctrine. But before the counterinsurgent can win the people over, he must take the necessary steps to really understand and know them.

The U.S. military clearly was not attuned to this reality at the outset of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Today, however, most Soldiers with multiple tours in theater understand that U.S. forces must consider the population first in everything they do operationally. They have discovered that any attempt to separate the insurgents from the population must be coordinated with effective efforts to win the population's support. Soldiers know that to succeed at the latter, they need to understand the human terrain intimately: only deep understanding can point to the conditions essential for success. Therefore, the important question is no longer "why" or "if" Soldiers operating in COIN environments should seek detailed understanding of the population; "how" they obtain that understanding is the issue at hand. In other words, how can a tactical unit most effectively amass and process the information it needs to decisively influence the population in its area of operations (AO)? Using the practical experience it gained during OIF V, Task Force (TF) Dragon (led by 1-15 Infantry, part of the 3d Heavy Brigade Combat Team, 3d Infantry Division) can help answer this question.

An Enemy Within

As many veterans and students of the current wars recognize, insurgents hold the upper hand with their better understanding of local customs and politics, their ability to speak the language, their freedom of movement within society, and their greater comprehension of the population's interests. Moreover, as is always the case in wars of foreign occupation, the insurgent enemy in this war does not wear a uniform and can easily blend with the population.

While preparing for its current combat tour, TF Dragon looked hard at units that were enjoying success in Iraq to figure out how to cope with the difficulties of COIN warfare. Overwhelmingly, the units that seemed to be winning the fight had made significant inroads with local leaders, had found proactive ways to understand and respect local cultural norms, and had addressed specific community needs. Although the task force recognized and understood this lesson early on, when it actually arrived in its area of

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operations (AO), Soldiers found that very little of the ethnographic data it needed to conduct effective operations had been collected.

The available information was sparse and spread out across the continuity files of nearly every staff section. It was also old: there had been no consistent coalition presence in the area for nearly two years, and when the staff tried to verify the little information it had received, it often found that key personalities had moved out of the area or local opinions and loyalties had changed. The task force quickly determined that the first step of its COIN fight would be to acquire an understanding of its AO in human terms.

When it deployed to Iraq in mid-2007, TF Dragon inherited a heavily populated (400,000 people) area southeast of Baghdad. The AO was volatile, in part because it straddled a Sunni/Shi'a fault-line. The majority of the Sunnis lived along the Tigris River, the task force's western boundary. Shi'a tribes resided in the north (close to Baghdad) and along the eastern boundary (the Baghdad-Al Kut highway).

The requirement for new ethnographic information on its AO weighed heavily on the task force. Thus, the entire unit began focusing on systematically collecting and collating ethnographic information. Ultimately, TF Dragon worked the collection through a process the staff labeled "human-terrain mapping," or HTM.

Developing the HTM process amounted to creating a tool for understanding social conditions. As it collected and cataloged pertinent information, the

task-force staff tailored its plan in order to capture a broad range of details. An important aspect of the process involved putting the data in a medium that all Soldiers could monitor and understand. Once the formatting and baseline information requirements were set, TF Dragon employed the shared situational-awareness enhancing capabilities of the Command Post of the Future (CPOF) computer system. Each company was allocated a CPOF to post the results of its mapping on a common database, a matrix that included information about religious boundaries, key economic structures, mosques, and important personalities such as sheiks.

Over time, the staff mapped the boundaries of each tribe and the demographic makeup of every village, town, and city the enemy could possibly seek refuge in. It went on to add data about personalities who were known to be supporting the insurgents, and the needs and wants of the particular populations. Mapping this political, economic, and sociological information created a common human-terrain picture that enabled more proactive initiatives and faster, much more effective responses to events. For example, as incidents occurred in specific areas, the common map enabled all companies to plot the location of the incident, then identify the proper sheiks to contact for intelligence or answers to critical questions.

Human-terrain mapping thereby allowed TF Dragon to understand the population and demonstrate its commitment to improving local communities. By addressing what the people felt were their priority needs, the task force was better able to cultivate relationships of significant trust with neighborhood leaders. In turn, these relationships led to the construction of an effective biometric database of military-age males. This information resulted in improved actionable intelligence on



Task Force Dragon's area of operations southeast of Baghdad.

Mapping...political, economic, and sociological information created a common human-terrain picture that enabled more proactive initiatives and faster...responses to events.

insurgent activities, greatly improving security.

These positive results validated measures prescribed by Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, for “determining who lives in an area and what they do.” In figurative terms, the human-terrain map became an outline of who the players in the current game were. Thus, the task-force commander concluded that developing a human-terrain map was crucial to simultaneously clearing out the enemy and driving a wedge between the insurgents and the population.

Defining Tactical Human-Terrain Mapping

TF Dragon executed its data-collection effort through systematic people-to-people contact. The staff planned decentralized platoon-level patrols, conducted during daylight hours, that sought answers to specific questions about the population. These specific “information requirements” (IR) about each separate village and town included—

- The boundaries of each tribal area (with specific attention to where they adjoined or overlapped).
- Location and contact information for each sheik or village mukhtar and any other important people (government officials, Iraqi Security Forces, etc.).
- Locations of mosques, schools, and markets.
- Identification of the population’s daily habits (when they woke up, slept, shopped, etc.).
- Nearest locations and checkpoints of Iraqi Security Forces.
- Economic driving force (i.e., occupation and livelihood).
- Employment and unemployment levels.
- Population flow (i.e., people moving in or out of the AO).
- Anti-coalition presence and activities.
- Access to essential services (fuel, water, emergency care, fire response, etc).
- Particular local population concerns and issues.

To avoid being targeted, companies designed their terrain-mapping patrols to be “systematically unpredictable.” In this way, all areas could be covered without telegraphing to the insurgents which areas might be visited next. For example, TF Dragon’s Baker Company used the main road in its AO (running between Jisr Diyala and Salman Pak, near Baghdad) as a focal point and began with the villages on the east and west side of the thoroughfare. Each

day patrols changed sides of the road or moved north or south of the villages they had visited previously. After two or three days of patrolling, they took a day off, further disrupting any patterns they may have been inadvertently setting.

Patrols were organized with specific objectives and purposes for each sub-element. The three major tasks were security, IR gathering, and relationship-building. As the composition of most patrols was centered on a mechanized infantry or tank platoon, some augmentation was required. Generally, the company commander was present on patrol to gain a firsthand look at his AO. The company fire support officer (FSO), acting as the company’s intelligence officer, accompanied the commander on every patrol. This enabled the staff to build a framework to address the three critical tasks. The commander focused on building relationships with key individuals, his FSO (augmented by part of the platoon) sought answers to IR, and the patrol’s platoon leader concentrated on security.

In addition to the three sub-element tasks, everyone within the patrol helped deliver information operations (IO) messages. These messages typically involved the rewards program (money for information about extremist activities), examples of the positive steps being taken by the local government and Iraqi Security Forces, and the benefits of cooperating with the coalition. Whenever possible, the messages took the form of pamphlets or one-page handouts given to local citizens. Prepared handouts and knowledge of current messages were considered TF Dragon’s IO basic load. They were the responsibility of every Soldier on patrol.

A typical HTM patrol required a platoon to move tactically and establish a cordon around the area to be mapped. As the perimeter was being set, the commander and FSO moved to the likely center of the town and began to talk with citizens to determine where the local sheik or village leader lived. One of the specific requests the commander would make from the sheik or village elder was permission to enter the men of the village into the biometric data system (using handheld interagency identity detection equipment, HIIDE). Depending on the reaction to this request, the platoon might establish a centralized location and begin the process. If the sheik or elder demurred, the unit would earmark the village for a return visit when they could con-

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tinue to press the issue. However, most times the local leaders had no problem with the request; they viewed the biometric census as an opportunity to show their innocence and willingness to cooperate with coalition forces.

While the commander met with these individuals and Soldiers took the census, the FSO and his platoon augmentees would talk with as many of the military-age males as possible to get answers to the IR. Other Soldiers also talked to as many people as possible to pass on the day's IO messages. On average, these patrols took about two to four hours to complete.

Oftentimes, patrols were reinforced with civil-affairs (CA) teams, human-intelligence collection teams (HCTs), psychological operations (PSYOP) teams, or additional medical personnel. These military specialists provided specific areas of expertise to assist the patrols, and the TF used their skills to enhance the perceived importance of the tactical

unit. For example, having a unit medic treat a civilian with an acute problem, especially a child, provided direct evidence of the task force's goodwill and the tangible benefits to be had by cooperating with the coalition. Special-team augmentation also increased the overall number of contacts in the village, furthering the acquisition of IR answers. Additionally, it created opportunities for TF Dragon's "village teams" (elements combining CA, HCT, and PSYOP personnel) to reconnoiter and consider the kinds of effects they might want to produce on future visits.

Special care and planning was taken to ensure that augmentation teams did not interrupt or interfere with the relationship between the company and the population being mapped. TF Dragon emphasized the supremacy of the responsible company commander (the "land-owner") as the primary point of contact for each village's leaders. The task force wanted to preclude any confusion on the part of



U.S. Army, 1LT Matthew Barwick

Captain Rich Thompson, commander of Baker Company, 1-15 Infantry, talking with a local leader and his interpreter in Al Ja'ara, Iraq, August 2007.

the local leadership as to who would make decisions regarding projects or future support. This clarity was especially critical when dealing with CA teams, whom the people often saw as “money guys.” Through a deliberate effort, the task force made it clear that these teams supported the company commander, not the other way around.

After every patrol, the responsible platoon prepared a detailed analysis of the mapped area, and links were made to other villages based on sect, tribes, and terrain. The result was a census-like compilation of data collated by the task-force staff (primarily the S2, the effects/IO cell, and the CA officer). This compilation helped the staff develop and refine both its lethal and nonlethal targeting. It also produced a graphical depiction of where potential sectarian fault lines were, allowing the task force to focus its initial security efforts quickly so that all other logical lines of operation could commence early.

Task Force Dragon used this approach repeatedly to develop its human-terrain map. Balanced with other tactical missions, the overall process took about two-and-a-half months. Importantly, information contributing to the overall map was also gathered on offensive missions. During intelligence-driven raids, cordon and searches, and attacks, TF Dragon units used the same IR as on HTM patrols. Also, all military-age males found were entered into the HIIDES biometric data system, which helped the task force piece together a picture of the extremist groups operating in AO Dragon. The S2 simply checked the names of individuals taken into custody against the database built during previous HTM missions, and if someone had been in another unit’s AO earlier, he became a suspect; the task force would then investigate why he was moving from area to area. This cross-reference system enabled the S2 to begin to link individuals so identified to a possible extremist cell that lived in one part of AO Dragon, but conducted missions in another. Eventually, it allowed the task force to create a link diagram of possible extremist activities.

HTM—A Necessary Process

Although the value of the map itself was obvious, in retrospect, the physical process of doing the mapping might have been even more beneficial. If the type of information gathered had been available upon arrival (in a database, for example), the task force might have accepted an abstract, and perhaps false, sense of the environment. It would have done so while depriving itself of firsthand knowledge gained from building the map. By way of analogy, having a ready-made database would have been like learning to do math problems on a calculator instead of the hard way, via reasoning. In conducting HTM, the battalion learned how to square ethnographic data the hard way, a method that provided maximum benefit via direct analysis of particulars within the situation at intimate levels. From this perspective, the advantages of having Soldiers do HTM themselves appear numerous. Besides gaining greater knowledge of the AO, some of the more salient benefits follow.

- HTM provided a practical vehicle for gathering human intelligence (HUMINT). Human-terrain mapping facilitated coalition forces getting to know the leadership of the different tribes, villages, towns, and



U.S. Army, 1LT Matthew Barwick

Sergeant Cecil Ray, B Company, 1-15 Infantry, collects biometric data by processing a citizen of the Al Ja'ara area into the HIIDES system, August 2007.

Human-terrain mapping facilitated coalition forces getting to know the leadership of the different tribes, villages, towns, and cities...

cities of a particular AO. After earning the respect and trust of village sheiks and elders through person-to-person contact, Soldiers found the locals more willing to provide intelligence. As units moved through the various villages and towns of AO Dragon, they consistently found local citizens who had been hesitant to call the task-force tips hotline or go to its combat outposts, but were more than willing to provide information if engaged at a personal level.

- As often as possible, the task force tried to integrate its supporting human-intelligence collection teams into HTM patrols, which provided excellent opportunities to make initial intelligence contacts and develop sources. The practice also produced good inside knowledge of local citizens and a ready-made cross-reference capability, improving the task force's ability to determine the reliability and motivation of informants.

- HTM put a human, personal face on contacts with the population, abetting the task force's effort to enlist the population against the insurgents. One company used an interpreter to assist in getting to know the local citizens. Another conducted joint HTM patrols with local Iraqi policemen and concerned citizens. As one company commander put it: "I believe it was vital to the initial impression of the locals in our AO that they saw us out walking amongst them, knocking on doors, shaking hands and asking questions specific to that family [and] tribe. I feel it put a human face on our company and opened the door to many of the initial dialogues that we are [now] currently exploiting with great success."

- HTM was critical to building trusted networks. The number-one tenet of the 3d Infantry Division's COIN handbook states, "It's all about the people." Building a trusted network means creating personal relationships between coalition tactical leaders and the leaders of the population they secure. Once those relationships were built, task-force units

were better able to deliver and assess the effects of IO messages and PSYOP products, better able to determine if local governments were talking to their constituents, and—when necessary—better able to minimize unrest among the population through consequence-management procedures.

- The patrolling required to map the human terrain was vital to the initial tone set by TF Dragon: it put coalition Soldiers in the streets immediately, sending a clear signal to the insurgents and the people about who was in charge. If the enemy tested U.S. force strength, Soldiers were out of their vehicles with gun barrels and eyes set in every direction, prepared to maneuver instantly. Soldiers conducted every HTM patrol as if the enemy was watching and assessing them. Thus, HTM simultaneously brought U.S. forces closer to the locals and deterred enemy contact.

- HTM provided unforeseen opportunities to demonstrate resolve to the population. While getting to know local leaders and meeting with them in their villages, the companies of TF Dragon often conducted hasty raids on weapons traffickers and IED emplacement cells pointed out by villagers. These raids showed the locals that task-force Soldiers were dedicated to making their village more secure. Furthermore, they proved to local leaders that when they gave Soldiers critical intelligence information, those Soldiers would act on it.

- HTM provided ground-level insight into local politics, motivations, and differences—and this served as the start point for reconciling Sunni with Shi'a. Understanding the differences between the two sects' areas was easy; finding a nexus for reconciliation was not. However, once a unit met and befriended leaders in both areas, those leaders had something in common: a partnership with coalition forces. In one particular area, Sunni and Shi'a families lived together with different sheiks leading each sect. Unfortunately, these sheiks were not eager to work with one another to reconcile their differences. To add to the area's problems, Al-Qaeda in Iraq often attacked both groups as a means to keep their foothold. After working numerous HTM patrols in those areas, the local company commander earned the trust of both the Sunni and Shi'a. This enabled him to initiate discussions between the two sheiks based on the common goals of security and economic development.

- Nothing can replace personal reconnaissance in importance. This is a principle that has existed in U.S. Army doctrine for decades. Even though the data entered into biometric databases includes addresses and street names, this information is often difficult to include in map overlays. Furthermore, different people may refer to local areas by different names. Many roads in rural areas are difficult to travel; conducting reconnaissance during HTM operations can assist a unit in figuring this out.

As the U.S. Army continues to examine the human-terrain mapping aspect of counterinsurgency warfare, TF Dragon Soldiers would offer a caveat based on their experience: do not rely solely on a computerized, automated solution to HTM or on the creation of a singular special-staff section to provide human-terrain insight. From what TF Dragon learned, a unit would best benefit from going out and collecting this information initially on its own, or, if it inherits such information from a previous

unit, by developing a process to continuously reassess that information.

Summary

Counterinsurgency is probably the most difficult form of warfare because it forces military professionals out of their comfort zones and into the complex realm of interacting with human beings, sometimes in very subtle ways. By developing a human-terrain map, a unit can acquire a greater sensitivity to and deeper understanding of its AO, enabling it to leverage the complex human relationships that make COIN succeed or fail. But the goodness of a human-terrain map lies not just in the “having”; the “doing” offers perhaps even greater dividends. Building the necessary human relations with the population you secure is not hard—it just takes time and effort. In short, TF Dragon’s experience has shown that making a human-terrain map is time and energy well spent. **MR**

Center for Army Lessons Learned

10 Meade Avenue, Building 50 Ft. Leavenworth, KS 66027 COM: 913-684-3035 DSN: 552-3035

HANDBOOK

Transitioning Into
C/JTF

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

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The First
100 Days

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

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HANDBOOK

Combat Casualty Care

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Check out the CALL Web site
for the latest publications.

NIPR Website: <http://call.army.mil>

RFI: <https://call-rfi.leavenworth.army.mil/rfisystem>

Draft line-up and contact list

Will all of these panels provide our core audience with useful information? Are we overlooking any critical topics?

Panel One: Global perspectives on homegrown radicalization

Speakers (all law enforcement):

United States: Javed Ali, Senior Intelligence Analyst, FBI Headquarters
***Chief Downing to provide contact information for this list.**

Australia: Nick Kaldas, Assistant Commissioner, New South Wales Police Counter Terrorism Coordination Command; kaldnag@police.nsw.gov.au

Nick Kaldas
Assistant Commissioner
Counter Terrorism & Special Tactics
New South Wales Police Force
P.O. Box 1614
North Sydney NSW 2060

Canada: Mike McConnell (are we sure about this name? Mike McConnell is also the name of the head of the DNI)

UK: John Parkinson, Metropolitan Police
***Chief Downing to provide contact information**

Panel Two: How the social sciences can enrich counter-terrorism efforts

Speakers:

Military: U.S. Army Human Terrain Project - Lt. Col. Edward Villacres, Human Terrain System and military leader of the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division, U.S. Army.
Edward.Villacres@us.army.mil

**I am e-mailing him to ask him for his address.

Law Enforcement: TBD (What interesting projects are out there ... other than community mapping?)

Media: George Packer, reporter for The New Yorker who wrote the article (“A Reporter at Large: Knowing the Enemy”) that profiled David Kilcullen and was highly influential in this area.

George Packer
Reporter
The New Yorker
4 Times Square
New York, NY 10036
George_packer@newyorker.com

Back up is David Rohde from The New York Times

Academia: Montgomery McFate is a cultural anthropologist who has spent years working to convince the Department of Defense that cultural knowledge is key to winning this war. She also works on the Human Terrain Project.

** I will get her contact information from Villacres.

Shall we have someone from the BIRR Project on this panel as the fourth speakers?
(In place of law enforcement)

Mustapha Kara-Ali
BIRR Project manager
Ground Floor
2-14 Meredith St.
Bankstown NSW 2200
E-mail: mkaraali@birr.edu.au
Phone: 0297096070
Mobile: 0402858568

Panel Three: The intelligence landscape

Government: Bart Johnson, chair of criminal intelligence coordinating committee, DNI

Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Washington, DC 20511
*Chief has more specific information.

Academia: Amy Zegart from UCLA can talk about intelligence reform.

Amy Zegart
Associate Professor of Public Policy
UCLA School of Public Policy
6333 Public Policy Bldg
Los Angeles, CA 90095

Campus mailcode: 165606
Phone: 310.825.2455
E-mail: zegart@ucla.edu

Academia Back-up: Jennifer Sims, author of Transforming U.S. Intelligence.

Politics: Rep. Jane Harman, D-CA

2400 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515
202.225.8220

2321 E. Rosecrans Ave.
Suite 3270
El Segundo, CA 90245
310.643.3636

Military: Combating Terrorism Center's Harmony Project, Col. Felter

Lt. Col. Joseph Felter
Director
Combating Terrorism Center
Lincoln Hall
West Point, NY 10996

Panel Four: Training - Resources and Ideas for '08

Law Enforcement: Dr. Jonathan Crego could talk about HYDRA

Professor Jonathan Crego BSc.(Hons) Ph.D
Director - Hydra Operations
Critical Incident Debriefing and Operational Research
Leadership Academy
Metropolitan Police Service . Peel Centre . Aerodrome Road . Hendon .
London . NW9 5JE
voice : +44 (0)20 8358 1384
e-mail: jcrego@ncalt.com jcrego@10kv.com

Firefighters paper – deputy assistant chief in FDNY – publication – Joe Ffeifer
** Tim sending information

Think Tank: Clint Watts, Executive Training Program/CT Academy
* I e-mailed him to ask him for his address.

wattscw@gmail.com

Panel Five: Future Trends

This is when attendees would get briefings on the groups/tactics that they will have to worry about the most.

John Robbs – these things are melding together – mutual interest in disorder – sharing techniques

*Tim providing contact information.

Frank Cilluffo, George Washington University

cilluffo@gwu.edu

202.994.0295

*I e-mailed him and asked him for his address. I only have his home address from last year's conference.

Who did we decide on to give us the official national perspective?

(Other suggestions - Rick Fuentes or Ray Guidetti from the NJSP)

Keynote speakers: (Both invited by the Chief)

Mike Leinart, executive director of the NCTC

Wayne Murphy, assistant director of intelligence

Lawrence Wright presents his play?

Submitted by Usha Sutliff

Possible Topics:

** These panels are numbered for the sake of clarity. They are not meant to be in any particular order. Also, I have listed several speakers for each panel. This is a running list created with the understanding that we will have to decide on - and limit - the number of panelists.

**More details on these panels is available.

Panel One: Counter-terrorism and the social sciences

Possible speakers:

Military: U.S. Army Human Terrain Project - Edward Villacres, Human Terrain System, U.S. Army.

Law Enforcement: TBD (What interesting projects are out there ... other than community mapping?)

Media: David Packer, reporter for The New Yorker who wrote the article (“A Reporter at Large: Knowing the Enemy”) that profiled David Kilcullen and was highly influential in this area.

Academia: Montgomery McFate is a cultural anthropologist who has spent years working to convince the Department of Defense that cultural knowledge is key to winning this war.

Lunch or Evening Keynote Candidate: David Kilcullen, an Australian Army officer who has spent a considerable amount of time with Gen. David Petraeus in Iraq, could follow on this theme as a keynote.

Panel Two: Developing Law Enforcement’s “Counter-Narrative” to Radicalization

Military: Speaker TBD (Tim Connors?) (Will McCants from the CTC at West Point). If not, it would be interesting to hear what an Army civil affairs commander had to say about this issue.

Academia: Frank Cilluffo from George Washington University does a lot of work in the area of creating the counter-narrative. He presented at last year’s conference but has since written a report on prison radicalization and undoubtedly has moved forward with his thinking of the counter-narrative. He did well at last year’s conference.

Note: He knows me from last year’s event. I could contact him.

Community Group: A representative of the BIRR Project in Australia, which has recently come out with excellent work on the counter-narrative piece of things, could talk about general strategies.

Law Enforcement: An NYPD representative could discuss the radicalization report that came out this year.

Note: I could run this down using our NY contacts.

Media: This panel screams for a media/communications expert. Is there anyone working for the federal government on this (a la Voice of America)? The U.S. State Department started an initiative in the past year in which Arabic-speaking (and writing) bloggers are taking a proactive approach in cyberspace to counter AQ-derived or -inspired rhetoric. It would be interesting to hear about this effort and whether they feel it is having any effect whatsoever. (Michael Duran, DOD Section for Public Affairs, working on countering ideological support for terrorism; Duncan McGuinness, State Department, does operational work on public diplomacy)

Panel Three: How law enforcement can use open source.

How open source and the Internet can be used in CT to both investigate and shape messages to various constituencies (the counter-narrative). How can open source information be harnessed? What does the intelligence-gathering landscape look like these days (with the current surveillance issues, the expansion of CCTV, the reshaping of intelligence guidelines, etc.)? We could draw out any number of these issues on the panel.

Government: Eliot A. Jardines, assistant deputy director of National Intelligence for Open Source, can talk about the DNI's open source project and how the intelligence gathering landscape has changed.

Academia: Amy Zegart from UCLA could talk about intelligence reform. Jennifer Sims, author of Transforming U.S. Intelligence, is

Politics: Jane Harmon, chair of the Intelligence Subcommittee, could talk about what it is that she (and her colleagues in D.C.) are interested in when it comes to the topic of law enforcement and intelligence gathering?

Military: Combating Terrorism Center's Harmony Project, Col. Felter

Government: An NCTC rep. or Joel Cohen from DHS could discuss how intelligence-gathering methods have changed in recent years and what the future holds. Or, someone from the Met could talk about CCTV in the UK and how that has affected society and CT operations.

Law Enforcement: FBI or DOJ representative, preferably from Los Angeles, can talk about their efforts. Or John Miller?

Quote I heard at a conference: “In the Internet Age, everybody knows what’s happened but nobody knows what it means.”

Panel Four: Training - A look at innovative training models

Law Enforcement: Dr. Jonathan Crego could talk about HYDRA.

Think Tank: Clint Watts could talk about the executive training program that is being created for the LAPD and its regional partners.

Military: Spider Marks, good speaker and former commander of the military intelligence school at Fort Huachuaca (making him the highest ranking intelligence officer in that branch).

Fort Irwin (Army) and Twenty Nine Palms (Marines) – They’ve recreated Iraqi villages and can talk about training there.

Academia: Max Taylor, University of St. Andrews, directs an all-Internet training program for law enforcement executives. He used to investigate cybercrimes.

Panel Five: Future Trends in Terrorism

This is when attendees would get briefings on the groups/tactics that they will have to worry about the most.

Hezbollah – Are they really under the authority of Iran? (Robert Baer, “See No Evil: The True Story of a Ground Soldier in the CIA’s War on Terror”)

AQ-inspired groups that are self-guided terror cells (Find a NY Times reporter who covered the Fort Dix case, etc.; or New Jersey State Police person who worked on that case)

Radical animal and environmental rights groups (will ask Det. Cellentano)

Domestic religious extremist groups (Jon Krakauer, “Under the Banner of Heaven”)

Other keynote candidates:

Ambassador McNamara, DNI, could talk about threats and strategies.

Thomas Friedman, author of “The World is Flat,” could talk about how globalization (particularly the Internet) has enabled terrorists.

Walid Phares, author of “The War of Ideas: Jihadism Against Democracy” and “Future Jihad: Terrorist Strategies Against the West.” (Tim’s idea)

Mike Leinart, executive director of the NCTC (Chief Downing’s idea)

John Nagl, author of “Eating Soup with a Knife,” and leading counterinsurgency expert

Bruce Hoffman, Georgetown

Lawrence Wright, “The Looming Tower”

LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT



WILLIAM J. BRATTON
Chief of Police

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TDD: (877) 275-5273
Ref #: 1.15

ANTONIO R. VILLARAIGOSA
Mayor

November 21, 2007

Dear :

Thank you for attending the meeting between the senior staff of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) and representatives of local Muslim communities on Thursday, November 15, 2007. The candid discussion was informative, and we look forward to expanding our relationship and partnership.

As we discussed, the "mapping" component of this initiative will not be pursued, as we understand the sensitivities involved and want to be considerate of the community concerns on this matter. We are deeply appreciative of your candor and of the insight that we received. The intention of our outreach efforts is not to alienate those with whom we seek continued partnerships but to forge relationships built on mutual trust, respect, and an informed understanding of law enforcement and Muslim cultures. I hope that you believe, as I do, that Thursday's meeting was a positive step in that direction.

As we discussed, I am proposing the formation of a Chief of Police Muslim Outreach Forum, which will meet at least biannually, so that we may further explore these issues and identify public safety concerns. The Forums began in 1998 as an opportunity for the Chief of Police to establish a dialogue with various communities. I have directed my staff to schedule meetings with the newly created Muslim Outreach Forum in February and June 2008. I welcome and encourage you to participate. Simultaneously, we will also continue expanding our many other ongoing relationship building initiatives with the Muslim community. In addition, I am always ready and willing to meet with members of the Muslim community. Working together, we can reduce the fear and incidence of crime and improve the quality of life in neighborhoods Citywide.

One of the major advantages of these meetings and relationships is that they open channels of communication between the LAPD and the community. In light of recent events, that component seems useful and beneficial to all. I also invite you to attend a Community Police Academy for a better understanding of our training, policies, and procedures.

A police department is only as strong as the community it serves. Together we, the Muslim

«Title» «FirstName» «LastName»

Page 2

1.15

community and the LAPD, will build strong, transparent ties and deepen our understanding of each other. I look forward to future dialogue.

All the best,

WILLIAM J. BRATTON
Chief of Police

Submitted by Usha Sutliff

Possible Topics:

** These panels are numbered for the sake of clarity. They are not meant to be in any particular order. Also, I have listed several speakers for each panel. This is a running list created with the understanding that we will have to decide on - and limit - the number of panelists.

Panel One: How the social sciences can be applied to law enforcement counter-terrorism efforts

Subtopics:

Community mapping - how the military, law enforcement and social scientists (particularly cultural anthropologists) do it

Discussion of new generation of warfare - the psychocultural war; culture-centric war

The overall goal of the panel will be to frame local efforts within the broader paradigm of a global insurgency. The other goal will be to get law enforcement to start thinking of how they can use resources outside of their discipline to round out their CT strategies.

Possible speakers for this panel:

Military: U.S. Army Human Terrain Project - Edward Villacres, Human Terrain System, U.S. Army (also Jim Greer). This project is the prototype of an effort to provide social sciences support to U.S. military operations. The first team currently deployed in Afghanistan - made up of civilian analysts and on-call subject matter experts - provides operational support at the brigade and divisional levels, which is new. The team collectively offers cultural expertise and research capability (it converts "data into knowledge"). This is the group that will provide commanders with information about the regions in which they are operating - customs, taboos, tribal structure, history, regional players, political structures and family structures. The team is trained for four months and, once deployed, stays there until the operation is complete so there is no rotating out and no loss of institutional knowledge.

Note: I have met these folks and have contact information.

Law Enforcement: Representative from the Met to talk about their community-mapping project.

Media: David Packer, reporter for The New Yorker who wrote the article ("A Reporter at Large: Knowing the Enemy") that profiled David Kilcullen and was highly influential in this area. He has made at least six trips to Iraq and observes that soldiers' knowledge of their area has increased over time but the nature of the war keeps changing and getting ahead of them.

Academia: Montgomery McFate is a cultural anthropologist who has spent years working to convince the Department of Defense that cultural knowledge is key to winning this war. She has been met with resistance and could talk about that, as well as the pushback she gets from the academic community. (She could also be a keynote speech candidate.)

Lunch or Evening Keynote Candidate: David Kilcullen, an Australian Army officer who has spent a considerable amount of time with Gen. David Petraeus in Iraq, could follow on this theme as a keynote. A foremost counterterrorism expert, Kilcullen refers to global counterinsurgency as "armed social science" and in his writings has redefined the war on terror as a "global counterinsurgency." This change in terminology has large implications because a terrorist is a lone operator. Put in the framework of an insurgency, he becomes an insurgent - someone with a mass base. This also changes the focus of response, which has been largely based on military responses. It calls for a move beyond that to political, economic and social efforts (including international operations).

Panel Two: Counterinsurgency/Law Enforcement's Counter-Narrative

* I think that radicalization could also be a stand-alone panel.

Continuing to develop the theme of the global insurgency, the overall goal will be for law enforcement to look at other models – particularly those from the military – for ideas about how to plan and execute their own strategies.

Subtopics:

Community outreach approaches

Counterinsurgency techniques: Lessons from the military - their applicability to law enforcement

Radicalization (in prison and the broader community)

Military: A representative from the U.S. Marines/Army could discuss the widely publicized counterinsurgency manual that came out in June 2006 and is reportedly considered to be the gold standard for counterinsurgency techniques. Are there techniques/tactics that law enforcement can adopt? If not, it would be interesting to hear what an Army civil affairs commander had to say about this issue.

Government: The U.S. State Department started an initiative in the past year in which Arabic-speaking (and writing) bloggers are taking a proactive approach in cyberspace to counter AQ-derived or -inspired rhetoric. It would be interesting to hear about this effort and whether they feel it is having any effect whatsoever.

Note: I could easily run this down through State contacts.

Academia: Frank Cilluffo from George Washington University does a lot of work in the area of prison radicalization/creating the counter-narrative. He presented at last year's conference but has since written a report on prison radicalization and undoubtedly has moved forward with his thinking of the counter-narrative. He did well at last year's conference.

Note: He knows me from last year's event. I could contact him.

Community Group: A representative of the BIRR Project in Australia, which has recently come out with excellent work on the counter-narrative piece of things, could talk about general strategies.

Law Enforcement: An NYPD representative could discuss the radicalization report that came out this year.

Note: I could run this down using our NY contacts.

Academia: Farhad Khosrokhavar, a sociology professor at Ecole des Haute Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris could talk about the joint British-French study on prison recruitment that he worked on.

Media: This panel screams for a media/communications expert. Is there anyone working for the federal government on this (a la Voice of America)?

Panel Three: "Strategic Listening" - How open source and the Internet can be used in CT to both investigate and shape messages to various constituencies (the counter-narrative). How can open source information be harnessed? What does the intelligence-gathering landscape look like these days (with the current surveillance issues, the expansion of CCTV, the reshaping of intelligence guidelines, etc.)? We could draw out any number of these issues on the panel.

Subtopics:

Cyber-investigations

Intelligence gathering in an Open Source environment (OSINT)

The role of the intelligence analyst in investigations: A discussion about whether they should be analyst-driven or detective-driven.

Building the capacity for linguistic and cultural understanding in media monitoring/Internet investigations/interviewing of suspects.

Government: The person from the DNI who is in charge of opensource.gov could talk about that effort and how the landscape has changed. Open-source intelligence was the theme of the DNI's conference this year and, according to them, marked a shift in the country's overall intelligence-gathering strategy. Also, it might be interesting to hear

from the CIA how they've moved toward creating a community of analysts (with wikis, etc.) and the challenges they've faced there.

Academia: Amy Zegart from UCLA could talk about intelligence reform.

Politics: Would someone like Jane Harmon, chair of the Intelligence Subcommittee, have a role to play here? What is she (and her colleagues in D.C. interested in when it comes to the topic of intelligence gathering)?

Law Enforcement: An NCTC rep. or Joel Cohen from DHS could discuss how intelligence-gathering methods have changed in recent years and what the future holds. Or, someone from the Met could talk about CCTV in the UK and how that has affected society and CT operations.

Quote I heard at a conference: "In the Internet Age, everybody knows what's happened but nobody knows what it means."

Panel Four: Training - A look at innovative training models

Law Enforcement: Dr. Jonathan Crego could talk about HYDRA.

Think Tank: Clint Watts could talk about the executive training program that is being created for the LAPD and its regional partners.

Military: What does the special-forces community have to offer in this area? One thing that comes to mind is that this is a community that is very good at empowering its partners to grow their capacity and eventually become self-sufficient. Is there applicability to law enforcement here in the context of the large department/small department dynamic?

Panel Five: Future Trends

This is when attendees would get briefings on the groups/tactics that they will have to worry about the most. We can discuss these as a group and then plug in the most appropriate forward-thinking experts.

Panel Six: Preserving civil liberties during domestic law enforcement CT operations (this could also just be part of Panel Three on intelligence gathering).

Community Group: There is a gentleman from the New York Civil Liberties Union who has been very vocal about the NYPD's operations before the RNC. Mike German from the ACLU (former FBI agent) could talk about this issue as well.

Note: I have the contact information for both of these people.

Military: Someone could talk about interrogations and the issues they have faced (detention, etc.) since 9/11.

Government: Someone could discuss the government surveillance program.

Law Enforcement: Who this speaker was would depend on whether you wanted a local or federal perspective on this issue.

Misc. Panel Ideas (for which I can offer ideas on speakers if any of them seem good):

1) The convergence of crime and terrorism

2) Lessons learned panel: A Discussion of specific cases that have been covered by the media and are now open source.

3) Fusion Centers

4) Recruiting the public in CT operations/building the First Preventer model.

Subtopics:

Messaging

Assets

Crisis Communications

5) Forging relationships with overseas assets

Subtopics:

Foreign intelligence services

Overseas liaison program

6) Partnering with private industry: Creating a larger community of First Preventers

Subtopics:

What can we learn? Financial companies, for example, are good models for how to improve our clearance procedures. It takes them a couple of weeks to clear someone who handles millions of dollars. Why does it take the government six months to one year?

Archangel

7) The outsourcing of intelligence gathering and security (i.e. Blackwater, etc.) and its ramifications for local law enforcement.

Other keynote candidates:

Ambassador McNamara, DNI, could talk about threats and strategies.

Thomas Friedman, author of “The World is Flat,” could talk about how globalization (particularly the Internet) has enabled terrorists.

Walid Phares, author of “The War of Ideas: Jihadism Against Democracy” and “Future Jihad: Terrorist Strategies Against the West.” (Tim’s idea)

Mike Leinart, executive director of the NCTC (Chief Downing’s idea)

John Nagl, author of “Eating Soup with a Knife,” and leading counterinsurgency expert

Marc Sageman, author of “Understanding Terror Networks,” although I understand he can be expensive. He will undoubtedly be on several of our lists.



One Team in:
Countering Violent Extremism

Failing Forward, 2007

If a community is isolated, it may be determined that it is susceptible to extremist ideology, Downing said. In such cases, he said, police could then go into those communities and try to head off potential problems by offering people access to government and social services.

"Our goal is to try to be a catalyst to integrate the communities into the greater society."

If social factors - such as enclaves where residents are culturally and linguistically isolated - contribute to radicalization, it is important for law enforcement to be aware of those potentially vulnerable communities. This is part of our next step. We want to map the locations of these closed, vulnerable communities, and in partnership with these communities, infuse social services that will help the people who live there while weaving these enclaves into the fabric of the larger society.

"Singling out individuals for investigation, surveillance, and data-gathering based on their religion constitutes religious profiling," the letter said. "In addition to constitutional concerns ... religious profiling engenders fear and distrust."

"It undermines trust established between Muslims and police since the 9/11 attacks and is reminiscent of how Nazis identified Jews during the Holocaust!"

"This is anti-Semitism reborn as Islamophobia," said Shakeel Syed, director of the Islamic Shura Council of Southern California. "We will fiercely resist this."

Without a community mapping blueprint and methodical community engagement strategy, our outreach efforts will be sporadic. Our counter-narrative will be empty of meaning, leaving us talking about, rather than talking with, this community.

I. Introduction

Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member Collins, and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Los Angeles Police Department's (LAPD) efforts to identify and counter violent extremism, which happens in this case, to be ideologically based. Local law enforcement has a culture and capacity that no federal agency enjoys - the know-how and ability to engage communities that today are a vital part of the equation. Part of this engagement process is the dissemination of security to community, that officers and/or isolated communities, hence, "ideologically based violent extremism."

No agency knows their industries better than local law enforcement: we were designed and built to be the eyes and ears of communities - the first responders of emergencies. What is important to law enforcement is that we carefully and accurately define those who we suspect will commit a criminal offense within our communities. That job needs to be done with the kind of balance and precision that requires the support and trust of the American people in order to aid us in the pursuit of our lawful mission.

Prior to 2001, much of America overlooked Muslim communities in the United States (U.S.) citizens who immigrated to the U.S. following the hostage crisis received some media attention but the broader Muslim community in this country was not at the forefront of the national profile. The renaissance now true as a result of the post-9/11 news coverage and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Muslim communities here and abroad have become centers of coverage for the print and broadcast media. While this coverage has, in many cases, helped to educate the American public, it has also put Muslims under a very bright spotlight. Feelings of persecution and so-called "big brother" Muslim communities have created anxiety and uncertainty about the future.

Before 9/11, law enforcement was equally unaware of this community, both at a local and statewide level. Even with our newfound awareness, law enforcement personnel are working from a disadvantage because of the obstacles we face as we approach wary communities deeply concerned with issues such as the implications of the Patriot Act, leading profiling in the transportation industry, and the misadventure of Islam in the media, high profile arrests and investigations of violent extremists such as the Fort Dix 6 play into Muslim fears that they are under increased scrutiny. These underlying dynamics play a role in how these communities interact with all facets of American society, especially law enforcement.

One major role that law enforcement can play in the fight against violent ideological extremism is that of education. Teaching all communities about the dangers of extremist ideologies can dispel harmful rumors and myths that alienate already persecuted communities. We have learned from the European experience how these alienated communities become a breeding ground for violent extremism and a safe haven for potential terrorists to hide among the population.

Granted, the U.S. does not have the same types of problems as England, France, Germany, or Israel. While the factors remain the same, the learned behaviors that migrate across national boundaries - through groups, training camps, and the Internet - the underlying motivations for

these violent acts are unique to the host countries. Consequently, the remedial (i.e., jailhouse de-radicalization in Malaysia, the Channel Project in northern England, and the Brix Project in Australia) are often contextually bounded and dependent on the depth, strength, national allegiance and identity of the native Muslim community.

In Los Angeles, for example, there are many Muslim communities that do not share the same profile as those in the United Kingdom as they are much more integrated into the larger society. This said, the European example does provide U.S. law enforcement with a starting point when searching for early indicators of radicalization.

We have learned that Muslim communities in the U.S. are mistrustful of the mainstream media. Therefore, they require other avenues of information for news and social issues, such as the Internet. Unfortunately, despite all of the positive aspects of the Internet, it allows those individuals and groups with ideological agendas to easily make contact with like-minded individuals and access potentially destructive information.

As we move from the virtual to the physical, it is important to apply the hard-learned lessons we have learned in combating gang crime to the problem of terrorism. Southern California was the birthplace of gang culture and in Los Angeles we all too familiar with the threat of violence crime by street gangs. Regardless of how many police officers we deploy, we can only suppress specific incidents. While more police are part of the answer, the real solution lies in the community - with the strengthening of the family structure and the economic base, and the weakening of political power bases built on victimization and a cultural tolerance of violence. The problem of violent crime (VCE) is based on deep community success. However, as a result of the solution sets of youth at-risk programs, gang prevention, mentoring, job training, community activism against violence, and religion-based interventions.

While it might seem counter-intuitive, the habits of Muslim communities act both as a well and as a self-regulator. Similar to gangs, the signs of extremism are first seen on the most local levels: in the families, neighborhoods, schools, mosques, and work places. The wall built by the community is the barrier created to sustain cultural identity and values and protect against the pace of assimilation.

II. LAPD Strategies and Initiatives

One of the biggest challenges for law enforcement in this environment is separating political jihadists (i.e., those who intentionally plan seeds of division in an effort to alienate and isolate Muslim citizens from the rest of society) from legitimate actors. Teaching all communities about the dangers of extremist ideologies can dispel harmful rumors and myths that alienate already persecuted communities. The LAPD has done much outreach in this area, both with Muslim and non-Muslim communities. For the 18 months, we have been involved in outreach and grassroots dialogue with Muslim extremists, through the crime command staff to observe, learn, engage and, most importantly, listen. This has helped to build more robust trust networks at the divisional level of police service. One of our goals is to be viewed as trusted friends by Muslim communities in our city.

***Complete notes from slide 2**

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No agency knows their landscape better than local law enforcement; we were designed and built to be the eyes and ears of communities — the First Preventers of terrorism. What is important to law enforcement is that we carefully and accurately define those who we suspect will commit a criminal-terrorist act within our communities. That job needs to be done with the kind of balance and precision that inspires the support and trust of the American people in order to aid us in the pursuit of our lawful mission.

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Before 9/11, law enforcement was equally unaware of this community, both at a federal and statewide level. Even with our newfound awareness, law enforcement personnel are working from a disadvantage because of the obstacles we face as we approach wary communities deeply concerned with issues such as the implications of the Patriot Act, racial-profiling in the transportation industry, and the mischaracterization of Islam in the media. High-profile arrests

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As we move from the virtual to the physical, it is important to apply the hard-won lessons we have learned in combating gang crime to the problem of terrorism. Southern California was the

birthplace of gang culture and in Los Angeles we are all too familiar with the threat of violent crime by street gangs. Regardless of how many police officers we deploy, we can only suppress specific incidents. While more police are part of the answer, the real solution lies in the community — with the strengthening of the family structure and the economic base; and the weakening of political power bases built on victimization and a cultural tolerance of violence. The problem of violent street gangs is based on deep community structures. However, so are the solution sets of youth-at-risk programs, parenting classes, economic infusion, job training, community activism against violence and religion-based interventions.

While it might seem counter-intuitive, the isolation of Muslim communities acts both as a wall and as a self-regulator. Similar to gangs, the signs of extremism are first seen on the most local levels: in the families, neighborhoods, schools, mosques, and work places. The wall built by the community is the barrier created to sustain cultural identity and values and protect against the pace of assimilation.

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Our outreach to the non-Muslim community has combined education with prevention. We now have Terrorism Liaison Officers (TL05) at all of our divisions and Fire Stations who serve as the principal points of contact for terrorism information and intelligence. These liaison officers educate Department personnel and the broader community about the indicators of violent

extremism and have proven to be critical assets when it comes to raising the level of terrorism prevention and preparedness.

The education provided by the TLOs has been supplemented with training by outside experts. Within our ranks, we have worked to educate our officers in the Counter-Terrorism and Criminal Intelligence Bureau about Islam and the cultural sensitivities they should be aware of when they are in the field. Approaching Muslims with respect and integrity is a large piece of the counternarrative that law enforcement can write for itself.

The LAPD must have the capability to hunt for signs of radicalization and terrorism activities on the Internet. We recently started a cyber investigations unit to do just that. The Internet is the virtual hangout for radicals and terrorists. It provides a plain-view means of identifying and gathering information on potential threats. Information gleaned from this open source, fed into the radicalization template, and combined with a thorough understanding of operational indicators, is critical to articulating suspicion and justifying the increased application of enforcement measures.

LAPD's Counter-Terrorism and Criminal Intelligence Bureau initiatives for both the present and future have aligned people, purpose, and strategy around the mission of building capacity to hunt and disrupt operational capability on the part of terrorists (recruiting, funding, planning, surveilling, and executing operations). However, just as important, we have aligned our resources to focus on the motivational side of the terrorist equation and have made great efforts and organizing, mobilizing and in partnership, raising the moderate Muslim voice to prevent the extremists from making inroads into this faith community. A few of these strategies are described below:

- Working in concert with our seven county regional and federal partners, we continue to build capacity to collect, fuse, analyze, and disseminate both strategic and operational intelligence. We are aligning our intelligence collection and dissemination process with an eye toward accountability and ensuring that our First Preventers have the information they need when they need it.
- Our Terrorism Liaison Officers are casting an ever-wider safety net to train more people in the city to be public data collectors and First Preventers.

- We have started a Muslim outreach program with our command staff to leverage resources, institutionalize the idea of developing the counter-narrative, and facilitate an educational process. In developing this counter-narrative, the goal is to inspire Muslim communities to responsibly partner with law enforcement to protect American values. We also aim to elevate the moderate Muslim voice and empower people to counter the extremist ideology with confidence. This enables community

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leadership to assist law enforcement in identifying those individuals and groups who espouse extremism and work to divide Muslim communities from American society.

- We are working with a think tank to develop a training program for mid-level executives that will be tailored specifically to state and local law enforcers. It is our hope that this will develop into a model for a national counter-terrorism academy.
- We initiated the Regional Public Private Infrastructure Collaboration System – a tool that enhances communication between and within LAPD and the Private Sector.
- Our Archangel program is a Critical Infrastructure Protection System that includes a Protective Security Task Force.
- We are developing a Cyber Investigation Unit to hunt violent extremists on the Internet.
- Our Community Mapping project is described below in Section V.

III. A Different Problem

In contrast to much of Europe, which has suffered from a marked increase in violence and violent intentions – often by its own citizens, the problem we face in the U.S is mainly political. There are those among us, I call them political jihadists, who are attempting to create division, alienation, and a sense of persecution in Muslim communities in order to create a cause. They are the nemesis of community engagement. Their purpose is to create the conditions that facilitate the radicalization process for international political causes.

Law enforcement's ultimate goal is to engender the continued loyalty and good citizenship of American-Muslims – not merely disrupt terrorist activities. Let me be clear, I am not saying that law enforcement should relax its effort to hunt down and neutralize small numbers of

"clusters" on the criminal side of the radicalization trajectory. That task remains, and must be done with precision and must also be carried out in the context of what is ultimately valuable. What good is it to disrupt a group planning a mall bombing if the enforcement method is so unreasonable that it is widely criticized and encourages many more to enter the radicalization process?

The point is not merely an academic one—it has operational consequence. In preserving good will and by in by Muslim communities, law enforcement is, in fact, advancing its intelligence agenda by fostering an environment that maximizes tips and leads surfacing from those same communities. The long-term solution to this radicalization problem will come from Muslim communities themselves.

The natural question is: What factors put a community at-risk? Taking a page from the European experience, diaspora communities are in transition from one culture to another, making its members particularly vulnerable to identity crises which may be very easily subverted by ideologues. As Eric Hoffer wrote in his book, "The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of

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Mass Movements": "Faith in a holy cause is to a considerable extent a substitute for the lost faith in ourselves." If there is a real or perceived threat of discrimination between the new community and the host, then an "us against them" mentality may prevail making that final step towards radicalization that much easier. Some Muslim communities may view any local discrimination as linked to Muslim causes globally, and vice versa, any discrimination against the Ummah (the global Muslim community) may be felt locally.

The Pakistani-British community in the United Kingdom is a diaspora, which is significant, because it makes the 2 nd and 3 r1 generations of the community particularly vulnerable to the social pressures of growing up in a country very different from their parents' and grandparents' homeland. As a diaspora community, they remain transnational, tending to maintain close family, social, and financial ties with Pakistan. Globalization allows a diaspora to maintain these transnational contacts via faster, cheaper air travel, global communications technology (Internet and cell phone), global mass media, and nearly instant transnational banking. If the first two risk factors are present, then one must ask, "Does the community also hail from an unstable

homeland with Wahabbi-Salafi ties?" If so, that community, like the British-Pakistani Muslim community, might be at greater risk of incubating homegrown radicalization.

If social factors - such as enclaves where residents are culturally and linguistically isolated - contribute to radicalization, it is important for law enforcement to be aware of those potentially vulnerable communities. This is part of our next step. We want to map the locations of these closed, vulnerable communities, and in partnership with these communities, infuse social services that will help the people who live there while weaving these enclaves into the fabric of the larger society. While the role of the law enforcer is not one of religious scholar or social worker, there is the potential to build and strengthen bridges from communities to those resources. It is then we will know where to find our Pakistani, Iranian, Somali, Chechen, Jordanian, and North African communities and thus understand how better to support their integration into the greater society. It is then that local law enforcement becomes an enabler.

IV. Legitimacy and Constitutionality

It is our position that legitimacy and intelligence are equally important tools for U.S. law enforcement to use in counter-terrorism efforts. Legitimacy starts with an organizational knowledge and pride in operating constitutionally and within the law. The need for transparency — being perceived to be and authentically honoring this principle — in intelligence and counterterrorism activities cannot be understated. Taking great care to ensure that intelligence and enforcement operations are narrowly targeted against terrorist cells determined to go operational is critical. Law enforcement and its advocates must also avoid name-calling exchanges with political jihadists, opting instead to engage them professionally on specific issues. Political jihadists will reveal themselves in these exchanges by being unreasonable and unable to articulate specific grievances, preferring instead to use personal attacks and blanket accusations. In doing so, they are failing in their purpose to attract converts. Community policing initiatives in Muslim communities should aim to create a shared sense of threat: society as a whole fears the indiscriminate, mass violence we are seeing around the world. All forms of communication with the public (whether analytical reports or post-incident news conferences) should address this fear. In summary, law enforcement's most pressing

challenge is to shield the public from this threat, while not advancing the purpose of political jihadists. It is a difficult balance to achieve, however, raising the moderate Muslim voice and creating the counter-narrative that offsets the fanatical trajectory of radicalization.

The LAPD has created the Counter-Terrorism and Criminal Intelligence Bureau with nearly 300 officers who are solely dedicated to counter-terrorism, criminal intelligence gathering, and community building. Policing terrorism must be a convergent strategy that enhances the fight against crime and disorder. In building the resistance to crime and disorder, we create hostile environments to terrorists.

V. Community Mapping

We need to understand the problem as it exists in Los Angeles before we roll out programs to mitigate radicalization. Historically, the temptation has been to turn to intervention programs before we have clearly identified problems within the community. In the past we have relied on interventions based on "experts," logic or previous programs that are either generic or insensitive to the constellation of issues. This has consistently produced unremarkable results. Public safety pays a high cost for this business practice. This is one of many reasons to support the rationale behind community mapping, a process that delivers a richer picture and road map that can guide future strategies.

In order to give our officers increased awareness of our local Muslim communities, the LAPD recently launched an initiative with an academic institution to conduct an extensive "community mapping" project. We are also soliciting input of local Muslim groups, so the process can be transparent and inclusive. While this project will lay out the geographic locations of the many different Muslim population groups around Los Angeles, we also intend to take a deeper look at their history, demographics, language, culture, ethnic breakdown, socio-economic status, and social interactions. It is our hope to identify communities, within the larger Muslim community, which may be susceptible to violent ideologically-based extremism and then use a full-spectrum approach guided by an intelligence-led strategy.

Community mapping is the start of a conversation, not just data sets: It is law enforcement identifying with its community and the community identifying with its families, neighborhoods,

city, state, country and police. For the past 18 months, the LAPD's outreach and grassroots dialogue with Muslim communities has helped the entire command staff to observe, learn, engage and, most importantly, listen. This has helped to build more robust trust networks at the divisional level of the police service area.

Without a community mapping blueprint and methodical community engagement strategy, our outreach efforts will be sporadic. Our counter-narrative will be empty of meaning, leaving us talking about, rather than talking with, this community.

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VI. Conclusion – The Evolving Threat

We need to show that our democratic principles built on the values, practices, and lives of American citizens are sacred and worthy of embracing. We need to show our belief in human dignity, the family and the value of the individual. We need to show how we honor the meaning of our lives by what we contribute to others' lives. We need to show that behind the badges of American law enforcement are caring Americans "doing" law enforcement. To do this we need to go into the community and get to know peoples' names. We need to walk into homes, neighborhoods, mosques, and businesses. We need to know how Islam expresses itself in Los Angeles if we expect to forge bonds of community support. The LAPD has been involved in this process and we are now ready to evolve our outreach to a more sophisticated and strategic level. The U.S. faces a vicious, amorphous, and unfamiliar adversary on our land. The principal threats will be local, self-generating and self-directed. If there are direct connections with overseas groups, these are most likely to be initiated by the local actors. Cases in point include the 7/7 bombers, the Glasgow car bombers, and, more locally, Lodi in which local individuals and groups sought out training in Pakistan. This is not intended to dismiss threats that emerge from overseas locations, which should continue to be of concern. Rather, it is an estimate of relative density—locally generated threats will manifest themselves with greater frequency. Ultimately, preventing extremism will be up to neighborhoods and communities, but thread by thread, relationship by relationship, the police can help build a network of services and relationships that will make it very hard for terrorism to take root. American Muslim neighborhoods and communities have a genuine responsibility in preventing any form of

extremism and terrorism. If the broader communities are intolerant of such things, these ideologies cannot take root in its midst. I believe no amount of enforcement or intelligence can ultimately prevent extremism if the communities are not committed to working with law enforcement to prevent it.

8becomes an enabler.

CVE Principles

- NOT intelligence
- Trust Building
- Engagement
- Relationships of support, not secure ties relationships
- No "one size fits all" implementation
- Work with communities to give them a voice
- Reflect the community
- Focus on all communities
- CVE is not about terrorism, it's a connection to law enforcement, problem solving, listening, participating, relationships. It is not a Law Enforcement lead endeavor. Law enforcement is a seat at the table, not the only seat.

Developing a Culture

- **Enhanced form of community relations**
 - Community policing in a traditional sense is inadequate
 - Proper approach with each diverse group
 - Understand the historical context and drivers that cause community angst
- **Integration – not assimilation**
 - Interfaith is the future
 - Strengthen isolated and Balkanized groups
 - Identify the meaning of being an American Muslim in the U.S.
- **Institutionalize new cultural atmosphere early on**
 - Begin enhanced community policing with academy recruits
 - Officers educated in different cultures, religions, and international affairs
 - Provide diversity training to new and existing officers annually
- **Place emphasis on grassroots level**
 - Empower those who do not regularly associate themselves with the police
 - Be innovative, meet diverse community outside religious institutions as well
 - Provide station tour, open houses, and community events

Empowering Muslim women

- Providing them with a platform and a voice
- Understanding their needs in context with the needs of the community
- Creating role models
- Creating opportunities for
 - **Muslim women to interact with mainstream America**
 - **Civic leadership**
 - **Interfaith**

Thus making them the first line of defense against
Radicalization -

Empowerment through engagement and education

[Www.ippaweebly.com](http://www.ippaweebly.com)

[Www.amwec.org](http://www.amwec.org)



Coordination Among Law Enforcement Stakeholders ICG-CVE



Monthly Meetings to discuss mutual outreach efforts:
Established in 2008 (local, state & federal)

participating Agencies:

LASD, LA City HRC, LAPD, DHS,
USAO, FBI, USCIS, and SBSB



Overall Purpose:

- Streamline collective efforts
- Strategically enhance community engagement to maximize overall effectiveness
- Raise awareness & education
- Collaborate to overcome challenges (external & internal)
- Coordinated communications and actions during times of heightened tensions



Youth and Young Leaders Development

- Identify and empower young leadership
- Establish a Young Leader Advisory Council
- Develop Youth Activities
- Address Youth and radicalization to Prevent Extremism
- Address Young Women's issues






Selecting the Right People

- Maturity, life experience, cultural awareness, self-awareness, open-mindedness, relationship builder, team builder, unifier.
- Cultural, educational and religious diversity.
- Identify the strengths of your personnel, and employ those strengths within the community.
- Try to mirror the communities they serve, specific to outreach.





- Community Based Organizations
- Faith-based Groups
- Social Advocacy
- Social Services
- Educational Institutions
- Grassroots Organizers

Challenges to Engagement

- Limited community infrastructures
- Misinformation, misperceptions & diminished trust
- Conflicting interests
- Rigidity and inability to work constructively
- Political inhibitors
- Limited resources



Muslim American Homeland Security Congress (MAHSC)

Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC)

Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR)

Islamic Council of Southern California:
Shura Council

Social Media







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Case Study: Los Angeles, CA

We can't arrest our way out of this problem. This is a high-consequence threat, and the long-term solution rests with local communities and local efforts to build relationships and build trust, so that we can intervene before there is violence.

--Mike Downing, Deputy Chief of the Los Angeles Police Department

At the close of 2015, the Los Angeles area was the site of one of the deadliest terrorist attacks in American history. On December 2, Syed Rizwan Farook and his wife, Tashfeen Malik, opened fire at a staff meeting and holiday party for county employees being held in San Bernardino, CA.¹ Fourteen people were killed and 22 seriously injured in the attack. An FBI investigation revealed that Farook and Malik were "homegrown violent extremists."

In the Los Angeles area, the effort to build community resilience against violent extremism is led by the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (LASD) in partnership with the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD).

Each agency has its own outreach programming, and they also lead the greater Los Angeles area's resilience-building effort through the Los Angeles Interagency Coordination Group (ICG). The ICG was created by the LASD to bring together representatives from various local and federal government agencies to coordinate their outreach and community-building programs.

--- INFO BOX---

Facts and Figures: Los Angeles County, California

*Population:*²

- **10,116,705** residents (Los Angeles County is the most populous county in California)

Demographics:^{3,4}

- 35% of residents were born outside the United States
- 57% of residents speak a language other than English at home
- 48% of residents are Latino
- 27% of residents are white
- 15% of residents are Asian
- 9% of residents are African American
- 3% of residents are multiracial
- 2% of residents are Native American

---END INFO BOX---

¹ San Bernardino is not within Los Angeles County – it is just beyond its eastern border in San Bernardino County.

² <http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06/06037.html>

³ <http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/24/24031.html>

⁴ Los Angeles County has the largest Latino, Asian, and Native American populations of any county in the United States. See more here: <http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/population/cb09-76.html>

The Los Angeles Area Outreach Effort

Overview and Organization

Government agencies in the Los Angeles area take a multi-pronged approach to building interdisciplinary partnerships to prevent violent extremism. The LAPD and the LASD have their own outreach programs, and they keep in close communication and work collaboratively with each other, and with other local government agencies and federal law enforcement officials.

The formal group through which these various stakeholders collaborate is the Los Angeles Interagency Coordination Group (ICG). ICG members work together to coordinate their outreach efforts and address discuss the concerns of community members. ICG members include the LASD, the LAPD, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, the Los Angeles City Office of Human Relations, and the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Central District of California. ICG members also work closely with community groups, non-governmental organizations, and social service providers in the Los Angeles area.

As LASD Sergeant Mike Abdeen explained, "Since we established it in 2008, the ICG meets monthly to discuss our outreach efforts. Our overall purpose is streamlining our collective efforts, working together to enhance our community engagement, raising awareness end engagement among law enforcement and the community, and coordinating our communications. We work together when tensions are high with the community as a result of events nationally and globally, and we coordinate our engagement with our interfaith and community partners."

At the ICG monthly meetings, we plan joint events, share successes and challenges, and brainstorm about how to solve issues that one or all of us might be facing. We recognize that it is not always easy for us to agree on everything, but we talk everything out. That's important because eventually we reach a point where, when we go out into the community, our message is consistent.

--Mike Abdeen, Sergeant with the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department

The goal of the ICG and its member agencies' outreach initiatives is to: 1) build trust and strong partnerships between community members and local police and government agencies; 2) ensure that community members have ready and easy access to resources that they need; 3) build social cohesion and a sense of shared belonging to the greater Los Angeles community; and 4) in so doing, improve the overall health and security of the community it its entirety so that is it more resilient to all forms of extremism and violence.

The greater Los Angeles area was one of three pilot sites chosen in 2014 to participate in the U.S. Department of Justice's program to counter violent extremism. These pilot sites were selected based on their robust engagement programs to identify and promulgate promising practices for building community resilience against violent extremism. *The Los Angeles Framework for Countering Violent Extremism* was developed by the ICG in cooperation with their community partners.⁵

⁵ *The Los Angeles Framework for Countering Violent Extremism*. February 2015.
<https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Los%20Angeles%20Framework%20for%20CVE-Full%20Report.pdf>

Genesis of the Los Angeles County Program

Los Angeles' coordinated outreach effort began in 2008 and was a product of a poorly-received mapping initiative, according to said LAPD Deputy Chief Mike Downing. LAPD officials said that the initiative was intended to identify where isolated parts of the Muslim American community were located, and then connect members of the community with social services provided by local government agencies and other organizations. Deputy Chief Downing explained that the initiative was designed as a community policing strategy modeled on a similar project that the LAPD had done with the Orthodox Jewish community.

Although the intention of the project was to strengthen relationships between the LAPD and Muslim American community members, it ended up sowing deep distrust with the Muslim American community. They perceived the mapping initiative as religious profiling that unduly targeted Muslim Americans.⁶

The LAPD decided to reevaluate its relationships with the Muslim American community and create new programming to build strong relationships of trust.

"I refer to that whole experience as failing forward," Deputy Chief Downing explained, "because it was a failure. It created a crisis that was both dangerous and an important opportunity, and we took that opportunity to get back into the trenches, go grassroots, and roll up our sleeves. We redoubled our efforts to get deep into the community and connect with people who were mistrustful of the police and felt really isolated, to see what we could do to help them feel a part of the larger Los Angeles community."

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The Muslim Mapping Initiative: Turning a Crisis into an Opportunity **By Mike Downing, Deputy Chief of the LAPD**

In late 2007, we started an initiative that really put us into a crisis situation with the Muslim American community. It was a mapping initiative for the Muslim American community that was similar to something we had done with the Orthodox Jewish community. Our goal was to identify where pockets of communities were, especially those who were isolated and therefore more likely to be victims of crime and also susceptible to recruitment to things like gangs, narcotics, and violent extremism.

We had an agreement with the University of Southern California and with Muslim Public Affairs Council⁷ to begin this project. It was completely overt: part of the initiative was our stated intention to give the results of the mapping project to the Muslim American community, academics, and other local police agencies. It wasn't a counterterrorism strategy, it was a community policing strategy.

The initiative was designed to identify underserved community members so that we could more effectively connect them with social services, ensure that they had

⁶ See, for example, "LAPD defends Muslim mapping effort." *Los Angeles Times*, Nov. 10, 2007. <http://www.latimes.com/local/la-me-lapd10nov10-story.html>

⁷ The Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC) is a public policy and advocacy organization whose mission is to "[improve] public understanding and policies that impact American Muslims by engaging our government, media, and communities." See more here: <http://www.mpac.org/>

access to local government, and make sure that all of the public safety and quality of life concerns that were important to them were being addressed. I went to Congress, I testified about it, we got a lot of accolades about it for about a week.

And then it started to go downhill as community members spoke out and said that it was religious profiling.

We realized that there was a huge gap between our intentions and community perceptions, and that was because the community didn't have the level of trust in us that we thought. So we got rid of the mapping program, went back to the drawing board, and used this crisis as an opportunity to take a hard look at our outreach efforts and figure out how we could make them better, to not only rebuild the trust that we'd lost, but also to make that trust stronger than it had ever been before.

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In order to address the problem, Deputy Chief Downing brought an officer on board to rebuild trusting relationships with the Muslim American community.

As its relationship-building efforts grew, the LAPD created a free-standing unit – called the Liaison Unit – that was dedicated to conducting outreach with community members. The Liaison Unit has officers dedicated to reaching out to various communities in Los Angeles, including Muslim Americans and Orthodox Jews.

In recognition of the need for collaboration among the various police and government agencies serving the public to augment the success of their individual outreach initiatives, Sergeant Mike Abdeen of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department's Muslim Affairs Unit created the Interagency Coordination Group (ICG) in 2008.

Tenets of the Los Angeles Approach

The three pillars of the Los Angeles area effort to address violent extremism and build strong community relationships are: prevention, intervention, and interdiction.⁸ First, the LASD, LAPD, and their partners focus on **prevention**. "These prevention efforts," said Deputy Chief Downing, "are geared toward building community resilience to violent extremism and numerous other influences and circumstances that might result in community members moving down the wrong path."

Los Angeles is also working to formalize an **intervention** program for community members in crisis.

Lastly, and as a final resort when confronted with criminal activity, is **interdiction**. This component is necessary for ensuring that individuals who are intent upon committing acts of violence inspired by violent extremist ideologies are prevented from harming others, and that the community is kept safe.

Recommendations for Police Agencies: Getting Outreach Efforts Off the Ground

⁸ Ibid. 29. <https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Los%20Angeles%20Framework%20for%20CVE-Full%20Report.pdf>

We need to develop a culture of prevention. I know that this is hard for law enforcement because we think that we're first responders, we're tactical. But we need to start thinking about ourselves as "first preventers."

In the CVE context, it's about reaching community members at risk of radicalization before they head down that road. This is about developing a culture of first preventers and getting communities on board with the idea that they're first preventers, too.

--Mike Downing, Deputy Chief of the Los Angeles Police Department

In the process of developing their outreach efforts, the LASD and LAPD have become internationally-recognized leaders in the effort to build robust and productive partnerships between police agencies and the communities they serve. At the PERF forum in September 2015, they laid out their key recommendations – based on their experiences – for police agencies looking to build community outreach initiatives.

Recommendation: Choose the right people for outreach. As Deputy Chief Downing and Sergeant Abdeen explained, choosing the right people to participate on an outreach team can play a significant role in an initiative's success.

Outreach teams should be diverse and representative of the community with which they work. "Over the years," said Deputy Chief Downing, "we've made sure to have an Egyptian Arabic-speaking Muslim American officer, an Iranian-born Farsi-speaking officer, a Hebrew-speaking Orthodox Jewish officer, and so on. We need to make sure that our outreach team is representative of the people we're trying to engage."

It is important to recognize that having a diverse outreach team is not an immediate guarantee of success. Sergeant Abdeen said that the characteristics that ultimately matter most in an outreach officer are not necessarily linguistic ability or cultural background, but the officer's personality.

"Getting the right people on board doesn't necessarily mean that you have to have somebody who speaks the language or is from the community itself," Abdeen said. "What you need is somebody who is willing to learn, who is open-minded, who is cultured, who is educated, and who is willing to go out and learn and listen to people's concerns."

When I was asked to start our program, I assumed that since I'm an American Muslim and I speak Arabic, it was going to be an easy task. I thought I would go out into the community, and everyone would welcome me with open arms, and that I was going to do really well right off the bat.

Well, it was a wakeup call when I first started reaching out, because the program was new and everyone was like, "Who is this guy here talking about being friends with the cops and the government?"

What I learned is that, while cultural competency is important to have, what matters even more is having the right mindset for the job. You need to be open-minded, and you need to be persistent in working to build trust with the community.

--Mike Abdeen, Sergeant in the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department

Equally important in an outreach officer is a commitment to the job in the long term, as relationship-building is time-intensive. "You need people who are willing to stick with it for a while," Sergeant Abdeen said, "because it's a position that you can't keep turning over every month. Relationships take time to develop."

Recommendation: Take a “whole community” approach. Outreach efforts should not focus only on one or two subsets of a community. A narrow focus can cause more problems than it solves, by alienating the community members police are engaging, as well as those they are not engaging. The result can be the opposite of the social cohesion and sense of belonging to the larger community that outreach efforts should be building.

We need to focus on all communities. It's a recognition of the fact that violent extremism is not a Muslim problem, it's not a Jewish problem, and it's not a Christian problem. It's a human problem. The only way we are going to solve it is through developing these partnerships among different government agencies and with the community.

--Mike Downing, Deputy Chief of the Los Angeles Police Department

“Don't put all your eggs in one basket,” said Deputy Chief Downing, “because if the community feels that you're favoring a certain organization or that you're better partners with one person rather than another, it's going to delegitimize your position in the community. What we are trying to do is create this 'starfish' environment so that decisions, influence, and power don't rest with a single hierarchical source. We are always trying to spread out our contacts in the community so that everyone feels like they have equal access to us.”

I always say “Muslim communities” instead of “Muslim community,” because there is no such thing as one Muslim community. There is no one area that I can go to and say, “This is where the Muslims are.” Muslims come from various ethnic groups with different cultural backgrounds. There are Southeast Asian Muslims, Latino Muslims, African American Muslims, and they all have different experiences and different needs. “Muslim community” is too simplistic. Muslims are Americans – they're part of the community.

--Mike Abdeen, Sergeant in the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department

Recommendation: Never “securitize” outreach. Outreach efforts should never be used to gather intelligence on community members or otherwise engage in counterterrorism activities. Outreach is about building trusting relationships with community members, a mandate that is diametrically opposed to covert intelligence-gathering.

“This is not about intelligence,” said Deputy Chief Downing. “It can never be about intelligence. You can never use it as a platform for exploitation of your relationships with community members, because if you do that, you will delegitimize yourself and communities will no longer trust you. What we're doing is about trust building, it's about engagement, it's about relationships. It's not about intelligence.”

As a result, any contact databases associated with outreach efforts should always be kept completely separate from databases used by investigators. If community members approach outreach team members with crime tips, because they have built a relationship of trust in the police, the tips should be passed along to investigators, but outreach officers should be completely divorced from any resulting investigations.

Just as importantly, outreach officers should be transparent with community members about how they will handle any crime tips that are shared with them.

Recommendation: Avoid locating outreach units in investigative divisions within a police agency.

Ideally, outreach should be kept separate from intelligence-gathering units, so there will be no opportunity for misperception among community members that outreach efforts are a cover for other activities.

"It depends on the size of your agency and what your goals are," said Sergeant Abdeen, "but if you have a community relations or community coordination section, outreach efforts should be led from there."

(In the LAPD, the Liaison Unit is organized under the Counter-Terrorism and Special Operations Bureau. While this might seem counterintuitive, keeping the Liaison Unit in the CTSOB was a conscious choice made by Deputy Chief Downing, so that he could personally ensure that the unit stayed intact and true to its engagement mandate. "As long as I'm with the LAPD," he explained, "it will stay with me. Ultimately it should go into the public affairs and community relations division, but it will stay with me for now, so that I can ensure that it stays focused and that its work is fully supported. In my current role, I ensure that there is absolutely no mission creep between the Liaison Unit and investigative units."

Recommendation: Focus on building interagency partnerships. Just as police agencies should reach out to all members of their communities, so too should they work to build productive partnerships with other government agencies. This improves the delivery of services to community members in need, and ensures that all of the government agencies that interact with the community are sharing the same messages and connecting people with the same types of resources. It also helps the agencies to work in concert and adapt quickly to changing circumstances and crises in the community.

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Overcoming Resistance Within the Department

Question from the Audience: *We appreciate everything that you've shared today about your successes and the challenges that you've faced. As a law enforcement officer, one of the questions I have is what kind of challenges you've faced internally, in dealing with some of the "good ol' boy" police guys who don't want to get on board with this type of policing?*

Deputy Chief Mike Downing, Los Angeles Police Department: One of the reasons that the Liaison Unit is still in my Bureau is because I think that we still need to do some work in that area, and I want to make sure that the outreach team has all of the institutional support they need to do this important work.

Outreach is so important in terms of where we're headed as a country, and how we can best address the violent extremist threat that we're facing from all across the spectrum, from white supremacists to Islamic extremism. What police agencies need is someone who will be the cheerleader for outreach and who will continually drive it, because you don't want to get lost in other priorities.

It's so incredibly important, and it has an impact that goes beyond preventing radicalization. It has an impact on emergency preparedness, on community resiliency, on the health of communities, on interagency communication. It can even help mitigate some of the anti-law enforcement sentiment that we've seen across the country.

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Overcoming Challenges

Los Angeles' outreach efforts have faced challenges.

One of these is **limited resources and competing demands**. Like many cities, Los Angeles contends with numerous types of crime and has a finite amount of funding and manpower available. Despite these competing demands, police leaders must be committed to staffing and funding outreach initiatives, or the efforts will wither. In the Los Angeles area, police executives have thrown their weight behind outreach efforts, and the community has shown support for these efforts. This has created a culture of engagement within police agencies and within the community as a whole.

Even given the general support in the community, Los Angeles agencies have had to face the challenge of **misinformation and misperception** within the community that outreach efforts are part of a counterterrorism and intelligence-gathering program. "What you're going to have to realize," said LASD Sergeant Mike Abdeen, "is that this misunderstanding is a fact of life, and so you need to design a strategy to work around it and not get discouraged when it happens."

One way to address these misconceptions is to work with community members to constantly spread the message about what outreach and preventing violent extremism initiatives entail. Muslim-American women in Los Angeles have proven important partners in this effort. "Women serve as a first line of defense against any kind of radicalization," said Anila Ali, founder and President of the American Muslim Women's Empowerment Council.⁹ "All they want is to make sure that their children are successful and don't get involved in criminal activity. That's why educating women about CVE is so important. Once they understand that it's not about spying and sending informants into mosques, but is instead about building bridges between communities and government agencies and services to make communities stronger and healthier, they get it and they want to get involved."

Productive Community Partnerships: Examples from Los Angeles

The LAPD and LASD have worked diligently to build productive partnerships with numerous community members and community organizations. Young people and women in the Muslim American community are often not easily reached through traditional outreach efforts, and they have concerns that are often different from those of older people and men in their communities.

Recognizing that these communities have unique needs, the LASD and LAPD took special care to address them.

Reaching out to young people: Young Muslim Americans, especially those whose parents were born outside of the United States, can sometimes struggle with their sense of identity and feel caught between the culture of their parents and the culture in which they are raised. While educating parents about this conflict is important, so too is providing opportunities for young Muslims to develop a sense of belonging to the American community. This is not to say that they should be pressured to assimilate. Rather, young Muslim Americans need to be given the chance to fully integrate into their communities, so that they no longer feel that there is a conflict between the cultural traditions of their families and their American identities.

⁹ http://www.lapdonline.org/west_bureau/news_view/58544

LASD Sergeant Abdeen established the **Young Muslim American Leaders Advisory Council (YoungMALAC)**, whose purpose is to promote civic engagement among young Muslim Americans, build avenues for communication between them and police agencies, and develop their leadership skills. YoungMALAC is composed of 12 young people, ranging in age from 19 to 27, who meet several times a month to plan activities, community service events, and training workshops. Members also conduct their own outreach to young people in the community and connect young Muslim Americans with the sheriff's department and other local police agencies.

According to Ali Jakvani, the chairman of YoungMALAC, his group's activities include feeding and providing other aid to the homeless, arranging ride-alongs for young people interested in learning more about police work, and producing outreach events at local schools.

It's very difficult to get young people engaged and for them to understand that law enforcement is there to help us and isn't out to get us.

I understand this, and the people who are part of my team understand this. That's why we work so hard to spread our message of civic engagement and bridge the trust gap between law enforcement and Muslim communities.

--Ali Jakvani, Chairman of the Young Muslim Americans Advisory Council

YoungMALAC's message to young Muslim Americans, Mr. Jakvani explained, is that the most effective way to make substantive changes in how local government does business is by working with local government representatives. "I encourage civic engagement," he said, "and I believe that the best way to make change is by sitting at the table and helping to shape policy, not separating yourself from the government. Young Muslim Americans are part of the fabric of American society, so we should participate in it to make sure that it's a welcoming space for us."

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Finding My Muslim American Identity
By Ali Jakvani, Chairman, YoungMALAC

I am the product of a multicultural family. My mother is from Mexico – she's a Mexican Muslim – and my father is from Pakistan. I grew up in a Muslim American household where we didn't have certain cultural touchstones, so finding a sense of who I am and my identity was difficult.

In trying to figure everything out, I was drawn toward my Muslim roots, but it was difficult at the beginning to figure out whether I was a Muslim or whether I was an American, since it didn't seem like the two identities could co-exist. It was through my experience with law enforcement and with YoungMALAC – which began when I was 15 – that I began to understand that these weren't two different identities at all. Now I am proud to say that I am an American Muslim.

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Beyond helping young Muslim Americans become more engaged with their communities, YoungMALAC also develops Muslim American communities' future leaders. "One of the main components of our program is working with young people and developing young leaders," said Sergeant Abdeen. "We

realized that while it is of course important to work with those who are leading the community today, it is equally important that we develop new, young leaders so that we can sustain our community partnerships in the decades down the road.”

Reaching out to Muslim American Women: From the outset, the LAPD and LASD have made a concerted effort to reach out to Muslim American women.

“I take pride in saying that law enforcement saw the needs of our community – especially the women – and came forward to support us,” said Anila Ali, founder and President of the **American Muslim Women’s Empowerment Council**. “They facilitated the empowerment of Muslim women and as a result we have a very high level of trust with them.”

As Ms. Ali explained, “We realized that Muslim women are quite powerful, and when they have a voice they speak up. But we felt that they needed a platform, and if they could be given that platform with support from federal government agencies and law enforcement, they would take a leadership role.”

Part of the work of the LAPD and LASD was helping Muslim American women create that platform by encouraging their civic engagement and supporting the creation of community organizations tailored to them, such as Ms. Ali’s American Muslim Women’s Empowerment Council (AMWEC).

For Muslim American women, the police have served not only as an ally but also an important resource. In cooperation with AMWEC, the LAPD has provided guidance and educational programming on domestic violence to women in Muslim American communities. The FBI also speaks at the AMWEC conference every year about women’s civil rights.

Summary of Recommendations

For Police Agencies

- **In building community trust, challenges should be expected, and should be seen as opportunities to improve.** Setbacks are an opportunity to learn and improve outreach and community engagement efforts. As Deputy Chief Downing expressed it, “Part of what CVE is, in my view, is putting credits in the community trust ‘bank.’ So when you make a mistake, you may use up a few of those credits, but you won’t go bankrupt.”
- **Consistency is crucial in building community trust.** Engaging and then disengaging can create mistrust in the community, because it calls into question the commitment of outreach officers and the police department.
- **Look for the right personality traits when recruiting outreach officers.** It is important to develop outreach teams that are culturally competent and reflect the community. A number of police officials have said that it is even more important that officers have the right personality traits for the job. Successful outreach officers are genuine, open-minded, persistent, and interested in learning from the community.

- **Collaborate with other government agencies and social service providers to coordinate outreach efforts and messaging.** This ensures that all participating agencies have contacts they can use when they must quickly help community members in need. It also ensures that all local agencies are united in their outreach efforts and are not working against each other unknowingly.
- **Embrace the whole-community approach.** If one of the goals of an outreach program is to build community resilience against violent extremism, then everyone in the community should be involved. Focusing outreach efforts on any single group within the community has the potential to alienate that group, who might see those efforts as a cover for surveillance activities. It can also alienate others in the community who might feel that resources are being unfairly funneled toward one particular group.
- **Outreach should never have an intelligence-gathering mandate.** Outreach efforts should be about building relationships, not gathering intelligence. Mixing functions can delegitimize outreach officers in the eyes of the community.
- **Find ways to engage with community members who might not be accessible through traditional outreach efforts.** In Los Angeles, this has meant devising novel ways to connect with young Muslim Americans and Muslim American women, identifying their particular needs, and finding ways to address them.

DRAFT

International Association of Chiefs of Police
Countering Violent Extremism
Deputy Chief Michael Downing

- 1) The development – the story, the response, the challenges that lie ahead
- 2) Executive sponsorship – economies of scale, a refinement of focus, re-affirming the community police partnership, and an emphasis that this is not another layer or another “thing to do”
- 3) Why CVE? – Cities across America are being challenged with both refugee and immigrant populations – This has been America’s story since becoming a country, however Globalization, the information era, fueled by the internet has more challenges and dynamics with diaspora’s
- 4) Our CVE strategies serve to integrate communities, groups, or individuals, who may feel they are on the fringe of society, have grievances, feel oppressed, or are discontent.
- 5) In addition to building deeper, more meaningful partnerships, we are putting credits in the bank. We know as we progress forward, we will make mistakes. There will be times when communities will question our motives and competence, lose their confidence in us, and times when their trust will be shaken by even a single incident. Some communities then start taking withdrawals on our account, and we need to make sure we have sufficient credits deposited so not to go bankrupt.
- 6) What it is and What it is not – It is not an inoculation against extremism. It is however, a good prescription to build healthy, resilient communities making it more difficult for violence extremism and violence for that matter to take root.
- 7) The Roles and Responsibilities – with police work there are times we have to take on the role of soldiers, controlling through force and fear, but much more often and certainly more sustaining, we control through the role of a public servant – through education, and by inspiring common values, human values, thereby raising the ethical stature of communities. In doing this we protect the values inherent in the United States Constitution – our country’s sacred text. What it is to be American – this is what we instill, this is why people from around the globe came to this country in the first place. We will protect the sacred texts from the great religions of the world, and there is an expectation that Americans (all Americans) will protect our country’s sacred text – The United States Constitution. One of our Muslim leader/scholars has a mantra that says, “home is not where our grandparent are buried, but where our grandchildren are to be raised.” This is home.
- 8) Executive Sponsorship – This is definitely a team sport no one entity can do it alone. Thank you to DHS for their executive sponsorship – it has sometimes been a painful journey,

however on the federal side, they did take the first step and focused the discussion with the federal leadership.

- 9) Justice Truth and Peace are pillars that American Law Enforcement stands on. In order to have peace one needs justice, but to have justice you first need truth. So what does this mean? A short story – Clearly you have seen this hate campaign against American Muslims play out in the media, and more recently in American politics. This has created a challenge for law enforcement and some of who were pinned in the middle. This is where “truth” fits in. The neo-conservative would have you believe that the real threat to America is the threat of Sharia – that Sharia will replace the United States Constitution – that American Muslims don’t recognize the constitution. Instead of listening to the soundbites and reading the headlines, I sought out the truth – the writings, the case studies, and theories of the neo conservatives were flawed and filled with mistruths. We met with the President of the Fiqh Council of North America, Dr. Musamil Saddiqi – a week before his annual Washington D.C. retreat with the 18 member Fiqh Council – a body that provides guidance and direction to the umma or Muslim body in North America. I explained to him the need to engage and confront this issue and state the truth. A few days after the Fiqh council met I received an email from Dr. Siddiqi describing the council’s discussion and action – attached to the email was a Fattwa – 2 pages – not the kind that brings danger and death but the kind that brings opportunity and hope. Beautifully written it begins by saying we see no inherent conflict between being a faithful Muslim and a loyal American. And they recognize the United States Constitution as the supreme law of the land and the rule of law in this country and do so as a principle of Sharia. I would urge you to pull this up on Google, read it, and most importantly put it into action.
- 10) There are some who will say we are being deceived – they will use the work Taqqiya or deception. This is non-sense. Seek the truth, see the truth so we may have justice – practice fair justice so we may have peace. We can be the example
- 11) Examples of Successes – Sikh ceremonies prayer events etc., Afgan Muslim Juvenile Shot by police, Coptic Christian Bishop and Islamic Scholar/leader conduct joint press conference., Suspect attempt to radicalize youth, Iraqi woman murdered, Chaos Disorder, violence, abroad as the result of expression of first amendment vs. peaceful protest, and demonstration, dialogue, problem solving, participation, integration, and protecting the values that represent America. SAR Story and Dr. Pannell
- 12) Conclusion – We each have a different landscape and our communities express themselves differently – that is why we cannot have a one size fits all. The principles may be the same but the execution needs to be different and fitting.
- 13) This has been a collaboration and will always be a work in progress just as we evolve and progress – this should never be in final form.
- 14) “Out of the crooked timber of humanity no straight thing was ever made”

15) Our work product, the 24 hour curriculum, the student workbook, the resource book, videos, and handouts are all available on the DHS CVE Training work portal.

16) As the threats against and within America continue to morph and converge, there is no better time to refine our focus and engage our officers in this philosophy and approach. This is not just another layer or another thing to do. This is a smarter way to do business.

Challenges to Engagement

- Limited community infrastructures
- Misinformation, misperceptions & diminished trust
- Conflicting interests
- Rigidity and inability to work constructively
- Political inhibitors
- Limited resources



Preserving Civil Rights

- LAPD OIG civilian oversight
- First ever *Suspicious Activity Reporting* audit
- Expanding the process to include community input
- Community awareness and workshops

Inspector General Alexander Bustamante



Muslim Mapping Dichotomy

LAPD:

- Identify Muslim Communities (location, demographics, sect, etc.)
- Engage through social services agencies
- Develop a better understanding of diverse populations



LAPD Scraps Muslim Mapping Program

Mayor rips 'counterproductive' police plan

Nov 15, 2007 6:22 AM CST



Public Perception:

- Civil rights/civil liberties violation
- Racial/religious profiling
- Damaging community trust



Creating a Vision

Managing/Building Stakeholder Trust

Operating Model—Successes and Barriers

Developing Human Capital

Metrics and Community Initiatives

Technology


Future Challenges

Key Messages



Training by Law Enforcement

- 2-Hour cultural diversity training
- 8-Hour CA Post certified CVE training
- King Fahd Mosque SAR training
- San Diego and Los Angeles 24-Hour curriculum CVE training



Course Curriculum

DAY ONE

0800 – 0930	Countering Violent Extremism – Mission and Vision Overview
0930 – 1100	Model Overview and Application
1100 – 1200	Context: Civil Rights / Civil Liberties
1200 – 1300	LUNCH
1300 – 1400	Community: Identifying Your Network
1400 – 1500	Group: Identifying Groups for Outreach
1500 – 1600	Outreach Panel
1600 – 1700	Assessment and Mission Statement


DAY TWO

0800 – 0810	Briefing
0810 – 0905	Hate Groups, Crimes and Social Media
0915 – 1000	Case Study Analysis
1000 – 1100	Context Factors
1100 – 1200	Increase Drivers / Decrease Drivers
1200 – 1300	LUNCH
1300 – 1400	Person Factors
1400 – 1500	Group Factors
1500 – 1600	Community Factors
1600 – 1700	Research Assessment and Strategy Adjustment


EXECUTIVE SESSION

0800 – 0845	Countering Violent Extremism – Mission and Vision Overview
0845 – 1000	Model Overview and Application <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Increase/Decrease Drivers
1000 – 1100	Context: Civil Rights / Civil Liberties
1100 – 1200	Developing A Counter Narrative <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Lessons Learned – Research on Program Evaluation• Resilience• Maximizing Social Media
1200 – 1300	LUNCH
1230 – 1515	Community Outreach Presentations
1515 – 1600	Outreach Team and Executive Collaboration
1600 – 1630	Closing – What Will Be Different in A Year?

Training by Law Enforcement



Training by Law Enforcement



Peer-to-Peer & Equal Partnership Training

Training in Enhanced Community Policing to Combat Violent Extremism

Partners:

- Muslim Public Affairs Council
 - Salam al-Marayati
- University of Illinois at Chicago
 - Dr. Stevan Weine
- Los Angeles Police Department
 - Deputy Chief Downing
 - CTSOB Liaison Section
 - Hydra & 10,000 Volt Debriefing Unit

Project Design:

- Focus Groups to Inform Curriculum
- Hydra Immersive Simulation System
- Data Collection & Mixed Methods Analysis
- Produce Final Product for National Dissemination

Training in Enhanced Community Policing to Combat Violent Extremism

Dr. Stevan Weine, University of Illinois at Chicago

Officer Guy D. Golan, Liaison Section



Los Angeles Police Department

Counter-Terrorism and Special Operations Bureau

June 20, 2014

Creating a Vision

Managing/Building Stakeholder Trust

Operating Model—Successes and Barriers

Developing Human Capital

Metrics and Community Initiatives

Technology

Future Challenges

Key Messages



Educational Workshops

AMERICAN MUSLIM WOMEN'S EMPOWERMENT CONFERENCE

May 7th, 2011 Hyatt Regency Hotel
17900 Jamboree Road, Irvine, California, 92614

Meet American Muslim women achievers from all walks of life...

American Muslim Women
Their Role in America, Protecting their Civil Rights



Keynote Speakers

Ms. Farah A. Pandith
Special Representative to Muslim Communities for the US Department of State

Andre Birotte Jr.

U.S. Attorney
Central District of California

Ms. Amanda Baran:
Sen. Advisor to the White House Initiative on Civil Rights and Women's Issues

FREE ATTENDANCE

REGISTRATION REQUIRED!!!!

www.anilaali.com

We've invited Rep. Peter King to meet and get to know the "moderates" and see how we work with our agencies and communities to keep our country safe.

Organizers:

Or simply register online at:
www.anilaali.com

Anila Ali: anila2008@gmail.com

Mahrukh Madad: mahrukh.madad@gmail.com

Tina Khan: tehminaakhan@yahoo.com

Faiza Arain: 35365@lapd.lacity.org

Consul of Pakistan American Affairs



Registration: 9:30 A.M.

Breakfast: 9:30-10:30 A.M.

Keynote and speeches, discussion, Q & A, followed by lunch 1:30-5:00 Bazaar / Meet & Greet
BAZAAR / Meet and Greet

Speakers

- Ms. Riffat Masood
Consul General Pakistan
- Chief Downing - LAPD
- Dr. Meher Tabatabai
- Anila Ali
- Fiza Shah
- Mahrukh Madad
- Iqbal Theba - Glee Fame
- Ani Zonneveld
- Honorable Maxine Waters*
- Mayor Pro-Tem Beth Krom
- Adnan Khan (COPAA)
- Gazala Adaya Shaik (COPAA)
- Monir Jalili
- Nahla Kayali
- Ethan Casey

Empowering Committee:

Mariam Rashid: 310-377-1824	Rubina Merchant: 714-348-0655
Faryal Khan: 909-948-7570	Huma Amir: 909-463-2822
Rabia Moosani: 714-768-0555	Nikki Kardar: 909-226-2252
Samina Rawda: 310-793-8895	Sumara Aziz: 949-293-6987
Aisha Keekeebhai: 310-621-0503	Rumaisa Rehman: 310-902-2165
Nargis Kurwa: kurwaey@gmail.com	Zohra Patail: 909-466-8748
Dr. Farhat Zubair: 562-832-8102	Nikki Kardar: 877-729-4707
Shaheen Awan: 714-396-2928	Blitquis Hyder: 310-428-8240
Shalata Khan: 818-998-0558	

L.A.P.D

The Anti-Defamation League
presents the

Counterterrorism Conference

JULY 23, 2014

WEDNESDAY 9 AM – 12:30 PM

Registration: 8:30 – 9:00 AM
Training: 9:00 AM – 12:30 PM

Orange County Sheriff's
Regional Training Academy
15991 Armstrong Avenue
Tustin, CA 92782

Registration is FREE

Limited Space!

Reserve your spot now!

[Register Online Here](#)

Registration Deadline: July 16

For more information, contact: Jeanra Mendelson
jmendelson@acli.org / 310.446.4248

This conference is for law enforcement as well as other TLO only. Proper identification required at entrance



Community Partners

FEATURED SPEAKERS

Chief Superintendent Eitan Menashe

Israeli National Police, Afula District
Intelligence Gathering and Information Sharing

Sgt. Major Ronit Tubul

Israeli National Police,
Jerusalem Central District.
Acts of Courage in the Face of Terrorism

Lt. Col. (Res.) Gideon Avrami

Director of Security
Malcha Mall, Jerusalem
Balance Between Security and Commerce: Jerusalem's Malcha Mall Case Study.



Cultural Awareness and Sensitivity Training



About Sikhism

One of the world's newest religions, Sikhism was founded by the Guru Nanak, born in 1469. He emphasized inner spiritual awakening over outer religious forms, directing followers to rise early, bathe, meditate on the divine name and direct each day's activities to God.



Source: Dorling Kindersley
Illustrated Dictionary of Religions

The Khanda

The Sikh symbol is framed by two swords, standing for spiritual and worldly power.



The single double-edged sword represents belief in one God.


The circle, or **chakra**, symbolizes this one God.

- Sikhism emphasized monotheism and rejected idol worship and the caste system.
- Sikhs follow the teachings of 10 gurus and the Sikh holy book, *Adi Granth*.
- Sikh men commonly wear a peaked turban to cover their hair, which is left uncut out of respect for God's creation. Some Sikhs also carry a ceremonial dagger.

DOUG GRISWOLD/MERCURY NEWS

Community Driven Counter Narratives

- Empowering grassroots leaders and communities
- Identify indicators towards extremism
- Establish community crisis inquiry teams



Peer-to-Peer & Equal Partnership Training

COUNTER-TERRORISM AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS BUREAU

DEPUTY CHIEF MICHAEL P. DOWNING
LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT

PRIVATE SECURITY BRIEFING

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 15, 2013 11:00 A.M.

LESSONS LEARNED:
RECENT TERRORIST ATTACKS / ACTIVE SHOOTER

IMPROVING INFORMATION FLOW

COMMAND AND CONTROL



Universal
Protection
Service



FREE SUBTERRANEAN PARKING

400 SOUTH HOPE STREET, SUITE 1140, LOS ANGELES, CA 90071
RSVP: OFFICER SUSAN TORRES 39732@LAPD.LACITY.ORG

R
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S



Private Security Symposium

AGENDA
Tuesday, October 15, 2013
1100 A.M.

Welcome Remarks

Deputy Chief Michael P. Downing, CTSOB
David Bowdich, SAC, FBI, CT
Randy Andrews, Private Sector

Introductions Commander Blake Chow

- Lessons Learned from the Kenya Mall Terrorist Attack/Active Shooter,
 - Deputy Chief Michael P. Downing, CTSOB
- Command and Control/Multi-Assault Counter-Terrorism Action Capabilities
 - Commander Michael Williams, CTSOB
 - Mike Little, Assistant Chief, LAFD
- Joint Counter-Terrorism Awareness Workshops Findings
 - Commander, Blake Chow, CTSOB
- Shoring Up Vulnerabilities of Soft Targets,
 - Captain Steve Sambar, MCD
- Panel Discussion
 - Questions

400 E. Hope Street, Suite 1140, Los Angeles, CA, 90071

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Social Media

The image is a screenshot of a Facebook profile for the LAPD Liaison Unit. At the top, the navigation bar includes the Facebook logo, the page name "LAPD Liaison Unit", a search icon, and user options for "Guy", "Home 20+", and "Find Friends". The main cover image is a black and white photograph of a city skyline at night, with numerous skyscrapers illuminated. On the left side of the profile, there is a profile picture showing four men in LAPD uniforms. Below the profile picture, the name "LAPD Liaison Unit" is displayed, followed by "423 likes". To the right of the name are buttons for "Like", "Follow", "Message", and a dropdown menu icon. Below the name, the category "Legal/Law" is listed with the URL "http://www.lapdonline.org/". At the bottom of the profile, there are three tabs: "Photos" with a small image of a menorah, "Likes" showing a thumbs-up icon and the number "423", and "Events" with a calendar icon showing the number "31". At the very bottom left, there are links for "About" and "Suggest an Edit".

f LAPD Liaison Unit



Guy

Home 20+

Find Friends



LAPD Liaison Unit

423 likes

Like

Follow

Message



Legal/Law

<http://www.lapdonline.org/>

About - Suggest an Edit



Photos

423

Likes



Events

Social Media



ABOUT

- Police Officer at Los Angeles Police Department
- Studied Law Enforcement at Los Angeles Police Academy
- Lives In Los Angeles, California
- In a complicated relationship

LAPD Liaison Unit shared Rumaisa Rahman's photo. November 7, 2012

WE WILL BE THERE!!!

PAKISTANI AMERICAN YOUTH & YOUNG PROFESSIONALS CONFERENCE
11.10.12

Presented by the Consulate General of Pakistan in Partnership with MALAC

Calling all Pakistani American Youth and Young Professionals for a highly inspiring, enlightening, and fun filled conference!

Explore the Pakistani American Identity & Community Relations

Sign into your own Powerful Workshop

Cruc. Empowerment. Learn About Relationships and Professional Connections

Special Guest:
In the Shoes of Law Enforcement Officers / Community Leaders in Public Service
Assessing the Entrepreneurship with Immigrant/ Pakistani Americans in Hollywood/Entertainment


Registration begins at 10 am (Onsite Registration at 11 am EARLY!)
FREE lunch and dinner will be served!

Be part of the experience by purchasing your tickets for only \$35* TODAY!
All payments to be made in person at the registration desk.

CONFIRMED:



Social Media



LAPD Liaison Unit

March 23, 2013 near Santa Clarita, CA

At Pakistan Day with Anila Ali Khan Adnan Nighat Nikki Kardar Fatima Khan Mohammed Akber Khan Arif Zaffar Mansuri Pakistan Link Urdu Link — with Arif Zaffar Mansuri. Consul General, Ahmed Ali and 14 others.

Like · Comment · Share

👍 10 people like this.



Tina Khan Very efficient !

March 24, 2013 at 12:29am · Like · 🔄 3



Kausar Sher Khaja Lapd liaison impressively prompt & efficient !

March 24, 2013 at 12:51am · Like · 🔄 3



LAPD Liaison Unit Thanks ladies, we try to stay relevant. You miss a day or two and your "late". Assist us in getting more LIKES by recommending this page to others 😊

March 24, 2013 at 5:58am · Like · 🔄 4



Anila Ali Thanks, LAPD, for sharing these wonderful pictures of a GREAT Pakistan Day, March 23rd.

March 24, 2013 at 1:04pm · Like · 🔄 1



Write a comment...

Social Media



Public · Hosted by LAPD Liaison Unit

[Join](#) [Save](#) [...](#)

Saturday, June 15, 2013 at 11:00am - 3:00pm
More than a year ago

Los Angeles Police Academy
1880 North Academy Dr, Los Angeles, California 90012 [Show Map](#)

GUESTS

377 going	143 maybe	2.8K invited
---------------------	---------------------	------------------------

SUGGESTED EVENTS



Katy Perry
Fri Sep 19 at Los Angeles, Calif...
317 guests
[Join](#) · [Save](#)

[Chat \(Off\)](#)

Come one, come all. Counter-Terrorism & Special Operations Bureau is hosting an Open House. Rarely is such equipment made available to the public. Please bring yourself and kids to meet specialized officers and our tactical equipment:

Social Media



LAPD Liaison Unit shared a link.

April 2, 2013

We refereed this event. Thanks for the invite. Fun times, very well organized.



LAPD's Fittest Cricketer Contest at IPL 2013

The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) held a unique contest to find the "fittest" cricketer at the 2013 IPL final held at Angel Stadium in...

Like · Comment · Share



[Cricketer Contest](#)



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
Future Challenges

Key Messages



Ineffective Training and Gaps

- Structure of CVE/enhanced community policing
 - Implement a decentralized approach
 - Provide training to all levels of local law enforcement agencies
- Build safety net for those who may not attend places of worship
 - Discover methods of reaching out to grassroots outside of religious establishments
 - Use a whole community approach
- Develop counter narratives for internet propaganda
 - Provide youth with alternatives to FTO recruitment
 - Emphasize humanitarian efforts within the community
- Terrorism Liaison Officer Program
 - Further integrate within department
 - Establish an atmosphere of situational awareness




Concerns for the Future: Instability in Large Parts of the World

- Recruitment from FTO using social media
 - ISIS and other FTOs use Twitter to recruit
 - Skype and language translating software to radicalize youth
- Civil War in Somalia
 - Recruitment by al-Shabaab
 - Youth identified with overseas movement and joined al-Shabaab without notice
- Vacuum in Syria and Iraq
 - Foreign recruitment observed in several groups
 - Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)
 - Jabhat al-Nusra
 - Abu Huraira al-Amriki (Ahmed)
- Civil War in Nigeria?
 - Abubakar Shekau known to use social media as recruiting resource
 - Boko Haram lens of fighting government corruption and establishing Islamic State
- Trend Towards Affiliates Pledging Allegiance to Daesh
 - AQIM, Taliban, AQAP, Boko Haram, etc.



- Refugees from the Middle East and Africa
 - How many; Where; Adequate aid; Organizational partnerships
 - Understand dynamics of their home countries
- State sponsored terrorism
 - Relations between Iran and Hezbollah
- Diaspora's perception on U.S. foreign policy
 - The impact these policies have on diaspora's original country
 - How subjective lenses influence thoughts and behavior
 - Israel/Palestine Conflict
- Trend toward anti-government activity
 - Sovereign citizen movement across the nation
 - Formation of anti-government militias
- Ensuring factually based concepts
 - Self-proclaimed experts
 - Biased content



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


Developing a Culture

- Enhanced form of community relations
 - Community policing in a traditional sense is inadequate
 - Proper approach with each diverse group
 - Understand the historical context and drivers that cause community angst
- Integration— not assimilation
 - Interfaith is the future
 - Strengthen isolated and Balkanized groups
 - Identify the meaning of being an American Muslim in the U.S.
- Institutionalize new cultural atmosphere early on
 - Begin enhanced community policing with academy recruits
 - Officers educated in different cultures, religions, and international affairs
 - Provide diversity training to new and existing officers annually
- Place emphasis on grassroots level
 - Empower those who do not regularly associate themselves with the police
 - Be innovative, meet diverse community outside religious institutions as well
 - Provide station tour, open houses, and community events


Intervention


- Strategically incorporate a multi-disciplinary threat assessment intervention program.
- Preventative work in the pre-criminal space and the disengagement of an individual from radicalized ideology that could escalate towards violent extremism
- Further develop collaborative partnerships with community leads and relevant agencies (i.e. mental health, educational institutes, social services, faith-based organizations, etc.)
- Identify new avenues to engage broader grassroots communities – develop buy-in



“We need to show that our democratic principles built on the values, practices, and lives of American citizens are sacred and worthy of embracing. We need to show our belief in human dignity, the family and the value of the individual. We need to show how we honor the meaning of our lives by what we contribute to others' lives. We need to show that behind the badges of American law enforcement are caring Americans "doing" law enforcement. To do this we need to go into the community and get to know peoples' names. We need to walk into homes, neighborhoods, mosques, and businesses. We need to know how Islam expresses itself in Los Angeles if we expect to forge bonds of community support.”

(Chief Downing, 2007)






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- Reed, H. E., & Andrezejewski, C. S. (2010). *The new wave of African immigrants in the United States*. Dept. of Sociology, Queens College: New York. Retrieved from <http://paa2010.princeton.edu/papers/100606>
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Countering Violent Extremism: Outreach Strategies



City's Supplemental Disclosures 000286




Radicalization Motivators and Indicators



Prevention Efforts:

- Community engagement and outreach
- Intergroup dialogue and awareness
- Support for social development and civic engagement
- Social learning through sports, education, etc.
- Expanding access to education & employment resources

(U) Spectrum of CT Strategies



NCTC


Disengagement Efforts:

- Build trust through social clubs, sports, health care, and social services
- Identify and resolve obstacles through support groups, classes, and counseling
- Provide aftercare support to maintain changed behavior
- Maintain open door for those who relapse



One Team in:

Countering Violent Extremism



Failing Forward, 2007

If a community is isolated, it may be determined that it is susceptible to extremist ideology, Downing said. In such cases, he said, police could then go into those communities and try to head off potential problems by offering people access to government and social services.

"Our goal is to try to be a catalyst to integrate the communities into the greater society."

If social factors - such as enclaves where residents are culturally and linguistically isolated - contribute to radicalization, it is important for law enforcement to be aware of those potentially vulnerable communities. This is part of our next step. We want to map the locations of these closed, vulnerable communities, and in partnership with these communities, infuse social services that will help the people who live there while weaving these enclaves into the fabric of the larger society.

"Singling out individuals for investigation, surveillance, and data-gathering based on their religion constitutes religious profiling," the letter said. "In addition to constitutional concerns ... religious profiling engenders fear and distrust."

"it undermines trust established between Muslims and police since the 9/11 attacks and is reminiscent of how Nazis identified Jews during the Holocaust."

"This is anti-Semitism reborn as Islamophobia," said Shakeel Syed, director of the Islamic Shura Council of Southern California. "We will fiercely resist this."

Without a community mapping blueprint and methodical community engagement strategy, our outreach efforts will be sporadic. Our counter-narrative will be empty of meaning, leaving us talking about, rather than talking with, this community.

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LAPD LIAISON SECTION

Parent Command
Counter-Terrorism and Special Operations
Bureau (CTSOB)
Commanding Officer
Deputy Chief Michael P. Downing


Mission:

The mission of CTSOB Liaison Section is to fully leverage the Department's public outreach capability and communications capacity in an effort to improve the quality of life and public safety within diverse communities by building mutual partnerships and trust through coordination and collaboration of all Department entities, government stakeholders, public/private/faith-based organizations, nongovernmental organizations with local communities.



CTSOB Liaison Unit

- 1 Sergeant II
- 2 Police Officer III
- 3 Police Officer II
- 1 Police Service Rep



A Collective Responsibility

“But when individuals or groups choose to further their grievances or ideologies through violence, by engaging in violence themselves or by recruiting and encouraging others to do so, it becomes the collective responsibility of the U.S. Government and the American people to take a stand.”

Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, 2011

- Re-framing CVE to include the broader definition of violent extremism creates a shift towards new approaches
- The above expanded definition of CVE is the foundation of engagement efforts in Los Angeles
- CVE is a societal issue in which everyone plays a role, hence the "Whole of Community" approach

Enhanced Community Policing

Deputy Chief Downing...Police Chief's Magazine:

“Community mobilization, an essential part of the crime-fighting model, is particularly important when applied to populations that may feel targeted by society or the police. One goal with Muslim communities has been to converge their community-building efforts with those of the LAPD; by opening channels of communication and fostering trust, opportunities to improve police service to those communities would arise.”

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
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Community & Public/Private Partnerships



Interagency Collaborations ICG-CVE

Founded in 2008 (local, state & federal)

Member Agencies: LASD, City HRC, LAPD, DHS, USAO, State DOJ, FBI, USCIS, and SBSB



Overall Purpose:

- Streamline collective efforts
- Strategically enhance community engagement to maximize overall effectiveness
- Raise awareness & education
- Collaborate to overcome challenges (external & internal)
- Coordinated communications and actions during times of heightened tensions

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THE F I Q H C O U N C I L

Of North America

Fataawah (Islamic Rulings)



Resolution of the Fiqh Council of North America On Being Faithful Muslims and Loyal Americans

Like other faith communities in the US and elsewhere, we see no inherent conflict between the normative values of Islam and the US Constitution and Bill of Rights.

Contrary to erroneous perceptions and Islamophobic propaganda of political extremists from various backgrounds, the true and authentic teachings of Islam promote the sanctity of human life, dignity of all humans, and respect of human, civil and political rights. Islamic teachings uphold religious freedom and adherence to the same universal moral values which are accepted by the majority of people of all backgrounds and upon which the US Constitution was established and according to which the Bill of Rights was enunciated.

The Qur'an speaks explicitly about the imperative of just and peaceful co-existence, and the rights of legitimate self-defense against aggression and oppression that pose threats to freedom and security, provided that, a strict code of behavior is adhered to, including the protection of innocent non-combatants.

The foregoing values and teachings can be amply documented from the two primary sources of Islamic jurisprudence – the Qur'an and authentic Hadith. These values are rooted, not in political correctness or pretense, but on the universally accepted supreme objectives of Islamic Shari'ah, which is to protect religious liberty, life, reason, family and property of all. The Shari'ah, contrary to misrepresentations, is a comprehensive and broad guidance for all aspects of a Muslim's life – spiritual, moral, social and legal. Secular legal systems in Western democracies generally share the same supreme objectives, and are generally compatible with, Islamic Shari'ah.

Likewise, the core modern democratic systems are compatible with the Islamic principles of Shura – mutual consultation and co-determination of all social affairs at all levels and in all spheres, family, community, society, state and globally.

As a body of Islamic scholars, we the members of FCNA believe that it is false and misleading to suggest there is a contradiction between being faithful Muslims committed to God (Allah) and being loyal American citizens. Islamic teachings require respect of the laws of the land where Muslims live as minorities, including the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, so long as there is no conflict with Muslims' obligation for obedience to God. We do not see any such conflict with the US Constitution and Bill of Rights. The primacy of obedience to God is a commonly held position of many practicing Jews and Christians as well.

We believe further that as citizens of a free and democratic society, we have the same obligations and rights of all US citizens. We believe that right of dissent can only be exercised in a peaceful and lawful manner to advance the short and long term interests of our country.

The Fiqh Council of North America calls on all Muslim Americans and American citizens at large to engage in objective, peaceful and respectful dialogue at all levels and spheres of common social concerns. We call upon all Muslim Americans to be involved in solving pressing social problems, such as the challenge of poverty, discrimination, violence, health care and environmental protection. It is fully compatible with Islam for Muslims to integrate positively in the society of which they are equal citizens, without losing their identity as Muslims (just as Jews and Christians do not lose their religious identify in doing the same).

We believe that emphasis on dialogue and positive collaborative action is a far better approach than following the paths of those who thrive on hate mongering and fear propaganda. Anti-Islam, anti-Semitism and other similar forms of religious and/or political-based discrimination are all forms of racism unfit for civilized people and are betrayal of the true American as well as Islamic values.

May the pursuit of peace, justice, love, compassion, human equality and fellowship prevail in the pluralistic mosaic that is the hallmark of our nation.

Adopted in its General Body Meeting held in Virginia on September 24-25, 2011

Community Successes

- Anti-Defamation League (ADL)
 - Outside faith recognizing law enforcement efforts in CVE & engagement with diverse communities



Civic Engagement

- Regional Public/Private Infrastructure Collaboration System (RPPICS)

- Hardening critical infrastructure sectors
- Collaborative information sharing
- Promotes accountability

The screenshot shows the Los Angeles Police Department's Regional Public Private Infrastructure Collaboration System (RPPICS) website. The header includes the LAPD logo and the text "LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT Regional Public Private Infrastructure Collaboration System". Below the header is a navigation menu with categories such as "City-Wide", "Analyst", "Chemical", "Commercial Facilities", "Communications", "Critical Manufacturing", "Dams", "Defense Industrial Base", "Education", "Emergency Services", "Energy", "Entertainment", "Financial Services", "Food and Agriculture", "Government Facilities", "Healthcare and Public Health", "Hotels", "Information Technology", "Maritime", "Nuclear Reactors, Materials and Waste", "Religious Affiliation", "Terrorism Liaison Officer", "Transportation Systems", and "Water and Wastewater Systems". The main content area features a "City-Wide" section with a "City-wide Calendar" for July 2014, which shows a grid of dates from 28 to 12. A sidebar on the left contains a "City-Wide" menu with options like "Announcements", "Calendar", "Discussion", "Members", "Reports", "Situational Awareness", and "Other Links".

The image shows the iWATCH Los Angeles logo and a promotional banner. The logo features the word "iWATCH" in a stylized font with stars above it, and the tagline "iREPORT iKEEP US SAFE" below. The banner below the logo shows a city skyline with the text "iWATCH Los Angeles" and the slogan "See Something Say Something" in large letters. Below the slogan are the website "IWATCHLA.ORG" and the phone number "1-877-N-THREAT". At the bottom of the banner, it says "SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY REPORTING".

Break us into a new frontier - Intel and policies

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CTCIB Staff Meeting October 10, 2007

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CTCIB Staff Meeting
October 10, 2007

1. Roles and Responsibilities →

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3. Projects

- a. Manual →
- b. Outreach →
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- d. Breaking the Code —
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Counter-Terrorism and Criminal Intelligence Bureau
Los Angeles Police Department

MISSION

The mission of Counter-Terrorism and Criminal Intelligence Bureau is **To Prepare** the citizenry and our city government for consequences associated with terrorist planning and operations against our City; **To Protect** the public and critical infrastructure by leveraging private sector resources and hardening targets; **To Prevent** terrorism by effective intelligence sharing aimed at disrupting operational capability and addressing underlying causes associated with the motivational component; and **To Pursue** terrorists and those criminal enterprises which support them.

OJECTIVE

In accomplishing this mission, our primary objectives are to first reduce the threat and second to reduce the vulnerability of the threat.

THE PROBLEM

Terrorism is not solely a domestic problem of individual concerns, but rather an international phenomenon that endangers world peace and social order. Given the rapidly changing global trends, the longer term threat to the United States and cities that make up the fabric of our country is more difficult to predict. There is a new normality which encompasses multiple geographic areas with a nexus to the continuum of terrorist planning and operations. The impact of terrorist attacks on communities, infrastructure, iconic, symbolic, and economic sectors can have devastating effects on the spirit and confidence of Americans.

Through the casting of a wide and deep safety net or “trip wire” intelligence, information can be gathered which helps law enforcement determine whether individuals or groups represent an increased threat and require additional investigation and coordination. This is the type of information which can evolve into actionable intelligence about persons who are not yet involved in terrorist activity but who may become so in the future and require disruption or monitoring.

GOALS

Institutional counter-terrorism and criminal intelligence in the Department while expanding our role as a national leader in the counter-terrorism community.

Expand Bureau resources and leadership in addressing vulnerabilities identified in the Archangel assessment of critical infrastructure.

Enhance intelligence and situational awareness throughout the Department and the seven-county region to obtain a richer picture.

Develop and communicate the counter-narrative in order to get communities to partner with law enforcement to protect human values and prevent acts of terrorism.

STATEMENT OF COMMAND

No agency knows their landscape better than local law enforcement and the Los Angeles Police Department was designed and built to be the eyes and ears of communities – the First Preventers of terrorism. What is important to law enforcement is that we carefully and accurately define those who we suspect will commit a criminal-terrorist act within our communities. That job needs to be done with the kind of balance and precision that inspires the support and trust of the American people in order to aid us in the pursuit of our lawful mission.

Prior to 2001, much of America overlooked Muslim communities in the United States (U.S). Iranians who immigrated to the U.S. following the hostage crisis received some media attention but the broader Muslim community in this country was not at the forefront of the national psyche. The reverse is now true as a result of the post-9/11 media coverage and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Muslim communities here and abroad have become centerpieces of coverage for the print and broadcast media. While this coverage has, in many cases, helped to educate the American public, it has also put Muslims under a very bright spotlight. Feelings of persecution and vulnerability by large swaths of Muslim communities have created anxiety and uncertainty about the future.

Before 9/11, law enforcement was equally unaware of this community, both at a federal and statewide level. Even with our newfound awareness, law enforcement personnel are working from a disadvantage because of the obstacles we face as we approach wary communities deeply concerned with issues such as the implications of the Patriot Act, racial-profiling in the transportation industry, and the mischaracterization of Islam in the media. High-profile arrests and investigations of violent extremists such as the Fort Dix 6 play into Muslims' fears that they are under increased scrutiny. These underlying dynamics play a role in how these communities interact with all facets of American society, especially law enforcement.

One major role that law enforcement can play in the fight against violent ideological extremism is that of educator. Teaching all communities about the dangers of extreme ideologies can dispel harmful rumors and myths that alienate already pressured communities. We have learned from the European experience how these alienated communities become a breeding ground for violent extremism and a safe haven for potential terrorists to hide among the population.

The U.S. does not have the same types of problems as England, France, Germany, or Israel. While the tactics terrorists employ are learned behaviors that migrate across national boundaries via groups, training camps, and the Internet – the underlying motivations for these violent acts are unique to the host countries. Consequently, the remedies (i.e., jailhouse de-radicalization in Malaysia, the Channel Project in northern England, and the BIRR Project in Australia) are often contextually bounded and dependent on the depth, strength, national allegiance and identity of the native Muslim community.

In Los Angeles, for example, there are many Muslim communities that do not share

the same risk profile as those in the United Kingdom as they are much more integrated into the larger society. That said, the European example does provide U.S. law enforcement with a starting point when searching for early indicators of radicalization.

As we move from the virtual to the physical, it is important to apply the hard-won lessons we have learned in combating gang crime to the problem of terrorism. Southern California was the birthplace of gang culture and in Los Angeles we are all too familiar with the threat of violent crime by street gangs. Regardless of how many police officers we deploy, we can only suppress specific incidents. While more police are part of the answer, the real solution lies in the community – with the strengthening of the family structure and the economic base; and the weakening of political power bases built on victimization and a cultural tolerance of violence. The problem of violent street gangs is based on deep community structures. However, so are the solution sets of youth-at-risk programs, parenting classes, economic infusion, job training, community activism against violence and religion-based interventions.

While it might seem counter-intuitive, the isolation of Muslim communities acts both as a wall and as a self-regulator. Similar to gangs, the signs of extremism are first seen on the most local levels: in the families, neighborhoods, schools, mosques, and work places. The wall built by the community is the barrier created to sustain cultural identity and values and protect against the pace of assimilation.

Our outreach to the non-Muslim community has combined education with prevention. We now have Terrorism Liaison Officers (TLOs) at all of our divisions and Fire Stations who serve as the principal points of contact for terrorism information and intelligence. These liaison officers educate Department personnel and the broader community about the indicators of violent extremism and have proven to be critical assets when it comes to raising the level of terrorism prevention and preparedness.

The education provided by the TLOs has been supplemented with training by outside experts. Within our ranks, we have worked to educate our officers in the Counter-Terrorism and Criminal Intelligence Bureau about Islam and the cultural sensitivities they should be aware of when they are in the field. Approaching Muslims with respect and integrity is a large piece of the counter-narrative that law enforcement can write for itself.

The LAPD must have the capability to hunt for signs of radicalization and terrorism activities on the Internet. The cyber investigations unit will do just that. The Internet is the virtual hangout for radicals and terrorists. It provides a plain-view means of identifying and gathering information on potential threats. Information gleaned from this open source, fed into the radicalization template, and combined with a thorough understanding of operational indicators, is critical to articulating suspicion and justifying the increased application of enforcement measures.

LAPD's Counter-Terrorism and Criminal Intelligence Bureau initiatives for both the present and future have aligned people, purpose, and strategy around the mission of building capacity to hunt and disrupt operational capability on the part of terrorists

(recruiting, funding, planning, surveilling, and executing operations). However, just as important, we have aligned our resources to focus on the motivational side of the terrorist equation and have made great efforts and organizing, mobilizing and in partnership, raising the moderate Muslim voice to prevent the extremists from making inroads into this faith community. A few of these strategies are described below:

- Working in concert with our seven county regional and federal partners, we continue to build capacity to collect, fuse, analyze, and disseminate both strategic and operational intelligence. We are aligning our intelligence collection and dissemination process with an eye toward accountability and ensuring that our First Preventers have the information they need when they need it.
- Our Terrorism Liaison Officers are casting an ever-wider safety net to train more people in the city to be public data collectors and First Preventers.
- We have started a Muslim outreach program with our command staff to leverage resources, institutionalize the idea of developing the counter-narrative, and facilitate an educational process. In developing this counter-narrative, the goal is to inspire Muslim communities to responsibly partner with law enforcement to protect American values. We also aim to elevate the moderate Muslim voice and empower people to counter the extremist ideology with confidence. This enables community leadership to assist law enforcement in identifying those individuals and groups who espouse extremism and work to divide Muslim communities from American society.
- National Counter-Terrorism Academy aimed at mid-level managers.
- The Regional Public Private Infrastructure Collaboration System – a tool that enhances communication between and within LAPD and the Private Sector.
- Archangel, the Critical Infrastructure Protection System that includes a Protective Security Task Force.

In contrast to much of Europe, which has suffered from a marked increase in violence and violent intentions – often by its own citizens, the problem we face in the U.S is mainly political. There are those among us who are attempting to create division, alienation, and a sense of persecution in Muslim communities in order to create a cause. They are the nemesis of community engagement and their purpose is to create the conditions that facilitate the radicalization process for international political causes.

Law enforcement's *ultimate* goal is to engender the continued loyalty and good citizenship of American-Muslims – not merely disrupt terrorist activities. Let me be clear, I am not saying that law enforcement should relax its effort to hunt down and neutralize small numbers of “clusters” on the criminal side of the radicalization trajectory. That task remains, and must be done with precision and must also be carried

out in the context of what is ultimately valuable. What good is it to disrupt a group planning a mall bombing if the enforcement method is so unreasonable that it is widely criticized and encourages many more to enter the radicalization process?

The point is not merely an academic one—it has operational consequence. In preserving good will and by in by Muslim communities, law enforcement is, in fact, advancing its intelligence agenda by fostering an environment that maximizes tips and leads surfacing from those same communities. The long-term solution to this radicalization problem will come from Muslim communities themselves.

As Eric Hoffer wrote in his book, “The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements”: “Faith in a holy cause is to a considerable extent a substitute for the lost faith in ourselves.” If there is a real or perceived threat of discrimination between the new community and the host, then an “us against them” mentality may prevail making that final step towards radicalization that much easier. Some Muslim communities may view any local discrimination as linked to Muslim causes globally, and vice versa, any discrimination against the *Ummah* (the global Muslim community) may be felt locally.

If social factors - such as enclaves where residents are culturally and linguistically isolated - contribute to radicalization, it is important for law enforcement to be aware of those potentially vulnerable communities. While the role of the law enforcer is not one of religious scholar or social worker, there is the potential to build and strengthen bridges from communities to those resources. It is then that local law enforcement becomes an enabler.

It is the position of CTCIB that legitimacy and intelligence are equally important tools for U.S. law enforcement to use in counter-terrorism efforts. Legitimacy starts with an organizational knowledge and pride in operating constitutionally and within the law. The need for transparency – being perceived to be and authentically honoring this principle – in intelligence and counter- terrorism activities cannot be understated. Taking great care to ensure that intelligence and enforcement operations are narrowly targeted against terrorist cells determined to go operational is critical.

Community policing initiatives in Muslim communities should aim to create a shared sense of threat: society as a whole fears the indiscriminate, mass violence we are seeing around the world. All forms of communication with the public (whether analytical reports or post-incident news conferences) should address this fear. In summary, law enforcement’s most pressing challenge is to shield the public from this threat, while not advancing the purpose of political jihadists. It is a difficult balance to achieve, however, raising the moderate Muslim voice and creating the counter-narrative that offsets the fanatical trajectory of radicalization.

The LAPD has created the Counter-Terrorism and Criminal Intelligence Bureau with 267 officers who are dedicated to counter-terrorism, criminal intelligence gathering, and community building. Policing terrorism must be a convergent strategy that enhances the

fight against crime and disorder. In building the resistance to crime and disorder, we create hostile environments to terrorists.

The Evolving Threat

We need to show that our democratic principles built on the values, practices, and lives of American citizens are sacred and worthy of embracing. We need to show our belief in human dignity, the family and the value of the individual. We need to show how we honor the meaning of our lives by what we contribute to others' lives. We need to show that behind the badges of American law enforcement are caring Americans “doing” law enforcement. To do this we need to go into the community and get to know peoples’ names. We need to walk into homes, neighborhoods, mosques, and businesses. We need to know how Islam expresses itself in Los Angeles if we expect to forge bonds of community support. The LAPD has been involved in this process and we are now ready to evolve our outreach to a more sophisticated and strategic level.

The U.S. faces a vicious, amorphous, and unfamiliar adversary on our land. The principal threats will be local, self-generating and self-directed. If there are direct connections with overseas groups, these are most likely to be initiated by the local actors. Locally generated threats will manifest themselves with greater frequency.

Ultimately, preventing extremism will be up to neighborhoods and communities, but thread by thread, relationship by relationship, the police can help build a network of services and relationships that will make it very hard for terrorism to take root. American Muslim neighborhoods and communities have a genuine responsibility in preventing any form of extremism and terrorism. If the broader communities are intolerant of such things, these ideologies cannot take root in its midst. I believe no amount of enforcement or intelligence can ultimately prevent extremism if the communities are not committed to working with law enforcement to prevent it and efforts to encourage and support this type of alliance will serve us well.

Response and Prevention will always be the primary tenets of policing, however, as we continue to employ more technology, human sources, and deepen our relationships with communities and the private sector, the core competency of prediction will be developed to further drive down crime levels and fear.

LAPD 'mapping' justified

It doesn't matter what name you call it, mapping, keeping an eye on, or whatever (LAPD abandons mapping plan, Thursday), it's for the safety of this city and country.

You don't see Christians blowing themselves up in crowded restaurants, Buddhists flying planes into buildings and Amish waving placards crowing that they will soon dominate the world.

The mapping of Muslim communities is sensible in light of the violent acts committed around the world — more than 9,000 separate attacks since 9-11 — in the name of Islam. But political correctness has kept law enforcement officials from asking the hard questions they should ask of Muslim leaders in the United States.

Peaceful American Muslims have not moved to expose, expel or separate themselves from any jihadists or terrorists who hold such sentiments for destroying this country.

There is no wall of separation in the American Muslim community between Muslims who accept American pluralism and want to live ordinary lives and those who hold to the ideology of jihad and the subjugation of infidels professed by Osama bin Laden.

And authorities have not investigated the presence of such sentiments at all, despite the fact that they could be a reliable indicator of who might commit violent acts in the future and who might not.

I AGREE WITH THIS — SANTE DE FINIS
Gardena

December 29th 2007

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JAN 03 2008
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF POLICE

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Muslims in
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women + young girls in the
market place with their head
scarves and head-to-toe clothing.
There is a large Mosque in
the city of Lomita. Too close!

Sincerely,
Lorraine Mone

Ms. Lorraine Mone

December 29th 2007

RECEIVED

JAN 03 2008

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF POLICE

Dear Chief Bratton,

I feel you were right to keep track of the Muslims. Their aim is to be the world's ONLY religion. They have been using violence and terror all over the world to accomplish this aim.

The number of Muslims in this area has increased to the point that I now see Muslim women + young girls in the market place with their head scarves and head-to-toe clothing.

There is a large Mosque in the city of Lomita. Too close!

Sincerely,

Lorraine Mone.

Ms. Lorraine Mone

RECEIVED

NOV 14 2007

VAN NUYS AREA

William J. Bratton
Chief of Police, City of Los Angeles
City Hall
6262 Van Nuys Blvd.
Van Nuys, CA 91401

Dear Chief Bratton,

First of all, please allow me to identify myself. I am an ordinary citizen, having lived here for 52 years, raised my family here and worked and retired here. Although I wasn't born here, I can claim to be a "Los Angelean" almost as much as anyone.

I am writing to comment on an article written in today's Los Angeles Times titled: "Outcry over Muslim Mapping", (copy included). I was upset over the article --- not because of "mapping" as the paper called it, but because of the blindness and political agendas of our media today. So, as much as anything, I am writing to tell you that I am unaware of any "outcry" among the public in general and further, to endorse what you are reported to be doing (to the extent that I am able to discern what that consists of!) It would appear that this "outcry" begins and ends within the pressroom of the L.A. Times.

I was born, raised and educated in this country and loved it with a passion. I appreciated the freedom(s) that our constitution provided and served a stint in the military when it was necessary to do so. During the last decade or so, however, I have been saddened and upset at the deterioration of our society in general, at the political bickering in our government and at the political posturing in our media. Although this is part and parcel to our general form of society it seems that it has gone beyond what is a reasonable "give and take" in recent time.

Then, to greatly exacerbate the problem, a social and political change evolved in another part of the world: militant Islam! I carefully chose the adjective "militant" because all Islam has not yet endorsed this posture. However, enough of a fraction has endorsed it as to: 1. greatly suppress those within Islam who haven't, and 2. become a real and present danger to the rest of the world's societies. One has only to look at the genocides that have taken place (and continue to take place) at various places in the world and to listen to what they say! I mean, they don't try to hide it! They hate us! We are called: "The Great Satan"! And they wish to destroy us and Israel, and western society in general. Now I could live with that if they simply hated us but otherwise left us alone --- but they don't! Witness the World Trade Center! Also listen to the fact that they plan to obtain nuclear weapons as soon as they can and plant them in U.S. cities. Does anyone think that somehow Los Angeles is not on their list? Is anyone listening? The fact that a second attack (on U.S. soil) hasn't already occurred is only due to a lot of investigative work by

a lot of very dedicated and very competent agencies, both national and local. Let's face it: "It's war time again!" This conflict is not of our choosing but is quite real indeed.

So we now have two choices: 1. Acquiesce and surrender, or 2. Resist and fight. [As an aside, I can safely assure you that our media will no longer have the freedoms that they now enjoy if option 1 is chosen (either actively or by default)]. I recommend that we choose option 2 instead.

As part and parcel of option 2 we may temporarily lose some shade of gray of both our freedoms and our mode of operation as we have known them. When this is over, however, we will gain them back. I have lived through several wars during my lifetime (including the big one) and observed both inconveniences and losses during the conflict, neither of which were preferred but both of which were recovered when the threat was eliminated. Such will be the case again, but until that day we need to address our very real threat of today. In that regard I believe that you are doing just that.


In summary, I believe that you are doing a good job to the extent that I can be aware of what all is going on. Occasionally things will go awry, as they did in the Rodney King case some years back; but our society, our constitution (and even our free press) will come to the rescue. In the meantime -- keep up the good work, accept the fact that there are people who want to destroy us and otherwise do the best that you can.

Finally, that "best that you can" should include both understanding and tracking real and potential enemies! To do less would be to let the rest of us down. I can assure you that if some tragedy (like the World Trade Center) occurred here in Los Angeles, the Police Department and its head would come in for severe criticism for not detecting the problem and stopping it before it happened. There is a fine line sometimes between what is right and what is wrong in pursuing such matters but I believe that you can find that fine line. I wish that I could say the same thing about our press!

Sincerely yours,

F.B. Nelson

F.B. Nelson



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Statement of
Michael P. Downing
Commanding Officer
Counter-Terrorism/Criminal Intelligence Bureau
Los Angeles Police Department

Before the
Committee on Homeland Security's and Governmental Affairs
United States Senate

Presented on
October 30, 2007

I. Introduction

Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member Collins, and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Los Angeles Police Department's (LAPD) efforts to identify and counter violent extremism which happens, in this case, to be ideologically based.

Local law enforcement has a culture and capacity that no federal agency enjoys - the know-how and ability to engage a community that today it is a vital part of the equation. Part of this engagement process is the demonstration of sensitivity to terminology that offends and or further isolates a community, hence, "*Ideologically Based Violent Extremism.*"

No agency knows their landscape better than local law enforcement; we were designed and built to be the eyes and ears of communities - the first preventers of terrorism. What is important to law enforcement is that we carefully define those who we suspect will commit a criminal-terrorist act within our communities. That definition needs to be crafted with the kind of balance and precision that inspires the support and trust of the American people.

Legitimacy and intelligence are equally important tools for U.S. law enforcement to use in its counter terrorism efforts. Legitimacy starts with an organizational knowledge and pride in operating constitutionally and within the law. The need for transparency -- being perceived to be and authentically honoring this principle -- in intelligence and counter terrorism activities cannot be understated. Taking great care to ensure that intelligence and enforcement operations are narrowly targeted against terrorist cells determined to go operational is critical.

Our desire to uphold these principles has been a driving force at the Los Angeles Police Department, as we have aligned our people, purpose and strategy around our mission. Since the Counter-Terrorism and Criminal Intelligence Bureau was formed in 2002, we have developed our ability to hunt those who would do us harm while building strong relationships with DHS, the FBI and our state and local partners. We have also reached beyond that to the private sector and the Muslim communities in our city. I will speak today about the dynamics I have observed in Muslim communities in Los Angeles and around the world and how that has shaped our strategy in terms of countering violent ideologically based extremism.

II. Lessons from Abroad

In contrast to much of Europe, which has suffered from a marked increase in violence and violent intentions -- often by its own citizens, the problem we face in the United States is mainly political. The political jihadists, who are attempting to create division, alienation, and a sense of persecution to create a cause, are the nemesis of community engagement. In doing so, they hope to create the conditions that facilitate the radicalization process for international political causes. Law enforcement's *ultimate* goal is to engender the continued loyalty and good citizenship of American-Muslims -- not merely the disruption of terrorist activities. This does not preclude law enforcement from hunting down and neutralizing small numbers of "clusters" on the criminal side of the radicalization trajectory. That task remains, must be done with precision and must also be carried out in the context of what is ultimately valuable. What good is it to disrupt a group planning a mall bombing, if the enforcement method is so unreasonable that it is widely criticized and encourages many more to enter the radicalization process? The point is not merely

an academic one—it has operational consequence. In preserving good will and buy in by Muslim communities, law enforcement is, in fact, advancing its intelligence agenda by fostering an environment that maximizes tips and leads surfacing from those same communities. The long-term solution to this radicalization problem will come from the Muslim communities themselves.

The natural question is: What factors put a community at-risk? Taking a page from the European experience, diasporic communities are in transition from one culture to another, making its members particularly vulnerable to identity crises which may be very easily subverted by ideologues. As Eric Hoffer wrote in his book, “The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements”: “Faith in a holy cause is to a considerable extent a substitute for the lost faith in ourselves.” If there is a real or perceived threat of discrimination between the new community and the host, then an “us against them” mentality may prevail making that final step towards radicalization that much easier. Some Muslim communities may view any local discrimination as linked to Muslim causes globally, and vice versa, any discrimination against the *Ummah* (the global Muslim community) may be felt locally.

The Pakistani-British community in the United Kingdom is a diaspora, which is significant, because it makes the 2nd and 3rd generations of the community particularly vulnerable to the social pressures of growing up in a country very different from their parents’ and grandparents’ homeland. As a diasporic community, they remain transnational, tending to maintain close family, social and financial ties with Pakistan. Globalization allows a diaspora to maintain these transnational contacts via faster, cheaper air travel, global communications technology (Internet and cell phone), global mass media, and nearly instant transnational banking. If the first two risk factors are present, then one must ask, “Does the community also hail from an unstable homeland with Wahabbi-Salafi ties?” If so, that community, like the British-Pakistani Muslim community, might be at greater risk of incubating homegrown radicalization.

If social factors - such as enclaves where residents are culturally and linguistically isolated - contribute to radicalization, it is important for law enforcement to be aware of where those potentially vulnerable communities are. This is part of our next step. We want to map the locations of these closed, vulnerable communities, and in partnership with these communities, infuse social services that will help the people who live there while weaving these enclaves into the fabric of the larger society. While the role of the law enforcer is not one of religious scholar or social worker, there is the potential to build and strengthen bridges from communities to those resources. It is then we will know where to find the Pakistani, Iranian, Somali, Chechen, Jordanian and North African communities and thus understand how better to support their integration into the greater society. It is then that local law enforcement becomes an enabler.

III. The Problems and the Solutions

Prior to 2001, much of America overlooked the Muslim communities in the United States. Iranians who immigrated to the U.S. following the hostage crisis received some media attention but the broader Muslim community in this country was not at the forefront of the national psyche. The reverse is now true as a result of the post-9/11 media coverage and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Muslim communities here and abroad have become centerpieces of coverage

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for the print and broadcast media. While this coverage has, in many cases, helped to educate the American public, it has also put Muslims under a very bright spotlight. Feelings of persecution and vulnerability by large swaths of Muslim communities have created anxiety and uncertainty about the future.

Before 9/11, law enforcement was equally unaware of this community, both at a federal and statewide level. But even with our newfound awareness, law enforcement personnel are working from a disadvantage because of the obstacles we face as approach wary communities deeply concerned with issues such as the implications of the Patriot Act, racial-profiling by the transportation industry, and the mischaracterization of Islam in the media. High-profile arrests and investigations of violent extremists such as the Fort Dix 6 play into Muslims' fears that they are under increased scrutiny. These underlying dynamics play a role in how these communities interact with all facets of American society, especially law enforcement.

One major role that law enforcement can play in the fight against violent ideological extremism is that of educator. Teaching all communities about the dangers of extreme ideologies can dispel harmful rumors and myths that alienate already pressured communities. The LAPD has done much outreach in this area, both with Muslim and non-Muslim communities.

For the past eighteen months, we have been involved in outreach and grassroots dialogue with the Muslim communities, bringing the entire command staff to observe, learn, engage and, most importantly, listen. This has helped to build more robust trust networks at the divisional level of the police service areas. Our ultimate goal is to be viewed as trusted friends by the Muslim communities in our city.

One of the biggest challenges for law enforcement in this environment is separating political jihadists (i.e., those who intentionally plant seeds of division in an effort to alienate and isolate Muslim citizens from the rest of society—the “spiritual sanctioners” discussed in the recent NYPD report clearly fall in this category) from legitimate actors.

Our outreach to the non-Muslim community has combined education with prevention. We now have Terrorism Liaison Officers at all of our divisions who serve as the principal points of contact for terrorism information and intelligence. These liaison officers educate Department personnel and the broader community about the indicators of violent extremism and have proven to be critical assets when it comes to raising the level of terrorism prevention and preparedness.

The education provided by TLOs has been supplemented by training by outside experts. Within our ranks, we have worked to educate our officers in the Counter-Terrorism Bureau about Islam and the cultural sensitivities they should be aware of when they are in the field. Approaching Muslims with respect and integrity is a large piece of the counter-narrative that law enforcement can write for itself.

We at the LAPD have learned from the European experience, which has shown us how these alienated communities become a breeding ground for violent extremism and a safe haven for potential terrorists to hide among the population.

Granted, the U.S. does not have the same types of problems as England, France, Germany, or Israel. While the tactics terrorists employ are learned behaviors that migrate across national boundaries – through groups, training camps and the Internet – the underlying motivations for these violent acts are unique to the host countries. Consequently, the remedies (i.e. jailhouse de-radicalization in Malaysia, the Channel Project in northern England, and the BIRR Project in Australia) are often contextually bounded and dependent on the depth, strength, national allegiance and identity of the native Muslim community.

In Los Angeles, for example, there are many Muslim communities that do not share the same risk profile as those in the United Kingdom because they are more integrated into the larger society. That said, the European example does provide U.S. law enforcement with a starting point when searching for early indicators of radicalization. We have learned that Muslim communities in the United States are mistrustful of the mainstream media. Therefore, they may turn to other sources of information for news and socialization, such as the Internet. Unfortunately, despite all of the positive aspects of the Internet, it allows those individuals and groups with ideological agendas to easily make contact with like-minded individuals and access potentially destructive information.

The LAPD must have the capability to hunt for signs of radicalization and terrorism activities on the Internet. We recently started a cyber investigations unit to do just that. The Internet is the virtual hangout for radicals and terrorists. It provides a plain-view means of identifying and gathering information on potential threats. Information gleaned from this open source, fed into the radicalization template, and combined with a thorough understanding of operational indicators is absolutely critical to reaching articulable suspicion and justifying the increased application of enforcement measures.

IV. Community Mapping

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As we move from the virtual to the physical, it is important to apply the hard-won lessons we've learned in combating gang crime to the problem of terrorism. Southern California was the birthplace of gang culture and in Los Angeles we are all too familiar with the threat of violent crime by minority street gangs. Regardless of how many police officers we deploy, we can only suppress specific incidents. While more police are part of the answer, the real solution lies in the community – with the strengthening of the family structure, the economic base and the assimilation into the greater community; and the weakening of political power bases built on victimization and a cultural tolerance of violence. The problem of violent street gangs is based on deep community structures. However, so are the solution sets of youth-at-risk programs, parenting classes, economic infusion, job training, community activism against violence, and religion-based interventions.

While it might seem counter-intuitive, the isolation of Muslim communities acts both as a wall and as a self-regulator. Similar to gangs, the signs of extremism are first seen on the most local levels: in the families, neighborhoods, schools, mosques and work places. The wall built by the community is the barrier created to sustain cultural identity and values and protect against the pace of assimilation.

We need to understand the problem as it exists in Los Angeles before we roll out programs to mitigate radicalization. Historically, the temptation has been to turn to intervention programs before we have clearly identified problems within the community. In the past we have relied on interventions based on "experts," logic or previous programs that are either generic or insensitive to the constellation of issues. For instance, the Department has turned to "experts" of all races and religions to provide guidance on how to intervene in gang violence. This has consistently produced unremarkable results. Public safety pays a high cost for this business practice. This is one of many reasons to support the rationale behind community mapping, a process that delivers a richer picture and road map that can guide future strategies.

In order to give our officers increased awareness of our local Muslim communities, the LAPD recently launched an initiative with an academic institution to conduct an extensive "community mapping" project. We are also soliciting input of local Muslim groups, so the process can be transparent and inclusive. While this project will lay out the geographic locations of the many different Muslim population groups around Los Angeles, we also intend to take a deeper look at their history, demographics, language, culture, ethnic breakdown, socio-economic status, and social interactions. It is our hope to identify communities, within the larger Muslim community, which may be susceptible to violent ideologically based extremism and then use a full-spectrum approach guided by an intelligence-led strategy.

Community mapping is the start of a conversation, not just data sets: It is law enforcement identifying with its community and the community identifying with its families, neighborhood, city, state, country and police. This process will identify where Muslims have immigrated from and risk factors such as exposure to Wahabbi-Salafi preaching, socioeconomic conditions, unemployment, and gender/age demographics. This will be the first layer of base line mapping with more to follow.

Without a community mapping blueprint and methodical community engagement strategy, our outreach efforts will be sporadic. Our counter-narrative will be empty of meaning, leaving us talking about, rather than talking with, this community.

V. LAPD Initiatives

Here is an overview of the present and future initiatives launched by the LAPD's Counter-Terrorism and Criminal Intelligence Bureau:

- Working in concert with our regional and federal partners, we continue to bolster the capacity of our Joint Regional Intelligence Center.
- We are aligning our intelligence collection and dissemination processes with an eye toward accountability and ensuring that our first preventers have the information they need when they need it.
- Our Terrorism Liaison Officers are casting an ever-wider safety net to train more people in the city to be data collectors and first preventers.

- Using DHS funding, we are developing a regional video command center by tying existing CCTV systems in with new ones.
- We are working with a think tank to develop a training program for mid-level executives that will be tailored specifically to state and local law enforcers. It is our hope that this will be a model for a national counter-terrorism academy.

VI. Legitimacy and Constitutionality

In summary, we need to show that our democratic principles built on the values, practices and lives of American citizens are sacred and worthy of embracing. We need to show our belief in human dignity, the family and the value of the individual. We need to show how we honor the meaning of our lives by what we contribute to others' lives. We need to show that behind the badges of American law enforcement are caring Americans "doing" law enforcement. To do this we need to go into the community and get to know peoples' names. We need to walk into homes, neighborhoods, mosques and businesses. We need to know how Islam expresses itself in Los Angeles if we expect to forge bonds of community support. The LAPD has been involved in this process and we are now ready to evolve our outreach to a more sophisticated and strategic level.

Law enforcement and its advocates must also avoid name-calling exchanges with political jihadists, opting instead to engage them professionally on specific issues. Political jihadists will reveal themselves in these exchanges by being unreasonable and unable to articulate specific grievances, preferring instead to use personal attacks and blanket accusations. In doing so, they are failing in their purpose to attract converts. Community policing initiatives in Muslim communities should aim to create a shared sense of threat: society as a whole fears the indiscriminate, mass violence we are seeing around the world. All public communications on this subject, whether analytical reports or post-incident news conferences, should address this fear. In summary, law enforcement's most pressing challenge is to shield the public from this threat, while not advancing the purpose of political jihadists. It is a difficult balance to achieve, however, raising the moderate Muslim voice and creating the counter-narrative that offsets the fanatical trajectory of radicalization.

The LAPD has created a Counter-Terrorism/Criminal Intelligence Bureau with nearly 300 officers who are solely dedicated to counter-terrorism, criminal intelligence gathering, and community building. Policing terrorism must be a convergent strategy, which enhances the fight against crime and disorder, and as such, fighting crime and disorder must be convergent with the war on terror. In building the resistance to crime and disorder, we create hostile environments to terrorists.

VII. Conclusion – The Evolving Threat

The United States faces a vicious, amorphous, and unfamiliar adversary on our land. The principal threats will be local, self-generating and self-directed. If there are direct connections with overseas groups, these are most likely to be initiated by the local actors. Cases in point include the 7/7 bombers, the Glasgow car bombers, and, more locally, Lodi in which local individuals and groups sought out training in Pakistan. This is not intended to dismiss threats that emerge from overseas locations, which should continue to be of concern. Rather, it is an estimate of relative density—locally generated threats will manifest themselves with greater frequency.

Ultimately, preventing extremism will be up to the neighborhoods and communities but thread by thread, relationship by relationship, police can help build a network of services and relationships that will make it very hard for terrorism to take root. American Muslim neighborhoods and communities have a genuine responsibility in preventing any form of extremism and terrorism. And if the broader community is intolerant of such things, these ideologies cannot take root in its midst. In my opinion, no amount of enforcement or intelligence can ultimately prevent extremism if the community is not committed to working with law enforcement to prevent it.

London Secondment
Commander Michael Downing
A week at a glance....

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
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
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



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


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


December 21, Thursday

- Traveled to Leeds by train to meet up with Operation Theseous personnel to look at CT structure, Muslim community and interaction there of.
- Drove with Superintendent John McLaughlin through Leeds, including Biston – where bomb factory house was located in a seniors housing development across from what was a church of England and now a Mosque. Observed the bookstore and gym the suspects ran in an attempt to recruit and radicalize youth. It is believed they were subjects of an Outbound Adventure themselves when younger.
- Drove through Dewsbury, West Yorkshire, 100% Muslim to the extreme in terms of coverage (complete with only eyes showing) dress, clothes etc.) Storefront Mosques just about on every block and store front Madrassa's as well. Suspects

rented their flats paying six months in advance through July (bombings occurred July 7, 2005). More information to share upon my return.


Note: Later in the afternoon met with the North East Regional Intelligence Cell who were using analyst to study the "Richer Picture" (Community Intelligence) mapping communities with layered application of intelligence. In one instance he showed me a map layered with Mosques and Youth Development programs. Close in proximity, further analysis and follow-up from the local West Yorkshire Police established a sponsorship scheme involving the Mosque and the Outbound Adventure business. Other analysts were completing problem profiles which would be forwarded to Special Branch and MI 5 and many would turn into intelligence cases.



[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



[REDACTED]

January 10, 2007, Wednesday

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

- Meeting with the Diversity & Citizen Focus Directorate. Received an information package and copy of their PowerPoint presentation. Their mission is to gather open source intelligence using outside agencies and research. They are broken down by international geographic areas and also special communities (ie-gay, faith based). They provide:
 - Community Mapping
 - Information Operations
 - Website (www.police.uk) E-policing
 - Message Service
 - Sending in crime information on a secure form

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

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January 12, 2007, Friday

- Traveled from London to Leeds via train. Met by Dr. Al McFayden, Head of the Religious and Theology Dept. he provided me with a tour of the campus, showed me to my temporary flat, and got me settled into my office at the university. I will be taking one class on Islam every Thur. and attending other lectures and events as required. There will be a presentation on the community mapping by religion for the Leeds area at the end of January.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



Fulbright Log
Lt. Mark G. Stainbrook

Week One January 22-28

[REDACTED]

January 26, 2007, Friday

[REDACTED]

- In regards to terrorism, Buxton continues to believe that officers at the most junior levels have the best possibility of disrupting their activities. The Home Office is developing the “richer picture.” One aspect of this is to do a detailed mapping of mosques, Islamic Centers, and other locations where terror cells might form including bookstores, associations, cafes, restaurants, and social groups. Additionally, when we form these partnerships with local communities, Buxton thinks that education at the lowest level possible is critical to anti-terrorist efforts.

[REDACTED]

Fulbright Log
Lt. Mark G. Stainbrook

Week One January 29 – February 4

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

January 31, 2007, Wednesday

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

- At night I went to a program put on by some Leeds undergraduates about the religious mapping of Chapletown, the area of Leeds that I had been in during the day. It basically went over the history of the area and each of the main religions in the area: Islam, Sikh, Catholic. The ethnic population is a mix of Afro-Caribbean, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, and Polish. Religious or community mapping is a great way to better understand an area and the current issues in the context of the areas history and social development.

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
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Fulbright Log
Lt. Mark G. Stainbrook

Week Six February 12-18

February 12, 2007, Monday

- Met with Faruq Miah, Director of Parklane College, and PC Angela Simpson, Race Relations Officer, on raising community awareness of hate crimes against Muslims and proper reporting procedures of hate crimes.
- Miah is also the Chairman of a Bangladeshi Muslim organization in Beeston, which teaches languages and mainstream Islamic religious traditions. He lives and works in the area near where the 7/7 suspects made the bombs. Because of this, there was heavy media attention given to the area post-7/7. One of the interesting things that the Leeds City Council did for community leaders post 7/7 was to set up a media training day to help them understand how to better engage with the media. This is a great idea and one that I think the police could use to educate community leaders on how to present a unified front to the media. Miah complained of some bad experiences that he has had with journalists.
- Parklane College, an adult learning center, is one of the first places many immigrants come to learn English. This makes it an important place to see who is settling into the community and a point where the police can interact with the people through a third party which is grounded in the community. In terms of "mapping" an area, these locations are important for law enforcement.
- Miah stated that he would help me set up some group meetings with local Muslim leaders and young Muslim people in early April. He is going to Bangladesh for several weeks.



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
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THE POLICE AND MUSLIM COMMUNITIES: A PRAGMATIC APPROACH

Lieutenant Mark G. Stainbrook
Los Angeles Police Department
Fulbright Police Fellow
January-June 2007



February 2007

Project Outline

- Overview: Conduct research into the relationship between the West Yorkshire Police Force and the various Muslim Communities it serves, through a combination of literature review and field work. Deliver a broad overview of current law enforcement/Muslim Community issues, against the backdrop of major global and local incidents; using these examples to illustrate key points. Suggest practical solutions for law enforcement agencies to implement when engaging Muslim Communities.

The “Who, What & When.”

- Audience
 - Western-style Law Enforcement Agencies
 - Academic Institutions
 - LAPD
- Deliverables (By end of June 2007):
 - Research paper
 - Presentation of findings
 - An overview article of the research for publication in an applicable law enforcement journal.

February 2007

Research Pitfalls

- Getting bogged down with the details.
- Going off-track into other specific areas of interest, i.e.-radicalization, the role of women, macro-theoretical issues of moral-ethical judgements of right and wrong.

Quote: “*We [police] are in the business of stopping bombs from killing people.*” LAPD Commander Michael Downing, Jan 2007

Focus of Main Effort- Educating police on the issues and giving them the tools to defeat terrorism over the long term.

February 2007

Methodology

- Academic Research
- First person Interviews
- Observation

Note: I want to come up with the most recent historical analysis and consider the repercussions on current events.

February 2007

Questions to be Explored

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What issues in Muslim Communities impact their relationship with Police?

- Home-country perception of the police
- Internationalism- Global Incidents with Local Impacts
- The Media and Muslim Self-Perception
- Cultural norms versus Religious norms
- Gender & Age gaps in Muslim Communities

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What police issues impact their relationship with Muslim Communities?

- Lack of knowledge among the police of Islamic History & Customs
- Enforcing laws that conflict with Muslim religious or cultural norms (i.e. marriages)
- Media impact on police operations in Muslim Communities
- Dealing with members of the opposite sex
- Tactical Safety concerns

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What is this that we call the “Muslim Community?”

- This research will rely on a Community Oriented Policing (COP) approach
 - Define COP
- What is the “Muslim Community”?
 - Common Religion
 - Various ethnicities and cultures
 - Common and competing interests
 - Gender and age gaps

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West Yorkshire Police Force

- Force demographics and structure
- Muslim Community Demographics
- Force history with Muslim Communities
- Major events over the last six years
 - Bradford Riots
 - 9/11
 - Iraq War
 - 7/7
 - Danish Cartoons

February 2007

West Yorkshire Police Force

- Brief history of each incident
- What was the Force response at the Force and divisional/station levels?
- How did these influence community reaction at the next event?
- What worked and what did not?

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The “Muslim Communities” Reaction

- What was the community’s post-incident analysis of the police response?
- Did the community do anything to assist the police before, during or after the incident?
- Did the police post-incident response make the next incident easier to deal with?
- What can the police do better?

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Ideas for Law Enforcement

- Two-way education between the police and their local Muslim communities
- Religious Mapping of Muslim Communities
- Implementation of a Community Intervention Cell (overt information gathering)
- Use of third parties (Public/Private) to engage with Muslim Communities
- Mutually Assured Positive Media Engagement

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Predictions for the Future of Muslim-Police relationships?

- This would be bold, wouldn't it?

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Key Conceptual Vocabularies

Nature of our Topic:

- “how religion and culture ‘travel’, how they alter and change as people move, mix and re-make their lives in new settings, what they ‘preserve’, ‘lose’ and ‘gain’, and the impact of all this on their identification with ‘homes’ new and old”

Understanding Ourselves and Others?

- Extent to which we and our own family histories, or at least the neighbourhoods, cities and countries in which we live, have been impacted by diaspora...?

Religious ‘Mapping’ of Localities: An Agenda

- background to, and history of, migration;
- places of worship and associated rituals;
- different religious movements, organisations and their leaderships;
- issues of gender and generation;
- the question of public recognition and multi-cultural / inter-faith relations;
- continuing links with the homeland and beyond.

Babylon and Beyond: the Study of Diaspora

- From ‘classical’ Jewish, Greek and Armenian ‘diasporas’ to...
- ...‘Immigrants’, ‘ethnic minorities’, ‘exiles’, ‘expatriates’, ‘refugees’, ‘guest-workers’ etc

Typology of Diasporas: (Cohen, 1997)

- *victim diasporas* (e.g. Jews, Africans and Armenians);
- *labour diasporas* (e.g. Indians);
- *trade diasporas* (e.g. Chinese and Lebanese);
- *imperial diasporas* (e.g. British);
- *cultural diasporas* (e.g. Caribbeans)

Common features of Diasporas: (Cohen, 1997)

- i) **dispersal** from a homeland to two or more foreign regions;
- ii) or, **expansion** from a homeland in search of work, trade or empire;
- iii) a **collective memory** and myth about the homeland;
- iv) an **idealization** of the ancestral home and collective **commitment** to it;
- v) a **return** movement;
- vi) a strong **ethnic** group consciousness of **distinctiveness** over a long period;
- vii) a troubled relationship with host societies, suggesting a **lack of acceptance**;
- viii) a sense of empathy and **solidarity** with **co-ethnics** elsewhere;
- ix) the **possibility of enrichment** in host countries tolerant of pluralism.

Diaspora and the Global Post-modern: Culture, Hybridity and Ethnicity

Globalisation:

- 'uneven' power relations between 'Rest & the West'
- contradictory impact...
- cultural *homogenization*, 'McWorld'
- *relativising discreteness of different 'cultures'*, given rise to a *defence of particularistic identities*

Cultural Hybridity and Ethnicity:

- *Hybridity* can be seen in terms of 'the fusion and intermixture of cultures'
- *Ethnicity* represents 'the reassertion of cultural distinctiveness'

Culture:

- Diaspora = 'de-territorialisation of *culture*', separated from 'origin'
- Culture as a *practice* rather than a *characteristic*
- People in continuous process of *making* and *remaking*, rather than something they *have* (Baumann, 1996; 1999).

'Post-Modernism':


- 'Old certainties' and 'universal claims' of post-Enlightenment thinking in crisis
- More uncertain and relative, more plural and contingent, constructions of identity and ways of knowing the world

Identity:

- Modernist thinking, *identity* relatively unified, stable and autonomous (Hall, 1992).
- Replaced by more social and dialectical notions
- 'Self' identifications shaped & modified contextually in relation to (often false) ascriptions of 'others'
- Post-modern age, usual to talk about 'multiple' & 'criss-crossing' identities, constantly under revision.

Hybridity and Cosmopolitanism:

- Crossing borders, cultural identities unconsciously *hybridised*
- Bhabha (1994) - renegotiation in the 'translated' spaces *in-between* 'cultures'... 'newness'
- 'hyphenated' identities; 'between two cultures' or 'skilled multi-cultural navigators'; 'roots' or 'routes' (Gilroy, 1993; Ballard, 1994).



AMERICAN MUSLIMS: Worshipers arrive for Friday prayers at the King Fahd Mosque in Culver City. Skeptics of a Los Angeles Police Department proposal to study communities say U.S. Muslims don't live in tight enclaves and have little in common with their counterparts in Europe.

CARLOS CRANEZ LOS ANGELES TIMES

Outcry over Muslim mapping

The LAPD plan is seen as religious profiling and impossible to achieve. Chief Bratton says it's an outreach effort.

By RICHARD WINTON,
TERESA WATANABE
and GREG KRIBORIAN
Times Staff Writers

The LAPD's plan to map Muslim communities in an effort to identify potential hotbeds of extremism departs from the way law enforcement has dealt with local anti-terrorism since 9/11 and prompted widespread skepticism Friday.

day by The Times, the LAPD's Los Angeles Police Department's counter-terrorism bureau proposed using U.S. census data and other demographic information to pinpoint various Muslim communities and then reach out to them through social service agencies.

LAPD officials said that it is crucial for them to gain a better understanding of isolated parts of the Muslim community. Those groups can potentially breed violent extremism, the LAPD said in its plan.

"This is not ... targeting or profiling," Police Chief William J. Bratton said Friday in defending the program. "It is an effort to understand communities," he said.


But the effort sparked an out-

some Muslim activists, who compared the program to religious profiling.

Others noted that the effort faces enormous practical difficulties. The U.S. Census Bureau is barred by law from asking people for their religious affiliation. As a result, there is no scientific data on the size of the nation's Muslim population, let alone its location, with estimates of the population nationwide ranging from about 1.4 million adults in a Pew Research Center study this year to the 7 million or more claimed by some community organizations.

Census data on ancestry also would not yield accurate Muslim estimates, because significant numbers of ethnic Iranians are Jewish and many ethnic Leba-

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